[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 45 (Wednesday, March 13, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H1163-H1171]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS ACT

  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules 
and pass the bill (H.R. 7521) to protect the national security of the 
United States from the threat posed by foreign adversary controlled 
applications, such as TikTok and any successor application or service 
and any other application or service developed or provided by ByteDance 
Ltd. or an entity under the control of ByteDance Ltd., as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 7521

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Americans from 
     Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act''.

     SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED 
                   APPLICATIONS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Prohibition of foreign adversary controlled 
     applications.--It shall be unlawful for an entity to 
     distribute, maintain, or update (or enable the distribution, 
     maintenance, or updating of) a foreign adversary controlled 
     application by carrying out, within the land or maritime 
     borders of the United States, any of the following:
       (A) Providing services to distribute, maintain, or update 
     such foreign adversary controlled application (including any 
     source code of such application) by means of a marketplace 
     (including an online mobile application store) through which 
     users within the land or maritime borders of the United 
     States may access, maintain, or update such application.
       (B) Providing internet hosting services to enable the 
     distribution, maintenance, or updating of such foreign 
     adversary controlled application for users within the land or 
     maritime borders of the United States.
       (2) Applicability.--Subsection (a) shall apply--
       (A) in the case of an application that satisfies the 
     definition of a foreign adversary controlled application 
     pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(A), beginning on the date that 
     is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (B) in the case of an application that satisfies the 
     definition of a foreign adversary controlled application 
     pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(B), beginning on the date that 
     is 180 days after the date of the relevant determination of 
     the President under such subsection.
       (b) Data and Information Portability to Alternative 
     Applications.--Before the date on which a prohibition under 
     subsection (a) applies to a foreign adversary controlled 
     application, the entity that owns or controls such 
     application shall provide, upon request by a user of such 
     application within the land or maritime borders of United 
     States, to such user all the available data related to the 
     account of such user with respect to such application. Such 
     data shall be provided in a machine readable format and shall 
     include any data maintained by such application with respect 
     to the account of such user, including content (including 
     posts, photos, and videos) and all other account information.
       (c) Exemptions.--
       (1) Exemptions for qualified divestitures.--Subsection 
     (a)--
       (A) does not apply to a foreign adversary controlled 
     application with respect to which a qualified divestiture is 
     executed before the date on which a prohibition under 
     subsection (a) would begin to apply to such application; and
       (B) shall cease to apply in the case of a foreign adversary 
     controlled application with respect to which a qualified 
     divestiture is executed after the date on which a prohibition 
     under subsection (a) applies to such application.
       (2) Exemptions for certain necessary services.--Subsections 
     (a) and (b) do not apply to services provided with respect to 
     a foreign adversary controlled application that are necessary 
     for an entity to attain compliance with such subsections.
       (d) Enforcement.--
       (1) Civil penalties.--
       (A) Foreign adversary controlled application violations.--
     An entity that violates subsection (a) shall be subject to 
     pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the amount 
     that results from multiplying $5,000 by the number of users 
     within the land or maritime borders of the United States 
     determined to have accessed, maintained, or updated a foreign 
     adversary controlled application as a result of such 
     violation.
       (B) Data and information violations.--An entity that 
     violates subsection (b) shall be subject to pay a civil 
     penalty in an amount not to exceed the amount that results 
     from multiplying $500 by the number of users within the land 
     or maritime borders of the United States affected by such 
     violation.
       (2) Actions by attorney general.--The Attorney General--
       (A) shall conduct investigations related to potential 
     violations of subsection (a) or (b), and, if such an 
     investigation results in a determination that a violation has 
     occurred, the Attorney General shall pursue enforcement under 
     paragraph (1); and
       (B) may bring an action in an appropriate district court of 
     the United States for appropriate relief, including civil 
     penalties under paragraph (1) or declaratory and injunctive 
     relief.
       (e) Severability.--
       (1) In general.--If any provision of this section or the 
     application of this section to any person or circumstance is 
     held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect the other 
     provisions or applications of this section that can be given 
     effect without the invalid provision or application.
       (2) Subsequent determinations.--If the application of any 
     provision of this section is held invalid with respect to a 
     foreign adversary controlled application that satisfies the 
     definition of such term pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(A), 
     such invalidity shall not affect or preclude the application 
     of the same provision of this section to such foreign 
     adversary controlled application by means of a subsequent 
     determination pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(B).
       (f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act may be 
     construed--
       (1) to authorize the Attorney General to pursue 
     enforcement, under this section, other than enforcement of 
     subsection (a) or (b);
       (2) to authorize the Attorney General to pursue 
     enforcement, under this section, against an individual user 
     of a foreign adversary controlled application; or
       (3) except as expressly provided herein, to alter or affect 
     any other authority provided by or established under another 
     provision of Federal law.
       (g) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Controlled by a foreign adversary.--The term 
     ``controlled by a foreign adversary'' means, with respect to 
     a covered company or other entity, that such company or other 
     entity is--
       (A) a foreign person that is domiciled in, is headquartered 
     in, has its principal place of business in, or is organized 
     under the laws of a foreign adversary country;
       (B) an entity with respect to which a foreign person or 
     combination of foreign persons described in subparagraph (A) 
     directly or indirectly own at least a 20 percent stake; or
       (C) a person subject to the direction or control of a 
     foreign person or entity described in subparagraph (A) or 
     (B).
       (2) Covered company.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``covered company'' means an 
     entity that operates, directly or indirectly (including 
     through a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate), a 
     website, desktop application, mobile application, or 
     augmented or immersive technology application that--
       (i) permits a user to create an account or profile to 
     generate, share, and view text, images, videos, real-time 
     communications, or similar content;
       (ii) has more than 1,000,000 monthly active users with 
     respect to at least 2 of the 3 months preceding the date on 
     which a relevant determination of the President is made 
     pursuant to paragraph (3)(B);
       (iii) enables 1 or more users to generate or distribute 
     content that can be viewed by other users of the website, 
     desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or 
     immersive technology application; and
       (iv) enables 1 or more users to view content generated by 
     other users of the website, desktop application, mobile 
     application, or augmented or immersive technology 
     application.
       (B) Exclusion.--The term ``covered company'' does not 
     include an entity that operates a website, desktop 
     application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive 
     technology application whose primary purpose is to allow 
     users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel 
     information and reviews.
       (3) Foreign adversary controlled application.--The term 
     ``foreign adversary controlled application'' means a website, 
     desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or 
     immersive technology application that is operated, directly 
     or indirectly (including through a parent company, 
     subsidiary, or affiliate), by--
       (A) any of--
       (i) ByteDance, Ltd.;
       (ii) TikTok;
       (iii) a subsidiary of or a successor to an entity 
     identified in clause (i) or (ii) that is controlled by a 
     foreign adversary; or
       (iv) an entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, 
     by an entity identified in clause (i), (ii), or (iii); or
       (B) a covered company that--
       (i) is controlled by a foreign adversary; and
       (ii) that is determined by the President to present a 
     significant threat to the national security of the United 
     States following the issuance of--

[[Page H1164]]

       (I) a public notice proposing such determination; and
       (II) a public report to Congress, submitted not less than 
     30 days before such determination, describing the specific 
     national security concern involved and containing a 
     classified annex and a description of what assets would need 
     to be divested to execute a qualified divestiture.

       (4) Foreign adversary country.--The term ``foreign 
     adversary country'' means a country specified in section 
     4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.
       (5) Internet hosting service.--The term ``internet hosting 
     service'' means a service through which storage and computing 
     resources are provided to an individual or organization for 
     the accommodation and maintenance of 1 or more websites or 
     online services, and which may include file hosting, domain 
     name server hosting, cloud hosting, and virtual private 
     server hosting.
       (6) Qualified divestiture.--The term ``qualified 
     divestiture'' means a divestiture or similar transaction 
     that--
       (A) the President determines, through an interagency 
     process, would result in the relevant foreign adversary 
     controlled application no longer being controlled by a 
     foreign adversary; and
       (B) the President determines, through an interagency 
     process, precludes the establishment or maintenance of any 
     operational relationship between the United States operations 
     of the relevant foreign adversary controlled application and 
     any formerly affiliated entities that are controlled by a 
     foreign adversary, including any cooperation with respect to 
     the operation of a content recommendation algorithm or an 
     agreement with respect to data sharing.
       (7) Source code.--The term ``source code'' means the 
     combination of text and other characters comprising the 
     content, both viewable and nonviewable, of a software 
     application, including any publishing language, programming 
     language, protocol, or functional content, as well as any 
     successor languages or protocols.
       (8) United states.--The term ``United States'' includes the 
     territories of the United States.

     SEC. 3. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       (a) Right of Action.--A petition for review challenging 
     this Act or any action, finding, or determination under this 
     Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals 
     for the District of Columbia Circuit.
       (b) Exclusive Jurisdiction.--The United States Court of 
     Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have 
     exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to this Act or any 
     action, finding, or determination under this Act.
       (c) Statute of Limitations.--A challenge may only be 
     brought--
       (1) in the case of a challenge to this Act, not later than 
     165 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (2) in the case of a challenge to any action, finding, or 
     determination under this Act, not later than 90 days after 
     the date of such action, finding, or determination.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Washington (Mrs. Rodgers) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Pallone) each will control 20 minutes.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in actual opposition to the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New Jersey opposed to 
the motion?
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, no.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey is not opposed 
to the motion.
  The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Massie) will control 20 minutes in 
opposition.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. Rodgers).


                             General Leave

  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material in the Record on the 
bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Washington?
  There was no objection.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting 
Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.
  Foreign adversaries, like the Chinese Communist Party, pose the 
greatest national security threat of our time. TikTok's access to 177 
million American users makes it a valuable propaganda tool for the CCP 
to exploit.
  Over the past week, we saw in real time how CCP-controlled TikTok 
used its influence and power to force users to contact their 
Representatives if they even wanted to continue using the app. This is 
just a small taste of how the CCP weaponizes applications it controls 
to manipulate tens of millions of people to further its agenda.
  Today's legislation will end this abuse by preventing apps controlled 
by foreign adversaries from targeting, surveilling, and manipulating 
the American people. We have given TikTok a clear choice: Separate from 
your parent company, ByteDance, which is beholden to the CCP, and 
remain operational in the United States, or side with the CCP and face 
the consequences. The choice is TikTok's.
  Companies controlled by a foreign adversary, like the CCP, will never 
embrace American values like the freedom of speech, human rights, the 
rule of law, and a free press. If given the choice, they will always 
choose the path of more control, more surveillance, and more 
manipulation. In the case of TikTok, we wouldn't even know it.
  Today, we send a clear message that we will not tolerate our 
adversaries weaponizing our freedoms against us.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I know the sponsors of this bill are sincere in their 
concerns and in their effort to protect Americans. They have described 
the TikTok application as a Trojan horse, but there are some of us who 
feel that, either intentionally or unintentionally, this legislation to 
ban TikTok is actually a Trojan horse. Some of us are concerned that 
there are First Amendment implications here.
  Americans have the right to view information. We don't need to be 
protected by the government from information. Some of us just don't 
want the President picking which apps we can put on our phones or which 
websites we can visit. We don't think that is appropriate.
  We also think it is dangerous to give the President that kind of 
power, to give him the power to decide what Americans can see on their 
phones and on their computers. To give him that sort of discretion, we 
also think, is dangerous.
  People say that this TikTok ban will only apply to TikTok or maybe 
another company that pops up just like TikTok, but the bill is written 
so broadly that the President could abuse that discretion and include 
other companies that aren't just social media companies and that 
aren't, as some people would believe, controlled by foreign 
adversaries. Again, we are giving the President that discretion to 
decide whether it is controlled by a foreign adversary.
  There were some people who were legitimately concerned that this was 
an overly broad bill, and they got an exclusion written into the bill 
that I want to read. It says: ``The term `covered company' does not 
include an entity that operates a website . . . or . . . application 
whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, 
business reviews, or travel information and reviews.''
  Why is this exception in the bill? Why did somebody feel like they 
needed this exception if the bill itself only covers social media 
applications that foreign adversaries are running? These and other 
questions we hope to answer in the course of this debate, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) and ask unanimous consent that 
he be permitted to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Washington?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans 
from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.
  Big Tech has transformed social media platforms into modern-day media 
companies. Unfortunately, these networks engage in invasive 
surveillance practices by collecting Americans' most sensitive personal 
data.
  Foreign adversaries also see access to Americans' data communication 
networks, devices, and applications as the entry points to disrupt our 
daily lives and conduct espionage activities. All of this endangers our 
national security interests.

  We have a long history of restricting our television and radio 
airwaves from ownership by foreign governments and

[[Page H1165]]

individuals due to the national security concerns that these 
arrangements pose. Social media companies should also face similar 
scrutiny. After all, while technology has evolved, the threats are very 
much the same.
  I also take the concerns raised by the intelligence community very 
seriously. They have asked Congress to give them more authority to act 
in narrowly defined situations. I believe this bill would do just that 
by addressing the national security risks posed by applications 
operated by companies controlled by foreign adversaries.
  While this bill establishes a national security framework that could 
apply to other applications, much of the public attention has focused 
on TikTok. The combination of TikTok's Beijing Communist-based 
ownership and the fact that over 170 million Americans use it 
exacerbates its dangers to our country and our privacy.
  Laws in China allow the Chinese Communist Party to compel companies 
like TikTok to share data with them whether the companies want to or 
not. This means the CCP has the ability with TikTok to compromise 
device security, maliciously access Americans' data, promote pro-
Communist propaganda, and undermine our Nation's interests.
  This is extremely troubling. Beijing, China, should not have the 
control over Americans that TikTok gives them. It is my hope that, if 
enacted, this legislation will force divestment of TikTok so that 
Americans will be able to continue to use this platform without the 
risk that it is being operated and controlled by Beijing, China.
  However, even if TikTok is divested, China and other foreign 
adversaries will still be able to acquire vast amounts of Americans' 
data. That is because we place no restrictions on who data brokers can 
sell data to, and that must stop as well. I look forward to the House 
considering next week legislation that I introduced with Chair Rodgers 
that would stop this from happening.
  We must begin to hold Big Tech accountable for transforming the 
information superhighway into a superspreader of harmful content, 
invasive surveillance practices, and addictive and damaging design 
features, all with the goal of collecting more data. We must enact a 
comprehensive data privacy bill so that we finally give Americans 
control over how their data is used and collected.
  I thank Representatives Krishnamoorthi and Gallagher for their 
bipartisan work on this bill, which unanimously passed out of the 
Energy and Commerce Committee last week, and I urge my colleagues to 
support H.R. 7521.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Gallagher).
  Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, TikTok is a threat to our national 
security because it is owned by ByteDance, which does the bidding of 
the Chinese Communist Party. We know this because ByteDance leadership 
says so and because Chinese law requires it.
  This bill, therefore, would force TikTok to break up with the Chinese 
Communist Party. It does not apply to American companies. It only 
applies to companies subject to the control of foreign adversaries 
defined by Congress. It says nothing about election interference and 
cannot be turned against any American social media platform.
  It does not impact websites in general. The only impacted sites are 
those associated with foreign adversary apps, such as TikTok.com.
  It can never be used to penalize individuals. The text explicitly 
prohibits that.
  It cannot be used to censor speech. It takes no position at all on 
the content of speech, only foreign adversary control, foreign 
adversary control of what is becoming the dominant news platform for 
Americans under 30.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a commonsense measure to protect our national 
security, and I urge my colleagues to support this critical bipartisan 
legislation.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Krishnamoorthi), who is the Democratic sponsor of the 
bill.
  Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Pallone; Mr. 
Gallagher, my partner on this bill; Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers; and 
all the members of the select committee.
  First, this bill is not a ban, and it is not about TikTok. It is 
about ByteDance. Let me tell you about ByteDance. ByteDance is a 100-
percent owner of TikTok. ByteDance is controlled by the Chinese 
Communist Party.
  In fact, the editor in chief of ByteDance is the secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party cell embedded at the very highest ranks of the 
company. He has been charged with making sure that TikTok and all 
products of ByteDance adhere to ``correct political direction.''
  This particular bill ensures that ByteDance divests itself of the 
vast majority of the ownership of TikTok. Our intention is for TikTok 
to continue to operate but not under the control of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
  Secondly, this divestment requirement is not new. It is not without 
precedent. When the app Grindr, a popular LGBTQ app, was acquired by a 
Chinese company and the United States Government determined that 
sensitive data of LGBTQ members of the military and U.S. Government 
officials got into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, they 
required divestment.
  This happened quickly. Why? Because Grindr was a very valuable social 
media company. The same is true with regard to TikTok. There will be no 
disruption to users, just as there was with Grindr.

  The third point, unfortunately, when TikTok has appeared before 
Congress, whether it is before the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
or otherwise, it has not been candid.
  First, TikTok has said its data is not accessible to China-based 
ByteDance employees. False. China-based employees routinely access this 
data, even unbeknownst to employees of TikTok USA.
  In addition, TikTok said its data will not be weaponized and has not 
been weaponized against American citizens. Again, false. Published 
reports have shown that TikTok data, geolocation data, has been used to 
surveil American journalists who reported on problems with Chinese-
based employees having access to American user data.
  Finally, last week, under the leadership of the chairwoman and the 
ranking member, they brought up for consideration our bill before the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee. On the morning of that vote, 
TikTok delivered a push notification and a popup to thousands of user 
across the country. They used geolocation data targeting minor children 
to then force them to call congressional offices in order to continue 
using the app. In doing so, these children called and asked the 
question: What is Congress, and what is a Congressman? This influence 
campaign illustrates the need for this bill.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Davidson), a data privacy champion.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is important we solve the right problem. The 
gentleman from New Jersey, who isn't actually opposed to the bill, 
seems to have identified the real issue, which is data privacy. I think 
it is important that we solve the correct problem.
  Our problem with all these companies, social media and otherwise--
your car, your phone, you name it--is surveillance. The spying that 
goes on of American citizens does need to be addressed, and it should 
be addressed by the Energy and Commerce Committee.

                              {time}  0930

  I have long pleaded with Members of both sides of the aisle to pass 
H.R. 4639 to reclaim the privacy rights that are so deeply infringed in 
our country, and by avoiding that problem, we take away the energy and 
momentum to address the root issue.
  Frankly, the people sponsoring this bill today claim that the real 
issue is ownership.
  Nonetheless, who owns this company?

[[Page H1166]]

  It is not 100 percent owned by ByteDance. Mr. Speaker, 60 percent of 
it is owned by investors, including American investors; 20 percent is 
owned by the founders; and 20 percent is owned by employees, over 7,000 
employees. The company's headquarters is not in China, it is in 
Singapore. The American user data isn't housed in China, it is housed 
in Texas controlled by a database owned by Oracle.
  The administration seems to believe that they can ban the export of 
Americans' sensitive data not just on TikTok but on all platforms 
because they just issued an executive order banning the export.
  Now, I wish this were the bill that Pramila Jayapal and I have 
sponsored that we were moving, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale 
Act. It passed Judiciary, but its complement to prevent foreigners from 
buying it would also address the privacy concerns.
  So if we think we can address the privacy concerns, then what is left 
to address?
  Frankly, it is content moderation.
  Mr. Speaker, do you remember before Elon Musk bought the crime scene 
at Twitter? It was all a conspiracy theory that these algorithms were 
silencing and canceling people. You guys are crazy.
  No. When Elon Musk bought Twitter he did keep it operating with 80 
percent fewer employees, but what we found is a lot of the employees 
were trying to do content moderation, shape who sees what and how they 
see it, which algorithms are used, and how does it promote certain 
people and filter others.
  So, really, Mr. Speaker, what you are saying here is that if you are 
not fully engaged with America's three-letter agencies in content 
moderation, we plan to TikTok you.
  Moreover, this bill isn't just limited to TikTok. It is a coercive 
power that can be applied to others, apps like Telegram and TUR. Things 
that provide privacy would be targeted by this bill--perhaps Tether, 
one of the things that they can't control as a monetary system.
  When you look at companies, Mr. Speaker, if it enables one user to 
see content that isn't approved, it is subject to a $500 million fine 
per user.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, this is meant to be able to take out 
anything, including email where its one user sees it. So it could 
target an infinite number of companies, but not an infinite number of 
places.
  So, for that, I do applaud the work that was done to back off from 
the dystopian RESTRICT Act, but this is essentially a downpayment on 
the RESTRICT Act. I encourage everyone to look up the RESTRICT Act.
  This is what the administration really wanted to do. What Members of 
Congress on both sides of the aisle wanted to do is to create a bigger 
surveillance state, and that is what the Intel Committee wants to do 
with FISA, is to make it bigger. We have to shrink it and protect our 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, it is not true that this is 
a downpayment on the RESTRICT Act--not interested in the RESTRICT Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Latta).
  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, the CEO of TikTok appeared before the Energy 
and Commerce Committee and admitted to me during questioning that 
ByteDance has access to U.S. user data.
  This should be an alarm to every TikTok user. There is no reason why 
the Chinese Communist Party should be in control of an app that can 
access information on a user's phone. Moreover, because companies who 
are owned or linked to the Chinese Communist Party are forced to comply 
with their laws, ByteDance and its employees are taking orders from 
this Communist regime.
  This is not a ban, but it provides Communist China-controlled 
ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, a choice. If ByteDance divests 
their ownership of TikTok, then TikTok would be available to its U.S. 
users.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), the Speaker Emerita.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for 
his leadership on this very important issue. I thank the distinguished 
chairwoman of the Energy and Commerce Committee and associate myself 
with her remarks as well as with Mr. Pallone. I thank Mr. 
Krishnamoorthi and Chairman Gallagher of the Select Committee on China 
for their great leadership bringing this legislation forward to the 
committee of legislative jurisdiction.
  Mr. Speaker, I have a few points to make, and it is interesting to 
hear this respectful debate.
  First of all, this is not a ban on TikTok. I am a grandmother of 
teenagers. I understand the entertainment value, the educational value, 
the communication value, and the business value for some businesses on 
this. This is not an attempt to ban TikTok. It is an attempt to make 
TikTok better, tic-tac-toe, a winner.
  Here is what I have to say: The people of China have come forth. The 
Tibetans have come forth and said on TikTok that in China they are 
suppressed. They cannot put their message out. Not only that, but the 
Chinese Government misrepresents the situation in Tibet.
  Let me just tell you about Hong Kong, Mr. Speaker. During the Hong 
Kong election, TikTok TikToked into Taiwan that the Uyghurs on whom 
there is a genocide exercised by the Chinese Government, they have told 
the people in Taiwan that the Uyghurs like that genocide, and they told 
them that the people of Hong Kong liked the destruction of their 
democracy. They don't frame it that way, but that is their message. 
Again, they are suppressing the communications from Tibet.

  Then, just yesterday on the steps, we heard from the Taiwan people, 
we heard from the Tibetans, we heard from Hong Kong, and we heard from 
a woman whose husband was arrested because of his communications with 
somebody with a shared view.
  So this is controlled by the Chinese Communist Government. I can't 
forget this.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. PELOSI. Forgetting that, if you can--Mr. Speaker, I can't--think 
of this: The Chinese Government will control the algorithm, and they 
can change it any time in the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Bishop), who is my friend and fellow colleague on 
the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time 
that restricting speech has been pursued in the interests of national 
security. In fact, in 5 days' time, next Monday, I will go to the 
Supreme Court for the first time where I will attend an oral argument 
in the case of Murphy v. Missouri.
  It is a case where agents from the White House, the Department of 
Justice, and other Federal agencies embedded themselves with American 
social media companies to manipulate what could appear on social media: 
expression by the American people.
  It has been described by the lower court as the most massive attack 
on free speech in U.S. history.
  Even as that pends for a decision by the Supreme Court, Congress 
would in this legislation say, in effect: Hold my beer.
  I don't use TikTok. I think it is ill-advised to do so. Members of 
this body are famous on TikTok, and I think that is unwise. Be that as 
it may, I respect the choices of 170 million users in the United 
States.
  The Trump administration attempted to ban TikTok in 2020. It was held 
that it couldn't do so in two court decisions because under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, he is subject to the 
Berman amendment, passed in 1988 by this body, to provide that in the 
interest of dealing with hostile foreign powers, the President can do 
all sorts of things

[[Page H1167]]

with respect to commerce, but he cannot ban the free flow of 
information across international boundaries.
  I have heard that described as a gap in the law, but it is a feature. 
It is not a bug.
  This legislation cannot be described as other than receding from the 
Berman amendment. That principle in American law--which did not, by the 
way, emerge from the brow of Representative Berman in 1988--was 
predicated on a much earlier principle of First Amendment law 
established in 1965 by the United States Supreme Court in the case 
Lamont v. Postmaster General which said the American people have a 
First Amendment right of access to foreign propaganda.
  At first, it may be remarkable or strike one as odd to hear that. 
However, it is because the proper relationship between government and 
citizen in the United States is that the citizen decides what to be 
exposed to and what ideologies to embrace and consider and is always 
free to engage in expression including across international boundaries. 
That remains the prevailing constitutional law today.
  It begs this question: How could it be that Congress should be 
working hard to devise a means to circumvent that prevailing principle 
of the First Amendment against the use of a particular means of 
expression by 170 million Americans?
  Isn't it ironic that the technical advisers in the construction of 
this legislation to design it so that it can get around legislation 
challenges, including isolating litigation challenges to 180 days and 
only in the court of appeals in the District of Columbia, those 
technical advisers are the same folks at the Department of Justice who 
devised that plan to embed agents of the Department of Justice and 
other Federal agencies with social media platforms in the United States 
to restrict what Americans could say online.
  Mr. Speaker, America confronts a grave challenge in China, and it 
will not prevail by becoming more like them.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Guthrie).
  Mr. GUTHRIE. Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize this bill does not ban 
TikTok. It simply would require the Chinese Communist Party-affiliated 
ByteDance to sell TikTok and divest their interest.
  I was asked: Does this affect TikTok?
  No. It is any foreign adversary or any app that is owned, controlled, 
or unduly influenced by any foreign adversary.
  We must protect our national security and help keep America's private 
data out of the hands of our foreign adversaries.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this bill.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), who is a member of the committee.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting 
Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.
  This bill will ensure the divestiture of TikTok from its People's 
Republic of China-controlled parent company, ByteDance.
  Why is it essential for Congress to do this?
  It is because the PRC controls ByteDance, and this presents a serious 
national security threat to our country.

  TikTok has 170 million-plus U.S. users, and it collects tremendous 
amounts of sensitive data. They also collect substantial background 
data that may be proprietary which may only be available to TikTok.
  The national security law of the PRC requires all Chinese 
organizations to ``support, assist, and cooperate with national 
intelligence efforts.'' Under this law, ByteDance could be compelled by 
the Chinese Government to provide data on every American TikTok user. 
They can weaponize this data to exploit and manipulate Americans 
through surveillance and disinformation.
  This legislation separates TikTok's data, algorithms, and source code 
from ByteDance.
  Importantly, this bill does not ban TikTok, something I do not 
support.
  I support divestiture because our first and most important 
responsibility as Members of Congress is to defend our Constitution and 
protect and defend the United States of America. The bill would also 
give Americans secure ownership of their data, including posts, photos, 
and videos, and give this administration and future administrations the 
authority to respond to future national security threats.
  For all these reasons, I urge all my colleagues to vote for this 
legislation in the name of our national security.

                              {time}  0945

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey's time has 
expired.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Georgia (Ms. Greene).
  Ms. GREENE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as the only Member 
of Congress that has ever been banned by social media.
  On January 2, 2022, Twitter banned me, banned my personal account on 
which I was campaigning for Congress, raising money, and using my free 
speech to inform the voters in my district they can vote for me.
  This was not done by a company owned by China. That was done by 
American-owned Twitter. This came on the heels of our own United States 
Government working with Big Tech and working with social media 
companies to censor and ban Americans' free speech.
  I believe that this bill can cause future problems. It is opening 
Pandora's box, and I am opposed to this bill.
  Most Americans don't trust the United States Government because of 
our experience dealing with it. Never forget that the United States 
Government also was the one that provided the Russia hoax to Americans. 
It also worked to ban Americans' free speech. It also has worked in so 
many ways to illegally spy on Americans through FISA without a warrant.
  If we wanted to be serious about stopping a foreign adversary, if we 
wanted to be serious about stopping China, we would stop China from 
buying our U.S. farmland. We would raise up our American energy 
independence. We would also stop the Green New Deal and not rely on 
China who owns and operates 85 percent of the battery market worldwide.
  There are dangers that lie ahead in this. This is really about 
controlling Americans' data. If we cared about Americans' data, then we 
would stop the sale of Americans' data universally, not just with 
China.
  There is some further issues. This is a Pandora's box. What is to 
stop Congress or the United States Government in the future from 
forcing the sale of another social media company claiming that it is 
protecting Americans' data from foreign adversaries.
  I think we can see in the future another Russia, Russia, Russia, and 
possibly force the sale of X as many Members in this body claim that 
Elon Musk is altering the algorithms of X.
  By the way, it was Elon Musk's purchase of X that restored my social 
media account on Twitter and allowed me to have my free speech back on 
Twitter.
  There are also Democrat Members of this body claiming that election 
meddling can happen on social media.
  Well, we can never forget Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook. We can never 
forget the election meddling that happened there. By the way, American-
owned Facebook and Instagram is where most of the garbage like the 
gender lies and the woke lies exist.
  Many Americans and many teenagers believe awful things and they don't 
just see them on TikTok, they see them on Facebook and Instagram, too. 
I don't think this will accomplish what the goal is to accomplish.
  The other concern is that when the government moves in to force the 
sale of TikTok, who is going to buy it? That is the question that we 
should be asking. Who is going to buy it? Who will be the next to 
control the data of over 170 million Americans? Are we going to trust 
Mark Zuckerberg to control their data? I certainly don't.
  By the way, most of the time, my posts on Facebook are shadow banned, 
and I certainly don't have the reach on that social media account.

[[Page H1168]]

  I think that there are many other ways to protect data, and I think 
this body is capable of it if we choose to do it.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose the bill.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy).
  Mr. ROY. Mr. Speaker, we are in a cold war with China and some of my 
colleagues want to ignore this fact. We have legislation before us that 
is 12 pages long.
  The bill is not a ban. It forces foreign adversaries, including 
Chinese Communists, to divest. The bill is not a bill of attainder; it 
is prospective, not retrospective.
  The bill does not violate the First Amendment. It focuses on conduct, 
not content. It requires both being controlled by a foreign adversary 
and conduct that itself is espionage. If you just had one alone, it 
might be debatable, as the gentleman from North Carolina or Senator 
Paul notes, in that it might protect Americans' rights to seek out and 
obtain foreign propaganda. However, again, that is not this case 
because we have, and have as a trigger in the bill, demonstrated 
national security conduct harm.
  To be clear, we have properly taken action at the device layer by 
banning Huawei and ZTE spy gear. We have taken action at the carrier 
level, prohibiting China Mobile and China Telecom from connecting to 
our networks based on a determination they are controlled by the CCP 
and a national security threat.
  We now need to take action at the application level when malign CCP 
control has been demonstrated lest we render meaningless our past 
actions to protect the United States of America.
  We should ban Chicom ownership of our farmland or drug manufacturing, 
but we should fight them here and ban the foreign ownership and control 
of American data and stop apologizing for the Chinese Communists.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr.  Robert Garcia), my friend on the other side of the 
aisle.
  Mr. ROBERT GARCIA of California. Mr. Speaker, I have enormous respect 
for the efforts of my colleagues to focus on security and data 
protection and I share many of their concerns; however, I disagree with 
this approach and this bill that could impact 170 million Americans who 
use TikTok.
  One-third of all U.S. adults use the app and millions of 
entrepreneurs and small business owners use the platform to support 
their family.

  Yes, just like every other social media platform, there is 
misinformation and privacy concerns on TikTok, and I share those; 
however, it is important that we don't treat TikTok differently than 
other platforms.
  If we are going to address this issue, we have to take the same 
approach to all social media platforms. We can't just single out one.
  I join many of my colleagues and the ACLU in voicing concern over the 
freedom of expression. I am a strong supporter of ensuring that TikTok 
remains an open marketplace. There is no guarantee in this bill that 
there won't be an interruption of service that could lead to an end of 
this app. I don't think we fully appreciate the impact this is going to 
have. Mr. Speaker, I am a strong ``no.''
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Bucshon).
  Mr. BUCSHON. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important duties the 
Constitution assigns to Congress is to protect the American people and 
to safeguard our national security.
  After hearing from national security experts last week, it is clear 
the prolific use of media platforms controlled by the Chinese Communist 
Party and other foreign adversaries poses a danger to our country.
  I am grateful to my bipartisan colleagues for moving this 
legislation, showing we will take action to protect the American people 
by protecting their personal data and security from foreign 
interference and manipulation. We took an oath to do so.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Kamlager-Dove), my friend on the other side of the 
aisle.
  Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose H.R. 7521.
  Banning TikTok is an insufficient Band-Aid solution to the genuine 
national security concerns the app raises and exposes. The bill 
seriously undermines civil liberties by essentially banning a platform 
that 150 million Americans use to engage in free speech and expression. 
A statewide TikTok ban has already been paused by a Federal judge on 
First Amendment grounds.
  Even without TikTok, the PRC could still be able to conduct influence 
operations on other social media platforms and obtain sensitive U.S. 
user data through hacking or data brokers.
  Finally, this bill would greatly expand the executive's authority to 
ban tech companies with zero congressional oversight. I cannot sign a 
blank check to some future President who would easily and dangerously 
weaponize this legislation to profit and silence.
  The creatives, artists, content creators, and businesses in my 
district will get caught in the cross fire of this bill, and deserve 
better than Federal overreach as a substitute for a thoughtful and 
incisive solution to this complicated national security challenge.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 40 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from Iowa (Mrs. Hinson).
  Mrs. HINSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this simple 
bill. It forces TikTok to cut ties with the CCP or lose American users.
  The day after we introduced our bill, TikTok went into panic mode. 
They lied to their users saying Congress was going to ban TikTok, using 
young kids as political pawns.
  TikTok's gross stunt proved our point. What if on election day, 
TikTok sent out an alert saying our elections were canceled. We must 
act now.
  Today, we are sending a message to the CCP that we are going to 
deflate the 140 million spy balloons that they have installed on 
American phones. We must act and pass this bill today.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Cammack).
  Mrs. CAMMACK. Mr. Speaker, today, we take a stand against the Chinese 
Communist Party and their efforts to turn content creators in America 
into foot soldiers for the CCP.
  We aren't banning a company, as the highest paid lobbyist for 
ByteDance, which is owned by China, would lead you to believe. We 
aren't infringing on constitutionally protected speech or growing the 
size of government.
  All we are saying is break up with the Chinese Communist Party. As a 
constitutional conservative, I don't want my government or Big Tech to 
have unfettered access to my private data, so why in the hell would we 
want and allow the Chinese Communist Party to have access to our 
private data?
  The CCP is an adversary of the United States, and this legislation 
narrowly, thoughtfully, and directly addresses the national security 
threat and protects Americans' data and, by extension, their First 
Amendment rights, because let us not pretend for one second that TikTok 
is not infringing on our First Amendment rights.
  I would say, as Representative Roy from Texas said, this bill is 
about conduct, not content.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mrs. CAMMACK. There is no restriction mentioned on content in this 
bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mrs. CAMMACK. But I will mention, Mr. Speaker, that the espionage is 
not covered or protected as one of the five tenets of the First 
Amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman is no longer recognized.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my good friend from 
Arizona (Mr. Schweikert).
  Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Speaker, I actually am about to try to make 
everyone mad. I actually believe data is a private property right. It 
belongs to you as an American citizen. The problem with our design 
here, it is really well-meaning, but it doesn't get at the 
structural problem.

  Let's say you have an entity over here that divests. What makes them 
not then take the data, sell it to a data broker, and it gets washed 
and ends up still in the bad actors' hands?
  You have to understand, there is even articles out this week of even 
our

[[Page H1169]]

own three-letter agencies buying their data now from data brokers 
instead of doing the tracking.
  We need to think dramatically more globally. Your data is a private 
property right. That will be the only way we end up protecting 
ourselves from bad actors and sometimes even our own selves.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg).
  Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, last March when I asked about Americans' 
data being stored and accessed by China, TikTok CEO stated under oath 
that it was not accessible by the CCP. However, this statement was a 
lie. As their own internal recording said, ``everything is seen in 
China.''
  H.R. 7521 gives TikTok and similar apps 6 months to divest from their 
parent company ByteDance. It is their choice. TikTok needs to decide 
whether they value their users or their ties to the Chinese Communist 
Party more. It is as simple as that. I urge a vote for this bill.

                              {time}  1000

  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to 
close.
  Mr. Speaker, I know the other side is sincere. We have not questioned 
that here today, and I won't question their sincerity.
  In fact, I think they have identified at least three problems that we 
have in America: moral decay of our society, invasion of Americans' 
privacy, and our competitiveness with China. However, in this case, 
their cure is worse than the diseases.
  There are ways to get at these root problems. We just haven't taken 
it upon ourselves to address those root problems with actual 
legislative solutions that have been put forth here in Congress.
  For instance, Mr. Warren Davidson's Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale 
Act would put a strong stake in the ground to protect Americans' 
privacy, whether it is from our own government or some foreign 
governments. That is the kind of thing we need.
  We need warrants in the FISA program. Our government shouldn't be 
able to spy on Americans without a warrant, yet they are. Let's bring 
that to the floor and vote on it.
  These are the kinds of cures we need, not the bill that is offered 
here today.
  The bill that is offered here today, even though I know it is offered 
genuinely, could also be named the Facebook protection and enhancement 
act because it is not the American people who are going to benefit most 
from this. It will be Facebook. Their stock is going to go up if this 
bill should pass the Senate.
  What are some ways that we could improve this bill? It should at 
least have a sunset. That is the only reason we are able to debate 
whether FISA should have warrants in it, because it sunsets. What have 
we observed? FISA has been abused.
  That is my concern with this TikTok ban. It will be abused. If it is 
just banning TikTok and ByteDance and copies of that, why does it need 
to be 13 pages long?
  I know they say it doesn't ban it, but it forces divestiture of the 
company. This sounds like when American companies try to do business in 
Third World countries and a dictator says: You can do business here. 
You just have to give me your company, and now you can continue to do 
business.
  We wouldn't let another country take over Ford Motor Company for 
selling Ford cars in their country, yet that is what we are wanting to 
do here.
  Again, this is a cure that is worse than the disease. Who is going to 
be prosecuted by this bill? Is it ByteDance or TikTok? Will they be 
taken to court? No. They are the target of this, but how do you elicit 
or effect a ban on them? By prosecuting Americans.
  The only way my colleagues can ban TikTok and the other companies 
from being here is to say what this bill says, which is the government 
will bring a civil action suit against you if you so much as host them 
here. If you have an app store that allows them to be here, and you are 
an American or an American company, you will be the target of this 
bill. Those are the only people who can be pursued under this bill. I 
know it is in order to go after TikTok, or so they say.
  I close by saying that we are sitting here with phones made in China. 
We are wearing suits made in China. We drove cars here with chips that 
are made in China.
  They are a foreign adversary, and, by golly, we are going to do 
something about it. What are we going to do? My colleagues are going to 
tell Americans they can't put a piece of software on their computer and 
can't go to certain websites that the President designates.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this well-intentioned 
bill because it will have bad consequences, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my 
time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw).
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Speaker, I want to address all of my colleagues who 
I think are confused about the First Amendment, confused about the 
nature of TikTok, and confused about the intentions of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
  Let me explain this very simply. TikTok is owned by ByteDance. 
ByteDance is in China, and when you are in China, you have to do 
whatever the Chinese Communist Party says you have to do. That is 
according to the National Intelligence Law passed in 2017. If they want 
you to spy for them, you will spy for them. That is how that works.
  They have a board member from the Chinese Communist Party on 
ByteDance. My colleagues wouldn't allow a radio tower owned by the 
Chinese to be put up right in the middle of Washington, D.C., and then 
allow it to put out Chinese propaganda. My colleagues would probably 
complain about that.
  That is exactly what TikTok can be used for because millions of 
Americans are addicted to it. They see it, and the Chinese can 
absolutely manipulate those algorithms.
  The First Amendment does not give the Chinese Communist Party the 
right to American data or the right to manipulate the minds of 
Americans. That would be a really weird interpretation of the First 
Amendment.
  The primary counterarguments to this bill seem to be as shallow as it 
doesn't do everything I want, and Facebook is really mean, and I don't 
want them to make money. Does that mean we owe the Chinese access to 
all of our data and access to manipulate the minds of Americans? I 
don't think so.
  This is a very specific bill, very specifically tailored. It does not 
harm American companies or American individuals. You know it. You have 
to read it. Pass this bill.
  Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me 
in supporting H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign 
Adversary Controlled Applications Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by 
our colleagues Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi.
  It is aimed at countering the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to 
sway public opinion in its favor--especially that of the younger 
generation--through the use of the social media app TikTok, as well as 
to counter the use of the app to collect data on Americans.
  Indeed, just this last week we saw a real time demonstration of the 
insidious use of TikTok: the targeting of American children with 
Communist Party propaganda--during school hours--and the recruiting of 
minors to act unwittingly as foreign agents of the Chinese Communist 
Party.
  On March 7, members of Congress--including me--were inundated with a 
phone call advocacy campaign that utilized children while we were 
debating the efforts of the CCP to sabotage the American economy. And 
the CCP connection with TikTok and its Chinese parent is something that 
is very tangible.
  TikTok's parent ByteDance, headquartered in Bejing, is compelled to 
participate in a strategic partnership with the Chinese Ministry of 
Public Security.
  Indeed, under China's Cybersecurity Law, companies are required to 
provide any information asked for to police or intelligence agencies. 
One former ByteDance official, Yintao Yu, has said that the CCP has 
access to all the company's data--including data stored in the U.S.
  Indeed TikTok has conceded as much--just look at the company's 
privacy policy, which says it can share user data with ByteDance and 
various governments around the world if required: ``We may disclose any 
of the Information we collect to respond to . . . government 
inquires,'' as well as to ``comply with any applicable law.''

[[Page H1170]]

  We also know that the CCP has punished executives and companies that 
do not tow the Party line--just ask Jack Ma, one of the richest men in 
the world, what happens when you buck the Party.
  Indeed, ByteDance, like many Chinese companies, has an internal 
Communist Party Committee within its corporate structure, which is led 
by ByteDance Vice President Zhang Fuping.
  So what is TikTok's response to all this?
  After being deluged with phone calls in my office, that very day, I 
wrote to TikTok, at their American headquarters in Culver City, 
California, asking them to provide all internal documentation relating 
to the ``genesis, approval and execution of the advocacy campaign 
initiated by TikTok on March 7,'' so that Congress may determine the 
role of the CCP in recruiting children to lobby Congress on its behalf. 
Four days later, TikTok Vice President for Public Policy Michael 
Beckerman responded, with piratical defiance, claiming that 
congressional interest in this issue was ``offensive'' and ``patently 
false.''
  Really? You don't think that this is an issue that is in the national 
interest?
  We shall see about that.
  I will vote in favor of H.R. 7521 and urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. DUNN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, a year ago, I asked TikTok CEO Shou 
Zi Chew point blank if ByteDance, its parent company, has spied on 
Americans on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.
  He told me: ``I don't think spying is the right way to describe it.''
  Congress has overwhelming evidence that TikTok collects search and 
browsing histories, keystroke patterns, biometric identifiers, draft 
messages, metadata, geolocation data, and more.
  We're talking an overwhelming amount of sensitive user-data.
  This is not just data on adults, but the personal information of our 
children.
  That is the very definition of spying.
  TikTok and ByteDance present a serious national security threat.
  TikTok functions as a sophisticated surveillance tool--an 
organization that is bound to the Chinese Communist Party and required 
by their National Intelligence Law to support Chinese intelligence 
services.
  My esteemed colleagues and I are trying to protect Americans from 
this dangerous, destructive spyware masked as a simple social media 
app.
  The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled 
Applications Act will incentivize the divestment of TikTok so that it 
is no longer controlled by a China-based entity.
  This bill does not punish individual social media users, censor 
speech, or impact apps or websites that sever ties with companies 
controlled by foreign adversaries.
  The First Amendment does not protect espionage.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on H.R. 7521, the 
Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications 
Act.
  This bill would prohibit the distribution, maintenance, or provision 
of internet hosting services for any foreign adversary controlled 
application unless they execute a qualified divestiture as determined 
by the President.
  More specifically, under this bill, ByteDance would be required to 
divest themself from Tiktok in order for the application to remain in 
operation.
  As one of the most dominant social media platforms in recent history, 
it currently has over 150 million active users in the United States 
alone.
  Much of this success could be attributed to the application's 
algorithms being used to generate specifically curated content for each 
user on their respective ``For You'' pages in a short-form, infinite 
scroll format.
  Upon the rapid success of this content format, other social media 
platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Youtube have all followed 
suit.
  This has only further entrenched the massive success of the company 
among its users.
  This success is not without caveat, however.
  Recent studies conducted by researchers at Rutgers University found a 
disturbing underrepresentation of certain topics on the platform.
  Though pop culture and political terms were represented roughly 
proportional to other platforms, topics involving Uyghurs, Tibet, 
Tiananmen Square, and the Hong Kong protests were severely 
underrepresented.
  In addition, many valid concerns have been raised regarding the issue 
of national security and foreign government interference.
  Many stakeholders argue that the vast amount of data harvested from 
American users poses a threat to our data security and democracy.
  With the vast amount of American users on the platform, particularly 
individuals under the age of 24, I recognize the need to ensure 
security in our national democracy.
  I hope, moving forward, that we can join together in taking action to 
protect our youth from harmful actors while also safeguarding their 
freedom of thought.
  More investigation must happen to decide the next steps for TikTok. I 
will pursue the next steps before finalizing a complete ban. What 
company will be the purchaser? All must be answered before the best 
decision can be made.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. Rodgers) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7521, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 352, 
nays 65, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 86]

                               YEAS--352

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Alford
     Allen
     Allred
     Amo
     Amodei
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Auchincloss
     Babin
     Bacon
     Baird
     Balderson
     Balint
     Banks
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bean (FL)
     Beatty
     Bentz
     Bera
     Bergman
     Beyer
     Bice
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt Rochester
     Boebert
     Bost
     Brecheen
     Brown
     Brownley
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Budzinski
     Burchett
     Burgess
     Burlison
     Calvert
     Cammack
     Caraveo
     Carbajal
     Cardenas
     Carey
     Carl
     Carson
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (LA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten
     Castor (FL)
     Chavez-DeRemer
     Cherfilus-McCormick
     Chu
     Ciscomani
     Clarke (NY)
     Cleaver
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyde
     Cohen
     Cole
     Collins
     Comer
     Correa
     Costa
     Courtney
     Craig
     Crane
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crow
     Cuellar
     Curtis
     D'Esposito
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (NC)
     De La Cruz
     Dean (PA)
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Deluzio
     DeSaulnier
     Diaz-Balart
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donalds
     Duncan
     Dunn (FL)
     Edwards
     Ellzey
     Emmer
     Escobar
     Eshoo
     Estes
     Evans
     Ezell
     Fallon
     Feenstra
     Ferguson
     Finstad
     Fischbach
     Fitzgerald
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fletcher
     Flood
     Foster
     Foushee
     Foxx
     Franklin, Scott
     Fry
     Fulcher
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garbarino
     Garcia (TX)
     Garcia, Mike
     Gimenez
     Golden (ME)
     Goldman (NY)
     Gonzales, Tony
     Gonzalez, Vicente
     Good (VA)
     Gooden (TX)
     Gottheimer
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Hageman
     Harris
     Harshbarger
     Hern
     Hill
     Hinson
     Houchin
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huffman
     Huizenga
     Hunt
     Issa
     Ivey
     Jackson (NC)
     Jackson (TX)
     James
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Jordan
     Joyce (OH)
     Joyce (PA)
     Kaptur
     Kean (NJ)
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kiggans (VA)
     Kildee
     Kiley
     Kilmer
     Kim (CA)
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster
     Kustoff
     LaHood
     LaLota
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Landsman
     Langworthy
     Latta
     LaTurner
     Lawler
     Lee (FL)
     Lee (NV)
     Leger Fernandez
     Lesko
     Letlow
     Levin
     Lieu
     Loudermilk
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Luna
     Luttrell
     Lynch
     Magaziner
     Malliotakis
     Maloy
     Mann
     Manning
     Mast
     Matsui
     McBath
     McCaul
     McClain
     McClellan
     McCollum
     McCormick
     McHenry
     Menendez
     Meuser
     Mfume
     Miller (IL)
     Miller (OH)
     Miller (WV)
     Miller-Meeks
     Mills
     Molinaro
     Moolenaar
     Moore (UT)
     Moran
     Morelle
     Moskowitz
     Moulton
     Mrvan
     Murphy
     Napolitano
     Neguse
     Nehls
     Newhouse
     Nickel
     Norcross
     Norman
     Nunn (IA)
     Obernolte
     Owens
     Pallone
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peltola
     Pence
     Perez
     Peters
     Pettersen
     Pfluger
     Pingree
     Posey
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Reschenthaler
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose
     Rosendale
     Ross
     Rouzer
     Roy
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Salazar
     Salinas
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Scanlon
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scholten
     Schrier
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Self
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Sherrill
     Slotkin
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Sorensen
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Spartz
     Stansbury
     Stanton
     Stauber
     Steel
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Stevens
     Strickland
     Strong
     Suozzi
     Sykes
     Takano
     Tenney
     Thanedar
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Tiffany
     Timmons
     Titus
     Tokuda

[[Page H1171]]


     Tonko
     Torres (NY)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Valadao
     Van Drew
     Van Duyne
     Van Orden
     Vasquez
     Veasey
     Walberg
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Wexton
     Wild
     Williams (NY)
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Yakym
     Zinke

                                NAYS--65

     Biggs
     Bishop (NC)
     Bonamici
     Bowman
     Boyle (PA)
     Bush
     Casar
     Castro (TX)
     Clark (MA)
     Clyburn
     Davidson
     Duarte
     Espaillat
     Frost
     Gaetz
     Gallego
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia, Robert
     Gomez
     Greene (GA)
     Hayes
     Higgins (LA)
     Himes
     Horsford
     Hoyle (OR)
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee
     Jacobs
     Jayapal
     Kamlager-Dove
     Khanna
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (PA)
     Lofgren
     Mace
     Massie
     McClintock
     McGarvey
     McGovern
     Meeks
     Meng
     Mooney
     Moore (AL)
     Moore (WI)
     Mullin
     Nadler
     Neal
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Omar
     Perry
     Phillips
     Pocan
     Porter
     Pressley
     Ramirez
     Schakowsky
     Schweikert
     Steube
     Swalwell
     Torres (CA)
     Vargas
     Velazquez
     Williams (GA)

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

       
     Crockett
       

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Connolly
     Davis (IL)
     DesJarlais
     Frankel, Lois
     Gosar
     Granger
     Grijalva
     Harder (CA)
     Kim (NJ)
     Ogles
     Simpson
     Tlaib
     Wagner
     Williams (TX)

                              {time}  1033

  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Messrs. WENSTRUP, CLEAVER, Ms. BALINT, Mr. CARSON, Mses. BOEBERT, and 
BROWNLEY changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  Ms. CROCKETT changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``present.''
  So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and 
the bill, as amended, was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Ms. GRANGER. Madam Speaker, I missed today's votes due to 
circumstances beyond my control. Had I been present, I would have voted 
``yea'' on rollcall no. 86.
  Mr. OGLES. Madam Speaker, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been 
present, I would have voted ``yea'' on rollcall No. 86.
  Stated against:
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Speaker, I was absent from the vote today due to 
illness. Had I been present, I would have voted ``nay'' on rollcall No. 
86.

                          ____________________