[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 39 (Tuesday, March 5, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H801-H803]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        ASSESSMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC CABLE

  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 3385) to direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Communications and Information to submit to Congress a report 
containing an assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility of 
developing a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the 
contiguous United States, the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and 
Nigeria, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3385

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC 
                   CABLE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as 
     necessary, shall submit to the Committee on Energy and 
     Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report 
     containing an assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility 
     of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting 
     the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin 
     Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, to enhance the national security 
     of the United States.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include an assessment of--
       (1) the digital security, national security, and economic 
     opportunities associated with a trans-Atlantic submarine 
     fiber optic cable described in subsection (a);
       (2) the lifespan of submarine fiber optic cables currently 
     connecting the United States Virgin Islands to the contiguous 
     United States;
       (3) the current security of telecommunications between the 
     contiguous United States and the United States Virgin 
     Islands;
       (4) the readiness of telecommunications infrastructure in 
     the United States Virgin Islands to

[[Page H802]]

     support a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable 
     described in subsection (a);
       (5) the potential for engagement with trusted entities in 
     the deployment of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic 
     cable described in subsection (a), and the associated 
     geopolitical and economic advantages;
       (6) the potential connectivity opportunities to maximize 
     investments in the United States economy through the use of a 
     trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable described in 
     subsection (a);
       (7) the value, cost, and feasibility of establishing a data 
     center and high-security cloud services facility, with 
     independent power generation, in the United States Virgin 
     Islands for communications of the United States Africa 
     Command, communications of the United States Special 
     Operations Command, and national security communications;
       (8) the state of submarine fiber optic cables connected to 
     United States telecommunications infrastructure; and
       (9) any other related matters the Secretary determines are 
     appropriate.
       (c) No Mandatory Data Collection.--The Secretary may not 
     require any entity to provide data for purposes of preparing 
     the report required by subsection (a).
       (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form without any designation 
     relating to dissemination control, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Not trusted.--The term ``not trusted'' means, with 
     respect to an entity, that the entity is determined by the 
     Secretary to pose an unacceptable risk to the national 
     security of the United States, or the security and safety of 
     United States persons, based solely on one or more 
     determination described under paragraphs (1) through (4) of 
     section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications 
     Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)).
       (2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of 
     Commerce for Communications and Information.
       (3) Trusted.--The term ``trusted'' means, with respect to 
     an entity, that the Secretary has not determined that the 
     entity is not trusted.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Latta) and the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Schrier) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.


                             General Leave

  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material in the Record on the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3385. This bill would direct 
the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information 
to assess the value, cost, and feasibility of developing a trans-
Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the United States, the 
Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria.
  A trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable could provide national 
security benefits to the United States, making this an important issue 
to study.
  I thank the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands and the gentleman 
from Idaho's First District for leading on this important legislation. 
I also thank the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman 
from New Jersey, for his willingness to work with Republicans on this 
legislation in a bipartisan way through regular order in the committee 
process.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3385, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Ms. SCHRIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3385, a bill requiring 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the 
NTIA, to assess the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans-Atlantic 
submarine fiber optic cable connecting the United States, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, and to submit a report to Congress 
with its findings.
  The bill also directs the NTIA to report to Congress on the current 
state of telecommunications connecting the U.S. Virgin Islands and the 
United States, including an assessment of the lifespan and security of 
the telecommunications infrastructure linking the two.
  This assessment and report will provide the Energy and Commerce 
Committee with vital information on the strength and resiliency of 
communications infrastructure in the U.S. Virgin Islands. It will help 
us determine whether the American interests can be served by connecting 
the United States and the African Continent with undersea cable 
infrastructure by way of the U.S. Virgin Islands.
  H.R. 3385 is a critical step to enhance American communications 
security and competitiveness around the world. In recent years, the 
United States and many allies have recognized the threat posed by 
untrusted Chinese telecommunications equipment to our own national 
security.
  Thanks to the work of the Energy and Commerce Committee and our 
colleagues, we have taken steps to remove suspect equipment from the 
American communications networks to protect against attacks or sabotage 
by our adversaries, but this work is not finished because network 
security does not end at the water's edge.
  For decades, China and other adversaries have spent considerable time 
and money to deploy suspect telecommunications equipment and 
infrastructure across the African Continent. The assessment required in 
this bill is an important step to understanding the cost of securing 
the connection between the United States and our African allies, and 
how best to ensure a critical global communications channel is 
protected from the prying eyes of our adversaries.

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Ms. 
Plaskett) for her leadership of this bill and the gentleman from Idaho 
(Mr. Fulcher) for his partnership in this effort.
  This legislation is critical to enhancing our Nation's national 
security and the security of communications between the United States 
and our African partners. I look forward to reviewing the results of 
NTIA's assessment when it becomes available.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan 
legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SCHRIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Ms. Plaskett), and I thank her for 
her leadership.
  Ms. PLASKETT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Washington 
for the opportunity to speak on this matter, and I thank my colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle for really digging into this information and 
recognizing the potential national security interests as you heard 
outlined by them both.
  There are hundreds of undersea fiber optic telecommunications cables 
linking North America with Europe, South America, and a myriad of 
locations in Asia, but not a single undersea fiber optic 
telecommunications cable connects North America with the entire African 
Continent.
  The DiasporaLink Act represents an opportunity to establish a high-
speed, secure telecommunications data connection to Africa and from 
American soil facilitating deepened economic connections and aiding 
American regional security assistance. This link will allow America to 
establish a direct digital presence on the continent to capitalize on 
emerging economic opportunities, as well as to protect our Nation 
against cyber and military threats that may come from the African 
Continent.
  The landing points of Lagos, Nigeria, and Accra, Ghana, have been 
selected as part of the study on the continent as landing points for 
the cables. These coastal cities are hubs for several undersea cables 
that connect West African nations to Europe and South America. 
Additionally, the strategically located American Embassies at these 
landing points provide additional security for us.
  There are two other nations which have been proliferating throughout 
the African Continent at this time. Both of those are our adversaries, 
and it is incredibly important that we establish our own 
telecommunications internet undersea cable to the continent.
  The first one, which is China, has a proliferation of Chinese 
telecommunications and military investments which is profound and 
growing. The Chinese multinational Huawei has constructed roughly 70 
percent of Africa's information technology infrastructure. China 
continues to make similar investments in the Caribbean through its

[[Page H803]]

Belt and Road Initiative. No less than 10 nations have signed 
agreements of various kinds to open their nations up to Chinese 
influence.
  Russia, as well, has developed a multipolar world order. Its 
deployment of disinformation and its use of mercenaries have undermined 
democratic stability and driven conflict on the continent of Africa. 
Moscow's increasing ambitions to position itself as an ally to African 
countries and stoke anti-Western sentiment has assisted to turn the 
continent into a flash point in the global strategic competition 
between Russia and the West.
  Russia's support of authoritarian governments, including its backing 
of a string of coups in recent years, is undermining the continent's 
democratic aspirations. Meanwhile, the involvement of Russia's Wagner 
Group is driving conflict, worsening human rights abuses, and spurring 
growing militarization in governance: Nigeria in 2023, Mali in 2022, 
Sudan in 2021, Guinea in 2023, Burkina Faso in 2024, all coups in the 
last few years with tremendous influence by Russia and China in that.
  The undersea cable linking the American East Coast and Africa via the 
United States Virgin Islands would serve as both a national security 
instrument and a digital commerce expressway to boost America's global 
political, economic, and military advantages. Such undersea cable 
development would facilitate similar links that could be developed in 
the U.S. Virgin Islands which already has links between the Virgin 
Islands, South America, and the mainland United States.
  We also need to be clear about the minerals that are in Africa that 
are being extracted continually by both Russia and China. Niger is the 
world's seventh largest producer of uranium. The Ministry of Mines says 
that Mali has one of the largest deposits of gold, and lithium, as 
well; cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Sudan, which also 
has tremendous minerals; and Burkina Faso with bauxite and phosphate. 
These are things being exploited by our adversaries on the continent, 
which we must have our own dedicated interest in.
  The DiasporaLink Act is an opportunity to assure that the United 
States can continue its work countering the proliferation of Chinese 
influence in the global telecommunications space. The use of the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, which not only has those cables, but also has a 
National Guard installation on the island of St. Croix with a nearby 
military support airport could expand and support that interest, as 
well.
  I thank the Energy and Commerce Committee for reviewing this at the 
subcommittee level, having it go through the committee process, the 
regular order process that this House so desperately wants, and after 
working together, it unanimously coming out of committee here to the 
floor.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this measure for the interest 
not only of our country but for the democracy in the African Continent, 
as well.
  Ms. SCHRIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to 
close. I just want to emphasize that H.R. 3385 is a matter of national 
security. I thank Representative Plaskett for painting such a clear 
picture of that risk. For that reason, I urge my colleagues to support 
this bipartisan legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, again to highlight, H.R. 3385, as stated in 
the bill, the report shall include an assessment of the digital 
security, the national security, and the economic opportunities 
associated with a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable. This is 
again essential for our security.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 3385, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McCormick). The question is on the 
motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta) that the House 
suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3385, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to direct 
the Secretary of Commerce to submit to Congress a report containing an 
assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans-Atlantic 
submarine fiber optic cable connecting the contiguous United States, 
the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria.''.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________