[Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 39 (Tuesday, March 5, 2024)]
[House]
[Pages H801-H803]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ASSESSMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC CABLE
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 3385) to direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Communications and Information to submit to Congress a report
containing an assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility of
developing a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the
contiguous United States, the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and
Nigeria, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 3385
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FIBER OPTIC
CABLE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with
the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as
necessary, shall submit to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report
containing an assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility
of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting
the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin
Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, to enhance the national security
of the United States.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include an assessment of--
(1) the digital security, national security, and economic
opportunities associated with a trans-Atlantic submarine
fiber optic cable described in subsection (a);
(2) the lifespan of submarine fiber optic cables currently
connecting the United States Virgin Islands to the contiguous
United States;
(3) the current security of telecommunications between the
contiguous United States and the United States Virgin
Islands;
(4) the readiness of telecommunications infrastructure in
the United States Virgin Islands to
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support a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable
described in subsection (a);
(5) the potential for engagement with trusted entities in
the deployment of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic
cable described in subsection (a), and the associated
geopolitical and economic advantages;
(6) the potential connectivity opportunities to maximize
investments in the United States economy through the use of a
trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable described in
subsection (a);
(7) the value, cost, and feasibility of establishing a data
center and high-security cloud services facility, with
independent power generation, in the United States Virgin
Islands for communications of the United States Africa
Command, communications of the United States Special
Operations Command, and national security communications;
(8) the state of submarine fiber optic cables connected to
United States telecommunications infrastructure; and
(9) any other related matters the Secretary determines are
appropriate.
(c) No Mandatory Data Collection.--The Secretary may not
require any entity to provide data for purposes of preparing
the report required by subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form without any designation
relating to dissemination control, but may include a
classified annex.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Not trusted.--The term ``not trusted'' means, with
respect to an entity, that the entity is determined by the
Secretary to pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States, or the security and safety of
United States persons, based solely on one or more
determination described under paragraphs (1) through (4) of
section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications
Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)).
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Communications and Information.
(3) Trusted.--The term ``trusted'' means, with respect to
an entity, that the Secretary has not determined that the
entity is not trusted.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Latta) and the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Schrier) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
General Leave
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material in the Record on the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3385. This bill would direct
the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information
to assess the value, cost, and feasibility of developing a trans-
Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the United States, the
Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria.
A trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable could provide national
security benefits to the United States, making this an important issue
to study.
I thank the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands and the gentleman
from Idaho's First District for leading on this important legislation.
I also thank the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman
from New Jersey, for his willingness to work with Republicans on this
legislation in a bipartisan way through regular order in the committee
process.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3385, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Ms. SCHRIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3385, a bill requiring
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the
NTIA, to assess the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans-Atlantic
submarine fiber optic cable connecting the United States, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, and to submit a report to Congress
with its findings.
The bill also directs the NTIA to report to Congress on the current
state of telecommunications connecting the U.S. Virgin Islands and the
United States, including an assessment of the lifespan and security of
the telecommunications infrastructure linking the two.
This assessment and report will provide the Energy and Commerce
Committee with vital information on the strength and resiliency of
communications infrastructure in the U.S. Virgin Islands. It will help
us determine whether the American interests can be served by connecting
the United States and the African Continent with undersea cable
infrastructure by way of the U.S. Virgin Islands.
H.R. 3385 is a critical step to enhance American communications
security and competitiveness around the world. In recent years, the
United States and many allies have recognized the threat posed by
untrusted Chinese telecommunications equipment to our own national
security.
Thanks to the work of the Energy and Commerce Committee and our
colleagues, we have taken steps to remove suspect equipment from the
American communications networks to protect against attacks or sabotage
by our adversaries, but this work is not finished because network
security does not end at the water's edge.
For decades, China and other adversaries have spent considerable time
and money to deploy suspect telecommunications equipment and
infrastructure across the African Continent. The assessment required in
this bill is an important step to understanding the cost of securing
the connection between the United States and our African allies, and
how best to ensure a critical global communications channel is
protected from the prying eyes of our adversaries.
{time} 1700
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Ms.
Plaskett) for her leadership of this bill and the gentleman from Idaho
(Mr. Fulcher) for his partnership in this effort.
This legislation is critical to enhancing our Nation's national
security and the security of communications between the United States
and our African partners. I look forward to reviewing the results of
NTIA's assessment when it becomes available.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan
legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SCHRIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Ms. Plaskett), and I thank her for
her leadership.
Ms. PLASKETT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Washington
for the opportunity to speak on this matter, and I thank my colleagues
on both sides of the aisle for really digging into this information and
recognizing the potential national security interests as you heard
outlined by them both.
There are hundreds of undersea fiber optic telecommunications cables
linking North America with Europe, South America, and a myriad of
locations in Asia, but not a single undersea fiber optic
telecommunications cable connects North America with the entire African
Continent.
The DiasporaLink Act represents an opportunity to establish a high-
speed, secure telecommunications data connection to Africa and from
American soil facilitating deepened economic connections and aiding
American regional security assistance. This link will allow America to
establish a direct digital presence on the continent to capitalize on
emerging economic opportunities, as well as to protect our Nation
against cyber and military threats that may come from the African
Continent.
The landing points of Lagos, Nigeria, and Accra, Ghana, have been
selected as part of the study on the continent as landing points for
the cables. These coastal cities are hubs for several undersea cables
that connect West African nations to Europe and South America.
Additionally, the strategically located American Embassies at these
landing points provide additional security for us.
There are two other nations which have been proliferating throughout
the African Continent at this time. Both of those are our adversaries,
and it is incredibly important that we establish our own
telecommunications internet undersea cable to the continent.
The first one, which is China, has a proliferation of Chinese
telecommunications and military investments which is profound and
growing. The Chinese multinational Huawei has constructed roughly 70
percent of Africa's information technology infrastructure. China
continues to make similar investments in the Caribbean through its
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Belt and Road Initiative. No less than 10 nations have signed
agreements of various kinds to open their nations up to Chinese
influence.
Russia, as well, has developed a multipolar world order. Its
deployment of disinformation and its use of mercenaries have undermined
democratic stability and driven conflict on the continent of Africa.
Moscow's increasing ambitions to position itself as an ally to African
countries and stoke anti-Western sentiment has assisted to turn the
continent into a flash point in the global strategic competition
between Russia and the West.
Russia's support of authoritarian governments, including its backing
of a string of coups in recent years, is undermining the continent's
democratic aspirations. Meanwhile, the involvement of Russia's Wagner
Group is driving conflict, worsening human rights abuses, and spurring
growing militarization in governance: Nigeria in 2023, Mali in 2022,
Sudan in 2021, Guinea in 2023, Burkina Faso in 2024, all coups in the
last few years with tremendous influence by Russia and China in that.
The undersea cable linking the American East Coast and Africa via the
United States Virgin Islands would serve as both a national security
instrument and a digital commerce expressway to boost America's global
political, economic, and military advantages. Such undersea cable
development would facilitate similar links that could be developed in
the U.S. Virgin Islands which already has links between the Virgin
Islands, South America, and the mainland United States.
We also need to be clear about the minerals that are in Africa that
are being extracted continually by both Russia and China. Niger is the
world's seventh largest producer of uranium. The Ministry of Mines says
that Mali has one of the largest deposits of gold, and lithium, as
well; cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Sudan, which also
has tremendous minerals; and Burkina Faso with bauxite and phosphate.
These are things being exploited by our adversaries on the continent,
which we must have our own dedicated interest in.
The DiasporaLink Act is an opportunity to assure that the United
States can continue its work countering the proliferation of Chinese
influence in the global telecommunications space. The use of the U.S.
Virgin Islands, which not only has those cables, but also has a
National Guard installation on the island of St. Croix with a nearby
military support airport could expand and support that interest, as
well.
I thank the Energy and Commerce Committee for reviewing this at the
subcommittee level, having it go through the committee process, the
regular order process that this House so desperately wants, and after
working together, it unanimously coming out of committee here to the
floor.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this measure for the interest
not only of our country but for the democracy in the African Continent,
as well.
Ms. SCHRIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close. I just want to emphasize that H.R. 3385 is a matter of national
security. I thank Representative Plaskett for painting such a clear
picture of that risk. For that reason, I urge my colleagues to support
this bipartisan legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, again to highlight, H.R. 3385, as stated in
the bill, the report shall include an assessment of the digital
security, the national security, and the economic opportunities
associated with a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable. This is
again essential for our security.
Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 3385, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McCormick). The question is on the
motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta) that the House
suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3385, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to direct
the Secretary of Commerce to submit to Congress a report containing an
assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans-Atlantic
submarine fiber optic cable connecting the contiguous United States,
the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria.''.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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