[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 206 (Thursday, December 14, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5990-S5991]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this explanation reflects the status of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence for the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024.
The explanation shall have the same effect with respect to the
implementation of this act as if it were a joint explanatory statement
of a conference committee.
I ask unanimous consent that the explanatory statement for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 be printed into the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Explanatory Statement on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024
The following is the Explanatory Statement to accompany the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (``the
Act''), which has been included as Division G of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The
Explanatory Statement reflects the result of negotiations
between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (together,
``the Committees''). The Explanatory Statement shall have the
same effect with respect to the implementation of the Act as
if it were a joint explanatory statement of a conference
committee.
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details
concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and
policy direction. Therefore, the Committees have prepared a
classified annex--referred to here and within the annex
itself as ``the Agreement''--that contains a classified
Schedule of Authorizations and that describes in detail the
scope and intent of the Committees' actions.
The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to
obligate and expend funds as requested in the President's
budget and as modified by the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, subject to applicable reprogramming
procedures.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
into the Act pursuant to Section 7102 of the Act. It has the
status of law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to
clarify the authorization levels found in the Act and in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
This Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, and
the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction
contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (S. Rept. 118-59) and in the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (H. Rept.
118-162). The Agreement supersedes all classified direction
related to programs and activities authorized by the Schedule
of Authorization.
The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:
Inspector General Review of Dissemination by Federal Bureau of
Investigation Richmond, Virginia, Field Office of Certain Document
The Committees are committed to ensuring full transparency
in the FBI's actions implicating the rights of the American
people to the free exercise of religion and speech.
Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 120
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall conduct
and submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Committee on Oversight and Accountability, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, a review
of the actions and events that served as a basis for the
January 23, 2023, dissemination by the field office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation located in Richmond,
Virginia, of a document titled ``Interest of Racially or
Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-
Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents
New Mitigation Opportunities.'' The review shall cover any
orders or direction regarding the document from any official
in any field office concerning purported proximate links
between any religion, any political affiliation, or the
intent of this report.
The Committees further direct that, not later than 10 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the same
committees identified above the unredacted August 22, 2023,
Inspection Division report associated with the Richmond
Domain Perspective.
Funding Limitations Relating to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena
Section 7343 of the Act provides for funding limitations
relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena because of
perceptions of insufficient transparency in this area.
Section 7343 is also intended to avoid technology and
security stovepipes and expand awareness regarding any
historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided
by the Federal Government for research and development
purposes if they are shown to exist.
Section 7343 further provides a limitation regarding
independent research and development funding to ensure that
certain indirect expenses are prohibited. That provision is
intended to be interpreted consistent with Department of
Defense Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014,
incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to
Department policy for oversight of independent research and
development), or any successor instruction.
Screening and Vetting of Visitors or Assignees from Sensitive Countries
at the National Laboratories
The Committees are concerned that the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of
Energy (DOE-IN) does not require the comprehensive screening
and vetting of foreign visitors or assignees from the
People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran, North Korea,
and Cuba who work or otherwise collaborate with scientists in
our National Laboratories. United States Government-funded
research carried out at National Laboratories is incredibly
important and sensitive. Whether a laboratory supports a
science mission or is oriented toward supporting national
security, it is critical that all foreign visitors and
assignees from countries of concern receive appropriate
vetting in order to mitigate counterintelligence risks. In
fiscal year 2023, more than 7,000 nationals from the PRC
visited 16 National Laboratories. Russian visitors numbered
more than 3,700. The Committees understand that international
cooperation on matters of basic, fundamental science helps
maintain the United States' technological edge. At the same
time, we need to protect both the classified research as well
as unclassified research that result in technologies with
dual-use applications, and which can be adapted for military
or economic gain, from getting into our adversaries' hands.
The Committees therefore direct that DOE-IN require a
robust effort to screen and vet visitors or assignees to our
National Laboratories from the PRC, Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and Cuba. The Committees also direct DOE-IN to ensure
appropriate oversight over such screening and vetting to
ensure that counterintelligence threat information related
to potential assignees or visitors is appropriately
identified and tracked. The Committees further direct
that, not fewer than twice per year, the Director of DOE-
IN shall submit to the Committees a report noting each
instance in which a visitor or assignee from the PRC,
Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, identified as a
significant counterintelligence risk was permitted access
to a National Laboratory.
Briefing Relating to Certain Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Activities of the Coast Guard
Section 416 of H.R. 3932 provided the Commandant of the
Coast Guard with enhanced authority to obligate and expend
amounts made available under the National Intelligence
Program for intelligence and counterintelligence activities
if the object of the activity is of a confidential,
extraordinary, or emergency nature.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, no later than March 31, 2024, to brief the
congressional intelligence committees, the congressional
defense committees, the congressional appropriations
committees, the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, and the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Technology on why this authority is necessary
and appropriate.
Director of National Intelligence Notice to Congress Before
Establishing New National Intelligence Center or Assigning Significant
New Function to Existing Center
The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence
to provide reasonable notice to the congressional
intelligence committees before the Director establishes a new
national intelligence center or assigns a significant new
function to an existing national intelligence center.
Briefing Relating to Confidential Human Source Program of Federal
Bureau of Investigation
The Committees direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, no later than March 31, 2024, to brief the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
judiciary committees on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
management of confidential human sources, specifically
pertaining to the current notification requirements and
program review processes in
[[Page S5991]]
the event that an agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has reasonable grounds to believe that a
confidential human source, or any immediate family member of
such a source, has engaged in unauthorized criminal activity,
including any misdemeanor or felony crime.
Enhanced Personnel Security Review with Respect to Social Media
The Committees are of the view that--
(1) A trusted national security and Intelligence Community
workforce is paramount to the protection of our nation's
security and to reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosures
of classified and other sensitive information;
(2) the increased global availability and use of social
media accounts, including by members of the national security
workforce of the United States, increase the risk of
unauthorized disclosures of classified national security
information, which can endanger the United States and its
partners and allies, and empower foreign adversaries;
(3) to maintain trust in and the protection of the national
security and Intelligence Community workforce of the United
States, the Intelligence Community must fully and
continuously use available vetting resources and all
authorities prescribed by law, while guaranteeing all
constitutional protections of such workforce;
(4) the Intelligence Community must maintain high-quality
vetting processes and ensure appropriate and necessary
measures are taken to thoroughly and in a timely manner
investigate and adjudicate prospective applicants for
sensitive national security positions within the Intelligence
Community; and,
(5) the Intelligence Community should use existing
authorities to ensure robust continuous vetting for continued
eligibility for access to classified information and
carefully manage the speed and accuracy of the security
clearance adjudication process at both the initial
investigation process and throughout the career of personnel
serving in positions within the Intelligence Community.
Matters Pertaining to United States Economic and Emerging Technology
Competition with United States Adversaries
The Committees support the National Intelligence Strategy
of 2023 goal of leveraging emerging technologies and their
adoption at scale. Sections 7502 through 7506 of the Act
further advance this objective, and the Committees expect the
Intelligence Community to implement these provisions
faithfully and expeditiously.
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the Department of
Agriculture
Section 7318 establishes a counterintelligence office
located within the Department of Agriculture. Accordingly,
the Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence
to submit the report required in section 7318(f)(2) to the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the
Senate and the Committee on Agriculture of the House, at the
same time that the Director submits the report to the
congressional intelligence and appropriations committees.
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