[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 206 (Thursday, December 14, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5990-S5991]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this explanation reflects the status of 
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence for the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2024.
  The explanation shall have the same effect with respect to the 
implementation of this act as if it were a joint explanatory statement 
of a conference committee.
  I ask unanimous consent that the explanatory statement for the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 be printed into the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Explanatory Statement on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
                               Year 2024

       The following is the Explanatory Statement to accompany the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (``the 
     Act''), which has been included as Division G of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The 
     Explanatory Statement reflects the result of negotiations 
     between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (together, 
     ``the Committees''). The Explanatory Statement shall have the 
     same effect with respect to the implementation of the Act as 
     if it were a joint explanatory statement of a conference 
     committee.
       The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities 
     prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details 
     concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and 
     policy direction. Therefore, the Committees have prepared a 
     classified annex--referred to here and within the annex 
     itself as ``the Agreement''--that contains a classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations and that describes in detail the 
     scope and intent of the Committees' actions.
       The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to 
     obligate and expend funds as requested in the President's 
     budget and as modified by the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations, subject to applicable reprogramming 
     procedures.
       The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated 
     into the Act pursuant to Section 7102 of the Act. It has the 
     status of law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to 
     clarify the authorization levels found in the Act and in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       This Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, and 
     the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction 
     contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2024 (S. Rept. 118-59) and in the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (H. Rept. 
     118-162). The Agreement supersedes all classified direction 
     related to programs and activities authorized by the Schedule 
     of Authorization.
       The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:


    Inspector General Review of Dissemination by Federal Bureau of 
   Investigation Richmond, Virginia, Field Office of Certain Document

       The Committees are committed to ensuring full transparency 
     in the FBI's actions implicating the rights of the American 
     people to the free exercise of religion and speech. 
     Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 120 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall conduct 
     and submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security 
     and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations 
     of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
     Committee on Oversight and Accountability, and the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, a review 
     of the actions and events that served as a basis for the 
     January 23, 2023, dissemination by the field office of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation located in Richmond, 
     Virginia, of a document titled ``Interest of Racially or 
     Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-
     Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents 
     New Mitigation Opportunities.'' The review shall cover any 
     orders or direction regarding the document from any official 
     in any field office concerning purported proximate links 
     between any religion, any political affiliation, or the 
     intent of this report.
       The Committees further direct that, not later than 10 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the same 
     committees identified above the unredacted August 22, 2023, 
     Inspection Division report associated with the Richmond 
     Domain Perspective.


    Funding Limitations Relating to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena

       Section 7343 of the Act provides for funding limitations 
     relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena because of 
     perceptions of insufficient transparency in this area. 
     Section 7343 is also intended to avoid technology and 
     security stovepipes and expand awareness regarding any 
     historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided 
     by the Federal Government for research and development 
     purposes if they are shown to exist.
       Section 7343 further provides a limitation regarding 
     independent research and development funding to ensure that 
     certain indirect expenses are prohibited. That provision is 
     intended to be interpreted consistent with Department of 
     Defense Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014, 
     incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to 
     Department policy for oversight of independent research and 
     development), or any successor instruction.


Screening and Vetting of Visitors or Assignees from Sensitive Countries 
                      at the National Laboratories

       The Committees are concerned that the Office of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of 
     Energy (DOE-IN) does not require the comprehensive screening 
     and vetting of foreign visitors or assignees from the 
     People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran, North Korea, 
     and Cuba who work or otherwise collaborate with scientists in 
     our National Laboratories. United States Government-funded 
     research carried out at National Laboratories is incredibly 
     important and sensitive. Whether a laboratory supports a 
     science mission or is oriented toward supporting national 
     security, it is critical that all foreign visitors and 
     assignees from countries of concern receive appropriate 
     vetting in order to mitigate counterintelligence risks. In 
     fiscal year 2023, more than 7,000 nationals from the PRC 
     visited 16 National Laboratories. Russian visitors numbered 
     more than 3,700. The Committees understand that international 
     cooperation on matters of basic, fundamental science helps 
     maintain the United States' technological edge. At the same 
     time, we need to protect both the classified research as well 
     as unclassified research that result in technologies with 
     dual-use applications, and which can be adapted for military 
     or economic gain, from getting into our adversaries' hands.
       The Committees therefore direct that DOE-IN require a 
     robust effort to screen and vet visitors or assignees to our 
     National Laboratories from the PRC, Russia, Iran, North 
     Korea, and Cuba. The Committees also direct DOE-IN to ensure 
     appropriate oversight over such screening and vetting to 
     ensure that counterintelligence threat information related 
     to potential assignees or visitors is appropriately 
     identified and tracked. The Committees further direct 
     that, not fewer than twice per year, the Director of DOE-
     IN shall submit to the Committees a report noting each 
     instance in which a visitor or assignee from the PRC, 
     Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, identified as a 
     significant counterintelligence risk was permitted access 
     to a National Laboratory.


   Briefing Relating to Certain Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
                     Activities of the Coast Guard

       Section 416 of H.R. 3932 provided the Commandant of the 
     Coast Guard with enhanced authority to obligate and expend 
     amounts made available under the National Intelligence 
     Program for intelligence and counterintelligence activities 
     if the object of the activity is of a confidential, 
     extraordinary, or emergency nature.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the Commandant of the 
     Coast Guard, no later than March 31, 2024, to brief the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the congressional 
     defense committees, the congressional appropriations 
     committees, the House Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure, and the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Technology on why this authority is necessary 
     and appropriate.


      Director of National Intelligence Notice to Congress Before 
Establishing New National Intelligence Center or Assigning Significant 
                    New Function to Existing Center

       The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence 
     to provide reasonable notice to the congressional 
     intelligence committees before the Director establishes a new 
     national intelligence center or assigns a significant new 
     function to an existing national intelligence center.


   Briefing Relating to Confidential Human Source Program of Federal 
                        Bureau of Investigation

       The Committees direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, no later than March 31, 2024, to brief the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
     judiciary committees on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
     management of confidential human sources, specifically 
     pertaining to the current notification requirements and 
     program review processes in

[[Page S5991]]

     the event that an agent of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation has reasonable grounds to believe that a 
     confidential human source, or any immediate family member of 
     such a source, has engaged in unauthorized criminal activity, 
     including any misdemeanor or felony crime.


    Enhanced Personnel Security Review with Respect to Social Media

       The Committees are of the view that--
       (1) A trusted national security and Intelligence Community 
     workforce is paramount to the protection of our nation's 
     security and to reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosures 
     of classified and other sensitive information;
       (2) the increased global availability and use of social 
     media accounts, including by members of the national security 
     workforce of the United States, increase the risk of 
     unauthorized disclosures of classified national security 
     information, which can endanger the United States and its 
     partners and allies, and empower foreign adversaries;
       (3) to maintain trust in and the protection of the national 
     security and Intelligence Community workforce of the United 
     States, the Intelligence Community must fully and 
     continuously use available vetting resources and all 
     authorities prescribed by law, while guaranteeing all 
     constitutional protections of such workforce;
       (4) the Intelligence Community must maintain high-quality 
     vetting processes and ensure appropriate and necessary 
     measures are taken to thoroughly and in a timely manner 
     investigate and adjudicate prospective applicants for 
     sensitive national security positions within the Intelligence 
     Community; and,
       (5) the Intelligence Community should use existing 
     authorities to ensure robust continuous vetting for continued 
     eligibility for access to classified information and 
     carefully manage the speed and accuracy of the security 
     clearance adjudication process at both the initial 
     investigation process and throughout the career of personnel 
     serving in positions within the Intelligence Community.


 Matters Pertaining to United States Economic and Emerging Technology 
               Competition with United States Adversaries

       The Committees support the National Intelligence Strategy 
     of 2023 goal of leveraging emerging technologies and their 
     adoption at scale. Sections 7502 through 7506 of the Act 
     further advance this objective, and the Committees expect the 
     Intelligence Community to implement these provisions 
     faithfully and expeditiously.


Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the Department of 
                              Agriculture

       Section 7318 establishes a counterintelligence office 
     located within the Department of Agriculture. Accordingly, 
     the Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit the report required in section 7318(f)(2) to the 
     Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Agriculture of the House, at the 
     same time that the Director submits the report to the 
     congressional intelligence and appropriations committees.

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