[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 162 (Tuesday, October 3, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4907-S4909]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                                 TikTok

  Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. President, last week, I came to the floor and 
brought forward the proof that the Biden administration allowed an 
Iranian influence operation to infiltrate our government, and they 
compromised one of the most sensitive weapons negotiations in our 
Nation's history. It was only after the media and Senate Republicans 
exposed this ongoing threat to our national security that the Biden 
administration agreed to investigate it.
  So, as I said, last week, I sent a letter to the Pentagon, demanding 
to know why Biden administration officials granted these operatives 
top-secret security clearances and sent them to negotiate with the very 
adversaries that they once worked for.
  But, today, I want to remind my colleagues of another influence 
operation that we have known of for a long time which requires no 
security clearance and no special access to government documents.
  For years, TikTok has been under scrutiny for its ties to the Chinese 
Communist Party. We know that this company openly violates basic 
privacy

[[Page S4908]]

standards, puts user data in the hands of the CCP, and subjects U.S. 
users to Chinese influence operations. Almost 100 million Americans 
have this app on their phones.
  And the Biden administration? They have very little to say about 
this. In fact, the President himself has embraced it as a tool to 
rehabilitate his failed policies with young voters. He has invited 
TikTok influencers to the White House.
  Still, my colleagues and I have made it impossible for the Biden 
administration to totally ignore the threat. TikTok has been in 
negotiations with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States. It is known as CFIUS. They are in negotiations on a potential 
framework called Project Texas that will supposedly keep Americans' 
data secure and make it impossible for Beijing to manipulate the flow 
of information in the app.
  A core component of these discussions involves measures to separate 
TikTok from its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. But, of course, we 
are already seeing the CCP find creative ways to get around that 
firewall.
  As you know, they have a habit of doing this with their propaganda 
schemes, whether it is Confucius classrooms, Confucius Institutes, 
Sister Cities programs, or a social media app, TikTok.
  The Wall Street Journal reported last week that this year, TikTok has 
transferred many high-level executives from ByteDance to TikTok in the 
United States. These executives are leading major divisions at TikTok, 
which provides the CCP with a significant degree of influence over the 
way they do business.
  The personnel changes undermine TikTok's independence from ByteDance, 
and there is no chance that this happened by accident.
  It is clear what TikTok is doing. They are repurposing ByteDance 
employees to masquerade as TikTok employees, undercutting the 
guardrails against Chinese espionage.
  We know that with the Confucius Institute, many of these professors 
who came our way were indeed connected and sent there by the Chinese 
Communist Party.
  Over the past 3 years, it has become clear that we cannot rely on the 
Biden administration to follow through on its promises to protect and 
defend this country and the citizens of this country. They fall behind 
repeatedly, especially when it is politically inconvenient to do so.
  So, today, Senator Blumenthal and I sent a letter to the CEO of 
TikTok demanding to know how many of his employees are former ByteDance 
employees? What are their jobs? What are the security protocols and 
other rules that are going to be imposed on these transfers? These are 
questions that we need the answers to.
  We also want to know if these personnel changes were disclosed to 
CFIUS before the Wall Street Journal published its article.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, October 3, 2023.
     Mr. Shou Zi Chew,
     Chief Executive Officer, TikTok,
     Culver City, CA.
       Dear Mr. Chew: We write regarding reports that TikTok has 
     recently hired several high-level executives from its Chinese 
     parent company ByteDance, further calling into question the 
     independence of TikTok's operations and the security of its 
     U.S. users' information.
       The Wall Street Journal recently reported that ``[slince 
     the start of the year, a string of high-level executives have 
     transferred from ByteDance to TikTok,'' moving from China to 
     the U.S., including after the departure of U.S. executives. 
     The former ByteDance executives have reportedly assumed 
     influential roles overseeing TikTok's ``advertising business, 
     human resources, monetization, business marketing and 
     products related to advertising and e-commerce initiatives'' 
     and have brought their own staff from Beijing.'' These 
     changes were alarming enough that employees raised concerns 
     about the lack of a true separation from ByteDance--
     reportedly joking that TikTok is solving its ByteDance 
     problem by moving ByteDance to the U.S.
       The relationship between ByteDance and TikTok poses a 
     unique risk to the security and privacy of TikTok's users in 
     the United States. TikTok executives, including personnel 
     based in China, have been found spying on American 
     journalists, and, in leaked recordings, its staff 
     acknowledged that ``everything is seen in China.'' As the 
     intelligence community has repeatedly warned, Chinese 
     national security laws provide the Chinese government 
     significant legal control over any data within the reach of 
     Chinese companies, thereby putting any data held by ByteDance 
     in the reach of the Chinese government.
       In response to these widespread concerns, TikTok has 
     repeatedly made commitments and representations to the 
     American public about the independent management of TikTok's 
     operations, the limited role of ByteDance, and the security 
     of U.S. users' information. You have attempted to distance 
     TikTok from ByteDance and promised a separation that 
     ''amounts to a firewall that seals off protected US user data 
     from unauthorized foreign access,'' with ``American data 
     stored on American soil by an American company, overseen by 
     American personnel.''
       However, the recent move of many ByteDance executives to 
     the U.S. seemingly undermines this assertion to Congress and 
     the public. The personnel changes give the impression that 
     TikTok is attempting to preserve ByteDance's influence over 
     TikTok while avoiding suspicion. Once again, TikTok's actions 
     appear to align with a pattern of misleading actions and 
     broken commitments regarding serious matters related to 
     users' safety and national security, which we noted in a 
     previous letter to you.
       We are concerned these personnel changes undermine the 
     security of U.S. data and the representations TikTok has made 
     about its independence from ByteDance. As such, please fully 
     answer the following questions by October 13:
       1. Prior to December 31, 2022, how many employees were 
     hired by TikTok who had previously worked at ByteDance?
       2. Since January 1, 2023, how many employees have been 
     hired by TikTok who previously worked at ByteDance?
       3. Please identify the roles of all current TikTok 
     employees who previously worked at ByteDance?
       4. Were these personnel changes disclosed to the Committee 
     on Foreign Investment in the United States prior to the 
     report in the Wall Street Journal?
       5. What security protocols are you imposing on ByteDance 
     employees that transfer from China to the U.S.?
       6. Are there any rules, restrictions, or controls on 
     communications between TikTok employees who were previously 
     employed at ByteDance and personnel based in China?
       7. How does TikTok supervise or oversee communications 
     between its employees who were previously employed at 
     ByteDance and personnel based in China?
           Sincerely,
     Marsha Blackburn,
       U.S. Senator.
     Richard Blumenthal,
       U.S. Senator.

  Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. President, we know that popular opinion would 
have each and every one of us believe that the threat posed by TikTok 
just isn't that serious. And we know from experience that the White 
House dislikes challenging popular opinion. After all, we hear: This is 
just an app the kids like to use. This is just a silly app with videos. 
This is an app that is putting up challenges. There is nothing wrong 
here.
  But what we do know is that TikTok gathers all of this information. 
They have insight into the virtual ``you.'' Once they are on your 
phone, they are following where you go, what you do, gathering 
keystrokes, and building that profile. We know this information leaves 
the United States, and we know this information makes its way to 
Beijing.
  Why do they think they need this information on U.S. citizens? Why do 
they think they need to follow U.S. citizens? All of this is a reason 
that CFIUS is reviewing TikTok.
  This country can no longer afford to take the word of our adversaries 
at face value. Self-propaganda--that is what the Chinese Communist 
Party is all about. They see that as a way to infiltrate our society, 
to infiltrate public opinion, to infiltrate and to influence elections.
  This is not the first letter Senator Blumenthal and I have sent to 
TikTok demanding transparency, and I would imagine this is not going to 
be the last.
  I know it is very difficult to accept that a silly video app that is 
liked by 100 million Americans could possibly pose a threat to our 
national security, but we believe that it does.
  I would remind my colleagues--indeed, anyone who has not deleted this 
spy app from their phones--to, please, recognize the threat that is 
there and do not provide your information to one of our greatest 
adversaries.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

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  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Markey). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.