[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 147 (Tuesday, September 12, 2023)]
[House]
[Pages H4239-H4242]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          FIGHT AND COMBAT RAMPANT IRANIAN MISSILE EXPORTS ACT

  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 3152) to impose sanctions with respect to countries, 
individuals, and entities that engage in any effort to acquire, 
possess, develop, transport, transfer, or deploy Iranian missiles and 
related goods and technology, including materials and equipment, and 
for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3152

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Fight and Combat Rampant 
     Iranian Missile Exports Act'' or the ``Fight CRIME Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     2231 (2015) restricts certain missile-related activities and 
     transfers to and from Iran, including all items, materials, 
     equipment, goods, and technology set out in the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime Annex, absent advance, case-by-case 
     approval from the United Nations Security Council.
       (2) Iran has transferred Shahed and Mohajer drones, covered 
     under the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, to the 
     Russian Federation, the Government of Ethiopia, and other 
     Iran-aligned entities, including the Houthis in Yemen and 
     militia units in Iraq, without prior authorization from the 
     United Nations Security Council, in violation of the 
     restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231.
       (3) Absent action by the United Nations Security Council, 
     certain missile-related restrictions in Annex B to United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 will expire in 
     October 2023, removing international legal restrictions on 
     missile-related activities and transfers to and from Iran.

     SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) to urgently seek the extension of missile-related 
     restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231 (2015);
       (2) to use all available authorities to constrain Iran's 
     domestic ballistic missile production capabilities;
       (3) to combat and deter the transfer of conventional and 
     non-conventional arms, equipment, material, and technology 
     to, or from Iran, or involving the Government of Iran; and
       (4) to ensure countries, individuals, and entities engaged 
     in, or attempting to engage in, the acquisition, 
     facilitation, or development of arms and related components 
     and technology subject to restrictions under Annex B to 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 are held to 
     account under United States and international law, including 
     through the application and enforcement of sanctions and use 
     of export controls, regardless of whether the restrictions 
     under Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     2231 remain in effect following their anticipated expiration 
     in October 2023.

     SEC. 4. REPORT.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for two 
     years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads 
     of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report, 
     with a classified annex if necessary, that includes the 
     following:
       (1) A diplomatic strategy to secure the renewal of 
     international restrictions on certain missile-related 
     activities, including transfers to and from Iran set forth in 
     Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
     (2015), prior to October 2023.
       (2) An analysis of how the expiration of missile-related 
     restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231 would impact the Government of Iran's 
     arms proliferation and malign activities, including as the 
     restrictions relate to cooperation with, and support for, 
     Iran-aligned entities and allied countries.
       (3) An assessment of the revenue, or in-kind benefits, to 
     be accrued by the Government of Iran, or Iran-aligned 
     entities, as a result of a lapse in missile-related 
     restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231.
       (4) A detailed description of a United States strategy to 
     deter, prevent, and disrupt the sale, purchase, or transfer 
     of covered technology involving Iran absent restrictions 
     pursuant to Annex B to United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 2231.
       (5) An identification of any foreign person engaging in, 
     enabling, or otherwise facilitating any activity involving 
     Iran restricted under Annex B to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231, regardless of whether such 
     restrictions remain in effect after October 2023.
       (6) A description of actions by the United Nations and 
     other multilateral organizations, including the European 
     Union, to hold accountable foreign persons that have violated 
     the restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 2231, and efforts to prevent 
     further violations of such restrictions.
       (7) A description of actions by individual member states of 
     the United Nations Security Council to hold accountable 
     foreign persons that have violated restrictions set forth in 
     Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
     and efforts to prevent further violations of such 
     restrictions.
       (8) A description of actions by the People's Republic of 
     China, the Russian Federation, or any other country to 
     prevent, interfere with, or undermine efforts to hold 
     accountable foreign persons that have violated the 
     restrictions set forth in Annex B to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231, including actions to restrict United 
     Nations-led investigations into suspected violations of such 
     restrictions, or limit funding to relevant United Nations 
     offices or experts.
       (9) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains 
     in Iran that directly or indirectly facilitate, support, or 
     otherwise aid the Government of Iran's drone or missile 
     program, including storage, transportation, or flight-testing 
     of related goods, technology, or components.
       (10) An identification of any foreign person, or network 
     containing foreign persons, that enables, supports, or 
     otherwise facilitates the operations or maintenance of any 
     Iranian airline subject to United States sanctions or export 
     control restrictions.

[[Page H4240]]

       (11) An assessment of how the continued operation of 
     Iranian airlines subject to United States sanctions or export 
     control restrictions impacts the Government of Iran's ability 
     to transport or develop arms, including covered technology.
       (b) Scope.--The initial report required by subsection (a) 
     shall address the period beginning on January 1, 2021, and 
     ending on the date that is 90 days after date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and each subsequent report shall 
     address the one-year period following the conclusion of the 
     prior report.

     SEC. 5. SANCTIONS TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF IRANIAN 
                   MISSILES.

       (a) In General.--The sanctions described in subsection (b) 
     shall apply to any foreign person the President determines, 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (1) knowingly engages in any effort to acquire, possess, 
     develop, transport, transfer, or deploy covered technology 
     to, from, or involving the Government of Iran or Iran-aligned 
     entities, regardless of whether the restrictions set forth in 
     Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
     (2015) remain in effect after October 2023;
       (2) knowingly provides entities owned or controlled by the 
     Government of Iran or Iran-aligned entities with goods, 
     technology, parts, or components, that may contribute to the 
     development of covered technology;
       (3) knowingly participates in joint missile or drone 
     development, including development of covered technology, 
     with the Government of Iran or Iran-aligned entities, 
     including technical training, storage, and transport;
       (4) knowingly imports, exports, or re-exports to, into, or 
     from Iran, whether directly or indirectly, any significant 
     arms or related materiel prohibited under paragraph (5) or 
     (6) to Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     2231 (2015) as of April 1, 2023;
       (5) knowingly provides significant financial, material, or 
     technological support to, or knowingly engages in a 
     significant transaction with, a foreign person subject to 
     sanctions for conduct described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), 
     or (4); or
       (6) is an adult family member of a person subject to 
     sanctions for conduct described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), 
     or (4).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
     authorities granted under the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent 
     necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property 
     and interests in property of the foreign person if such 
     property and interests in property are in the United States, 
     come within the United States, or come within the possession 
     or control of a United States person.
       (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
       (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in 
     subsection (a) shall be--
       (i) inadmissible to the United States;
       (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to 
     enter the United States; and
       (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into 
     the United States or to receive any other benefit under the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 16 seq.).
       (B) Current visas revoked.--
       (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of 
     any alien described in subsection (a) is subject to 
     revocation regardless of the issue date of the visa or other 
     entry documentation.
       (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) 
     shall, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i))--

       (I) take effect immediately; and
       (II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation 
     that is in the possession of the alien.

       (c) Penalties.--Any person that violates, or attempts to 
     violate, subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order 
     issued pursuant to that subsection, shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to 
     the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.
       (d) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
     sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person 
     only if, not later than 15 days prior to the date on which 
     the waiver is to take effect, the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a written determination 
     and justification that the waiver is in the vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       (e) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 
     and 1704) to carry out any amendments made by this section.
       (f) Regulations.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall, not later than 120 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate 
     regulations as necessary for the implementation of this Act 
     and the amendments made by this Act.
       (2) Notification to congress.--Not less than 10 days before 
     the promulgation of regulations under subsection (a), the 
     President shall notify the appropriate congressional 
     committees of the proposed regulations and the provisions of 
     this Act and the amendments made by this Act that the 
     regulations are implementing.
       (g) Exceptions.--
       (1) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under 
     this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the 
     reporting requirements under title V of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized 
     intelligence activities of the United States.
       (2) Exception to comply with international obligations and 
     for law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section 
     shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or 
     paroling the alien into the United States is necessary--
       (A) to permit the United States to comply with the 
     Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 
     signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 
     November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United 
     States, or other applicable international obligations; or
       (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement 
     activity in the United States.
       (h) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.--
       (1) In general.--The authorities and requirements to impose 
     sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the 
     authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the 
     importation of goods.
       (2) Good defined.--In this subsection, the term ``good'' 
     means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, 
     supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test 
     equipment, and excluding technical data.
       (i) Termination of Sanctions.--This section shall cease to 
     be effective beginning on the date that is 30 days after the 
     date on which the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that--
       (1) the Government of Iran no longer repeatedly provides 
     support for international terrorism as determined by the 
     Secretary of State pursuant to--
       (A) section 1754(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act 
     of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4318(c)(1)(A));
       (B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2371);
       (C) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780); or
       (D) any other provision of law; and
       (2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and 
     development of, and verifiably dismantled its, nuclear, 
     biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and 
     ballistic missile launch technology.

     SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person''--
       (A) means an individual or entity that is not a United 
     States person; and
       (B) includes a foreign state (as such term is defined in 
     section 1603 of title 28, United States Code).
       (3) Government of iran.--The term ``Government of Iran'' 
     has the meaning given such term in section 560.304 of title 
     31, Code of Federal Regulations, as such section was in 
     effect on January 1, 2021.
       (4) United states person.--The terms ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen;
       (B) a permanent resident alien of the United States;
       (C) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity; or
       (D) a person in the United States.
       (5) Iran-aligned entity.--The term ``Iran-aligned entity'' 
     means a foreign person that--
       (A) is controlled or significantly influenced by the 
     Government of Iran; and
       (B) knowingly receives material or financial support from 
     the Government of Iran, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, or 
     any other proxy group that furthers Iran's national security 
     objectives.
       (6) Covered technology.--The term ``covered technology'' 
     means--
       (A) any goods, technology, software, or related material 
     specified in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, as 
     in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act; and
       (B) any additional goods, technology, software, or related 
     material added to the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex 
     after the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (7) Family member.--The term ``family member'' means--
       (A) a child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, sibling, or 
     spouse; and
       (B) any spouse, widow, or widower of an individual 
     described in subparagraph (A).
       (8) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (9) Missile technology control regime.--The term ``Missile 
     Technology Control Regime'' means the policy statement, 
     between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal 
     Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, 
     announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-
     relevant

[[Page H4241]]

     transfers based on the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     Annex, and any amendments thereto or expansions thereof, as 
     in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (10) Missile technology control regime annex.--The term 
     ``Missile Technology Control Regime Annex'' means the 
     Guidelines and Equipment and Technology Annex of the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime, and any amendments thereto or 
     updates thereof, as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. McCaul) and the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Dean) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.


                             General Leave

  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous material on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran poses an existential threat to the global balance 
of power, threatening our national security, as well as those of our 
allies, and regional stability.
  General Kurilla, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, who I met 
with at the Munich Security Conference, testified to Congress this year 
that Iran possessed both the largest and most diverse missile arsenal 
in the Middle East and the largest and most capable unmanned aerial 
vehicle, or drone, force in the region, which is why the passage of the 
Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act is so vital.
  For years, we have seen Iran and its terrorist proxies use these 
weapons against the United States as well as our partners and allies 
throughout the Middle East.
  In January 2020, Iran launched a missile attack on U.S. troops in 
Iraq. Iranian UAVs are frequently used to attack U.S. servicemembers 
and personnel in the Middle East. These UAVs are a deadly threat that 
have killed and wounded Americans.
  Iranian UAVs have also been used in destructive strikes on Saudi- and 
Israeli-linked targets. Iran frequently provides these deadly weapons 
to its proxies, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militia 
groups.
  Now, Iran's lethal drones are wreaking havoc outside the Middle East. 
Hundreds of these drones have been deployed by Vladimir Putin against 
civilian and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, becoming a key element 
in his unprovoked war of aggression and war crimes.
  For years, Iran's missile and drone proliferation to its terror 
proxies and to Russia has taken place in outright violation of the 
United Nations international embargo on Iran's missile and drone 
programs.
  We note that the Ayatollah, Vladimir Putin, and Iran's terrorist 
proxies don't care about violating U.N. resolutions, but other 
countries do. Next month, these international restrictions on Iran's 
lethal missile and drone programs will expire after 15 years. I am 
deeply concerned that the marketplace for Iran's missiles and drones 
will expand. Dangerous autocrats, war criminals, and terrorists around 
the world will turn to Iran for missiles and drones, just as we saw 
them doing following the expiration of the U.N. arms embargo on Iran in 
2020.
  That is why it is urgent that the House pass my bipartisan bill, the 
Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports, or Fight CRIME, Act. 
The bill, which I was proud to introduce with Ranking Member Meeks, 
imposes strict mandatory sanctions on Iran's missile and drone 
capability to fill the gap left by the expiration of the U.N. 
restrictions.
  Everyone must know that if they purchase Iran's weapons of war, they 
will be frozen out of the U.S. financial system, denied use of the U.S. 
dollar, and denied access to the United States. For years, Iran and its 
proxies have rained hell on the Middle East from the sky with their 
attack UAVs. Now Iran's dangerous arsenal is enabling Russian war 
crimes and the devastation of Ukraine.
  We cannot wait to act until the U.N. restrictions expire. We need to 
prevent these weapons sales now before these deadly missiles and drones 
are on the battlefield. In fact, Iran is working with Russia inside of 
Russia to make these very drones.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the bill, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.

                                                September 1, 2023.
     Hon. Michael McCaul,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
       Dear Chairman McCaul: I write regarding H.R. 3152, the 
     Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act. 
     Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's 
     Rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with 
     us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that 
     it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill 
     so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
       The Committee takes this action with the understanding that 
     forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in 
     any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any 
     future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their 
     subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment 
     of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a 
     conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar 
     legislation.
       I ask that you please include this letter in your 
     committee's report to accompany this legislation. I 
     appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees 
     have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working 
     collaboratively in the future on matters of shared 
     jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Jim Jordan,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                               September 11, 2023.
     Hon. Jim Jordan,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
     Washington, D.C.
       Dear Chairman Jordan: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from 
     further consideration of H.R. 3152, the ``Fight and Combat 
     Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act,'' so that the measure 
     may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate 
     conference on this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate 
     your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward 
     to continuing to work together as this measure moves through 
     the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael T. McCaul,
                                                         Chairman.

  Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, for decades, the United States and our allies have 
harbored grave concerns regarding Iran's ballistic missile program. 
Leading among those concerns is the fear that they are being developed 
to one day deploy a nuclear warhead. However, we have also experienced 
Iran's short- and medium-range missiles that pose a direct and deadly 
threat to American forces in the region and the territories of numerous 
allies and partners.
  Iran currently has more than 3,000 ballistic missiles in its 
stockpile. In recent years, despite international pressure, these 
missiles have achieved a much greater range and accuracy. Iran has also 
supplied precision-guided missiles and drones to proxies in Lebanon and 
Syria. Iran's growing missile capabilities could one day allow it to 
threaten Europe and the United States' mainland directly.
  Without a doubt, it is in the interest of the United States to 
prevent Iran from further expanding its missile capabilities. Today, 
global sanctions are in place which aim to limit Iran's missile 
program. They are found in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, 
and unfortunately, they are set to expire in October of 2023. Russia 
and China's presence on the Security Council has made it impossible to 
negotiate an extension of these multilateral sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, in October, when the U.N. regulations expire, Iran would 
be free in the eyes of the U.N. to develop nuclear weapon delivery 
systems, including ICBMs that could reach the United States homeland. 
Let's be clear. Iran has never abided by the missile restrictions 
outlined in the Security

[[Page H4242]]

Council resolution, but when the sanctions expire, it would open the 
door for Iran to advance its missile program by utilizing technologies 
more freely from around the world.
  Upon expiration of the sanctions, Iranian leaders will immediately 
gain access to items it cannot easily acquire domestically, such as 
gyroscopes, sensors, and numerous other sophisticated components 
necessary for modern ballistic missiles. Upon securing these 
technologies from abroad, Iran could begin to reverse engineer them and 
begin domestic production as it has done in the past.
  That is why, together with our allies, we must act. I applaud the 
European Union for telling Iran they plan to retain their own EU, 
European Union, ballistic missile sanctions set to expire in October. 
Today we want to send Iran the message that the United States intends 
to do the same.
  That is why we are considering this bipartisan legislation introduced 
by Chairman McCaul that imposes mandatory property blocking and visa 
sanctions on anyone involved in the supply, sale, or transfer of or 
support for Iran's missiles and drones. The legislation also requires 
the executive branch to submit a report on the Iranian missiles and 
drones to Congress, specifically outlining their strategy to counter 
this menace.
  Mr. Speaker, there is near-global consensus that Iran should not be 
allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon or the missile that could help them 
carry one. I encourage all of my colleagues to support this important 
bipartisan legislation.
  Therefore, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
measure. I thank Mr. McCaul and Ranking Member Meeks, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I thank Congresswoman Dean for her strong 
support of this measure and her leadership.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. I reserve the right to 
close, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume for the purpose of closing.
  The threat of Iranian missiles and drones is real. The clock is 
ticking, and Congress, the United States Government, and the world at 
large needs to act. This bill is an important measure to prevent Iran 
from being able to acquire more sophisticated technology as a result of 
the expiring sanctions.
  I thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Meeks for introducing this 
legislation, and I strongly urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Despite what you may hear about partisan divides, our committee, I 
think, stands apart. This bill to impose sanctions on those doing 
business with Iran's missile and drone program was introduced by myself 
and Ranking Member Meeks of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It passed 
our committee unanimously. It has over 225 cosponsors, with a mix of 
Republicans and Democrats.
  Congress and the American people are keenly aware of the destructive 
power of Iran's drones, and we are absolutely committed to reining in 
this threat. We are united in delivering a bipartisan message to 
countries around the world: Do not buy or acquire Iranian drones and 
missiles. Do not associate yourself with the IRGC, Vladimir Putin, or 
Iran's terrorist proxies.
  Putin and the Ayatollah may try to ramp up their military 
cooperation, but we will do everything in our power to stop them, and 
in doing so, safeguard free democracies around the world.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan measure, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3152, 
the Fight CRIME Act.
  This bill looks to impose sanctions with respect to countries, 
individuals, and entities that engage in any effort to acquire, 
possess, develop, transport, transfer, or deploy Iranian missiles and 
related goods and technology.
  For years, the Government of Iran has proven to be erratic and 
unpredictable.
  With thousands of people being arbitrarily detained or unfairly 
prosecuted solely for peacefully exercising their human rights.
  Women, people of the LGBTQ+ community, and people of ethnic and 
religious minority suffer intensified discrimination and violence in 
Iran.
  We must impose visa- and property-blocking sanctions on foreign 
persons that are knowingly involved with Iran or Iran-aligned entities 
in certain missile-related activities.
  This involves the acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, 
transferring, or deploying missiles or related items and technology 
that are covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, or 
developing missile or drone technologies.
  We must also impose sanctions on certain adult family members of 
those who are subject to the sanctions previously mentioned.
  Foreign persons who knowingly provide significant support to or 
engage in a significant transaction with those are also subject to the 
sanctions previously mentioned.
  The bill also requires the Department of State to report to Congress 
on various topics, including a diplomatic strategy to renew 
international restrictions on certain missile-related activities.
  The Government of Iran brought this upon themselves.
  The many accounts of enforced disappearances, torture and other ill-
treatment are just some of many atrocities committed by the Iranian 
Government.
  Similarly, the usage of the death penalty increased, and public 
executions resumed.
  The people of Iran are tired of the regime forcing its unjust will on 
them.
  In 2022 alone, more than 500 people were killed by the violent 
crackdown on protesting in Iran.
  Additionally, more than 14,000 people were arrested, including 
protesters, journalists, lawyers, activists, artists, and athletes who 
voiced support for the freedom movement.
  There are countless more stories and recollections as to why the 
Government of Iran should face these sanctions.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 3152, the Fight 
and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act, and the limiting of the 
Iranian Government.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul) that the House suspend the rules and 
pass the bill, H.R. 3152, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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