[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 125 (Thursday, July 20, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3466-S3482]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 994. Mr. WARNER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 2226, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2024 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

    DIVISION _--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

     SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this 
     division is as follows:

    DIVISION _--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

           Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters

Sec. 301. Plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with experience 
              in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
Sec. 302. Policy and performance framework for mobility of intelligence 
              community workforce.
Sec. 303. In-State tuition rates for active duty members of the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence 
              vulnerability assessments and surveys.
Sec. 305. Improving administration of certain post-employment 
              restrictions for intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
              Center.
Sec. 307. Prohibition relating to transport of individuals detained at 
              United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 308. Department of Energy science and technology risk assessments.
Sec. 309. Congressional oversight of intelligence community risk 
              assessments.
Sec. 310. Inspector General review of dissemination by Federal Bureau 
              of Investigation Richmond, Virginia, field office of 
              certain document.
Sec. 311. Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 321. Change to penalties and increased availability of mental 
              health treatment for unlawful conduct on Central 
              Intelligence Agency installations.
Sec. 322. Modifications to procurement authorities of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

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Sec. 323. Establishment of Central Intelligence Agency standard 
              workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation 
              procedure.

             TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

                 Subtitle A--People's Republic of China

Sec. 401. Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of 
              atrocities of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 402. Interagency working group and report on the malign efforts of 
              the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 403. Amendment to requirement for annual assessment by 
              intelligence community working group for monitoring the 
              economic and technological capabilities of the People's 
              Republic of China.
Sec. 404. Assessments of reciprocity in the relationship between the 
              United States and the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 405. Annual briefing on intelligence community efforts to identify 
              and mitigate Chinese Communist Party and Russian foreign 
              malign influence operations against the United States.
Sec. 406. Assessment of threat posed to United States ports by cranes 
              manufactured by countries of concern.

                  Subtitle B--Other Foreign Countries

Sec. 411. Report on efforts to capture and detain United States 
              citizens as hostages.
Sec. 412. Sense of Congress on priority of fentanyl in National 
              Intelligence Priorities Framework.

  TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING 
         TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

Sec. 501. Assignment of detailees from intelligence community to 
              Department of Commerce.
Sec. 502. Threats posed by information and communications technology 
              and services transactions and other activities.
Sec. 503. Support of intelligence community for export controls and 
              other missions of the Department of Commerce.

   Subtitle B--Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial 
                              Intelligence

Sec. 511. Expanded annual assessment of economic and technological 
              capabilities of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 512. Assessment of using civil nuclear energy for intelligence 
              community capabilities.
Sec. 513. Policies established by Director of National Intelligence for 
              artificial intelligence capabilities.

                    TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Submittal to Congress of complaints and information by 
              whistleblowers in the intelligence community.
Sec. 602. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as 
              reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees 
              and contractors in intelligence community.
Sec. 603. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance 
              and access determinations.
Sec. 604. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory 
              revocation of security clearances and access 
              determinations.
Sec. 605. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.

                    TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM

             Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Definitions.
Sec. 703. Classification and declassification of information.
Sec. 704. Transparency officers.

            Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023

Sec. 711. Short title.
Sec. 712. Definitions.
Sec. 713. Findings and sense of the Senate.
Sec. 714. Classification authority.
Sec. 715. Promoting efficient declassification review.
Sec. 716. Training to promote sensible classification.
Sec. 717. Improvements to Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 718. Implementation of technology for classification and 
              declassification.
Sec. 719. Studies and recommendations on necessity of security 
              clearances.

          TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE

Sec. 801. Review of shared information technology services for 
              personnel vetting.
Sec. 802. Timeliness standard for rendering determinations of trust for 
              personnel vetting.
Sec. 803. Annual report on personnel vetting trust determinations.
Sec. 804. Survey to assess strengths and weaknesses of Trusted 
              Workforce 2.0.
Sec. 805. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to classified 
              information solely because of past use of cannabis.

                  TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Sec. 901. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by the Central 
              Intelligence Agency for qualifying injuries to the brain.
Sec. 902. Clarification of requirements to seek certain benefits 
              relating to injuries to the brain.
Sec. 903. Intelligence community implementation of HAVANA Act of 2021 
              authorities.
Sec. 904. Report and briefing on Central Intelligence Agency handling 
              of anomalous health incidents.

                       TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY

Sec. 1001. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for 
              Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2023.

                        TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 1101. Modification of reporting requirement for All-domain Anomaly 
              Resolution Office.
Sec. 1102. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous 
              phenomena.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning 
     given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2024 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the 
     intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany this division.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2024 the sum of $658,950,000.
       (b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In 
     addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), 
     there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2024 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

     SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund 
     $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

           Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters

     SEC. 301. PLAN TO RECRUIT, TRAIN, AND RETAIN PERSONNEL WITH 
                   EXPERIENCE IN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
                   EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of human capital

[[Page S3468]]

     of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
     Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives a plan for the 
     intelligence community to recruit, train, and retain 
     personnel who have skills and experience in financial 
     intelligence and emerging technologies in order to improve 
     analytic tradecraft.
       (b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following elements:
       (1) An assessment, including measurable benchmarks of 
     progress, of current initiatives of the intelligence 
     community to recruit, train, and retain personnel who have 
     skills and experience in financial intelligence and emerging 
     technologies.
       (2) An assessment of whether personnel in the intelligence 
     community who have such skills are currently well integrated 
     into the analytical cadre of the relevant elements of the 
     intelligence community that produce analyses with respect to 
     financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
       (3) An identification of challenges to hiring or 
     compensation in the intelligence community that limit 
     progress toward rapidly increasing the number of personnel 
     with such skills, and an identification of hiring or other 
     reforms to resolve such challenges.
       (4) A determination of whether the National Intelligence 
     University has the resources and expertise necessary to train 
     existing personnel in financial intelligence and emerging 
     technologies.
       (5) A strategy, including measurable benchmarks of 
     progress, to, by January 1, 2025, increase by 10 percent the 
     analytical cadre of personnel with expertise and previous 
     employment in financial intelligence and emerging 
     technologies.

     SEC. 302. POLICY AND PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILITY OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel 
     Management as the Director of National Intelligence considers 
     appropriate, develop and implement a policy and performance 
     framework to ensure the timely and effective mobility of 
     employees and contractors of the Federal Government who are 
     transferring employment between elements of the intelligence 
     community.
       (b) Elements.--The policy and performance framework 
     required by subsection (a) shall include processes with 
     respect to the following:
       (1) Human resources.
       (2) Medical reviews.
       (3) Determinations of suitability or eligibility for access 
     to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 
     13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes 
     related to suitability for Government employment, fitness for 
     contractor employees, and eligibility for access to 
     classified national security information).

     SEC. 303. IN-STATE TUITION RATES FOR ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 135(d) of the Higher Education Act 
     of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d(d)), as amended by section 
     6206(a)(4) of the Foreign Service Families Act of 2021 
     (Public Law 117-81), is further amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) a member of the intelligence community (as defined in 
     section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3003)) (other than a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States) who is on active duty for a period of more than 30 
     days.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect at each public institution of higher 
     education in a State that receives assistance under the 
     Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) for the 
     first period of enrollment at such institution that begins 
     after July 1, 2026.

     SEC. 304. STANDARDS, CRITERIA, AND GUIDANCE FOR 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
                   AND SURVEYS.

       Section 904(d)(7)(A) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement 
     Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7)(A)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(A) Counterintelligence vulnerability assessments and 
     surveys.--To develop standards, criteria, and guidance for 
     counterintelligence risk assessments and surveys of the 
     vulnerability of the United States to intelligence threats, 
     including with respect to critical infrastructure and 
     critical technologies, in order to identify the areas, 
     programs, and activities that require protection from such 
     threats.''.

     SEC. 305. IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN POST-EMPLOYMENT 
                   RESTRICTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3073a) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``A former'' and inserting the following:
       ``(A) In general.--A former''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Prior disclosure to director of national 
     intelligence.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the case of a former employee who 
     occupies a covered post-service position in violation of 
     subsection (a), whether the former employee voluntarily 
     notified the Director of National Intelligence of the intent 
     of the former employee to occupy such covered post-service 
     position before occupying such post-service position may be 
     used in determining whether the violation was knowing and 
     willful for purposes of subparagraph (A).
       ``(ii) Procedures and guidance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may establish procedures and guidance relating 
     to the submittal of notice for purposes of clause (i).''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the restrictions under 
     subsection (a) and'' before ``the report requirements'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``ceases to occupy'' and 
     inserting ``occupies''; and
       (C) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``before the person 
     ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position'' and 
     inserting ``when the person occupies a covered intelligence 
     position''.

     SEC. 306. MISSION OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 
                   SECURITY CENTER.

       (a) In General.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence 
     Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as 
     subsections (e) through (j), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Mission.--The mission of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center shall include 
     organizing and leading strategic planning for 
     counterintelligence activities of the United States 
     Government by integrating instruments of national power as 
     needed to counter foreign intelligence activities.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Counterintelligence enhancement act of 2002.--Section 
     904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 
     U.S.C. 3383) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (e), as redesignated by subsection 
     (a)(1), by striking ``Subject to subsection (e)'' both places 
     it appears and inserting ``Subject to subsection (f)''; and
       (B) in subsection (f), as so redesignated--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (d)(1)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (e)(1)''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (d)(2)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (e)(2)''.
       (2) Counterintelligence and security enhancements act of 
     1994.--Section 811(d)(1)(B)(ii) of the Counterintelligence 
     and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C. 
     3381(d)(1)(B)(ii)) is amended by striking ``section 904(d)(2) 
     of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(2))'' and inserting ``section 
     904(e)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(e)(2))''.

     SEC. 307. PROHIBITION RELATING TO TRANSPORT OF INDIVIDUALS 
                   DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, 
                   GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) Definition of Individual Detained at Guantanamo.--In 
     this section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 1034(f)(2) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 
     (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 971; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).
       (b) Prohibition on Chartering Private or Commercial 
     Aircraft to Transport Individuals Detained at United States 
     Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.--No head of an element 
     of the intelligence community may charter any private or 
     commercial aircraft to transport an individual who is or was 
     an individual detained at Guantanamo.

     SEC. 308. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RISK 
                   ASSESSMENTS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Country of risk.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``country of risk'' means a 
     foreign country determined by the Secretary, in accordance 
     with subparagraph (B), to present a risk of theft of United 
     States intellectual property or a threat to the national 
     security of the United States if nationals of the country, or 
     entities owned or controlled by the country or nationals of 
     the country, participate in any research, development, 
     demonstration, or deployment activity authorized under this 
     Act or an amendment made by this Act.
       (B) Determination.--In making a determination under 
     subparagraph (A), the Secretary, in coordination with the 
     Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence, shall take into consideration--
       (i) the most recent World Wide Threat Assessment of the 
     United States Intelligence Community, prepared by the 
     Director of National Intelligence; and
       (ii) the most recent National Counterintelligence Strategy 
     of the United States.
       (2) Covered support.--The term ``covered support'' means 
     any grant, contract, subcontract, award, loan, program, 
     support, or other activity authorized under this Act or an 
     amendment made by this Act.
       (3) Entity of concern.--The term ``entity of concern'' 
     means any entity, including a national, that is--
       (A) identified under section 1237(b) of the Strom Thurmond 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note; Public Law 105-261);
       (B) identified under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) 
     Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283);

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       (C) on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry 
     and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in 
     Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations;
       (D) included in the list required by section 9(b)(3) of the 
     Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 
     134 Stat. 656); or
       (E) identified by the Secretary, in coordination with the 
     Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence and the applicable office that would 
     provide, or is providing, covered support, as posing an 
     unmanageable threat--
       (i) to the national security of the United States; or
       (ii) of theft or loss of United States intellectual 
     property.
       (4) National.--The term ``national'' has the meaning given 
     the term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
       (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Energy.
       (b) Science and Technology Risk Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop and maintain 
     tools and processes to manage and mitigate research security 
     risks, such as a science and technology risk matrix, informed 
     by threats identified by the Director of the Office of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to facilitate 
     determinations of the risk of loss of United States 
     intellectual property or threat to the national security of 
     the United States posed by activities carried out under any 
     covered support.
       (2) Content and implementation.--In developing and using 
     the tools and processes developed under paragraph (1), the 
     Secretary shall--
       (A) deploy risk-based approaches to evaluating, awarding, 
     and managing certain research, development, demonstration, 
     and deployment activities, including designations that will 
     indicate the relative risk of activities;
       (B) assess, to the extent practicable, ongoing high-risk 
     activities;
       (C) designate an officer or employee of the Department of 
     Energy to be responsible for tracking and notifying 
     recipients of any covered support of unmanageable threats to 
     United States national security or of theft or loss of United 
     States intellectual property posed by an entity of concern;
       (D) consider requiring recipients of covered support to 
     implement additional research security mitigations for 
     higher-risk activities if appropriate; and
       (E) support the development of research security training 
     for recipients of covered support on the risks posed by 
     entities of concern.
       (3) Annual updates.--The tools and processes developed 
     under paragraph (1) shall be evaluated annually and updated 
     as needed, with threat-informed input from the Office of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to reflect changes in 
     the risk designation under paragraph (2)(A) of research, 
     development, demonstration, and deployment activities 
     conducted by the Department of Energy.
       (c) Entity of Concern.--
       (1) Prohibition.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), no 
     entity of concern, or individual that owns or controls, is 
     owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or 
     control with an entity of concern, may receive, or perform 
     work under, any covered support.
       (2) Waiver of prohibition.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary may waive the prohibition 
     under paragraph (1) if determined by the Secretary to be in 
     the national interest.
       (B) Notification to congress.--Not less than 2 weeks prior 
     to issuing a waiver under subparagraph (A), the Secretary 
     shall notify Congress of the intent to issue the waiver, 
     including a justification for the waiver.
       (3) Penalty.--
       (A) Termination of support.--On finding that any entity of 
     concern or individual described in paragraph (1) has received 
     covered support and has not received a waiver under paragraph 
     (2), the Secretary shall terminate all covered support to 
     that entity of concern or individual, as applicable.
       (B) Penalties.--An entity of concern or individual 
     identified under subparagraph (A) shall be--
       (i) prohibited from receiving or participating in covered 
     support for a period of not less than 1 year but not more 
     than 10 years, as determined by the Secretary; or
       (ii) instead of the penalty described in clause (i), 
     subject to any other penalties authorized under applicable 
     law or regulations that the Secretary determines to be in the 
     national interest.
       (C) Notification to congress.--Prior to imposing a penalty 
     under subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall notify Congress 
     of the intent to impose the penalty, including a description 
     of and justification for the penalty.
       (4) Coordination.--The Secretary shall--
       (A) share information about the unmanageable threats 
     described in subsection (a)(3)(E) with other Federal 
     agencies; and
       (B) develop consistent approaches to identifying entities 
     of concern.
       (d) International Agreements.--This section shall be 
     applied in a manner consistent with the obligations of the 
     United States under international agreements.
       (e) Report Required.--Not later than 240 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to 
     Congress a report that--
       (1) describes--
       (A) the tools and processes developed under subsection 
     (b)(1) and any updates to those tools and processes; and
       (B) if applicable, the science and technology risk matrix 
     developed under that subsection and how that matrix has been 
     applied;
       (2) includes a mitigation plan for managing risks posed by 
     countries of risk with respect to future or ongoing research 
     and development activities of the Department of Energy; and
       (3) defines critical research areas, designated by risk, as 
     determined by the Secretary.

     SEC. 309. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   RISK ASSESSMENTS.

       (a) Risk Assessment Documents and Materials.--Except as 
     provided in subsection (b), whenever an element of the 
     intelligence community conducts a risk assessment arising 
     from the mishandling or improper disclosure of classified 
     information, the Director of National Intelligence shall, not 
     later than 30 days after the date of the commencement of such 
     risk assessment--
       (1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
     copies of such documents and materials as are--
       (A) within the jurisdiction of such committees; and
       (B) subject to the risk assessment; and
       (2) provide such committees a briefing on such documents, 
     materials, and risk assessment.
       (b) Exception.--If the Director determines, with respect to 
     a risk assessment described in subsection (a), that the 
     documents and other materials otherwise subject to paragraph 
     (1) of such subsection (a) are of such a volume that 
     submittal pursuant to such paragraph would be impracticable, 
     the Director shall--
       (1) in lieu of submitting copies of such documents and 
     materials, submit a log of such documents and materials; and
       (2) pursuant to a request by the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of 
     a document or material included in such log, submit to such 
     committee such copy.

     SEC. 310. INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF DISSEMINATION BY 
                   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RICHMOND, 
                   VIRGINIA, FIELD OFFICE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENT.

       (a) Review Required.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of 
     the Department of Justice shall conduct a review of the 
     actions and events, including any underlying policy 
     direction, that served as a basis for the January 23, 2023, 
     dissemination by the field office of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation located in Richmond, Virginia, of a document 
     titled ``Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent 
     Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost 
     Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities.''.
       (b) Submittal to Congress.--The Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall submit the findings of the 
     Inspector General with respect to the review required by 
     subsection (a) to the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on 
     Oversight and Accountability, and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 311. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS.

       Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     121) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(h) Prohibition.--
       ``(1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term `United 
     States person' means a United States citizen, an alien known 
     by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent 
     resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially 
     composed of United States citizens or permanent resident 
     aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, 
     except for a corporation directed and controlled by 1 or more 
     foreign governments.
       ``(2) Collection of information from united states 
     persons.--
       ``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage 
     in the collection of information or intelligence targeting 
     any United States person except as provided in subparagraph 
     (B).
       ``(B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any 
     employee, officer, or contractor of the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis who is responsible for collecting 
     information from individuals working for a State, local, or 
     Tribal territory government or a private employer.''.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 321. CHANGE TO PENALTIES AND INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF 
                   MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSTALLATIONS.

       Section 15(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(b)) is amended, in the second sentence, 
     by striking ``those specified in section 1315(c)(2) of title 
     40, United States Code'' and inserting ``the maximum penalty 
     authorized for a Class B misdemeanor under section 3559 of 
     title 18, United States Code''.

[[Page S3470]]

  


     SEC. 322. MODIFICATIONS TO PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       Section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 3503) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``sections'' and all 
     that follows through ``session)'' and inserting ``sections 
     3201, 3203, 3204, 3206, 3207, 3302 through 3306, 3321 through 
     3323, 3801 through 3808, 3069, 3134, 3841, and 4752 of title 
     10, United States Code'' and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``in paragraphs'' and 
     all that follows through ``1947'' and inserting ``in sections 
     3201 through 3204 of title 10, United States Code, shall not 
     be delegable. Each determination or decision required by 
     sections 3201 through 3204, 3321 through 3323, and 3841 of 
     title 10, United States Code''.

     SEC. 323. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   STANDARD WORKPLACE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT 
                   INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE.

       (a) Workplace Sexual Misconduct Defined.--The term 
     ``workplace sexual misconduct''--
       (1) means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
     favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
     nature when--
       (A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or 
     implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment;
       (B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an 
     individual is used as the basis for employment decisions 
     affecting such individual; or
       (C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
     interfering with an individual's work performance or creating 
     an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment; 
     and
       (2) includes sexual harassment and sexual assault.
       (b) Standard Complaint Investigation Procedure.--Not later 
     than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall--
       (1) establish a standard workplace sexual misconduct 
     complaint investigation procedure;
       (2) implement the standard workplace sexual misconduct 
     complaint investigation procedure through clear workforce 
     communication and education on the procedure; and
       (3) submit the standard workplace sexual misconduct 
     complaint investigation procedure to the congressional 
     intelligence committees.
       (c) Minimum Requirements.--The procedure established 
     pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall, at a minimum--
       (1) identify the individuals and offices of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency to which an employee of the Agency may 
     bring a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct;
       (2) detail the steps each individual or office identified 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) shall take upon receipt of a 
     complaint of workplace sexual misconduct and the timeframes 
     within which those steps shall be taken, including--
       (A) documentation of the complaint;
       (B) referral or notification to another individual or 
     office;
       (C) measures to document or preserve witness statements or 
     other evidence; and
       (D) preliminary investigation of the complaint;
       (3) set forth standard criteria for determining whether a 
     complaint of workplace sexual misconduct will be referred to 
     law enforcement and the timeframe within which such a 
     referral shall occur; and
       (4) for any complaint not referred to law enforcement, set 
     forth standard criteria for determining--
       (A) whether a complaint has been substantiated; and
       (B) for any substantiated complaint, the appropriate 
     disciplinary action.
       (d) Annual Reports.--On or before April 30 of each year, 
     the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense 
     of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives an annual report that includes, for the 
     preceding calendar year, the following:
       (1) The number of workplace sexual misconduct complaints 
     brought to each individual or office of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency identified pursuant to subsection (c)(1), 
     disaggregated by--
       (A) complaints referred to law enforcement; and
       (B) complaints substantiated.
       (2) For each complaint described in paragraph (1) that is 
     substantiated, a description of the disciplinary action taken 
     by the Director.

             TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

                 Subtitle A--People's Republic of China

     SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR 
                   ACCOUNTABILITY OF ATROCITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Atrocity.--The term ``atrocity'' means a crime against 
     humanity, genocide, or a war crime.
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means--
       (A) any person or entity that is not a United States 
     person; or
       (B) any entity not organized under the laws of the United 
     States or of any jurisdiction within the United States.
       (3) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
       (b) Intelligence Community Coordinator for Accountability 
     of Atrocities of the People's Republic of China.--
       (1) Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall designate a senior official of the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the 
     intelligence community coordinator for accountability of 
     atrocities of the People's Republic of China (in this section 
     referred to as the ``Coordinator'').
       (2) Duties.--The Coordinator shall lead the efforts of and 
     coordinate and collaborate with the intelligence community 
     with respect to the following:
       (A) Identifying and addressing any gaps in intelligence 
     collection relating to atrocities of the People's Republic of 
     China, including by recommending the modification of the 
     priorities of the intelligence community with respect to 
     intelligence collection and by utilizing informal processes 
     and collaborative mechanisms with key elements of the 
     intelligence community to increase collection on atrocities 
     of the People's Republic of China.
       (B) Prioritizing and expanding the intelligence analysis 
     with respect to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic 
     of China and disseminating within the United States 
     Government intelligence relating to the identification and 
     activities of foreign persons suspected of being involved 
     with or providing support to atrocities of the People's 
     Republic of China, including genocide and forced labor 
     practices in Xinjiang, in order to support the efforts of 
     other Federal agencies, including the Department of State, 
     the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, 
     the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Department of 
     Commerce, the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Customs 
     and Border Protection, and the National Security Council, to 
     hold the People's Republic of China accountable for such 
     atrocities.
       (C) Increasing efforts to declassify and share with the 
     people of the United States and the international community 
     information regarding atrocities of the People's Republic of 
     China in order to expose such atrocities and counter the 
     disinformation and misinformation campaign by the People's 
     Republic of China to deny such atrocities.
       (D) Documenting and storing intelligence and other 
     unclassified information that may be relevant to preserve as 
     evidence of atrocities of the People's Republic of China for 
     future accountability, and ensuring that other relevant 
     Federal agencies receive appropriate support from the 
     intelligence community with respect to the collection, 
     analysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination, 
     of intelligence related to atrocities of the People's 
     Republic of China, which may include the information from the 
     annual report required by section 6504 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).
       (E) Sharing information with the Forced Labor Enforcement 
     Task Force, established under section 741 of the United 
     States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 
     4681), the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the 
     Treasury for the purposes of entity listings and sanctions.
       (3) Plan required.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress--
       (A) the name of the official designated as the Coordinator 
     pursuant to paragraph (1); and
       (B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the 
     collection and dissemination of intelligence relating to 
     ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China, 
     including a detailed description of how the Coordinator shall 
     support, and assist in facilitating the implementation of, 
     such strategy.
       (4) Annual report to congress.--
       (A) Reports required.--Not later than May 1, 2024, and 
     annually thereafter until May 1, 2034, the Director shall 
     submit to Congress a report detailing, for the year covered 
     by the report--
       (i) the analytical findings, changes in collection, and 
     other activities of the intelligence community with respect 
     to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China;
       (ii) the recipients of information shared pursuant to this 
     section for the purpose of--

       (I) providing support to Federal agencies to hold the 
     People's Republic of China accountable for such atrocities; 
     and
       (II) sharing information with the people of the United 
     States to counter the disinformation and misinformation 
     campaign by the People's Republic of China to deny such 
     atrocities; and

       (iii) with respect to clause (ii), the date of any such 
     sharing.
       (B) Form.--Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) may 
     be submitted in classified form, consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods.
       (c) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the 
     date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 402. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON THE MALIGN 
                   EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 
                   AFRICA.

       (a) Establishment.--

[[Page S3471]]

       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence 
     community as the Director considers appropriate, shall 
     establish an interagency working group within the 
     intelligence community to analyze the tactics and 
     capabilities of the People's Republic of China in Africa.
       (2) Establishment flexibility.--The working group 
     established under paragraph (1) may be--
       (A) independently established; or
       (B) to avoid redundancy, incorporated into existing working 
     groups or cross-intelligence efforts within the intelligence 
     community.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In 
     this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of 
     Congress'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee 
     on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
     and
       (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee 
     on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and twice annually thereafter, the 
     working group established under subsection (a) shall submit 
     to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
     specific tactics and capabilities of the People's Republic of 
     China in Africa.
       (3) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (2) shall 
     include the following elements:
       (A) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China to exploit mining and reprocessing 
     operations in Africa.
       (B) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China to provide or fund technologies in 
     Africa, including--
       (i) telecommunications and energy technologies, such as 
     advanced reactors, transportation, and other commercial 
     products; and
       (ii) by requiring that the People's Republic of China be 
     the sole provider of such technologies.
       (C) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China to expand intelligence 
     capabilities in Africa.
       (D) A description of actions taken by the intelligence 
     community to counter such efforts.
       (E) An assessment of additional resources needed by the 
     intelligence community to better counter such efforts.
       (4) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (2) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex if necessary.
       (c) Sunset.--The requirements of this section shall 
     terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 403. AMENDMENT TO REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL ASSESSMENT BY 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP FOR 
                   MONITORING THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
                   CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Section 6503(c)(3)(D) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117-263) is 
     amended by striking ``the top 200'' and inserting ``all the 
     known''.

     SEC. 404. ASSESSMENTS OF RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
                   BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State 
     for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with the 
     Director of National Intelligence and such other heads of 
     elements of the intelligence community as the Assistant 
     Secretary considers relevant, shall submit to Congress the 
     following:
       (1) A comprehensive assessment that identifies critical 
     areas in the security, diplomatic, economic, financial, 
     technological, scientific, commercial, academic, and cultural 
     spheres in which the United States does not enjoy a 
     reciprocal relationship with the People's Republic of China.
       (2) A comprehensive assessment that describes how the lack 
     of reciprocity between the People's Republic of China and the 
     United States in the areas identified in the assessment 
     required by paragraph (1) provides advantages to the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (b) Form of Assessments.--
       (1) Critical areas.--The assessment required by subsection 
     (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
       (2) Advantages.--The assessment required by subsection 
     (a)(2) shall be submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 405. ANNUAL BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS 
                   TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE CHINESE COMMUNIST 
                   PARTY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE 
                   OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Chinese entities engaged in foreign malign influence 
     operations.--The term ``hinese entities engaged in foreign 
     malign influence operations'' means all of the elements of 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
     Chinese Communist Party involved in foreign malign influence, 
     such as--
       (A) the Ministry of State Security;
       (B) other security services of the People's Republic of 
     China;
       (C) the intelligence services of the People's Republic of 
     China;
       (D) the United Front Work Department and other united front 
     organs;
       (E) state-controlled media systems, such as the China 
     Global Television Network (CGTN); and
       (F) any entity involved in foreign malign influence 
     operations that demonstrably and intentionally disseminate 
     false information and propaganda of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.
       (2) Russian malign influence actors.--The term ``Russian 
     malign influence actors'' refers to entities or individuals 
     engaged in foreign malign influence operations against the 
     United States who are affiliated with--
       (A) the intelligence and security services of the Russian 
     Federation
       (B) the Presidential Administration;
       (C) any other entity of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation; or
       (D) Russian mercenary or proxy groups such as the Wagner 
     Group.
       (3) Foreign malign influence operation.--The term ``foreign 
     malign influence operation'' means a coordinated and often 
     concealed activity that is covered by the definition of the 
     term ``foreign malign influence'' in section 119C of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059) and uses 
     disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion, 
     targeted investments, corruption, or academic censorship, 
     which are often intended--
       (A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, values, 
     institutions, or individuals; and
       (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes 
     in the United States that support the interests of the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese 
     Communist Party.
       (b) Briefing Required.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter 
     until the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Foreign Malign 
     Influence Center shall, in collaboration with the heads of 
     the elements of the intelligence community, provide Congress 
     a classified briefing on the ways in which the relevant 
     elements of the intelligence community are working internally 
     and coordinating across the intelligence community to 
     identify and mitigate the actions of Chinese and Russian 
     entities engaged in foreign malign influence operations 
     against the United States, including against United States 
     persons.
       (c) Elements.--The classified briefing required by 
     subsection (b) shall cover the following:
       (1) The Government of the Russian Federation, the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese 
     Communist Party tactics, tools, and entities that spread 
     disinformation, misinformation, and malign information and 
     conduct influence operations, information campaigns, or other 
     propaganda efforts.
       (2) A description of ongoing foreign malign influence 
     operations and campaigns of the Russian Federation against 
     the United States and an assessment of their objectives and 
     effectiveness in meeting those objectives.
       (3) A description of ongoing foreign malign influence 
     operations and campaigns of the People's Republic of China 
     against the United States and an assessment of their 
     objectives and effectiveness in meeting those objectives.
       (4) A description of any cooperation, information-sharing, 
     amplification, or other coordination between the Russian 
     Federation and the People's Republic of China in developing 
     or carrying out foreign malign influence operations against 
     the United States.
       (5) A description of front organizations, proxies, cut-
     outs, aligned third-party countries, or organizations used by 
     the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China to 
     carry out foreign malign influence operations against the 
     United States.
       (6) An assessment of the loopholes or vulnerabilities in 
     United States law that Russia and the People's Republic of 
     China exploit to carry out foreign malign influence 
     operations.
       (7) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center, in 
     coordination with the Global Engagement Center, relating to 
     early-warning, information sharing, and proactive risk 
     mitigation systems, based on the list of entities identified 
     in subsection (a)(1), to detect, expose, deter, and counter 
     foreign malign influence operations of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party 
     against the United States.
       (8) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center to 
     conduct outreach, to identify and counter tactics, tools, and 
     entities described in paragraph (1) by sharing information 
     with allies and partners of the United States, in 
     coordination with the Global Engagement Center, as well as 
     State and local governments, the business community, and 
     civil society in order to expose the political influence 
     operations and information operations of the Government of 
     the Russian

[[Page S3472]]

     Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China or the Chinese Communist Party carried out against 
     individuals and entities in the United States.

     SEC. 406. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT POSED TO UNITED STATES PORTS 
                   BY CRANES MANUFACTURED BY COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Subcommittee on 
     Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Oversight and Accountability, the Committee on Financial 
     Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Country of concern.--The term ``country of concern'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the 
     State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 
     2651a(m)(1)).
       (b) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with such other heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate 
     and the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct an assessment of 
     the threat posed to United States ports by cranes 
     manufactured by countries of concern and commercial entities 
     of those countries, including the Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy 
     Industries Co. (ZPMC).
       (c) Report and Briefing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit a report and provide a briefing to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress on the findings of the 
     assessment required by subsection (b).
       (2) Elements.--The report and briefing required by 
     paragraph (1) shall outline the potential for the cranes 
     described in subsection (b) to collect intelligence, disrupt 
     operations at United States ports, and impact the national 
     security of the United States.
       (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

                  Subtitle B--Other Foreign Countries

     SEC. 411. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN UNITED 
                   STATES CITIZENS AS HOSTAGES.

       (a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In 
     this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the 
     Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (b) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on efforts by the Maduro regime in 
     Venezuela to detain United States citizens and lawful 
     permanent residents.
       (c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall 
     include, regarding the arrest, capture, detainment, or 
     imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful permanent 
     residents, the following:
       (1) The names, positions, and institutional affiliation of 
     Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on their behalf, who 
     have engaged in such activities.
       (2) A description of any role played by transnational 
     criminal organizations, and an identification of such 
     organizations.
       (3) Where relevant, an assessment of whether and how United 
     States citizens and lawful permanent residents have been 
     lured to Venezuela.
       (4) An analysis of the motive for the arrest, capture, 
     detainment, or imprisonment of United States citizens and 
     lawful permanent residents.
       (5) The total number of United States citizens and lawful 
     permanent residents detained or imprisoned in Venezuela as of 
     the date on which the report is submitted.
       (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 412. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITY OF FENTANYL IN 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES FRAMEWORK.

       It is the sense of Congress that the trafficking of illicit 
     fentanyl, including precursor chemicals and manufacturing 
     equipment associated with illicit fentanyl production and 
     organizations that traffic or finance the trafficking of 
     illicit fentanyl, originating from the People's Republic of 
     China and Mexico should be among the highest priorities in 
     the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence.

  TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING 
         TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

     SEC. 501. ASSIGNMENT OF DETAILEES FROM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   TO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

       (a) Authority.--In order to better facilitate the sharing 
     of actionable intelligence on foreign adversary intent, 
     capabilities, threats, and operations that pose a threat to 
     the interests or security of the United States, particularly 
     as they relate to the procurement, development, and use of 
     dual-use and emerging technologies, the Director of National 
     Intelligence may assign or facilitate the assignment of 
     members from across the intelligence community to serve as 
     detailees to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the 
     Department of Commerce.
       (b) Assignment.--Detailees assigned pursuant to subsection 
     (a) shall be drawn from such elements of the intelligence 
     community as the Director considers appropriate, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Commerce.
       (c) Expertise.--The Director shall ensure that detailees 
     assigned pursuant to subsection (a) have subject matter 
     expertise on countries of concern, including China, Iran, 
     North Korea, and Russia, as well as functional areas such as 
     illicit procurement, counterproliferation, emerging and 
     foundational technology, economic and financial intelligence, 
     information and communications technology systems, supply 
     chain vulnerability, and counterintelligence.
       (d) Duty Credit.--The detail of an employee of the 
     intelligence community to the Department of Commerce under 
     subsection (a) shall be without interruption or loss of civil 
     service status or privilege.

     SEC. 502. THREATS POSED BY INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 
                   TECHNOLOGY AND SERVICES TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered transaction.--The term ``covered transaction'' 
     means a transaction reviewed under authority established 
     under Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive 
     Order 14034, or any successor order.
       (2) Emerging and foundational technologies.--The term 
     ``emerging and foundational technologies'' means emerging and 
     foundational technologies described in section 1758(a)(1) of 
     the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4817(a)(1)).
       (3) Executive order 13873.--The term ``Executive Order 
     13873'' means Executive Order 13873 (84 Fed. Reg. 22689; 
     relating to securing information and communications 
     technology and services supply chain).
       (4) Executive order 13984.--The term ``Executive Order 
     13984'' means Executive Order 13984 (86 Fed. Reg. 6837; 
     relating to taking additional steps to address the national 
     emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled 
     activities).
       (5) Executive order 14034.--The term ``Executive Order 
     14034'' means Executive Order 14034 (84 Fed. Reg. 31423; 
     relating to protecting Americans' sensitive data from foreign 
     adversaries).
       (6) Significant transaction.--The term ``significant 
     transaction'' means a covered transaction that--
       (A) involves emerging or foundational technologies;
       (B) poses an undue or unacceptable risk to national 
     security; and
       (C) involves--
       (i) an individual who acts as an agent, representative, or 
     employee, or any individual who acts in any other capacity at 
     the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a 
     foreign adversary or of an individual whose activities are 
     directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, 
     financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part by a 
     foreign adversary;
       (ii) any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen or 
     resident of a nation-state controlled by a foreign adversary;
       (iii) any corporation, partnership, association, or other 
     organization organized under the laws of a nation-state 
     controlled by a foreign adversary; or
       (iv) any corporation, partnership, association, or other 
     organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is 
     owned or controlled by a foreign adversary.
       (b) Threat Assessment by Director of National 
     Intelligence.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall expeditiously carry out a threat assessment of each 
     significant transaction.
       (2) Identification of gaps.--Each assessment required by 
     paragraph (1) shall include the identification of any 
     recognized gaps in the collection of intelligence relevant to 
     the assessment.
       (3) Views of intelligence community.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall seek and incorporate into each 
     assessment required by paragraph (1) the views of all 
     affected or appropriate elements of the intelligence 
     community with respect to the significant transaction or 
     class of significant transactions.
       (4) Provision of assessment.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide an assessment required by 
     paragraph (1) to such agency heads and committees of Congress 
     as the Director considers appropriate, as necessary, to 
     implement Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, 
     Executive Order 14034, or any successor order.
       (c) Interaction With Intelligence Community.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall ensure that the intelligence community remains engaged 
     in the collection, analysis, and dissemination to such agency 
     heads as the Director considers

[[Page S3473]]

     appropriate of any additional relevant information that may 
     become available during the course of any investigation or 
     review process conducted under authority established under 
     Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 
     14034, or any successor order.
       (2) Elements.--The collection, analysis, and dissemination 
     of information described in paragraph (1) shall include 
     routine assessments of the following:
       (A) The intent, capability, and operations of foreign 
     adversaries as related to a significant transaction or class 
     of significant transactions.
       (B) Supply chains and procurement networks associated with 
     the procurement of emerging and foundational technologies by 
     foreign adversaries.
       (C) Emerging and foundational technologies pursued by 
     foreign adversaries, including information on prioritization, 
     spending, and technology transfer measures.
       (D) The intent, capability, and operations of the use by 
     malicious cyber actors of infrastructure as a service (IaaS) 
     against the United States.
       (E) The impact on the intelligence community of a 
     significant transaction or class of significant transactions.
       (d) Information in Civil Actions.--
       (1) Protected information in civil actions.--(A) If a civil 
     action challenging an action or finding under Executive Order 
     13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any 
     successor order is brought, and the court determines that 
     protected information in the administrative record relating 
     to the action or finding, including classified or other 
     information subject to privilege or protections under any 
     provision of law, is necessary to resolve the action, that 
     information shall be submitted ex parte and in camera to the 
     court and the court shall maintain that information under 
     seal.
       (B) If the Court determines that, in order to resolve the 
     civil action, it is necessary to make such protected 
     information available to a party to the litigation, other 
     than the government, the Court shall conduct an ex parte and 
     in camera hearing to make all determinations concerning the 
     use, relevance, or admissibility of such protected 
     information before such protected information is disclosed to 
     a party other than then government.
       (C) Nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to 
     require the government to disclose such protected information 
     to a party other than the government.
       (D) If the government declines to disclose such protected 
     information to a party after the court has determined that it 
     is necessary for the government to do so in order to resolve 
     the civil action, the court may order an appropriate remedy, 
     including entering a judgment in favor of the party. Any such 
     judgement shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.
       (E) This paragraph does not confer or imply any right to 
     judicial review.
       (2) Nonapplicability of use of information provisions.--The 
     use of information provisions of sections 106, 305, 405, and 
     706 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1806, 1825, 1845, and 1881e) shall not apply in a 
     civil action described in paragraph (1).
       (e) Rule of Construction Concerning Right to Access.--No 
     provision of this section may be construed to create a right 
     to obtain access to information in the possession of the 
     Federal Government that was considered by the Secretary of 
     Commerce under authority established under Executive Order 
     13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any 
     successor order, including any classified information or 
     sensitive but unclassified information.
       (f) Administrative Record.--The following information may 
     be included in the administrative record relating to an 
     action or finding described in subsection (d)(1) and shall be 
     submitted only to the court ex parte and in camera:
       (1) Sensitive security information, as defined in section 
     1520.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (2) Privileged law enforcement information.
       (3) Information obtained or derived from any activity 
     authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), except that, with respect to 
     such information, subsections (c), (e), (f), (g), and (h) of 
     section 106 (50 U.S.C. 1806), subsections (d), (f), (g), (h), 
     and (i) of section 305 (50 U.S.C. 1825), subsections (c), 
     (e), (f), (g), and (h) of section 405 (50 U.S.C. 1845), and 
     section 706 (50 U.S.C. 1881e) of that Act shall not apply.
       (4) Information subject to privilege or protection under 
     any other provision of law, including the Currency and 
     Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (31 U.S.C. 5311 et 
     seq.).
       (g) Treatment Consistent With Section.--Any information 
     that is part of the administrative record filed ex parte and 
     in camera under subsection (d)(1), or cited by the court in 
     any decision in a civil action described in such subsection, 
     shall be treated by the court consistent with the provisions 
     of this section. In no event shall such information be 
     released to the petitioner or as part of the public record.
       (h) Inapplicability of Freedom of Information Act.--Any 
     information submitted to the Federal Government by a party to 
     a covered transaction in accordance with this section, as 
     well as any information the Federal Government may create 
     relating to review of the covered transaction, is exempt from 
     disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly referred to as the ``Freedom of Information Act'').
       (i) Inapplicability to Other Authorities.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to modify authority established 
     under Executive Order 13913 (47 U.S.C. 154 note; relating to 
     establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign 
     Participation in the United States Telecommunications 
     Services Sector), including the process and timelines 
     established therein.

     SEC. 503. SUPPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR EXPORT 
                   CONTROLS AND OTHER MISSIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF COMMERCE.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Emerging and foundational technologies.--The term 
     ``emerging and foundational technologies'' includes 
     technologies identified under section 1758(a)(1) of the 
     Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4817(a)(1)).
       (2) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary'' 
     means any foreign government, foreign regime, or foreign 
     nongovernment person determined by the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of such other 
     agencies as the Director considers appropriate, to have 
     engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of 
     conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the 
     United States or the security and safety of United States 
     persons.
       (b) Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination Required.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence--
       (A) is authorized to collect, retain, analyze, and 
     disseminate information or intelligence necessary to support 
     the missions of the Department of Commerce, including with 
     respect to the administration of export controls pursuant to 
     the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et 
     seq.); and
       (B) shall, through regular consultation with the Secretary 
     of Commerce, ensure that the intelligence community is 
     engaged in such collection, retention, analysis, and 
     dissemination.
       (2) Information to be collected, analyzed, and 
     disseminated.--The information to be collected, analyzed, and 
     disseminated under subsection (a) shall include information 
     relating to the following:
       (A) The intent, capability, and operations of foreign 
     adversaries with respect to items under consideration to be 
     controlled pursuant to the authority provided by part I of 
     the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811 et 
     seq.).
       (B) Attempts by foreign adversaries to circumvent controls 
     on items imposed pursuant to that part.
       (C) Supply chains and procurement networks associated with 
     procurement and development of emerging and foundational 
     technologies by foreign adversaries.
       (D) Emerging and foundational technologies pursued by 
     foreign adversaries, including relevant information on 
     prioritization, spending, and technology transfer measures 
     with respect to such technologies.
       (E) The scope and application of the export control systems 
     of foreign countries, including decisions with respect to 
     individual export transactions.
       (F) Corporate and contractual relationships, ownership, and 
     other equity interests, including monetary capital 
     contributions, corporate investments, and joint ventures, 
     resulting in end uses of items that threaten the national 
     security and foreign policy interests of the United States, 
     as described in the policy set forth in section 1752 of the 
     Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811).
       (G) The effect of export controls imposed pursuant to part 
     I of that Act (50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.), including--
       (i) the effect of actions taken and planned to be taken by 
     the Secretary of Commerce under the authority provided by 
     that part; and
       (ii) the effectiveness of such actions in achieving the 
     national security and foreign policy objectives of such 
     actions.
       (c) Provision of Analysis to Department of Commerce.--Upon 
     the request of the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall expeditiously--
       (1) carry out analysis of any matter relating to the 
     national security of the United States that is relevant to a 
     mission of the Department of Commerce; and
       (2) consistent with the protection of sources and methods, 
     make such analysis available to the Secretary and such 
     individuals as the Secretary may designate to receive such 
     analysis.
       (d) Identification of Single Office to Support Missions of 
     Department of Commerce.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall identify a single office within the 
     intelligence community to be responsible for supporting the 
     missions of the Department of Commerce.
       (e) Treatment of Classified and Sensitive Information.--
       (1) In general.--A civil action challenging an action or 
     finding of the Secretary of Commerce made on the basis of any 
     classified or sensitive information made available to 
     officials of the Department of Commerce pursuant to this 
     section may be brought only in the United States Court of 
     Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

[[Page S3474]]

       (2) Consideration and treatment in civil actions.--(A) If a 
     civil action described in paragraph (1) is brought, and the 
     court determines that protected information in the 
     administrative record, including classified or other 
     information subject to privilege or protections under any 
     provision of law, is necessary to resolve the civil action, 
     that information shall be submitted ex parte and in camera to 
     the court and the court shall maintain that information under 
     seal.
       (B) If the Court determines that, in order to resolve the 
     civil action, it is necessary to make such protected 
     information available to a party to the litigation, other 
     than the government, the Court shall conduct an ex parte and 
     in camera hearing to make all determinations concerning the 
     use, relevance, or admissibility of such protected 
     information before such protected information is disclosed to 
     a party other than then government.
       (C) Nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to 
     require the government to disclose such protected information 
     to a party other than the government.
       (D) If the government declines to disclose such protected 
     information to a party after the court has determined that it 
     is necessary for the government to do so in order to resolve 
     the civil action, the court may order an appropriate remedy, 
     to include entering a judgment in favor of the party. Any 
     such judgement shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.
       (E) This paragraph does not confer or imply any right to 
     judicial review.
       (3) Administrative record.--
       (A) In general.--The following information may be included 
     in the administrative record relating to an action or finding 
     described in paragraph (1) and shall be submitted only to the 
     court ex parte and in camera:
       (i) Sensitive security information, as defined by section 
     1520.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (ii) Privileged law enforcement information.
       (iii) Information obtained or derived from any activity 
     authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
       (iv) Information subject to privilege or protection under 
     any other provision of law.
       (B) Treatment consistent with section.--Any information 
     that is part of the administrative record filed ex parte and 
     in camera under subparagraph (A), or cited by the court in 
     any decision in a civil action described in paragraph (1), 
     shall be treated by the court consistent with the provisions 
     of this subsection. In no event shall such information be 
     released to the petitioner or as part of the public record.
       (4) Nonapplicability of use of information provisions.--The 
     use of information provisions of sections 106, 305, 405, and 
     706 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1806, 1825, 1845, and 1881e) shall not apply in a 
     civil action challenging an action or finding of the 
     Secretary of Commerce made on the basis of information made 
     available to officials of the Department of Commerce pursuant 
     to this section.
       (5) Rule of construction concerning right to access.--No 
     provision of this section shall be construed to create a 
     right to obtain access to information in the possession of 
     the Federal Government that was considered in an action or 
     finding of the Secretary of Commerce, including any 
     classified information or sensitive but unclassified 
     information.

   Subtitle B--Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial 
                              Intelligence

     SEC. 511. EXPANDED ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC AND 
                   TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(I) A detailed assessment, prepared in consultation with 
     all elements of the working group--
       ``(i) of the investments made by the People's Republic of 
     China in--

       ``(I) artificial intelligence;
       ``(II) next-generation energy technologies, especially 
     small modular reactors and advanced batteries; and
       ``(III) biotechnology; and

       ``(ii) that identifies--

       ``(I) competitive practices of the People's Republic of 
     China relating to the technologies described in clause (i);
       ``(II) opportunities to counter the practices described in 
     subclause (I);
       ``(III) countries the People's Republic of China is 
     targeting for exports of civil nuclear technology;
       ``(IV) countries best positioned to utilize civil nuclear 
     technologies from the United States in order to facilitate 
     the commercial export of those technologies;
       ``(V) United States vulnerabilities in the supply chain of 
     these technologies; and
       ``(VI) opportunities to counter the export by the People's 
     Republic of China of civil nuclear technologies globally.

       ``(J) An identification and assessment of any unmet 
     resource or authority needs of the working group that affect 
     the ability of the working group to carry out this 
     section.''.

     SEC. 512. ASSESSMENT OF USING CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES.

       (a) Assessment Required.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such 
     other elements of the intelligence community as the Director 
     considers appropriate, conduct an assessment of capabilities 
     identified by the Intelligence Community Continuity Program 
     established pursuant to section E(3) of Intelligence 
     Community Directive 118, or any successor directive, or such 
     other intelligence community facilities or intelligence 
     community capabilities as may be determined by the Director 
     to be critical to United States national security, that have 
     unique energy needs--
       (1) to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of using 
     civil nuclear reactors to meet such needs; and
       (2) to identify such additional resources, technologies, 
     infrastructure, or authorities needed, or other potential 
     obstacles, to commence use of a nuclear reactor to meet such 
     needs.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
     Oversight and Accountability and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report, 
     which may be in classified form, on the findings of the 
     Director with respect to the assessment conducted pursuant to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 513. POLICIES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   CAPABILITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1), by striking ``subsection (b)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (c)'';
       (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Policies.--
       ``(1) In general.--In carrying out subsection (a)(1), not 
     later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the 
     Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
     heads of the elements of the intelligence community, the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and such 
     other officials as the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines appropriate, shall establish the policies 
     described in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) Policies described.--The policies described in this 
     paragraph are policies for the acquisition, adoption, 
     development, use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial 
     intelligence capabilities that--
       ``(A) establish a lexicon relating to the use of machine 
     learning and artificial intelligence developed or acquired by 
     elements of the intelligence community;
       ``(B) establish guidelines for evaluating the performance 
     of models developed or acquired by elements of the 
     intelligence community, such as by--
       ``(i) specifying conditions for the continuous monitoring 
     of artificial intelligence capabilities for performance, 
     including the conditions for retraining or retiring models 
     based on performance;
       ``(ii) documenting performance objectives, including 
     specifying how performance objectives shall be developed and 
     contractually enforced for capabilities procured from third 
     parties;
       ``(iii) specifying the manner in which models should be 
     audited, as necessary, including the types of documentation 
     that should be provided to any auditor; and
       ``(iv) specifying conditions under which models used by 
     elements of the intelligence community should be subject to 
     testing and evaluation for vulnerabilities to techniques 
     meant to undermine the availability, integrity, or privacy of 
     an artificial intelligence capability;
       ``(C) establish guidelines for tracking dependencies in 
     adjacent systems, capabilities, or processes impacted by the 
     retraining or sunsetting of any model described in 
     subparagraph (B);
       ``(D) establish documentation requirements for capabilities 
     procured from third parties, aligning such requirements, as 
     necessary, with existing documentation requirements 
     applicable to capabilities developed by elements of the 
     intelligence community;
       ``(E) establish standards for the documentation of imputed, 
     augmented, or synthetic data used to train any model 
     developed, procured, or used by an element of the 
     intelligence community; and
       ``(F) provide guidance on the acquisition and usage of 
     models that have previously been trained by a third party for 
     subsequent modification and usage by such an element.
       ``(3) Policy review and revision.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall periodically review and revise each policy 
     established under paragraph (1).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 6712(b)(1) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 3024 note) is amended by striking ``section 
     6702(b)'' and inserting ``section 6702(c)''.

[[Page S3475]]

  


                    TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS

     SEC. 601. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF COMPLAINTS AND INFORMATION 
                   BY WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       (a) Amendments to Chapter 4 of Title 5.--
       (1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 416 of title 
     5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(i) Appointment of Security Officers.--Each Inspector 
     General under this section, including the designees of the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Defense pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(3), shall appoint within their offices 
     security officers to provide, on a permanent basis, 
     confidential, security-related guidance and direction to 
     employees and contractors described in subsection (b)(1) who 
     intend to report to Congress complaints or information, so 
     that such employees and contractors can obtain direction on 
     how to report to Congress in accordance with appropriate 
     security practices.''.
       (2) Procedures.--Subsection (e) of such section is 
     amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or any other committee 
     of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives'' after ``either or both of the intelligence 
     committees'';
       (B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) Limitation.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the employee may contact an intelligence committee or another 
     committee of jurisdiction directly as described in paragraph 
     (1) of this subsection or in subsection (b)(4) only if the 
     employee--
       ``(i) before making such a contact, furnishes to the head 
     of the establishment, through the Inspector General (or 
     designee), a statement of the employee's complaint or 
     information and notice of the employee's intent to contact an 
     intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction 
     of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly; and
       ``(ii)(I) obtains and follows, from the head of the 
     establishment, through the Inspector General (or designee), 
     procedural direction on how to contact an intelligence 
     committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate 
     or the House of Representatives in accordance with 
     appropriate security practices; or
       ``(II) obtains and follows such procedural direction from 
     the applicable security officer appointed under subsection 
     (i).
       ``(B) Lack of procedural direction.--If an employee seeks 
     procedural direction under subparagraph (A)(ii) and does not 
     receive such procedural direction within 30 days, or receives 
     insufficient direction to report to Congress a complaint or 
     information, the employee may contact an intelligence 
     committee or any other committee of jurisdiction of the 
     Senate or the House of Representatives directly without 
     obtaining or following the procedural direction otherwise 
     required under such subparagraph.''; and
       (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) Committee members and staff.--An employee of an 
     element of the intelligence community who intends to report 
     to Congress a complaint or information may report such 
     complaint or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or 
     Ranking Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence 
     committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate 
     or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the 
     committee staff designated for purposes of receiving 
     complaints or information under this section, or a member of 
     the majority staff and a member of the minority staff of the 
     committee.''.
       (3) Clarification of right to report directly to 
     congress.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Clarification of right to report directly to 
     congress.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection 
     (e), an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information 
     may report such complaint or information directly to 
     Congress.''.
       (b) Amendments to National Security Act of 1947.--
       (1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 103H(j) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office 
     of the Inspector General security officers as required by 
     section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.''.
       (2) Procedures.--Subparagraph (D) of section 103H(k)(5) of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended--
       (A) in clause (i), by inserting ``or any other committee of 
     jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives'' 
     after ``either or both of the congressional intelligence 
     committees'';
       (B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:
       ``(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee 
     may contact a congressional intelligence committee or another 
     committee of jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i) 
     only if the employee--
       ``(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
     Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
     employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
     employee's intent to contact a congressional intelligence 
     committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate 
     or the House of Representatives directly; and
       ``(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through 
     the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact 
     a congressional intelligence committee or another committee 
     of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives 
     in accordance with appropriate security practices; or
       ``(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from 
     the applicable security officer appointed under section 
     416(i) of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under 
     subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural 
     direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction 
     to report to Congress a complaint or information, the 
     employee may contact a congressional intelligence committee 
     or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the 
     House of Representatives directly without obtaining or 
     following the procedural direction otherwise required under 
     such subclause.'';
       (C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and
       (D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
       ``(iii) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or 
     information may report such complaint or information to the 
     Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may 
     be, of a congressional intelligence committee or another 
     committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff 
     designated for purposes of receiving complaints or 
     information under this section, or a member of the majority 
     staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.''.
       (3) Clarification of right to report directly to 
     congress.--Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended--
       (A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph 
     (D), an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information 
     may report such complaint or information directly to 
     Congress, regardless of whether the complaint or information 
     is with respect to an urgent concern--
       ``(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information 
     under clause (i); or
       ``(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or 
     information under clause (i).''.
       (c) Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949.--
       (1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 17(d)(5) of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     3517(d)(5)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(I) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office 
     of the Inspector General security officers as required by 
     section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.''.
       (2) Procedures.--Subparagraph (D) of such section is 
     amended--
       (A) in clause (i), by inserting ``or any other committee of 
     jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives'' 
     after ``either or both of the intelligence committees'';
       (B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:
       ``(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee 
     may contact an intelligence committee or another committee of 
     jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i) only if the 
     employee--
       ``(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
     Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
     employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
     employee's intent to contact an intelligence committee or 
     another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House 
     of Representatives directly; and
       ``(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through 
     the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact 
     an intelligence committee or another committee of 
     jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives in 
     accordance with appropriate security practices; or
       ``(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from 
     the applicable security officer appointed under section 
     416(i) of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under 
     subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural 
     direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction 
     to report to Congress a complaint or information, the 
     employee may contact an intelligence committee or another 
     committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives directly without obtaining or following the 
     procedural direction otherwise required under such 
     subclause.'';
       (C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and
       (D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
       ``(iii) An employee of the Agency who intends to report to 
     Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint 
     or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking 
     Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence committee or 
     another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House 
     of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee 
     staff designated for purposes of receiving complaints or 
     information under this section, or a member of the majority 
     staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.''.

[[Page S3476]]

       (3) Clarification of right to report directly to 
     congress.--Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended--
       (A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph 
     (D), an employee of the Agency who intends to report to 
     Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint 
     or information directly to Congress, regardless of whether 
     the complaint or information is with respect to an urgent 
     concern--
       ``(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information 
     under clause (i); or
       ``(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or 
     information under clause (i).''.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or an 
     amendment made by this section shall be construed to revoke 
     or diminish any right of an individual provided by section 
     2303 of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 602. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER 
                   IDENTITY AS REPRISAL AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWER 
                   DISCLOSURE BY EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS IN 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 1104 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(3) of such section--
       (A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     a semicolon;
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K); 
     and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following:
       ``(J) a knowing and willful disclosure revealing the 
     identity or other personally identifiable information of an 
     employee or contractor employee so as to identify the 
     employee or contractor employee as an employee or contractor 
     employee who has made a lawful disclosure described in 
     subsection (b) or (c); or'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections 
     (g) and (h), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
       ``(f) Personnel Actions Involving Disclosure of 
     Whistleblower Identity.--A personnel action described in 
     subsection (a)(3)(J) shall not be considered to be in 
     violation of subsection (b) or (c) under the following 
     circumstances:
       ``(1) The personnel action was taken with the express 
     consent of the employee or contractor employee.
       ``(2) An Inspector General with oversight responsibility 
     for a covered intelligence community element determines 
     that--
       ``(A) the personnel action was unavoidable under section 
     103H(g)(3)(A) of this Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), section 
     17(e)(3)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)(A)), section 407(b) of title 5, United 
     States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such title;
       ``(B) the personnel action was made to an official of the 
     Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a 
     prosecution should be undertaken; or
       ``(C) the personnel action was required by statute or an 
     order from a court of competent jurisdiction.''.
       (b) Applicability to Detailees.--Subsection (a) of section 
     1104 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(5) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an 
     agency or a covered intelligence community element, includes 
     an individual who has been detailed to such agency or covered 
     intelligence community element.''.
       (c) Harmonization of Enforcement.--Subsection (g) of such 
     section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this 
     section, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(g) Enforcement.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement 
     of this section.
       ``(2) Harmonization with other enforcement.--To the fullest 
     extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement 
     of this section in a manner that is consistent with the 
     enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States 
     Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used 
     to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.''.

     SEC. 603. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR ADVERSE SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCE AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

       Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 
     3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(C) Contributing factor.--
       ``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii), in determining 
     whether the adverse security clearance or access 
     determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find 
     that paragraph (1) was violated if the individual has 
     demonstrated that a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was 
     a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or 
     access determination taken against the individual.
       ``(ii) Circumstantial evidence.--An individual under clause 
     (i) may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing 
     factor in the adverse security clearance or access 
     determination taken against the individual through 
     circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that--

       ``(I) the official making the determination knew of the 
     disclosure; and
       ``(II) the determination occurred within a period such that 
     a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a 
     contributing factor in the determination.

       ``(iii) Defense.--In determining whether the adverse 
     security clearance or access determination violated paragraph 
     (1), the agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was 
     violated if, after a finding that a disclosure was a 
     contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and 
     convincing evidence that it would have made the same security 
     clearance or access determination in the absence of such 
     disclosure.''.

     SEC. 604. ELIMINATION OF CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR 
                   RETALIATORY REVOCATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES 
                   AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

       Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is 
     amended, in the second sentence, by striking ``not to exceed 
     $300,000''.

     SEC. 605. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Modification of Frequency of Whistleblower 
     Notifications to Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community.--Section 5334(a) of the Damon Paul Nelson and 
     Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116-92; 50 
     U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended by striking ``in real time'' and 
     inserting ``monthly''.
       (b) Repeal of Requirement for Inspectors General Reviews of 
     Enhanced Personnel Security Programs.--
       (1) In general.--Section 11001 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking subsection (d); and
       (B) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).
       (2) Technical corrections.--Subsection (d) of section 11001 
     of such title, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(B), is 
     amended--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by adding ``and'' after the semicolon 
     at the end; and
       (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     period.

                    TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM

             Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023

     SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Classification Reform 
     Act of 2023''.

     SEC. 702. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive agency 
     as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, any 
     military department as defined in section 102 of such title, 
     and any other entity in the executive branch of the Federal 
     Government that comes into the possession of classified 
     information.
       (2) Classify, classified, classification.--The terms 
     ``classify'', ``classified'', and ``classification'' refer to 
     the process by which information is determined to require 
     protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to Executive 
     Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified 
     national security information), or previous and successor 
     executive orders or similar directives, or section 703 in 
     order to protect the national security of the United States.
       (3) Classified information.--The term ``classified 
     information'' means information that has been classified 
     under Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to 
     classified national security information), or previous and 
     successor executive orders or similar directives, or section 
     703.
       (4) Declassify, declassified, declassification.--The terms 
     ``declassify'', ``declassified'', and ``declassification'' 
     refer to the process by which information that has been 
     classified is determined to no longer require protection from 
     unauthorized disclosure pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (50 
     U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security 
     information), or previous and successor executive orders or 
     similar directives, or section 703.
       (5) Information.--The term ``information'' means any 
     knowledge that can be communicated, or documentary material, 
     regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is 
     owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of 
     the United States Government.

     SEC. 703. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--The President may, in accordance with this 
     section, protect from unauthorized disclosure any information 
     owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the 
     executive branch of the Federal Government when there is a 
     demonstrable need to do so in order to protect the national 
     security of the United States.
       (b) Establishment of Standards and Procedures for 
     Classification and Declassification.--
       (1) Governmentwide procedures.--
       (A) Classification.--The President shall, to the extent 
     necessary, establish categories of information that may be 
     classified and procedures for classifying information under 
     subsection (a).
       (B) Declassification.--At the same time the President 
     establishes categories and procedures under subparagraph (A), 
     the President shall establish procedures for declassifying 
     information that was previously classified.
       (C) Minimum requirements.--The procedures established 
     pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall--
       (i) provide that information may be classified under this 
     section, and may remain classified under this section, only 
     if the harm to national security that might reasonably be 
     expected from disclosure of such information

[[Page S3477]]

     outweighs the public interest in disclosure of such 
     information;
       (ii) establish standards and criteria for the 
     classification of information;
       (iii) establish standards, criteria, and timelines for the 
     declassification of information classified under this 
     section;
       (iv) provide for the automatic declassification of 
     classified records with permanent historical value;
       (v) provide for the timely review of materials submitted 
     for pre-publication;
       (vi) narrow the criteria for classification set forth under 
     section 1.4 of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; 
     relating to classified national security information), as in 
     effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act;
       (vii) narrow the exemptions from automatic declassification 
     set forth under section 3.3(b) of Executive Order 13526 (50 
     U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security 
     information), as in effect on the day before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act;
       (viii) provide a clear and specific definition of ``harm to 
     national security'' as it pertains to clause (i); and
       (ix) provide a clear and specific definition of 
     ``intelligence sources and methods'' as it pertains to the 
     categories and procedures under subparagraph (A).
       (2) Agency standards and procedures.--
       (A) In general.--The head of each agency shall establish a 
     single set of consolidated standards and procedures to permit 
     such agency to classify and declassify information created by 
     such agency in accordance with the categories and procedures 
     established by the President under this section and otherwise 
     to carry out this section.
       (B) Submittal to congress.--Each agency head shall submit 
     to Congress the standards and procedures established by such 
     agency head under subparagraph (A).
       (c) Conforming Amendment to FOIA.--Section 552(b)(1) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1)(A) specifically authorized to be classified under 
     section 703 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2024, or specifically authorized under criteria 
     established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the 
     interest of national security; and
       ``(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to that 
     section or Executive order;''.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect 
     on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (2) Relation to presidential directives.--Presidential 
     directives regarding classifying, safeguarding, and 
     declassifying national security information, including 
     Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to 
     classified national security information), or successor 
     order, in effect on the day before the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, as well as procedures issued pursuant to such 
     Presidential directives, shall remain in effect until 
     superseded by procedures issues pursuant to subsection (b).

     SEC. 704. TRANSPARENCY OFFICERS.

       (a) Designation.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the head 
     of any other department, agency, or element of the executive 
     branch of the Federal Government determined by the Privacy 
     and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established by section 
     1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee) to be appropriate for coverage 
     under this section, shall each designate at least 1 senior 
     officer to serve as the principal advisor to assist such head 
     of a department, agency, or element and other officials of 
     the department, agency, or element of the head in identifying 
     records of significant public interest and prioritizing 
     appropriate review of such records in order to facilitate the 
     public disclosure of such records in redacted or unredacted 
     form.
       (b) Determining Public Interest in Disclosure.--In 
     assisting the head of a department, agency, or element and 
     other officials of such department, agency, or element in 
     identifying records of significant public interest under 
     subsection (a), the senior officer designated by the head 
     under such subsection shall consider whether--
       (1) or not disclosure of the information would better 
     enable United States citizens to hold Federal Government 
     officials accountable for their actions and policies;
       (2) or not disclosure of the information would assist the 
     United States criminal justice system in holding persons 
     responsible for criminal acts or acts contrary to the 
     Constitution;
       (3) or not disclosure of the information would assist 
     Congress or any committee or subcommittee thereof, in 
     carrying out its oversight responsibilities with regard to 
     the executive branch of the Federal Government or in 
     adequately informing itself of executive branch policies and 
     activities in order to carry out its legislative 
     responsibilities;
       (4) the disclosure of the information would assist Congress 
     or the public in understanding the interpretation of the 
     Federal Government of a provision of law, including Federal 
     regulations, Presidential directives, statutes, case law, and 
     the Constitution of the United States; or
       (5) or not disclosure of the information would bring about 
     any other significant benefit, including an increase in 
     public awareness or understanding of Government activities or 
     an enhancement of Federal Government efficiency.
       (c) Periodic Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Each senior officer designated under 
     subsection (a) shall periodically, but not less frequently 
     than annually, submit a report on the activities of the 
     officer, including the documents determined to be in the 
     public interest for disclosure under subsection (b), to--
       (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives; and
       (C) the head of the department, agency, or element of the 
     senior officer.
       (2) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted, to the greatest extent possible, in 
     unclassified form, with a classified annex as may be 
     necessary.

            Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023

     SEC. 711. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Sensible Classification 
     Act of 2023''.

     SEC. 712. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the 
     term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (2) Classification.--The term ``classification'' means the 
     act or process by which information is determined to be 
     classified information.
       (3) Classified information.--The term ``classified 
     information'' means information that has been determined 
     pursuant to Executive Order 12958 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; 
     relating to classified national security information), or 
     successor order, to require protection against unauthorized 
     disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status 
     when in documentary form.
       (4) Declassification.--The term ``declassification'' means 
     the authorized change in the status of information from 
     classified information to unclassified information.
       (5) Document.--The term ``document'' means any recorded 
     information, regardless of the nature of the medium or the 
     method or circumstances of recording.
       (6) Downgrade.--The term ``downgrade'' means a 
     determination by a declassification authority that 
     information classified and safeguarded at a specified level 
     shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level.
       (7) Information.--The term ``information'' means any 
     knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, 
     regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is 
     owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of 
     the United States Government.
       (8) Originate, originating, and originated.--The term 
     ``originate'', ``originating'', and ``originated'', with 
     respect to classified information and an authority, means the 
     authority that classified the information in the first 
     instance.
       (9) Records.--The term ``records'' means the records of an 
     agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as 
     those terms are defined in title 44, United States Code, 
     including those created or maintained by a government 
     contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee that are 
     subject to the sponsoring agency's control under the terms of 
     the contract, license, certificate, or grant.
       (10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance'' 
     means an authorization to access classified information.
       (11) Unauthorized disclosure.--The term ``unauthorized 
     disclosure'' means a communication or physical transfer of 
     classified information to an unauthorized recipient.
       (12) Unclassified information.--The term ``unclassified 
     information'' means information that is not classified 
     information.

     SEC. 713. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) According to a report released by the Office of the 
     Director of Intelligence in 2020 titled ``Fiscal Year 2019 
     Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations'', more 
     than 4,000,000 individuals have been granted eligibility for 
     a security clearance.
       (2) At least 1,300,000 of such individuals have been 
     granted access to information classified at the Top Secret 
     level.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) the classification system of the Federal Government is 
     in urgent need of reform;
       (2) the number of people with access to classified 
     information is exceedingly high and must be justified or 
     reduced;
       (3) reforms are necessary to reestablish trust between the 
     Federal Government and the people of the United States; and
       (4) classification should be limited to the minimum 
     necessary to protect national security while balancing the 
     public's interest in disclosure.

     SEC. 714. CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--The authority to classify information 
     originally may be exercised only by--
       (1) the President and, in the performance of executive 
     duties, the Vice President;
       (2) the head of an agency or an official of any agency 
     authorized by the President pursuant to a designation of such 
     authority in the Federal Register; and

[[Page S3478]]

       (3) an official of the Federal Government to whom authority 
     to classify information originally has been delegated 
     pursuant to subsection (c).
       (b) Scope of Authority.--An individual authorized by this 
     section to classify information originally at a specified 
     level may also classify the information originally at a lower 
     level.
       (c) Delegation of Original Classification Authority.--An 
     official of the Federal Government may be delegated original 
     classification authority subject to the following:
       (1) Delegation of original classification authority shall 
     be limited to the minimum required to administer this 
     section. Agency heads shall be responsible for ensuring that 
     designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and 
     continuing need to exercise this authority.
       (2) Authority to originally classify information at the 
     level designated as ``Top Secret'' may be delegated only by 
     the President, in the performance of executive duties, the 
     Vice President, or an agency head or official designated 
     pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
       (3) Authority to originally classify information at the 
     level designated as ``Secret'' or ``Confidential'' may be 
     delegated only by the President, in the performance of 
     executive duties, the Vice President, or an agency head or 
     official designated pursuant to subsection (a)(2), or the 
     senior agency official described in section 5.4(d) of 
     Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to 
     classified national security information), or successor 
     order, provided that official has been delegated ``Top 
     Secret'' original classification authority by the agency 
     head.
       (4) Each delegation of original classification authority 
     shall be in writing and the authority shall not be 
     redelegated except as provided by paragraphs (1), (2), and 
     (3). Each delegation shall identify the official by name or 
     position title.
       (d) Training Required.--
       (1) In general.--An individual may not be delegated 
     original classification authority under this section unless 
     the individual has first received training described in 
     paragraph (2).
       (2) Training described.--Training described in this 
     paragraph is training on original classification that 
     includes instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified 
     information and of the criminal, civil, and administrative 
     sanctions that may be brought against an individual who fails 
     to protect classified information from unauthorized 
     disclosure.
       (e) Exceptional Cases.--
       (1) In general.--When an employee, contractor, licensee, 
     certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have 
     original classification authority originates information 
     believed by that employee, contractor, licensee, certificate 
     holder, or grantee to require classification, the information 
     shall be protected in a manner consistent with Executive 
     Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified 
     national security information), or successor order.
       (2) Transmittal.--An employee, contractor, licensee, 
     certificate holder, or grantee described in paragraph (1), 
     who originates information described in such paragraph, shall 
     promptly transmit such information to--
       (A) the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest 
     and classification authority with respect to this 
     information; or
       (B) if it is not clear which agency has appropriate subject 
     matter interest and classification authority with respect to 
     the information, the Director of the Information Security 
     Oversight Office.
       (3) Agency decisions.--An agency that receives information 
     pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) or (4) shall decide within 30 
     days whether to classify this information.
       (4) Information security oversight office action.--If the 
     Director of the Information Security Oversight Office 
     receives information under paragraph (2)(B), the Director 
     shall determine the agency having appropriate subject matter 
     interest and classification authority and forward the 
     information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency 
     for a classification determination.

     SEC. 715. PROMOTING EFFICIENT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW.

       (a) In General.--Whenever an agency is processing a request 
     pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly known as the ``Freedom of Information Act'') or the 
     mandatory declassification review provisions of Executive 
     Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified 
     national security information), or successor order, and 
     identifies responsive classified records that are more than 
     25 years of age as of December 31 of the year in which the 
     request is received, the head of the agency shall review the 
     record and process the record for declassification and 
     release by the National Declassification Center of the 
     National Archives and Records Administration.
       (b) Application.--Subsection (a) shall apply--
       (1) regardless of whether or not the record described in 
     such subsection is in the legal custody of the National 
     Archives and Records Administration; and
       (2) without regard for any other provisions of law or 
     existing agreements or practices between agencies.

     SEC. 716. TRAINING TO PROMOTE SENSIBLE CLASSIFICATION.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Over-classification.--The term ``over-classification'' 
     means classification at a level that exceeds the minimum 
     level of classification that is sufficient to protect the 
     national security of the United States.
       (2) Sensible classification.--The term ``sensible 
     classification'' means classification at a level that is the 
     minimum level of classification that is sufficient to protect 
     the national security of the United States.
       (b) Training Required.--Each head of an agency with 
     classification authority shall conduct training for employees 
     of the agency with classification authority to discourage 
     over-classification and to promote sensible classification.

     SEC. 717. IMPROVEMENTS TO PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION 
                   BOARD.

       Section 703 of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 
     2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355a) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) A member of the Board whose term has expired may 
     continue to serve until a successor is appointed and sworn 
     in.''; and
       (2) in subsection (f)--
       (A) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Any employee''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2)(A) In addition to any employees detailed to the Board 
     under paragraph (1), the Board may hire not more than 12 
     staff members.
       ``(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out 
     subparagraph (A) such sums as are necessary for fiscal year 
     2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.''.

     SEC. 718. IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY FOR CLASSIFICATION AND 
                   DECLASSIFICATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Office of 
     Electronic Government (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Administrator'') shall, in consultation with the Secretary 
     of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     the Director of National Intelligence, the Public Interest 
     Declassification Board, the Director of the Information 
     Security Oversight Office, and the head of the National 
     Declassification Center of the National Archives and Records 
     Administration--
       (1) research a technology-based solution--
       (A) utilizing machine learning and artificial intelligence 
     to support efficient and effective systems for classification 
     and declassification; and
       (B) to be implemented on an interoperable and federated 
     basis across the Federal Government; and
       (2) submit to the President a recommendation regarding a 
     technology-based solution described in paragraph (1) that 
     should be adopted by the Federal Government.
       (b) Staff.--The Administrator may hire sufficient staff to 
     carry out subsection (a).
       (c) Report.--Not later than 540 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress 
     a classified report on the technology-based solution 
     recommended by the Administrator under subsection (a)(2) and 
     the President's decision regarding its adoption.

     SEC. 719. STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON NECESSITY OF 
                   SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) Agency Studies on Necessity of Security Clearances.--
       (1) Studies required.--The head of each agency that grants 
     security clearances to personnel of such agency shall conduct 
     a study on the necessity of such clearances.
       (2) Reports required.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency that 
     conducts a study under paragraph (1) shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the findings of the agency head with respect to 
     such study, which the agency head may classify as 
     appropriate.
       (B) Required elements.--Each report submitted by the head 
     of an agency under subparagraph (A) shall include, for such 
     agency, the following:
       (i) The number of personnel eligible for access to 
     information up to the ``Top Secret'' level.
       (ii) The number of personnel eligible for access to 
     information up to the ``Secret'' level.
       (iii) Information on any reduction in the number of 
     personnel eligible for access to classified information based 
     on the study conducted under paragraph (1).
       (iv) A description of how the agency head will ensure that 
     the number of security clearances granted by such agency will 
     be kept to the minimum required for the conduct of agency 
     functions, commensurate with the size, needs, and mission of 
     the agency.
       (3) Industry.--This subsection shall apply to the Secretary 
     of Defense in the Secretary's capacity as the Executive Agent 
     for the National Industrial Security Program, and the 
     Secretary shall treat contractors, licensees, and grantees as 
     personnel of the Department of Defense for purposes of the 
     studies and reports required by this subsection.
       (b) Director of National Intelligence Review of Sensitive 
     Compartmented Information.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall--
       (1) review the number of personnel eligible for access to 
     sensitive compartmented information; and
       (2) submit to Congress a report on how the Director will 
     ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the 
     minimum required.

[[Page S3479]]

       (c) Agency Review of Special Access Programs.--Each head of 
     an agency who is authorized to establish a special access 
     program by Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; 
     relating to classified national security information), or 
     successor order, shall--
       (1) review the number of personnel of the agency eligible 
     for access to such special access programs; and
       (2) submit to Congress a report on how the agency head will 
     ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the 
     minimum required.
       (d) Secretary of Energy Review of Q and L Clearances.--The 
     Secretary of Energy shall--
       (1) review the number of personnel of the Department of 
     Energy granted Q and L access; and
       (2) submit to Congress a report on how the Secretary will 
     ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the 
     minimum required
       (e) Independent Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date on which a study is completed under subsection (a) or a 
     review is completed under subsections (b) through (d), the 
     Director of the Information Security Oversight Office of the 
     National Archives and Records Administration, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, and the Public Interest 
     Declassification Board shall each review the study or review, 
     as the case may be.

          TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE

     SEC. 801. REVIEW OF SHARED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES 
                   FOR PERSONNEL VETTING.

       (a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In 
     this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on 
     Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on 
     Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (b) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a review of the extent to which the intelligence 
     community can use information technology services shared 
     among the intelligence community for purposes of personnel 
     vetting, including with respect to human resources, 
     suitability, and security.

     SEC. 802. TIMELINESS STANDARD FOR RENDERING DETERMINATIONS OF 
                   TRUST FOR PERSONNEL VETTING.

       (a) Timeliness Standard.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall, acting through the 
     Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and 
     Credentialing Executive Agent, establish and publish in such 
     public venue as the President considers appropriate, new 
     timeliness performance standards for processing personnel 
     vetting trust determinations in accordance with the Federal 
     personnel vetting performance management standards.
       (2) Quinquennial reviews.--Not less frequently than once 
     every 5 years, the President shall, acting through the 
     Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and 
     Credentialing Executive Agent--
       (A) review the standards established pursuant to paragraph 
     (1); and
       (B) pursuant to such review--
       (i) update such standards as the President considers 
     appropriate; and
       (ii) publish in the Federal Register such updates as may be 
     made pursuant to clause (i).
       (3) Conforming amendment.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) 
     is amended by striking subsection (g).
       (b) Quarterly Reports on Implementation.--
       (1) In general.--Not less frequently than quarterly, the 
     Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and 
     Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly make available to 
     the public a quarterly report on the compliance of Executive 
     agencies (as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States 
     Code) with the standards established pursuant to subsection 
     (a).
       (2) Disaggregation.--Each report made available pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall disaggregate, to the greatest extent 
     practicable, data by appropriate category of personnel risk 
     and between Government and contractor personnel.
       (c) Complementary Standards for Intelligence Community.--
     The Director of National Intelligence may, in consultation 
     with the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance 
     Accountability Council established pursuant to Executive 
     Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming 
     processes related to suitability for Government employment, 
     fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access 
     to classified national security information) establish for 
     the intelligence community standards complementary to those 
     established pursuant to subsection (a).

     SEC. 803. ANNUAL REPORT ON PERSONNEL VETTING TRUST 
                   DETERMINATIONS.

       (a) Definition of Personnel Vetting Trust Determination.--
     In this section, the term ``personnel vetting trust 
     determination'' means any determination made by an executive 
     branch agency as to whether an individual can be trusted to 
     perform job functions or to be granted access necessary for a 
     position.
       (b) Annual Report.--Not later than March 30, 2024, and 
     annually thereafter for 5 years, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, and the 
     Director of the Office of Personnel Management, acting as the 
     Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, in 
     coordination with the Security, Suitability, and 
     Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, shall 
     jointly make available to the public a report on specific 
     types of personnel vetting trust determinations made during 
     the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report 
     is made available, disaggregated, to the greatest extent 
     possible, by the following:
       (1) Determinations of eligibility for national security-
     sensitive positions, separately noting--
       (A) the number of individuals granted access to national 
     security information; and
       (B) the number of individuals determined to be eligible for 
     but not granted access to national security information.
       (2) Determinations of suitability or fitness for a public 
     trust position.
       (3) Status as a Government employee, a contractor employee, 
     or other category.
       (c) Elimination of Report Requirement.--Section 3001 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 
     U.S.C. 3341) is amended by striking subsection (h).

     SEC. 804. SURVEY TO ASSESS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
                   TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0.

       Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and once every 2 years thereafter until 2029, the 
     Comptroller General of the United States shall administer a 
     survey to such sample of Federal agencies, Federal 
     contractors, and other persons that require security 
     clearances to access classified information as the 
     Comptroller General considers appropriate to assess--
       (1) the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of 
     the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative; and
       (2) the effectiveness of vetting Federal personnel while 
     managing risk during the onboarding of such personnel.

     SEC. 805. PROHIBITION ON DENIAL OF ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO 
                   CLASSIFIED INFORMATION SOLELY BECAUSE OF PAST 
                   USE OF CANNABIS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Cannabis.--The term ``cannabis'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``marihuana'' in section 102 of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).
       (2) Eligibility for access to classified information.--The 
     term ``eligibility for access to classified information'' has 
     the meaning given the term in the procedures established 
     pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161(a)).
       (b) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the head of an element of the intelligence community may 
     not make a determination to deny eligibility for access to 
     classified information to an individual based solely on the 
     use of cannabis by the individual prior to the submission of 
     the application for a security clearance by the individual.

                  TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

     SEC. 901. IMPROVED FUNDING FLEXIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS MADE BY 
                   THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR QUALIFYING 
                   INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.

       Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by striking paragraph 
     (3) and inserting the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Funding.--
       ``(A) In general.--Payment under paragraph (2) in a fiscal 
     year may be made using any funds--
       ``(i) appropriated in advance specifically for payments 
     under such paragraph; or
       ``(ii) reprogrammed in accordance with section 504 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094).
       ``(B) Budget.--For each fiscal year, the Director shall 
     include with the budget justification materials submitted to 
     Congress in support of the budget of the President for that 
     fiscal year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, an estimate of the funds required in that fiscal 
     year to make payments under paragraph (2).''.

     SEC. 902. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO SEEK CERTAIN 
                   BENEFITS RELATING TO INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.

       (a) In General.--Section 19A(d)(5) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(5)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``Payments made'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) In general.--Payments made''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Relation to certain federal workers compensation 
     laws.--Without regard to the requirements in sections (b) and 
     (c), covered employees need not first seek benefits provided 
     under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to be 
     eligible solely for payment authorized under paragraph (2) of 
     this subsection.''.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall--
       (1) revise applicable regulations to conform with the 
     amendment made by subsection (a); and
       (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense 
     of

[[Page S3480]]

     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives copies of such regulations, as revised 
     pursuant to paragraph (1).

     SEC. 903. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IMPLEMENTATION OF HAVANA ACT 
                   OF 2021 AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Regulations.--Except as provided in subsection (c), not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community 
     that has not already done so shall--
       (1) issue regulations and procedures to implement the 
     authorities provided by section 19A(d) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) and 
     section 901(i) of title IX of division J of the Further 
     Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) to 
     provide payments under such sections, to the degree that such 
     authorities are applicable to the head of the element; and
       (2) submit to the congressional intelligence, the 
     Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the House of Representatives committees 
     copies of such regulations.
       (b) Reporting.--Not later than 210 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the 
     intelligence community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the 
     Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives a report on--
       (1) the estimated number of individuals associated with 
     their element that may be eligible for payment under the 
     authorities described in subsection (a)(1);
       (2) an estimate of the obligation that the head of the 
     intelligence community element expects to incur in fiscal 
     year 2025 as a result of establishing the regulations 
     pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
       (3) any perceived barriers or concerns in implementing such 
     authorities.
       (c) Alternative Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an 
     element of the intelligence community (other than the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) who believes 
     that the authorities described in subsection (a)(1) are not 
     currently relevant for individuals associated with their 
     element, or who are not otherwise in position to issue the 
     regulations and procedures required by subsection (a)(1) 
     shall provide written and detailed justification to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on 
     Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and 
     the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives to explain 
     this position.

     SEC. 904. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   HANDLING OF ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``Agency'' means the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.
       (2) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying injury'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 19A(d)(1) of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     3519b(d)(1)).
       (b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the handling of anomalous 
     health incidents by the Agency.
       (c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) HAVANA act implementation.--
       (A) An explanation of how the Agency determines whether a 
     reported anomalous health incident resulted in a qualifying 
     injury or a qualifying injury to the brain.
       (B) The number of participants of the Expanded Care Program 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency who--
       (i) have a certified qualifying injury or a certified 
     qualifying injury to the brain; and
       (ii) as of September 30, 2023, applied to the Expanded Care 
     Program due to a reported anomalous health incident.
       (C) A comparison of the number of anomalous health 
     incidents reported by applicants to the Expanded Care Program 
     that occurred in the United States and that occurred in a 
     foreign country.
       (D) The specific reason each applicant was approved or 
     denied for payment under the Expanded Care Program.
       (E) The number of applicants who were initially denied 
     payment but were later approved on appeal.
       (F) The average length of time, from the time of 
     application, for an applicant to receive a determination from 
     the Expanded Care Program, aggregated by qualifying injuries 
     and qualifying injuries to the brain.
       (2) Priority cases.--
       (A) A detailed list of priority cases of anomalous health 
     incidents, including, for each incident, locations, dates, 
     times, and circumstances.
       (B) For each priority case listed in accordance with 
     subparagraph (A), a detailed explanation of each credible 
     alternative explanation that the Agency assigned to the 
     incident, including--
       (i) how the incident was discovered;
       (ii) how the incident was assigned within the Agency; and
       (iii) whether an individual affected by the incident is 
     provided an opportunity to appeal the credible alternative 
     explanation.
       (C) For each priority case of an anomalous health incident 
     determined to be largely consistent with the definition of 
     ``anomalous health incident'' established by the National 
     Academy of Sciences and for which the Agency does not have a 
     credible alternative explanation, a detailed description of 
     such case.
       (3) Anomalous health incident sensors.--
       (A) A list of all types of sensors that the Agency has 
     developed or deployed with respect to reports of anomalous 
     health incidents, including, for each type of sensor, the 
     deployment location, the date and the duration of the 
     employment of such type of sensor, and, if applicable, the 
     reason for removal.
       (B) A list of entities to which the Agency has provided 
     unrestricted access to data associated with anomalous health 
     incidents.
       (C) A list of requests for support the Agency has received 
     from elements of the Federal Government regarding sensor 
     development, testing, or deployment, and a description of the 
     support provided in each case.
       (D) A description of all emitter signatures obtained by 
     sensors associated with anomalous health incidents in Agency 
     holdings since 2016, including--
       (i) the identification of any of such emitters that the 
     Agency prioritizes as a threat; and
       (ii) an explanation of such prioritization.
       (d) Additional Submissions.--Concurrent with the submission 
     of the report required by subsection (b), the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the 
     Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives--
       (1) a template of each form required to apply for the 
     Expanded Care Program, including with respect to payments for 
     a qualifying injury or a qualifying injury to the brain;
       (2) copies of internal guidance used by the Agency to 
     adjudicate claims for the Expanded Care Program, including 
     with respect to payments for a qualifying injury to the 
     brain;
       (3) the case file of each applicant to the Expanded Care 
     Program who applied due to a reported anomalous health 
     incident, including supporting medical documentation, with 
     name and other identifying information redacted;
       (4) copies of all informational and instructional materials 
     provided to employees of and other individuals affiliated 
     with the Agency with respect to applying for the Expanded 
     Care Program; and
       (5) copies of Agency guidance provided to employees of and 
     other individuals affiliated with the Agency with respect to 
     reporting and responding to a suspected anomalous health 
     incident, and the roles and responsibilities of each element 
     of the Agency tasked with responding to a report of an 
     anomalous health incident.
       (e) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the 
     Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives on the report.

                       TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY

     SEC. 1001. STRENGTHENING ELECTION CYBERSECURITY TO UPHOLD 
                   RESPECT FOR ELECTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT 
                   TESTING ACT OF 2023.

       (a) Requiring Penetration Testing as Part of the Testing 
     and Certification of Voting Systems.--Section 231 of the Help 
     America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Required Penetration Testing.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall 
     provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the 
     testing, certification, decertification, and recertification 
     of voting system hardware and software by accredited 
     laboratories under this section.
       ``(2) Accreditation.--The Director of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology shall recommend to the 
     Commission entities the Director proposes be accredited to 
     carry out penetration testing under this subsection and 
     certify compliance with the penetration testing-related 
     guidelines required by this subsection. The Commission shall 
     vote on the accreditation of any entity recommended. The 
     requirements for such accreditation shall be a subset of the 
     requirements for accreditation of laboratories under 
     subsection (b) and shall only be based on consideration of an 
     entity's competence to conduct penetration testing under this 
     subsection.''.
       (b) Independent Security Testing and Coordinated 
     Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election 
     Systems.--
       (1) In general.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help America 
     Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new part:

[[Page S3481]]

  


 ``PART 7--INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY 
      VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS

     ``SEC. 297. INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED 
                   CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT 
                   PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS.

       ``(a) In General.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--The Commission, in consultation with 
     the Secretary, shall establish an Independent Security 
     Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot 
     Program for Election Systems (VDP-E) (in this section 
     referred to as the `program') in order to test for and 
     disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.
       ``(2) Duration.--The program shall be conducted for a 
     period of 5 years.
       ``(3) Requirements.--In carrying out the program, the 
     Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall--
       ``(A) establish a mechanism by which an election systems 
     vendor may make their election system (including voting 
     machines and source code) available to cybersecurity 
     researchers participating in the program;
       ``(B) provide for the vetting of cybersecurity researchers 
     prior to their participation in the program, including the 
     conduct of background checks;
       ``(C) establish terms of participation that--
       ``(i) describe the scope of testing permitted under the 
     program;
       ``(ii) require researchers to--

       ``(I) notify the vendor, the Commission, and the Secretary 
     of any cybersecurity vulnerability they identify with respect 
     to an election system; and
       ``(II) otherwise keep such vulnerability confidential for 
     180 days after such notification;

       ``(iii) require the good faith participation of all 
     participants in the program;
       ``(iv) require an election system vendor, within 180 days 
     after validating notification of a critical or high 
     vulnerability (as defined by the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology) in an election system of the 
     vendor, to--

       ``(I) send a patch or propound some other fix or mitigation 
     for such vulnerability to the appropriate State and local 
     election officials, in consultation with the researcher who 
     discovered it; and
       ``(II) notify the Commission and the Secretary that such 
     patch has been sent to such officials;

       ``(D) in the case where a patch or fix to address a 
     vulnerability disclosed under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I) is 
     intended to be applied to a system certified by the 
     Commission, provide--
       ``(i) for the expedited review of such patch or fix within 
     90 days after receipt by the Commission; and
       ``(ii) if such review is not completed by the last day of 
     such 90 day period, that such patch or fix shall be deemed to 
     be certified by the Commission, subject to any subsequent 
     review of such determination by the Commission; and
       ``(E) 180 days after the disclosure of a vulnerability 
     under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify the Director of the 
     Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the 
     vulnerability for inclusion in the database of Common 
     Vulnerabilities and Exposures.
       ``(4) Voluntary participation; safe harbor.--
       ``(A) Voluntary participation.--Participation in the 
     program shall be voluntary for election systems vendors and 
     researchers.
       ``(B) Safe harbor.--When conducting research under this 
     program, such research and subsequent publication shall be 
     considered to be:
       ``(i) Authorized in accordance with section 1030 of title 
     18, United States Code (commonly known as the `Computer Fraud 
     and Abuse Act'), (and similar state laws), and the election 
     system vendor will not initiate or support legal action 
     against the researcher for accidental, good faith violations 
     of the program.
       ``(ii) Exempt from the anti-circumvention rule of section 
     1201 of title 17, United States Code (commonly known as the 
     `Digital Millennium Copyright Act'), and the election system 
     vendor will not bring a claim against a researcher for 
     circumvention of technology controls.
       ``(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may 
     be construed to limit or otherwise affect any exception to 
     the general prohibition against the circumvention of 
     technological measures under subparagraph (A) of section 
     1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code, including with 
     respect to any use that is excepted from that general 
     prohibition by the Librarian of Congress under subparagraphs 
     (B) through (D) of such section 1201(a)(1).
       ``(5) Exempt from disclosure.--Cybersecurity 
     vulnerabilities discovered under the program shall be exempt 
     from section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly 
     referred to as the Freedom of Information Act).
       ``(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Cybersecurity vulnerability.--The term `cybersecurity 
     vulnerability' means, with respect to an election system, any 
     security vulnerability that affects the election system.
       ``(B) Election infrastructure.--The term `election 
     infrastructure' means--
       ``(i) storage facilities, polling places, and centralized 
     vote tabulation locations used to support the administration 
     of elections for public office; and
       ``(ii) related information and communications technology, 
     including--

       ``(I) voter registration databases;
       ``(II) election management systems;
       ``(III) voting machines;
       ``(IV) electronic mail and other communications systems 
     (including electronic mail and other systems of vendors who 
     have entered into contracts with election agencies to support 
     the administration of elections, manage the election process, 
     and report and display election results); and
       ``(V) other systems used to manage the election process and 
     to report and display election results on behalf of an 
     election agency.

       ``(C) Election system.--The term `election system' means 
     any information system that is part of an election 
     infrastructure, including any related information and 
     communications technology described in subparagraph (B)(ii).
       ``(D) Election system vendor.--The term `election system 
     vendor' means any person providing, supporting, or 
     maintaining an election system on behalf of a State or local 
     election official.
       ``(E) Information system.--The term `information system' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, 
     United States Code.
       ``(F) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security.
       ``(G) Security vulnerability.--The term `security 
     vulnerability' has the meaning given the term in section 102 
     of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 
     U.S.C. 1501).''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act 
     is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to 
     subtitle D of title II the following:

 ``PART 7--Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity 
         Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems

``Sec. 297. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity 
              vulnerability disclosure program for election systems.''.

                        TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 1101. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR ALL-
                   DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE.

       Section 1683(k)(1) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(k)(1)), as amended 
     by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263), is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Director of national 
     intelligence and secretary of defense'' and inserting ``All-
     domain anomaly resolution office''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly'' and 
     inserting ``Director of the Office shall''.

     SEC. 1102. FUNDING LIMITATIONS RELATING TO UNIDENTIFIED 
                   ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' means--
       (A) the majority leader of the Senate;
       (B) the minority leader of the Senate;
       (C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
       (D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
     the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
       (4) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.--The term 
     ``unidentified anomalous phenomena'' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)), 
     as amended by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
     due to the increasing potential for technology surprise from 
     foreign adversaries and to ensure sufficient integration 
     across the United States industrial base and avoid technology 
     and security stovepipes--
       (1) the United States industrial base must retain its 
     global lead in critical advanced technologies; and
       (2) the Federal Government must expand awareness about any 
     historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided 
     by the Federal Government for research and development 
     purposes.
       (c) Limitations.--No amount authorized to be appropriated 
     by this Act may be obligated or expended, directly or 
     indirectly, in part or in whole, for, on, in relation to, or 
     in support of activities involving unidentified anomalous 
     phenomena protected under any form of special access or 
     restricted access limitations that have not been formally, 
     officially, explicitly, and specifically described, 
     explained, and justified to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress, congressional leadership, and the Director, 
     including for any activities relating to the following:

[[Page S3482]]

       (1) Recruiting, employing, training, equipping, and 
     operations of, and providing security for, government or 
     contractor personnel with a primary, secondary, or 
     contingency mission of capturing, recovering, and securing 
     unidentified anomalous phenomena craft or pieces and 
     components of such craft.
       (2) Analyzing such craft or pieces or components thereof, 
     including for the purpose of determining properties, material 
     composition, method of manufacture, origin, characteristics, 
     usage and application, performance, operational modalities, 
     or reverse engineering of such craft or component technology.
       (3) Managing and providing security for protecting 
     activities and information relating to unidentified anomalous 
     phenomena from disclosure or compromise.
       (4) Actions relating to reverse engineering or replicating 
     unidentified anomalous phenomena technology or performance 
     based on analysis of materials or sensor and observational 
     information associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena.
       (5) The development of propulsion technology, or aerospace 
     craft that uses propulsion technology, systems, or 
     subsystems, that is based on or derived from or inspired by 
     inspection, analysis, or reverse engineering of recovered 
     unidentified anomalous phenomena craft or materials.
       (6) Any aerospace craft that uses propulsion technology 
     other than chemical propellants, solar power, or electric ion 
     thrust.
       (d) Notification and Reporting.--Any person currently or 
     formerly under contract with the Federal Government that has 
     in their possession material or information provided by or 
     derived from the Federal Government relating to unidentified 
     anomalous phenomena that formerly or currently is protected 
     by any form of special access or restricted access shall--
       (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, notify the Director of such possession; and
       (2) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, make available to the Director for assessment, 
     analysis, and inspection--
       (A) all such material and information; and
       (B) a comprehensive list of all non-earth origin or exotic 
     unidentified anomalous phenomena material.
       (e) Liability.--No criminal or civil action may lie or be 
     maintained in any Federal or State court against any person 
     for receiving material or information described in subsection 
     (d) if that person complies with the notification and 
     reporting provisions described in such subsection.
       (f) Limitation Regarding Independent Research and 
     Development.--
       (1) In general.--Consistent with Department of Defense 
     Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014, 
     incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to 
     Department policy for oversight of independent research and 
     development), independent research and development funding 
     relating to material or information described in subsection 
     (c) shall not be allowable as indirect expenses for purposes 
     of contracts covered by such instruction, unless such 
     material and information is made available to the Director in 
     accordance with subsection (d).
       (2) Effective date and applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall 
     take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to funding 
     from amounts appropriated before, on, or after such date.
       (g) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date on which the Director has received a notification under 
     paragraph (1) of subsection (d) or information or material 
     under paragraph (2) of such subsection, the Director shall 
     provide written notification of such receipt to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress and congressional 
     leadership.
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