[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 120 (Thursday, July 13, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2707-S2708]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 595. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 2226, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2024 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the appropriate place in title XV, insert the following:

     SEC. ___. INVESTING IN CURES BEFORE MISSILES ACT OF 2023.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Investing in Cures Before Missiles Act of 2023'' or the 
     ``ICBM Act''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
     projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States 
     nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017 
     dollars over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to 
     operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear 
     forces and about $400 billion to modernize them''. With 
     inflation, the cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not 
     include the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities 
     proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
       (2) The Government Accountability Office found in July 2020 
     that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear 
     Security Administration have still not taken meaningful steps 
     to address affordability concerns or heeded the Government 
     Accountability Office's recommendation to consider 
     ``deferring the start of or cancelling specific modernization 
     programs'', including the W87-1 warhead modification program, 
     to address increases in the weapons activities budget 
     requests of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
       (3) The LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system (formerly known as 
     the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent) is expected to cost 
     between $93,100,000,000 and $95,800,000,000, which does not 
     include the cost of the W87-1 warhead modification program or 
     the cost to produce new plutonium pits for the warhead. The 
     total estimated life cycle cost of the LGM-35A Sentinel 
     weapon system is $264,000,000,000, and the program is 
     intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with 
     more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights and 
     spares.
       (4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to 
     Northrop Grumman for the engineering and manufacturing 
     component of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system in September 
     2020, raising concerns that the absence of competition for 
     the award may result in higher than projected costs to United 
     States taxpayers.
       (5) The National Nuclear Security Administration is also in 
     the early stages of developing a replacement intercontinental 
     ballistic missile warhead, the W87-1, and expanding plutonium 
     pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least 
     $12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, to meet the 
     modernization needs of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system.
       (6) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III 
     missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to 
     the Congressional Budget Office, through 2036, this would 
     cost $37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and 
     deploying the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system. The 
     Congressional Budget Office estimates that between 2021 and 
     2030, the United States has budgeted $82,000,000,000 for 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles.
       (7) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28, 
     2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American 
     Scientists found that only 26 percent of registered voters in 
     the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missile with the LGM-35A Sentinel 
     weapon system, as compared to 60 percent of registered voters 
     who opposed replacing the Minuteman III missile.
       (8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark, 
     then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence 
     and Nuclear Integration, noted in testimony before the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
     that we have ``one more opportunity'' to conduct life 
     extension on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
     missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extending 
     the Minuteman III missile despite his stated preference for 
     the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system.
       (9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic 
     missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
     signaled that the United States would have an assured 
     retaliatory capability in the form of several ballistic 
     missile submarines, which are, ``at present, virtually 
     undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible 
     threats to

[[Page S2708]]

     the survivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] 
     force'', a benefit that will be enhanced as the Department of 
     Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic submarine 
     fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic missile fleet.
       (10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles had 
     historically been the most responsive leg of the United 
     States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine 
     communications to allow for the dissemination of emergency 
     action messages in wartime have negated that advantage.
       (11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be 
     recalled, leaving decision makers with mere minutes to decide 
     whether to launch the missiles before they are destroyed, 
     known as a posture of ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under 
     attack'' in the face of a perceived nuclear attack, greatly 
     increasing the risk of a national leader initiating a nuclear 
     war by mistake.
       (12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel 
     of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false 
     warning in an early warning system that showed several United 
     States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders 
     from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov 
     the nickname ``the man who saved the world''.
       (13) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who once 
     briefed President Bill Clinton on a suspected Russian first 
     nuclear strike, wrote that the ground-based leg of the 
     nuclear triad is ``destabilizing because it invites an 
     attack'' and intercontinental ballistic missiles are ``some 
     of the most dangerous weapons in the world'' and ``could even 
     trigger an accidental nuclear war''.
       (14) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United 
     States Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry, 
     ``[T]he greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US 
     blunder--that we might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. 
     As we make decisions about which weapons to buy, we should 
     use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk 
     of accidental war and is not needed to deter an intentional 
     attack, we should not build it. . . . Certain nuclear 
     weapons, such as . . . the [intercontinental ballistic 
     missile], carry higher risks of accidental war that, 
     fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We are safer without 
     these expensive weapons, and it would be foolish to replace 
     them.''.
       (15) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-
     Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently 
     Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, 
     said, ``I would have removed land-based missiles from our 
     arsenal a long time ago. I'd be happy to put that mission on 
     the submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bombers 
     having a nuclear weapons capability that can be restored to 
     alert very quickly, and with even a small component of 
     Trident submarines--with all those missiles and all those 
     warheads on patrol--it's hard to imagine we couldn't get 
     by.''.
       (16) While a sudden ``bolt from the blue'' first strike 
     from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely 
     scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the 
     purported role of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg 
     of the triad to absorb such an attack.
       (c) Statement of Policy on Extension of Lifespan of 
     Minuteman III and Developing a Vaccine of Mass Prevention.--
     It is the policy of the United States that--
       (1) the operational life of the Minuteman III missiles can 
     be safely extended until at least 2050; and
       (2) investments in developing a universal coronavirus 
     vaccine and efforts to save lives from other types of 
     infectious diseases are a better use of United States 
     taxpayer resources than building a new and unnecessary 
     intercontinental ballistic missile.
       (d) Availability of Funds for Vaccines Instead of 
     Missiles.--
       (1) Transfer from department of defense.--Of the 
     unobligated balances of appropriations made available for the 
     Department of Defense for the research, development, test, 
     and evaluation of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall transfer $1,000,000,000 to the 
     National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to 
     conduct or support comprehensive research for the development 
     of a universal coronavirus vaccine.
       (2) Transfer from national nuclear security 
     administration.--The Secretary of Energy shall transfer all 
     unobligated balances of appropriations made available for the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration for the W87-1 
     warhead modification program to the Centers for Disease 
     Control and Prevention to research and combat emerging and 
     zoonotic infectious diseases.
       (e) Prohibition on Use of Funds for LGM-35A Sentinel Weapon 
     System and W87-1 Warhead Modification Program.--None of the 
     funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available for fiscal year 2024 may be obligated or expended 
     for the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system or the W87-1 warhead 
     modification program.
       (f) Independent Study on Extension of Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.--
       (1) Independent study.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall seek to enter into a contract with the National Academy 
     of Sciences to conduct a study on extending the life of 
     Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to 2050.
       (2) Matters included.--The study under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
       (i) extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles; and
       (ii) deploying the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system.
       (B) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 
     technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missile program as part of a service life extension 
     program that could also be incorporated in the future LGM-35A 
     Sentinel weapon system, including, at a minimum, 
     opportunities to increase the resilience against adversary 
     missile defenses.
       (C) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating 
     sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies 
     to reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the 
     service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through 
     2050.
       (D) An analysis and validation of the methods used to 
     estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and 
     Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch 
     experience of motors retired after the operational service 
     life of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.
       (E) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative 
     methods of estimating the operational service life of 
     Minuteman III motors, such as those methods based on 
     fundamental physical and chemical processes and 
     nondestructive measurements of individual motor properties.
       (F) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 
     configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic 
     missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.
       (G) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service 
     life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing 
     the deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery 
     vehicle force from 400 to 300.
       (H) An assessment on the degree to which the Columbia class 
     ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will 
     enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile 
     submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine 
     warfare threats.
       (I) An analysis of the degree to which an extension of the 
     Minuteman III would impact the decision of Russian Federation 
     to target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 
     States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding with the LGM-
     35A Sentinel weapon system.
       (J) A best case estimate of what percentage of the 
     strategic forces of the United States would survive a 
     counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down 
     by intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile 
     submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
       (K) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78 
     warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new LGM-35A 
     Sentinel weapon system missile as compared to proceeding with 
     the W-87 life extension.
       (L) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional 
     launchers or uploading submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
     with additional warheads to compensate for a reduced 
     deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 
     United States.
       (3) Submission to department of defense.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     National Academy of Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a 
     report containing the study conducted under paragraph (1).
       (4) Submission to congress.--Not later than 210 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
     report required by paragraph (3), without change.
       (5) Form.--The report required by paragraph (3) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (g) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives.
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