[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 120 (Thursday, July 13, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2532-S2533]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 346. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2226, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2024 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in title XV, insert the following:
SEC. 15___. SMARTER APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR EXPENDITURES ACT.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Smarter Approaches to Nuclear Expenditures Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States continues to maintain an excessively
large and costly arsenal of nuclear delivery systems and
warheads that are a holdover from the Cold War.
(2) The current nuclear arsenal of the United States
includes approximately 3,708 total nuclear warheads in its
military stockpile, of which approximately 1,744 are deployed
with five delivery components: land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear
gravity bombs, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed
with nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, and short-
range fighter aircraft that can deliver nuclear gravity
bombs. The strategic bomber fleet of the United States
comprises 87 B-52 and 20 B-2 aircraft, over 66 of which
contribute to the nuclear mission. The United States also
maintains 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 14
Ohio-class submarines, up to 12 of which are deployed. Each
of those submarines is armed with approximately 90 nuclear
warheads.
(3) Between fiscal years 2021 and 2030, the United States
will spend an estimated $634,000,000,000 to maintain and
recapitalize its nuclear force, according to a January 2019
estimate from the Congressional Budget Office, an increase of
$140,000,000,000 from the Congressional Budget Office's 2019
estimate, with 36 percent of that additional cost stemming
``mainly from new plans for modernizing [the Department of
Energy's] production facilities and from [the Department of
Defense's] modernization programs moving more fully into
production''.
(4) Adjusted for inflation, the Congressional Budget Office
estimates that the United States will spend $634,000,000,000
between 2021 and 2030 on new nuclear weapons and
modernization and infrastructure programs, an estimate that
in total is 28 percent higher than the Congressional Budget
Office's most recent previous estimate of the 10-year costs
of nuclear forces.
(5) Inaccurate budget forecasting is likely to continue to
plague the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy, as evidenced by the fiscal year 2023 budget request
of the President for the National Nuclear Security
Administration ``Weapon Activities'' account, which far
exceeded what the National Nuclear Security Administration
had projected in previous years.
(6) The projected growth in nuclear weapons spending is
coming due as the Department of Defense is seeking to replace
large portions of its conventional forces to better compete
with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of
China and as internal and external fiscal pressures are
likely to limit the growth of, and perhaps reduce, military
spending. As then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Dave
Goldfein said in 2020, ``I think a debate is that this will
be the first time that the nation has tried to simultaneously
modernize the nuclear enterprise while it's trying to
modernize an aging conventional enterprise. The current
budget does not allow you to do both.''.
(7) In 2023, the Government Accountability Office released
a report entitled ``Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Does Not Have a
Comprehensive Schedule or Cost Estimate for Pit Production
Capability'', stating the National Nuclear Security
Administration ``had limited assurance that it would be able
to produce sufficient numbers of pits in time'' to meet the
requirement under section 4219 of the Atomic Energy Defense
Act (50 U.S.C. 2538a) that the National Nuclear Security
Administration produce 80 plutonium pits by 2030.
(8) According to the Government Accountability Office, the
National Nuclear Security Administration has still not
factored affordability concerns into its planning as was
recommended by the Government Accountability Office in 2017,
with the warning that ``it is essential for NNSA to present
information to Congress and other key decision makers
indicating whether the agency has prioritized certain
modernization programs or considered trade-offs (such as
deferring or cancelling specific modernization programs)''.
Instead, the budget estimate of the Department of Energy for
nuclear modernization activities during the period of fiscal
years 2021 through 2025 was $81,000,000,000--$15,000,000,000
more than the 2020 budget estimate of the Department for the
same period.
(9) A December 2020 Congressional Budget Office analysis
showed that the projected costs of nuclear forces over the
next decade can be reduced by $12,400,000,000 to
$13,600,000,000 by trimming back current plans, while still
maintaining a triad of delivery systems. Even larger savings
would accrue over the subsequent decade.
(10) The Department of Defense's June 2013 nuclear policy
guidance entitled ``Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of
the United States'' found that force levels under the April
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United
States and the Russian Federation (commonly known as the
``New START Treaty'') ``are more than adequate for what the
United States needs to fulfill its national security
objectives'' and can be reduced by up to \1/3\ below levels
under the New START Treaty to 1,000 to 1,100 warheads.
(11) Former President Trump expanded the role of, and
spending on, nuclear weapons in United States policy at the
same time that he withdrew from, unsigned, or otherwise
terminated a series of important arms control and
nonproliferation agreements.
(c) Reductions in Nuclear Forces.--
(1) Reduction of nuclear-armed submarines.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to
be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of
Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than
eight Columbia-class submarines.
(2) Reduction of ground-based missiles.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2024,
the forces of the Air Force shall include not more than 150
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(3) Reduction of deployed strategic warheads.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in
fiscal year 2024, the forces of the United States Military
shall include not more than 1,000 deployed strategic
warheads, as that term is defined in the New START Treaty.
(4) Limitation on new long-range penetrating bomber
aircraft.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for any of fiscal
[[Page S2533]]
years 2024 through 2028 for the Department of Defense may be
obligated or expended for purchasing more than 80 B-21 long-
range penetrating bomber aircraft.
(5) Prohibition on f-35 nuclear mission.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to
be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of
Defense or the Department of Energy may be used to make the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of carrying
nuclear weapons.
(6) Prohibition on new air-launched cruise missile.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the research, development, test,
and evaluation or procurement of the long-range stand-off
weapon or any other new air-launched cruise missile or for
the W80 warhead life extension program.
(7) Prohibition on new intercontinental ballistic
missile.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of
the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended
for the research, development, test, and evaluation or
procurement of the LGM-35 Sentinel, previously known as the
ground-based strategic deterrent, or any new intercontinental
ballistic missile.
(8) Termination of uranium processing facility.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the Uranium Processing Facility
located at the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.
(9) Prohibition on procurement and deployment of new low-
yield warhead.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year
thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of
Energy may be obligated or expended to deploy the W76-2 low-
yield nuclear warhead or any other low-yield or nonstrategic
nuclear warhead.
(10) Prohibition on new submarine-launched cruise
missile.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of
the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may
be obligated or expended for the research, development, test,
and evaluation or procurement of a new submarine-launched
cruise missile capable of carrying a low-yield or
nonstrategic nuclear warhead, as the 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review found this system ``no longer necessary''.
(11) Limitation on plutonium pit production.--
(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal
year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the
Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for
expanding production of plutonium pits at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, or the Savannah
River Site, South Carolina, until the Administrator for
Nuclear Security submits to the appropriate committees of
Congress an integrated master schedule and total estimated
cost for the National Nuclear Security Administration's
overall plutonium pit production effort during the period of
2025 through 2035.
(B) Requirements for schedule.--The schedule required to be
submitted under paragraph (1) shall--
(i) include timelines, resources, and budgets for planned
work; and
(ii) be consistent with modern management standards and
best practices as described in guidelines of the Government
Accountability Office.
(12) Prohibition on sustainment of b83-1 bomb.--
Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the sustainment of the B83-1 bomb,
as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review declared the B83-1 ``will
be retired''.
(13) Prohibition on space-based missile defense.--
Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the research, development, test,
and evaluation or procurement of a space-based missile
defense system.
(14) Prohibition on the w-93 warhead.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024
or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense
or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for
the procurement and deployment of a W-93 warhead on a
submarine launched ballistic missile.
(d) Reports Required.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the
plan of each Secretary to carry out subsection (c).
(2) Annual report.--Not later than March 1, 2024, and
annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each
Secretary to carry out subsection (c), including any updates
to previously submitted reports.
(3) Annual nuclear weapons accounting.--Not later than
September 30, 2024, and annually thereafter, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report containing a comprehensive accounting by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget of the amounts
obligated and expended by the Federal Government for each
nuclear weapon and related nuclear program during--
(A) the fiscal year covered by the report; and
(B) the life cycle of such weapon or program.
(4) Cost estimate report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the
estimated cost savings that result from carrying out
subsection (c).
(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on
Natural Resources of the House of Representatives.
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