[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 120 (Thursday, July 13, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2530-S2531]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 343. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2226, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2024 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in title XV, insert the following:
SEC. ___. HASTENING ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS ACT OF 2023.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act of 2023'' or the
``HALT Act of 2023''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat
to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint
statement in 1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought'', a sentiment affirmed by the People's
Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom, and the United States in January 2022.
(2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people
attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in
support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms
race, a movement that helped to create the political will
necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms
control treaties between the United States and former Soviet
Union, and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties
contributed to strategic stability through mutual and
verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions.
(3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions
of people around the world have stood up to demand
meaningful, immediate international action to halt, reduce,
and eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear
weapons testing, and nuclear war, to humankind and the
planet.
(4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968
(21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), entered into force,
which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon
states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other
things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race .
. . and to nuclear disarmament''.
(5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed
the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear
weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among
countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is
highlighted by a more than 90 percent reduction in the United
States nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of
31,255 in 1967.
(6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no
longer necessary as a result of the following major technical
developments since the Senate's consideration of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to
as the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
(A) The verification architecture of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (commonly referred to as
the ``CTBTO'')--
(i) has made significant advancements, as seen through its
network of 300 International Monitoring Stations and its
International Data Centre, which together provide for the
near instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives tests,
including all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea between
2006 and 2017; and
(ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
(B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, confidence has
grown in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms the
basis of annual certifications to the President regarding the
continual safety, security, and effectiveness of the United
States nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing,
leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to remark in
2015 that ``lab directors today now state that they certainly
understand much more about how nuclear weapons work than
during the period of nuclear testing''.
(7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role
of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold
War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that
possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk
reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles
of weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative
global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the
countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of
billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their
arsenals.
(8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the development of
destabilizing types of nuclear weapons that are not presently
covered under any existing arms control treaty or agreement
and the People's Republic of
[[Page S2531]]
China, India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea have each taken concerning steps to diversify their
more modest sized, but nonetheless very deadly, nuclear
arsenals.
(9) President Joseph R. Biden's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
was right to label the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile as ``no longer necessary'', as that missile, if
deployed, would have the effect of lowering the threshold for
nuclear weapons use.
(10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden
preserved binding and verifiable limits on the deployed and
non-deployed strategic forces of the largest two nuclear
weapons powers through the five-year extension of the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010,
and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly referred to
as the ``New START Treaty'').
(11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment
strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of
title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible
to ensure the security of the United States and allies and
partners of the United States and maintain a strong and
credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a
\1/3\ reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level
established in the New START Treaty.
(12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President Biden stated,
``[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of
today's threats--it's hard to envision a plausible scenario
in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United
States would be necessary. Or make sense.''.
(13) In light of moves by the United States and other
countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, a
global nuclear freeze would seek to halt the new nuclear arms
race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable
freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(14) The reckless and repeated nuclear threats by Russian
President Vladimir Putin since the February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine by the Russian Federation underscore the need for a
global nuclear freeze.
(c) Statement of Policy.--The following is the policy of
the United States:
(1) The United States should build upon its decades long,
bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of
nuclear weapons by leading international negotiations on
specific arms-reduction measures as part of a 21st century
global nuclear freeze movement.
(2) Building on the 2021 extension of the New START Treaty,
the United States should engage with all other countries that
possess nuclear weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude
future multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk
reduction agreements, which should contain some or all of the
following provisions:
(A) An agreement by the United States and the Russian
Federation on a resumption of on-site inspections and
verification measures per the New START Treaty and a follow-
on treaty or agreement to the New START Treaty that may lower
the central limits of the Treaty and cover new kinds of
strategic delivery vehicles or non-strategic nuclear weapons.
(B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the testing,
production, and further deployment of all nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(C) An agreement that establishes a verifiable numerical
ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and intermediate-range
and strategic delivery systems (as defined by the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles signed at Washington
December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988
(commonly referred to as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty''), and the New START Treaty, respectively) and
the nuclear warheads associated with such systems belonging
to the P5, and to the extent possible, all countries that
possess nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels.
(D) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy of no
first use of nuclear weapons or provide transparency into its
nuclear declaratory policy.
(E) An agreement on a proactive United Nations Security
Council resolution that expands access by the International
Atomic Energy Agency to any country found by the Board of
Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant with its
obligations under the NPT.
(F) An agreement to refrain from configuring nuclear forces
in a ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under warning''
nuclear posture, which may prompt a nuclear armed country to
launch a ballistic missile attack in response to detection by
an early-warning satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming
ballistic missile.
(G) An agreement not to target or interfere in the nuclear
command, control, and communications (commonly referred to as
``NC3'') infrastructure of another country through a kinetic
attack or a cyberattack.
(H) An agreement on transparency measures or verifiable
limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise missiles and glide
vehicles that are fired from sea-based, ground, and air
platforms.
(I) An agreement to provide a baseline and continuous
exchanges detailing the aggregate number of active nuclear
weapons and associated systems possessed by each country.
(3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the
United Nations Conference on Disarmament toward the
negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to
another international body or fora, such as a meeting of the
P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably
prevent any country's production of highly enriched uranium
and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
(4) The United States should convene a series of head-of-
state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the
Nuclear Security Summits process, which saw the elimination
of the equivalent of 3,000 nuclear weapons.
(5) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of
the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the
CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of
the CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which
ratification by the United States will provide critical
momentum, will activate the CTBT's onsite inspection
provision to investigate allegations that any country that is
a party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of any
yield.
(6) The President should make the accession of North Korea
to the CTBT a component of any final agreement in fulfilling
the pledges the Government of North Korea made in Singapore,
as North Korea is reportedly the only country to have
conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1998.
(7) The United States should--
(A) refrain from developing any new designs for nuclear
warheads or bombs, but especially designs that could add a
level of technical uncertainty into the United States
stockpile and thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive
testing in order to test that new design; and
(B) seek reciprocal commitments from other countries that
possess nuclear weapons.
(d) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Nuclear Test
Explosions.--
(1) In general.--None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024
or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year
before fiscal year 2024 and available for obligation as of
the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated or
expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive
nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time
as--
(A) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the
report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense
Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition
of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the
report submitted under that section in the preceding year;
and
(B) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of
Congress that approves the test.
(1) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (1) does not limit
nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent
with the zero-yield standard and other requirements under
law.
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