[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 119 (Wednesday, July 12, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2421-S2422]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 254. Mr. RISCH (for himself and Mr. Menendez) submitted an 
amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2226, to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2024 for military activities 
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for 
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which 
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the 
     following:

              Subtitle __--Safeguarding Tunisian Democracy

     SEC. 12_1. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Safeguarding Tunisian 
     Democracy Act of 2023''.

     SEC. 12_2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In 2010 and 2011, waves of anti-government protests and 
     violence reshaped governments across the Middle East and 
     North Africa.
       (2) While other countries in the Middle East and North 
     Africa experienced violent crackdown, rapid changes in 
     government, or descent into civil war, Tunisia's ``Jasmine 
     Revolution'' saw the ouster of autocratic President Zine El 
     Abidine Ben Ali and the emergence of a nascent, growing 
     democracy.
       (3) On October 14, 2019, Tunisians overwhelmingly elected 
     Kais Saied, a constitutional law professor, as President 
     based on his pledges to combat corruption and improve 
     Tunisia's economic outlook.
       (4) On July 25, 2021, President Saied unilaterally 
     suspended parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister, citing 
     exceptional circumstances and Article 80 of the 2014 
     constitution.
       (5) On September 22, 2021, President Saied issued 
     Presidential Decree 117, consolidating full executive and 
     legislative powers within the presidency and authorizing 
     further decrees regulating the judiciary, media, political 
     parties, electoral law, freedoms and human rights.
       (6) On February 6, 2022, President Saied dissolved the 
     Supreme Judicial Council, eliminating an independent 
     judiciary.
       (7) On March 30, 2022, President Saied officially dissolved 
     parliament, further consolidating power and eliminating 
     checks and balances on the presidency.
       (8) On June 30, 2022, President Saied unilaterally 
     introduced a new draft constitution, subject to a referendum, 
     consolidating broad powers under executive rule.
       (9) On July 25, 2022, Saied claimed victory in a 
     constitutional referendum widely criticized for its lack of 
     credibility and participation.
       (10) On September 13, 2022, President Saied announced 
     Presidential Decree 2022-54 on Cybercrime, imposing prison 
     terms for ``false information or rumors'' online and 
     crippling free speech.
       (11) On September 15, 2022, President Saied announced 
     Presidential Decree 2022-55 which weakened the role of 
     political parties and imposed burdensome requirements to run 
     for parliament.
       (12) On October 15, 2022, the International Monetary Fund 
     reached a staff-level agreement to support Tunisia's economic 
     policies with a 48-month arrangement under the Extended Fund 
     Facility of $1,900,000,000 and the potential for more from 
     international donors.
       (13) On December 17, 2022, only 11 percent of Tunisians 
     participated in parliamentary elections, reflecting 
     dissatisfaction with the referendum, barriers to political 
     parties, and low public trust for democratic institutions in 
     Tunisia.
       (14) On January 20, 2023, four political opponents of 
     President Saied were sentenced through military courts for 
     ``insulting a public official'' and disturbing public order.
       (15) On January 29, 2023, only 11 percent of Tunisians 
     participated in parliamentary run-off elections, reaffirming 
     low public trust for democratic institutions in Tunisia.
       (16) On February 1, 2023, President Saied extended the 
     state of emergency until the end of 2023.
       (17) On February 10, 2023, President Saied announced 
     strengthened diplomatic ties with the Government of Syria, a 
     United States-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism.
       (18) On February 11, 2023, and in the following weeks, 
     President Saied launched a political crackdown by arresting 
     political activists, journalists, and business leaders for 
     allegedly plotting against the state, including by opening a 
     criminal investigation against a former Nidaa Tounes 
     parliamentarian.
       (19) On February 21, 2023, President Saied justified 
     widespread arrests and harassment of African migrants and 
     Black Tunisians by accusing ``hordes of irregular migrants'' 
     of criminality and violence, claiming a ``criminal enterprise 
     hatched at the beginning of this century to change the 
     demographic composition of Tunisia'' threatened national 
     security.
       (20) On February 22, 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested 
     Republican Party leader Issam Chebbi and National Salvation 
     Front member Chaima Issa.
       (21) On February 24, 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested 
     National Salvation Front member Jawher Ben Mbarek.
       (22) On April 17, 2023, President Kais Saied vowed 
     ``relentless war'' against opposition figures, such as jailed 
     Ennahdha party leader Rached Ghannouchi, and shuttered 
     Ennahdha offices and the offices of an ideologically broad 
     opposition coalition.
       (23) As of April 20, 2023, an International Monetary Fund 
     loan for Tunisia remains stalled as President Saied's 
     characterized necessary reforms as ``foreign diktats'' and 
     decried proposed cuts in subsidies as socially destabilizing.

[[Page S2422]]

  


     SEC. 12_3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It shall be the policy of the United States--
       (1) to forge a strong and lasting partnership with the 
     Government of Tunisia to support shared national security 
     interests to include countering the enduring threat of 
     transnational terrorism and promoting regional stability;
       (2) to develop and implement a security strategy that 
     builds partner capacity to address shared threats and cements 
     the role of the United States as the partner of choice;
       (3) to encourage standards and training for the Tunisian 
     Armed Forces that enshrines military professionalism and 
     respect for civil-military relations;
       (4) to support the Tunisian people's aspirations for a 
     democratic future and support democratic principles in 
     Tunisia, to include a robust civil society, respect for 
     freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, 
     separation of powers, and the rule of law;
       (5) to support the Tunisian people's livelihoods and 
     aspirations for economic dignity;
       (6) to work in tandem with our G7 and other partners to 
     promote Tunisia's return to democratic principles in a manner 
     that halts democratic backsliding, stabilizes the economic 
     crisis, spurs economic development, and mitigates 
     destabilizing migration flows; and
       (7) to readjust bilateral United States foreign assistance, 
     including security assistance, based on the progress of the 
     Government of Tunisia toward meeting the democratic 
     aspirations and economic needs of the Tunisian people.

     SEC. 12_4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS; CREATION OF TUNISIA DEMOCRACY 
                   SUPPORT FUND; REPORT.

       (a) In General.--Effective upon the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Secretary of State , in conjunction with the 
     Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
     Development--
       (1) shall limit funding to Tunisia, as provided for in 
     subsection (b); and
       (2) is authorized to establish a ``Tunisia Democracy 
     Support Fund'', as provided for in subsection (c), to 
     encourage reforms that restore Tunisian democracy and rule of 
     law.
       (b) Limitation on Funds.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available in fiscal years 2024 
     and 2025 to carry out chapters 1 and 8 of part I of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), 
     chapters 1 through 6, 8, and 9 of part II of such Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2301 et seq.), and section 23 of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for the Government of Tunisia, 
     25 percent the amount made available under each such 
     authority for each such fiscal year shall be withheld from 
     obligation, with the exception of funding for Tunisian civil 
     society, until the Secretary of State determines and 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     the Government of Tunisia--
       (1) has ceased its use of military courts to try civilians;
       (2) is making clear and consistent progress in releasing 
     political prisoners; and
       (3) has terminated all states of emergency.
       (c) Tunisia Democracy Support Fund Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Secretary of State $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
     years 2024 and 2025, which shall be used to establish the 
     ``Tunisia Democracy Support Fund'' for the purpose of 
     encouraging reforms that--
       (A) restore Tunisia's democratic institutions;
       (B) restore the rule of law; and
       (C) stabilize the Tunisian economy.
       (2) Limitation.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     under paragraph (1) shall not be available for obligation 
     until the Secretary of State certifies in writing to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that the Government of 
     Tunisia has demonstrated measurable progress towards the 
     democratic benchmarks outlined in subsection (d).
       (d) Democratic Benchmarks.--Pursuant to subsection (c)(2), 
     the democratic benchmarks to be addressed in the Secretary of 
     State's certification are whether the Government of Tunisia--
       (1) appropriately empowers Parliament to serve the Tunisian 
     people and serve as an independent, co-equal branch of 
     government essential to a healthy democracy;
       (2) restores judicial independence and establishes the 
     Constitutional Court in a manner that fosters an independent 
     judiciary and serves as a check on the presidency;
       (3) is taking credible steps to respect freedoms of 
     expression, association, and the press;
       (4) creates an enabling operating environment in which 
     Tunisian civil society organizations can operate without 
     undue interference, including permitting international 
     funding; and
       (5) ceases efforts to intimidate Tunisian independent media 
     through arbitrary arrests and criminal prosecutions of 
     journalists on illegitimate charges.
       (e) Initial Report, Annual Report and Briefing.--
       (1) Initial report.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter through 
     2028, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and 
     accompanying briefing to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that describes--
       (A) the state of Tunisia's democracy and associated 
     progress on the democratic benchmarks outlined in subsection 
     (d); and
       (B) how United States foreign assistance is funding 
     programs to support progress towards achieving such 
     benchmarks.
       (2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.
       (f) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
     limitation on funding under subsection (b) if the Secretary, 
     not later than 15 days before the waiver is to take effect, 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     such waiver is in the national interest of the United States. 
     The Secretary shall submit with the certification a detailed 
     justification explaining the reasons for the waiver.
       (g) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 12_5. SUNSET.

       This subtitle shall terminate on the date that is 5 years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 ______