[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 109 (Thursday, June 22, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2216-S2217]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            RWANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to call upon the administration 
to take urgent action, as we did in 2012-2013, to pressure Rwanda to 
end its support for United Nations sanctioned M23 rebels and stop 
destabilizing eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, and to 
stress the need for DRC to hold credible, on-time elections in December 
2023.
  According to the final report by the U.N. Group of Experts for the 
DRC, Rwandan support for the M23 extends from the highest levels in 
Kigali, including the Minister of Defense, an alarming allegation. 
Rwandan troops now are fighting alongside the M23 inside DRC, and the 
Rwandan Government is providing the M23 with weapons, uniforms, and 
equipment. M23 has killed hundreds of Congolese civilians over the past 
year, including the November 29 massacre of more than 170 men, women, 
and children in the village of Kishishe. With Rwandan support, M23 
downed a U.N. helicopter, killing U.N. peacekeepers, recruited child 
soldiers, and displaced more than 1 million Congolese in eastern DRC. 
Incidents of sexual violence targeting internally displaced persons are 
also skyrocketing. On June 13, Human Rights Watch reported that, 
``Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have 
committed unlawful killings, rape, and other apparent war crimes since 
late 2022.''
  There is overwhelming evidence of Rwandan support for M23, and M23 
has repeatedly failed to adhere to ceasefire agreements brokered by the 
East African Community. Despite this, the United States, the United 
Nations, and other members of the international community have been 
slow to respond. The last time Rwandan President Paul Kagame supported 
M23 rebels in eastern DRC, in 2012, the United States suspended Foreign 
Military Financing--FMF--for Rwanda, a decision that prompted several 
European donors to also suspend or redirect assistance away from 
Rwanda. The U.S. also imposed additional security assistance 
restrictions under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, CSPA. President 
Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs Sherman, and Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs Carson all engaged directly with the leaders of DRC, Rwanda, 
and Uganda to end the conflict and pressure Kagame to cease his support 
for M23.
  Our response to the current M23 crisis has been, by comparison, 
woefully inadequate. Although Secretary of State Blinken travelled to 
the region in August 2022 to discuss the instability in eastern DRC, 
the United States did not publicly call on President Kagame to end 
Rwanda's support for M23 until October 2022, months after the first 
U.N. Group of Experts report documented Rwanda's actions. We have not 
imposed any new sanctions on M23 leaders or Rwandan officials 
implicated in gross violations of human rights in eastern DRC, nor have 
we completely cut security assistance and military-to-military 
engagement to Rwanda. In fact, as recently as May of this year, Rwanda 
participated in the African Land Forces Summit sponsored by the U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff. In February 2023, the United States invited 
members of the Rwandan Defense Force to participate in a multinational 
exercise in Kenya called Justified Accord, where the U.S. reportedly 
provided Rwanda cyber capability training. The decision to provide 
cyber-related training to Rwanda is particularly difficult to 
comprehend in light of 2021 reports by Freedom House and Amnesty 
International. According to the Amnesty report, ``Rwanda used NSO 
Group's spyware to potentially target more than 3,500 activists, 
journalists and politicians.'' The Freedom House report states that 
``Rwandans abroad experience digital threats, spyware attacks, family 
intimidation and harassment, mobility controls, physical intimidation, 
assault, detention, rendition, and assassination.'' The United States 
cannot continue to support Rwandan efforts to serve as peacekeepers in 
some parts of Africa while the very same Rwandan military is fomenting 
violence and instability next door in DRC.
  In addition to disrupting the lives of more than 1 million people in 
eastern DRC, Rwanda's support for M23 is also undermining efforts to 
prepare for elections. The last elections were so poorly managed that 
the United States sanctioned the leadership of the National Independent 
Electoral Commission--CENI--a precedent that should serve as a warning 
to future electoral commissions across Africa. While CENI is under new 
leadership, procurement and management of the voter registry seem as 
opaque now as they were before. This is a problem. It is important for 
CENI to be transparent about its spending and its management of the 
voter registry. Contrary to its actions in 2018, the DRC should welcome 
international election observers and do everything it can to help, not 
hinder, domestic election observers.
  Even if all of those shortcomings are addressed, violence in the east 
may disenfranchise voters by preventing them from registering to vote 
or casting a ballot on election day. Credible and

[[Page S2217]]

timely elections are crucial to the future stability of the DRC and in 
the interest of the United States, the region, and the international 
community. The U.S. and its partners must increase pressure on Rwanda 
to end its destabilization campaign and must encourage the CENI and the 
Congolese Government to do all they can to hold timely, credible 
elections in December 2023.
  Although the situation is dire, it is not hopeless. There are steps 
that the United States can take. First, the State Department must 
complete a review of its Rwanda policy, which it committed to undertake 
in response to a letter I sent last July. As I also requested in July, 
the Department should continue suspending security assistance until 
Rwanda ceases support for the M23. This suspension should apply to 
security cooperation and exchanges with Rwanda at all levels. The U.S. 
should impose sanctions on Rwandan Government officials implicated--
either directly or indirectly--in human rights violations or 
corruption, to include the theft of minerals or other resources from 
eastern DRC.
  And there are steps the Congolese must take. I encourage President 
Tshisekedi and DRC officials to do more to combat corruption in their 
country, particularly within the judiciary and the armed forces, and to 
lift the ``state of siege'' in eastern DRC. It is clear that conditions 
for civil society have improved under President Tshisekedi, but much 
more should be done to ensure that Congolese are able to criticize 
their government freely, particularly in eastern DRC. I am troubled by 
multiple reports that journalists have been arrested, including by 
national intelligence agency operatives, for reporting on what is 
happening in the east. There have also been disturbing reports that the 
DRC Government or individual DRC military officers are enlisting the 
support of rebel groups or militias to help combat M23. If these 
reports are true, it is incumbent upon President Tshisekedi to put an 
end to such efforts. Finally, I urge CENI and President Tshisekedi to 
ensure that international organizations are able to obtain 
accreditation and visas in a timely manner, so that they are able to 
support domestic election observation efforts without impediment.
  The situation in eastern Congo is not going to fix itself. It 
requires a collective effort--from us, from our partners, from the 
U.N., and from the Congolese. I urge us all to act.

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