[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 105 (Thursday, June 15, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Page S2106]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                                Germany

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, as I have discussed all week, the war 
in Ukraine has forced some of America's closest allies to sober up and 
start investing more seriously in their own defense.
  Germany is exhibit A. Yesterday, Germany's Government released a 
comprehensive security strategy--another important step forward for a 
key member of the transatlantic alliance--but, as I mentioned at the 
Munich Security Conference, questions remain about whether the 
encouraging changes in Germany will be sufficient or enduring.
  Some of these questions are being answered. Germany's national 
security strategy is an incremental shift. It is the product of a 
rather divided government, like our own, reaching difficult consensus, 
except with three different, sometimes internally divided political 
parties rather than just two.
  But just consider where our German allies were before Putin's 
escalation. Europe's most powerful economy had let a major portion of 
its military fall into literal disrepair. German military spending 
reached barely halfway--halfway--to NATO's member target of 2 percent 
of GDP. And the country's precarious reliance on Russian energy was 
actually only increasing.
  But as Ukraine dug in for a fight last February, Germany changed 
course. In the last 18 months, Berlin has made major contributions of 
key lethal capabilities to the Ukrainian cause and is on track to 
provide even more. The new German security strategy is clear-eyed about 
the Russian threat, and in light of hard-learned lessons, it 
prioritizes reducing dependence on foreign energy and integrating 
economic and security policy.
  As Foreign Minister Baerbock put it this week:

       We paid for every cubic metre of Russian gas twofold and 
     threefold with our national security.

  None of us should want to make the same mistake when it comes to 
Beijing, and in this regard, Germany's strategy indicates incremental 
progress toward a more realistic understanding of the challenge a 
revisionist power and systemic rival like China poses not only to 
neighbors but to the West as well. Germany's governing coalition 
continues to debate its approach to the PRC, and answers to how Germany 
plans to manage it are still forthcoming.
  The world will want to know how Germany will balance growing realism 
about Beijing's behavior with its stated desire for economic 
partnership with China. They will want to know what Germany is prepared 
to do to assist vulnerable Asian countries that are the most threatened 
by the PRC's military aggression, espionage, and economic or diplomatic 
pressure. Of course, these same questions can still be asked about our 
own government's approach to the PRC.
  More broadly, I am encouraged that Germany's strategy explicitly 
recognizes robust defense as a pillar--a pillar--of German security.
  I have criticized Germany's slow pace of defense spending to meet 
urgent needs, but I am encouraged by Germany's new Minister of Defense, 
Boris Pistorius, who has a focus on rebuilding Germany's military and 
cutting through its calcified military procurement bureaucracy. To be 
successful, he will need cross-party political support and sustained 
defense spending above 2 percent of Germany's GDP. This new strategy 
does not necessarily guarantee such a commitment.
  Ultimately, the biggest question for our German allies is whether 
their strategy sufficiently defines the priorities of their government 
and whether it provides the resources necessary to execute it. The very 
same question still applies to America's own national security 
strategy.