[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 75 (Wednesday, May 3, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1516-S1519]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
U.S. NAVY
Mr. SULLIVAN. Madam President, recently, there have been numerous
articles in the media about the U.S. Navy's lack of amphibious ships--
one that I would like to submit for the Record, headlined ``Grounding
of U.S. Marine Unit Spotlights Lack of Ships in Asia-Pacific,'' can be
found online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/grounding-of-u-s-marine-
unit-spotlights-lack-of-ships-in-asia-pacific-757315b4.
(Mr. WHITEHOUSE assumed the Chair.)
In this piece, the writer leads with how the 31st Marine
Expeditionary Unit, a rapid response force of the Marine Corps designed
for quick deployment on three Navy ships--what we call an ``amphibious
ready group''--how they were forced to abandon a training exercise
because the amphibious warships that they are supposed to train on were
not available due to maintenance problems.
Here is what the article said in part:
The Marine unit's grounded status illustrates the larger obstacles
the United States is facing as it tries to pivot its military to handle
the challenges from China. Overall, defense officials said the Navy
doesn't have enough amphibious ships to transport marines, and a
central part of the Marine Corps's mission is to hop from island to
island in the Asia-Pacific and harry Chinese forces in the event of a
conflict.
By the way, Mr. President, the Marines are really good at this. They
have been doing it for decades. But they need ships.
Another article from Defense News is also a recent one about the lack
of amphibious ships and the problem that poses. This one is from
another part of the world but very recent. The article starts with how
hundreds of American citizens were stranded in war-torn Sudan.
It says:
Hundreds of Americans in war-torn Sudan last month needed a
way out of the country, but the U.S. Marine Corps, the go-to
service for such rescues [of American citizens] couldn't
help.
The article continued:
Typically, this kind of mission would be standard for the
Navy and Marine Corps' amphibious ready group--
A Marine expeditionary unit, or what we call in the Marine Corps a
MEU, a MEU-R, a Marine expeditionary unit, an amphibious ready group--
three ships, super well trained, special operations capable, can go
anywhere in the world, kick the door in, save American citizens.
The article continues:
For the Americans who fled to the coast [in Sudan] the
Pentagon sent an auxiliary transport ship--
that they contracted out, I believe, from another country--
to shuttle them safely to . . . Saudi Arabia.
It was, in essence, a self-evacuation of U.S. citizens.
Mr. President, NPR reported that the buses actually took hundreds of
Americans to the Port of Sudan. Imagine--imagine--my colleagues, what
would have happened had those Americans, traveling in contract buses in
the middle of a civil war, got caught in the crossfire.
The article that I just quoted was entitled ``Marines want 31
amphibious ships. The Pentagon disagrees. Now what?'' I ask unanimous
consent to have that article printed in the Record at the end of my
remarks.
Finally, Mr. President, there was another recent article from Defense
One. Its title was ``Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship
Requirement in 2024.''
Now, Mr. President, this is what I wanted to get to. Last year, in
the Armed Services Committee, we held a number of hearings with the
Navy and the Marine Corps saying: What is the minimum number of
amphibious ships that would enable the Marine Corps to do its global
force response mission--the minimum number? After many hearings, after
much discussion with the Marines and Navy, we came up, in a bill of
mine, with a minimum of 31 ships.
This bill in the Armed Services Committee last year passed
unanimously. Every Democrat and every Republican voted for it.
The law now reads as follows. I know this is a little small, but here
is the new U.S. Code that has the new language. It says:
The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less
than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31
operational amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than
10 shall be amphibious assault ships--
What we call in the Marine Corps ``big-deck assault ships'' that can
carry helicopters and Ospreys and Harriers and now F-35 Bravos. That
was the law. That passed. The President signed it.
Here is the problem. The U.S. Navy is violating the law. The U.S.
Navy is treating that law--31 amphibs, a minimum--as a suggestion from
the Congress, as an option from the Congress.
How do I know? Because we had a hearing 2 weeks ago on the Armed
Services Committee, and the Secretary of the Navy essentially said: We
are looking at different options for the President's budget on how many
amphibs that the Navy is going to have.
And, currently, the Navy presented a budget that doesn't have 31
amphibs.
I had some cross words with the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO of the
Navy, because they are violating the law. And I will tell you, my
Democratic and Republican colleagues on the Armed Services Committee
were supportive of what I was saying. We had a hearing on the Armed
Services Readiness Subcommittee yesterday. The Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Franchetti, said that the Navy was ``studying the
issue.''
The Navy can't study the issue anymore. The Navy needs to follow the
[[Page S1517]]
law. The U.S. Congress has done the studies. We need the ships.
But here is what the Navy presented to the Armed Services Committee 2
weeks ago. They provided us their 30-year shipbuilding plan for the
Navy. Right here is the 31 amphib ship statutory minimum that is
required by the law. Here is the Navy shipbuilding plan for the next 30
years. You see in the numbers, these are different options: plan one,
plan two, plan three.
You might notice the Navy never gets to 31 amphibs. So the Secretary
of the Navy, the CNO of the Navy, and the Vice CNO of the Navy came to
the Congress in the last 2 weeks and said: Your 31 amphib ship
requirement, we are going to ignore it. Your 31 amphib ship
requirement, Congress, United States of America, we are going to
violate that.
This is unacceptable. The U.S. Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, the
Secretary of Defense should not be thumbing their nose at the Congress,
and, worse, they should not be violating the law and not trying to
abide by the law. They are saying, for 30 years, we are going to ignore
the Congress, and we are going to ignore the laws of the United States
of America.
This cannot happen. This cannot happen.
Let me end with this. Whether you are a Democrat or a Republican,
whether you are a hawk on defense issues or a dove on defense issues,
if you are a U.S. Senator, this should make you really mad. This should
make you really mad.
Last year, the Congress spoke. And, again, on the Armed Services
Committee, on which I serve, it was unanimous. Every member of that
committee who had studied the issue said, at a minimum, the Navy needs
31 amphibs so the U.S. Marine Corps can do its mission around the
world. Everybody agreed. We passed the law.
The Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense are
thumbing their nose at this body, are breaking the law as we speak, are
intending to break the law for the next 30 years. That is their 30-year
shipbuilding plan. It never hits 31 ships.
But here is the worst thing they are doing, and this is a real
serious issue. They are putting the lives of American citizens at risk.
Why do I say that? Well, let me end where I began, with Sudan, the
rescue of American citizens. Again, normally, that is a mission tailor-
made for the U.S. Marine Corps, whether in an embassy or another
dangerous part of the world--what we call a noncombatant evacuation
operation, a NEO. The Marines do them all the time. They bring up their
amphibs, launch helos, launch support craft, helicopters, fighters, if
they need the air support.
The capability of a MEU-R to go rescue American citizens--a lot of
them--is unsurpassed by any service in the world.
The U.S. Marines do it all the time. But guess what they can't do it
without? They can't do it without amphibious ships. And right now, we
don't have enough. So we dodged a bullet 2 weeks ago in Sudan.
American citizens were put on buses and driven across dangerous parts
of Sudan in a civil war, for hours after hours, and got to a port,
self-evacuated on some other country's ships. We are so lucky that
those Americans did not get killed or wounded--did not get killed or
wounded--because there was no Marine Corps to rescue them.
I am going to keep raising this issue. The Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of the Navy, today, are violating the law. Today, they have
no intention of meeting this 31 amphib ship requirement, and American
citizens are at risk. And the next time we might not be so lucky. The
next time Americans somewhere around the world need to be rescued, the
next time an enemy of our country does something nefarious to our
citizens, our national interests, and we don't have the ability to
respond as a Marine Corps because we don't have the ships, we are going
to know who is responsible.
I yield floor.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From Defense News, May 2, 2023]
Marines Want 31 Amphibious Ships. The Pentagon Disagrees. Now What?
(By Megan Eckstein)
Washington.--Hundreds of Americans trapped in war-torn
Sudan last month needed a way out of the country, but the
U.S. Marine Corps, the go-to service for such rescues,
couldn't help.
Typically, this kind of mission would be standard for the
Navy and Marine Corps' amphibious ready group and Marine
expeditionary unit, made up of 2,300 Marines aboard three
ships who are trained to fight their way into and evacuate
citizens from dangerous locations.
Instead, as violence surged, the Pentagon relied on drones
to monitor a 500-mile escape route from the capital of
Khartoum to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan. For the Americans
who fled to the coast, the Pentagon sent an auxiliary
transport ship to shuttle them to safety in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia.
It was a complicated and risky self-evacuation.
At the same time, off the coast of Marine Corps Base Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, the Bataan ARG and 26th MEU were
conducting a noncombatant evacuation simulation--training for
the very operation Americans in Sudan needed. But the group
stayed put because it wasn't yet certified for global
missions.
The Navy didn't have another set of ready amphibious ships
to deploy from the East Coast on short notice.
All of this followed a similar situation a few months
earlier, when service leaders were unable to send a team to
Turkey and Syria to provide aid after a 7.8-magnitude
earthquake rocked the region.
Maj. Gen. Roger Turner, the Marine Corps' operations
division director, told Defense News the naval forces ``have
this razor-thin capacity'' with amphibious ships, and when
emergencies arise, ``there's no capacity to react.''
It's a trend that could continue.
Today, the Navy has 31 amphibious ships--what the Marine
Corps considers the bare minimum it needs--but the Pentagon
plans to shrink the fleet below that number in fiscal 2024.
As a result, Turner anticipates the Corps will be more
challenged to respond to global crises.
Throughout last year and into this spring, that number--
31--has been at the center of debates, as the Navy, Marine
Corps, Defense Department, Congress and industry weigh in on
how many amphibious ships the military needs, what they
should look like and how much they should cost.
Now, the argument is about to come to a head.
In June, the Pentagon is expected to complete a study on
whether to continue buying amphibious ships and, if so, what
capabilities those vessels will have.
The final decision is expected to have major ramifications
for the Marine Corps and defense contractor Ingalls
Shipbuilding, a division of HII.
For example, the study might back a requirement for 31
ships and recommend continuing to build San Antonio-class
vessels at a cost of about $2 billion each. Or the report
could recommend a new design that would cost less per ship--
an idea the Corps already rejected, and one that could
disrupt Ingalls' production line.
Or there's a third option: The report could call for a
continued pause in the Pentagon buying amphibious ships,
which could force Ingalls to close its production line and
would force the Marine Corps to reevaluate its amphibious
operations plans.
But unless the Office of the Secretary of Defense approves
the continued construction of ships, or unless Congress
overrides the Pentagon, ``trying to maintain even a minimal
[amphibious] presence is going to be really difficult,''
Turner said.
This comes at a time when he said ``aggressive behavior of
the [People's Republic of China] is driving people to us;
they want us to be the security partner of choice,'' making
American amphibious presence all the more important today.
Outsider observers like Mackenzie Eaglen, an expert in
military readiness at the American Enterprise Institute think
tank, believe the debate itself is problematic.
``Funding disagreements signal indecision to our
adversaries on the role of this capability,'' she warned.
A 31-ship requirement
For years, the Marine Corps had a requirement of 38
amphibious ships, with the caveat it would accept 34 in a
fiscally constrained environment.
This requirement was based on the rationale that the
service needed 38 ships to move two entire Marine
expeditionary brigades into combat for a forcible entry.
In July 2019, Gen. David Berger took command of the service
and quickly released a document titled ``Commandant's
Planning Guidance'' that backed away from the requirement of
transporting those two brigades, saying the Corps would fight
differently in the future.
Since then, a range of concepts have emerged, focused on
the idea that small units would already be dispersed
throughout the Pacific region to be able to tamp down an
emerging conflict until additional forces arrive.
The Marine Corps began talking publicly about a 31-ship
requirement in 2021, and the Navy acknowledged that
requirement in 2022.
According to the director of the Maritime Expeditionary
Warfare Division, Shon Brodie, the 31-ship figure is based on
an idea that the fleet should do three things:
Keep two three-ship amphibious ready groups at sea at any
given time.
Support contingency plans that call for five three-ship
amphibious ready groups to deploy on short notice.
[[Page S1518]]
Allow for enough ready ships--those not tied up in
maintenance--that some would be available for training
Marines in events like fleet exercises.
The requirement is specifically divided up into 10
amphibious assault ships (made up of the America-class LHAs
and Wasp-class LHDs that host fixed-wing jets like the F-
35B), and 21 medium-sized amphibious vessels (either the
aging Whidbey Island-class LSDs or the newer San Antonio-
class LPDs). An amphibious ready group includes one
amphibious assault ship and two medium-sized ships.
Brodie told Defense News this 31-ship requirement is backed
by studies undertaken from 2008 to 2022, and reflects ships'
recent maintenance readiness rates, which hover around 40%.
That rate means in a fleet of 31 ships, 12 or 13 might be
available at any given time. If six are supposed to be
deployed, and another six are getting ready to deploy next,
that leaves little to no additional capacity for training or
surging in response to natural disasters or conflicts.
This low readiness rate has complicated the discussion and
is a key reason the Marine Corps considers 31 ships the bare
minimum.
Pilots with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit fly over the
amphibious transport dock Anchorage on Dec. 8, 2022. (Sgt.
Brendan Custer/U.S. Marine Corps)
Bryan Clark, director of the Center for Defense Concepts
and Technology at the Hudson Institute think tank, said 31
ships is the right number, but noted ``presence is now the
driver, rather than warfighting lift requirements.''
While the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary
unit, or ARG/MEU, team still can storm an island and take it
from enemy forces, the group is most often used to train
alongside partners and allies, respond to friendly nations
after a natural disaster, or rescue American citizens trapped
in dangerous countries.
Eaglen said this emphasis on presence as a means of
deterrence has contributed to the disagreement with the
Pentagon over the 31-ship requirement.
``The rub as I see it between the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Marine Corps is over amphib ship
requirements for operational plans, versus the additional
duties of crisis response (and to a lesser extent building
partner capacity) the Marines have on a daily basis,'' she
told Defense News. ``To me, the commandant is saying he wants
and needs more ships for tasks scoped outside [of
warfighting].''
Dakota Wood, a senior research fellow for defense programs
at the Heritage Foundation, acknowledged concerns over the
amphibious ships' survivability against Chinese anti-ship
missiles, but said ``large-scale combat operations against a
highly capable enemy like China is only part of the story.''
``Much has been made about China being the most substantial
security challenge for the U.S., but Navy-Marine Corps
forces, made possible with Marines embarked aboard Navy
amphibious ships, have repeatedly [proved] their worth across
a range of small crises in various parts of the world,'' he
told Defense News.
Fleet under fire
Though the Marine Corps maintains it needs 31 ships, the
Pentagon has not committed to that requirement.
DoD officials have not spoken publicly on the matter. Asked
by Defense News whether the Office of the Secretary of
Defense backs the 31-ship requirement, Pentagon spokesman
Chris Sherwood said the requirement can't be considered in
isolation and the department is ``focused on having the right
mix of capabilities to meet the objectives of the 2022
National Defense Strategy.''
The Navy's fiscal 2023 budget request, shaped by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the White House before going
to Congress, called for truncating the San Antonio-class
production line after one final ship that fiscal year. This
move would end the San Antonio program after 16 ships, rather
than the planned 26.
The FY24 request advances that plan, including no
additional LPDs in the five-year spending plan.
With the Marine Corps and the Pentagon at odds, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the services are conducting a
capability and cost analysis to consider alternative ship
designs and acquisition strategies that might lower the cost
of future amphibious ships. That study is set to conclude in
June.
U.S. Navy vessels sail with a Royal Thai Navy ship and a
South Korean ship while transiting the Gulf of Thailand
during the exercise Cobra Gold on March 3, 2023. (MC3 Joshua
Martinez/U.S. Navy)
Marine Corps, and later Navy, leaders have pushed to buy
these ships in multiyear procurement contracts, which must
generate cost-savings as a condition of service secretaries
approving them. These savings are often on the order of 10%.
But a top Marine general told Defense News that the Office of
the Secretary of Defense wants larger savings by paring down
the ship design and capability.
Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat
development and integration, told Defense News in March that
Pentagon officials had presented him with several rough
drawings of ship designs that would be cheaper than the
current LPDs.
``None of them are acceptable,'' he said. ``They're trying
to reduce cost by reducing my requirement. The answer to
reduced cost would have been to exercise [two previous
congressional authorizations for multi-ship contracts], one
of which was a five-ship and would have saved the American
taxpayers almost $900 million.''
Heckl, speaking at the annual Sea-Air-Space conference in
April, said the Marines had in 2014 worked with the Navy to
scale down the LPD design to the cheaper Flight II design,
now under construction at Ingalls Shipbuilding. ``We drove
out cost. We're done.''
Berger, who was part of that 2014 effort, made the same
point in an April 18 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
saying that ``every bit of efficiency [was] squeezed out'' of
the LPD design.
``If there's another effort to reduce that further, I know
that we went to the minimums in 2014,'' the commandant added.
When Navy leadership first rolled out the plan to nix
future LPDs, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said
that as the service prepares for a potential fight against
China, it must prioritize programs most relevant to that
conflict.
But more recently, top Navy officials said they would like
to continue buying LPDs. Gilday told reporters in early
April: ``We agree on the 31 requirement, we agree on
leveraging the multiyear procurement in terms of doing a
bundle buy, and hopefully this study that ends in June
informs these next steps.''
Sherwood, when asked about the Pentagon's commitment to
restart LPD buys in FY25 and to use multiyear procurement
authority, said the Office of the Secretary of Defense plans
to ``address the next purchase in our FY25 budget.''
Lawmakers last year included a provision in the FY23
National Defense Authorization Act giving the commandant of
the Marine Corps the authority to set the requirement for
amphibious ships. That effectively makes the congressionally
mandated requirement 31.
today's plan
The Navy's FY24 long-range shipbuilding plan, released
April 17, envisions a dwindling amphibious fleet unless a
compromise can be reached on building a future LPD-like ship.
Until the amphibious ship study determines the future of
the San Antonio program--whether to continue or truncate it;
whether to buy ships one at a time or commit to a multi-ship
buy; whether to keep the Flight II design or pare it down
further--the Navy's existing long-range plan does not include
buying medium amphibious ships.
It continues retiring the aging Whidbey Island LSDs,
though, calling for six of the 10 remaining ships to be
retired from FY24 to FY26.
Under the baseline plan--the long-range ship plan includes
three potential options--the fleet of 31 amphibious vessels
today would sit at 29 in a decade, 24 in two decades and 19
in three decades.
If the Navy were to continue buying the San Antonio-class
LPDs every other year, for about a billion dollars a year,
the fleet could instead sit at 34 in a decade, 34 in two
decades and 33 in three decades.
The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock Fort
Lauderdale is seen moored in Florida ahead of its July 30,
2022, commissioning ceremony. (Sgt. Gavin Shelton/U.S. Marine
Corps)
Clark said the Office of the Secretary of Defense may not
want the Navy to spend $2 billion every other year for a ship
it doesn't highly value right now, particularly because that
cadence would generate a fleet slightly larger than the
Corps' 31-ship requirement.
On the other hand, if the Navy stops the production line,
lets the fleet size shrink and then later opts to restart the
production line, the cost might be exorbitant--if Ingalls
could even reconstitute its workforce and supply base.
``Are you better off buying those ships? Is that actually
cheaper in the long run than it would be to stop the
production line and turn around and restart it?'' Clark said.
``It may be that it almost becomes a wash.''
That's the case with aircraft carriers: The Navy
essentially pays HII's Newport News Shipbuilding to keep the
production line ``activated and fully manned'' in order to
keep the sole builder of nuclear-powered carriers viable,
Clark said. The line isn't perfectly optimized, as that would
create a larger fleet than the Navy needs, but it delivers a
new ship every five to six years, and the Navy retains the
industrial base to produce these complex ships.
This arrangement ``ends up being slightly cheaper than if
you started and stopped and started the construction line
multiple times,'' Clark explained. ``The question is: Does
Congress or [the Office of the Secretary of Defense]--mostly
Congress--want to take that longer term view and say, `We're
just going to keep building LPDs on two-year centers because
in the end it's cheaper than to stop and start this line,
unless you don't think you need LPDs [for future operations]?
''
Several experts expressed concern the Pentagon won't take
long-term measures, like approving multi-ship contracts, to
build and maintain a 31-ship fleet.
Brent Sadler, a senior research fellow for naval warfare
and advanced technology at the Heritage Foundation, told
Defense News that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
its Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office ``don't see
value in amphibs in
[[Page S1519]]
a China fight, and therefore [they are] not worth the
money.''
Eaglen added that the the Office of the Secretary of
Defense ``is concerned some amphibs are too slow and
therefore easy targets after the shooting starts'' with
China, despite the Marine Corps seeing amphibious ships and
the surface connectors they haul as ``critical to fighting
inside the First Island Chain using Marines as a stand-in
force.'' (The first island chain stretches from Japan's
East China Sea islands through the Philippines.)
``Ultimately, Congress will be the adjudicator, and they
will again side with the commandant,'' she predicted.
The cost of falling short of a 31-ship fleet
Berger told the Senate committee that not having enough
ships puts at risk Marines' ability to deter or win a war,
plus their ability to respond to global crises.
``You have to be there with allies and partners because
they have to believe that the United States is not running
away from them, is going to be there even when things get
tough,'' he said.
The commandant added that ``if you still believe . . .
three amphibious ships loaded up with 2,300 Marines, if they
have a deterrent value, and I think they do, then you want
them right in the adversary's grill, right in their face
where they can see them all the time . . . Can we afford
conventional deterrence? Absolutely yes, because the
alternative is a lot worse.''
U.S. Marines sit in formation in combat rubber raiding
crafts during a launch and recovery exercise with the
amphibious transport dock New Orleans in the Philippine Sea
on Aug. 6, 2022. (Lance Cpl. Yvonne Iwae/U.S. Marine Corps)
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith
during a panel discussion at Sea-Air-Space said the service
is providing as much airlift as possible for its forces in
the Pacific, allowing Marines to get to exercises and respond
to problems.
But there are still gaps when no ARG/MEUs are patrolling
the Pacific, and Smith warned those would increase if the
fleet size decreases.
If Americans traveling or working abroad find themselves in
the middle of a violent uprising, ``you better hope it's in
the months that we have an ARG/MEU ready to come get you. If
you're a combatant commander and somebody tries to close down
a SLOC, a sea line of communication, you're going to want to
hope that's during the months that we're there.''
Calling the ARG/MEU the ``crown jewel of our expeditionary
crisis response capability,'' Turner said ``with the minimum
of 31 ships that has been established and the readiness
challenges that we're facing that we discussed, really the
confluence between capacity and readiness has pinched that
capability in ways that are really not helpful.''
If the Navy continues down its path of decommissioning the
old LSDs and not replacing them with new LPDs, ``trying to
maintain even a minimal ARG/MEU presence is going to be
really difficult.''
``At a time that we should be adding capability, we're
actually reducing capability,'' Turner said.
____________________