[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 71 (Thursday, April 27, 2023)]
[House]
[Pages H2056-H2069]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DIRECTING THE PRESIDENT, PURSUANT TO SECTION 5(C) OF THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION, TO REMOVE ALL UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, OTHER THAN UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES ASSIGNED TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, FROM
SOMALIA
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the order of the House of April
26, 2023, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 30)
directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers
Resolution, to remove all United States Armed Forces, other than United
States Armed Forces assigned to protect the United States Embassy, from
Somalia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of
Wednesday, April 26, 2023, the concurrent resolution is considered
read.
The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:
H. Con. Res. 30
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That, pursuant to section
[[Page H2057]]
5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)),
Congress directs the President to remove all United States
Armed Forces, other than United States Armed Forces assigned
to protect the United States Embassy, from Somalia by not
later than the date that is 365 days after the date of the
adoption of this resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The concurrent resolution shall be debatable
for 80 minutes, with 20 minutes controlled by the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. McCaul), 20 minutes controlled by the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Meeks), and 40 minutes controlled by the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Gaetz), or their respective designees.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. James) will control 20 minutes, the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) will control 20 minutes, and the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Gaetz) will control 40 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
General Leave
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I will start by commending both gentlemen from Florida
for their concern about our Nation's ongoing military engagements. It
is one I share as a veteran of the global war on terrorism.
Unfortunately, there are no silver bullets in policymaking, and when
we try to make one, we usually end up shooting ourselves in the foot.
It is for this reason and this reason alone that I stand in opposition.
I served in Operation Iraqi Freedom as an attack helicopter pilot. As
a combat veteran, Mr. Speaker, I can assure you that no one hates war
more than those who have come face-to-face with it. I do not look back
on the days of American military overreach and intervention in the
Middle East with nostalgia.
That said, as a West Point graduate, I understand history and the
lessons it teaches. The siren song of isolationism is tempting, but
allowing vacuums of American influence around the world to be filled by
terrorists and exploited by communists is a direct threat to Americans
at home.
While each Presidential administration has made errors in the conduct
of its foreign policy since the tragedies of 9/11 22 years ago, the
most egregious of these errors is continuing to concede America's
diplomatic leverage and allowing our agricultural, manufacturing, and
energy independence to erode.
It is Congress, this body, that has lazily conceded its
constitutional duty to guard its war powers jealously from the
executive branch. Congress' failure to hold each administration this
century accountable for their vague, broad, and failing foreign
policies may force Congress to exercise our war powers again in my
lifetime.
That is why I agree with Mr. Gaetz, in large part, that war should
never be on autopilot nor open-ended. Americans have the right and
Congress has the responsibility to understand and approve of the
sacrifice that we will be asking our country to make.
Our servicemembers are real people with families. They are sons and
daughters. Many weren't even born when 9/11 occurred.
Congress needs to do its job, but it needs to do its job the right
way. That is why, rather than continuing an open-ended, 22-year-old
law, I believe we must work together to first replace it with an
Authorization for Use of Military Force that focuses on today's
critical terrorist threats and requires Congress to stay engaged.
We must prioritize first building an America that is strong at home,
or we will never have hope of being strong abroad.
Regrettably, my friends, today's resolution does little toward those
ends. It will merely direct the removal of U.S. forces from Somalia.
That will not work.
Less than 2 years ago, we saw what happens when we pull troops with
no plan. Joe Biden's botched Afghanistan withdrawal forced our troops
to abandon billions of dollars in taxpayer-funded military equipment.
It resulted in 13 young American servicemembers dead. It left hundreds
of thousands of American veterans who served in Afghanistan wondering
if their efforts were in vain. It embarrassed America on the world
stage and left a gaping hole that China and the Taliban rushed to fill
in.
What have we learned? The Biden administration responded with the
Commander in Chief checking his watch during a dignified transfer of
servicemembers killed, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin claiming he
had no regrets about the withdrawal.
What have we learned?
Lest my argument be debased or derided as petty partisanship, let me
flip the script.
Mr. Speaker, I ask you, what happened the last time Republicans tried
to repeal something without a plan to replace it?
I tell you the truth: What happened then will pale in comparison to
the consequences of ceding the global strategic high ground of the
future to those who mean to harm us.
I will be the first to argue that we have become overdependent on the
military rather than investing in ourselves, in our industrial base at
home, wielding diplomacy, and harnessing economic statecraft as our
tools of first resort.
There is no global stability when America is economically weak and
militarily impulsive and has a reputation of retreat. The most
devastating effect of abandoning our allies--even now, thousands of our
fellow Americans are on the battlefield--is that our friends don't
trust us and our enemies no longer fear us. If we want nations around
the world to choose America instead of dictators and despots, we must
give them a reason to do so.
This premature withdrawal from Somalia will be a great victory for a
dangerous al-Qaida affiliate that seeks the death of America.
There is another group of adversaries to keep in mind, as well.
Russia and the Communist Party of China would like nothing more than to
see the U.S. take a foreign policy of isolationism. There is already a
Chinese military base on the east coast of Djibouti. There are reports
of more coming to the west coast of Africa, which will pose a direct
threat to America.
If we cavalierly withdraw from Africa, the CCP will rush to fill in
the void like they did in Afghanistan. By emboldening terrorists,
Russia, and Communist China, this resolution would harm the national
security of the United States.
Again, Mr. Speaker, I applaud the gentleman from Florida's initiative
for forcing this long-overdue debate. I also applaud leadership for
allowing it to come to the floor.
I invite the gentleman to work with me to end this executive
overreach of over two decades, to pull back our war powers and Article
I authority under the Constitution in a way that truly puts America
first. As it stands today, regretfully, this resolution will not
strengthen America at home or keep her safe abroad.
It is for that reason, and again, that reason alone, that I urge my
colleagues to join me in opposition.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H. Con. Res. 30.
This resolution was drafted in such a way that it is simultaneously
overbroad and underinclusive. The resolution fails to end our
involvement in hostilities in the region while preventing crucial
security cooperation with local partners in Somalia.
The resolution states that the United States forces must withdraw
from Somalia, unless they are there for the purposes of protecting the
Embassy.
Historically, war powers resolutions such as this are thought of as
attempting to force the President to withdraw American troops from a
foreign country that are actively engaged in combat, but our forces on
the ground in Somalia are there to provide security training and
intelligence support.
Our footprint in Somalia is not large. We have several hundred troops
stationed in the country primarily to train host-nation troops in
countering terrorism.
The sponsor of this legislation sometimes references the lost blood
and
[[Page H2058]]
treasure from our overseas engagements. These are obviously essential
considerations. It is why I supported President Biden's decision to end
the war in Afghanistan. But no American has been killed in Somalia in
over 4 years, and our security cooperation and assistance to the
country amounts to a rounding error in the Federal budget.
It is a fact that Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations like
ISIS control large swaths of territory in Somalia, but local forces
from the Somali Government and the African Union Transition Mission in
Somalia have made steady gains the past several years. United States
forces have been instrumental in some of these changes because of the
very training and intelligence support we provide to local forces on
the ground.
By mandating that our forces cease security cooperation in Somalia,
this resolution would roll back some of the gains that have been made
to take back territory from terrorist organizations in the past several
years.
This measure doesn't end American hostilities in the region. It
includes nothing about removing American forces from other nations in
the region where groups like Al-Shabaab operate, and it does nothing to
address over-the-horizon strikes.
While I disagree with this measure, let me say that what I do agree
with is that we are having this debate. It is one that is long overdue.
American forces have been in Somalia and other parts of the world
without proper engagement from the United States Congress.
While I understand the logic that both Republican and Democratic
administrations have used to include groups like Al-Shabaab under the
2001 AUMF, I can tell you that Members of Congress did not believe that
they were authorizing force against Al-Shabaab when we passed the
legislation decades ago. I can tell you this not just because I was
here when Congress voted on that AUMF but because Al-Shabaab didn't
even exist in September 2001.
I believe, though, that the proper way to address the issues of
matters of war and peace in Somalia is not through a legally dubious
resolution such as this. I agree with Representative James in this, and
we should work together, all three of us, I believe, because the right
way to address this issue is through a repeal of the 2001 AUMF and its
replacement with a narrow force authorization that provides the
President authority to combat selected terrorists in selected countries
where the United States' national security is at stake.
Mr. Speaker, I have introduced just such a resolution, and I look
forward to working with my colleagues on that. H.J. Res. 52, which
narrows the list of terrorist organizations the executive branch can
strike, limits the number of countries in which we could engage in
hostilities, places curbs on executive branch additions of associated
forces and successor groups, and includes a sunset requiring Congress
to reauthorize the legislation.
{time} 1245
Reasserting Congress' proper role over matters of war and peace while
ensuring that the President has the necessary authorities to strike
those who mean to do us harm can be and is a tough balance to strike. I
believe wholeheartedly it is our responsibility to make some of those
hard decisions. We cannot punt it or give it off just to the executive.
I am willing to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to
strike a balance.
Let's take a look at H.J. Res. 52. From the debate we are having
today, I think that we have some of the basics of what we agree with,
that it is this body that the Constitution empowered to make sure there
are checks and balances on the executive.
Unfortunately, I cannot say that about H. Con. Res. 30 before us
today. Therefore, I must oppose this legislation, urge my colleagues to
do the same. Let's come together as Members of the United States House
of Representatives and take our responsibility. Let's repeal and
replace the 2001 AUMF and move forward.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed
colleague, Mr. Meeks, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a
great patriot such as Mr. James of Michigan.
I welcome the American people to the second part in a legislative
series we are conducting about all of the places on the planet Earth
where Congress still believes that 9/11 justifies current U.S. troop
presence in 2023.
The first in that series was Syria. I came to this floor, only got
about 103 votes, but I made the argument that our troops were
essentially sitting ducks, guarding oil extraction operations where
their presence was known and where their location was easily
identifiable. I called for a withdrawal. That withdrawal was defeated.
Then what happened is precisely what I predicted, more U.S. casualties
from Iranian drones, exactly what I said would occur. It is with no joy
I say that.
I know all of us would take any policy decision we could to reduce
U.S. casualties, and I think this debate will present an excellent
opportunity to reflect on Somalia in that light.
There are currently 900 U.S. troops in Somalia, give or take, and
this resolution would bring them home.
Somalia is a country of 17 million who have been tortured at times by
Al-Shabaab, a group of roughly 7,000 hardened fighters and even more
sympathizers. But to logically believe any of the arguments that my
colleagues are making, you have to believe that 900 U.S. troops is what
is going to save a country of 17 million from a hardened group of
7,000. I think that strains not only logic but understanding of the
history of Somalia, a country that has oscillated between failed state
and just absolute coup revolution over and over again, civil war, and
sectarian violence.
The future of Somalia must be determined by Somalia. To the extent
that foreign influences could be helpful, I would argue that the
African Union is far better positioned to build a stronger sense of
national identity and national unity among clans that have been warring
in Somalia for generations than U.S. troops. I have yet to see the
evidence that U.S. troops are the essential element to fusing
relationships among warring African warlords, clans, and tribes.
Now, the British controlled Somalia, and in nearly half a century
since, we have seen a constant state of despair.
So what is the end state for our military presence in Somalia?
Are we going to be the block captain of Mogadishu, presumably
forever, until we beat the last sympathy for Al-Shabaab out of the last
heart of the last Somali?
That was the argument with Syria and ISIS; we have to stay in Syria
because there are still people who believe the ISIS ideology.
Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the U.S. military is not an effective
capability to deploy to defeat an ideology. We are not able to
permanently stabilize countries by having a presence that can at times
be the very basis for the terrorism recruitment that we seem to work
against.
There is also an opportunity cost to being in Somalia that I would
like to share with the body. I represent constituents who are part of
these missions, these train, equip, and advise missions throughout
Africa. Increasingly, they are having to enter the INDOPACOM to get
analysis and research on the best communication skills, tactical skills
and strategic skills that would be necessary if conflict were to erupt
in the INDOPACOM theater.
What I have observed firsthand is that at times, some of our best and
brightest are having to go split squad, where some are wandering about
Africa on train-and-equip missions. Then there is less of a focused
capability in places where I think America must hold the high ground to
ensure the enduring success of our Nation.
My colleague from the other side of the aisle made mention of the
training that America does in Africa and how critical it is. The
problem is, far too often, we are training the next generation of coup
leaders. We haven't figured that out yet. I got to ask the question of
the leader of AFRICOM: Why so many people who are leading coups in
Africa were trained by Americans? He was unable to identity even
current leaders of African countries, that they were trained by
Americans or that they participated in coups.
[[Page H2059]]
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from The Intercept:
``AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We share `core values' with coup
leaders.''
[From The Intercept, April 10, 2023]
Africom Chief to Congress: We Share ``Core Values'' With Coup Leaders
(By Nick Turse)
In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire last month, 1,300 U.S., NATO,
and African troops met for tactical and mock raids as part of
Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special
Operations Command Africa, or SOCAFRICA. Among the countries
participating was Burkina Faso, which has been restricted
from receiving substantial U.S. security aid since an officer
trained by Americans at previous Flintlock exercises
overthrew his democratically elected government in a coup
last year.
U.S. military officials have spent the last month trying to
explain this curious state of affairs to Congress and the
press. Flintlock provides a ``critical training opportunity''
for special operations forces from the U.S. and Africa and a
chance to ``exchange best practices,'' Rear Adm. Milton
``Jamie'' Sands, the chief of SOCAFRICA, told The Intercept
and other reporters on a conference call last month. He
didn't mention that, by the Pentagon's own assessments,
militant Islamist attacks in the Sahel have spiked and
security has plummeted across West Africa since SOCAFRICA
began Flintlock trainings in 2005. ``The Sahel now accounts
for 40 percent of all violent activity by militant Islamist
groups in Africa, more than any other region in Africa,''
reads a recent report: by the Defense Department's Africa
Center for Strategic Studies.
The four-star general in charge of U.S. Africa Command, or
AFRICOM, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee
that only a small percentage of U.S.-trained officers
overthrow their governments--while admitting he didn't know
the exact number. This prompted farright Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-
Fla., to ask, ``Why should U.S. taxpayers be paying to train
people who then lead coups in Africa?''
Flintlock attendees have conducted at least five coups in
the last eight years. Since 2008, in fact, U.S.-trained
officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in
at least eight) across five West African countries, including
Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times),
Mauritania, and the Gambia.
Before he toppled Burkina Faso's democratically elected
president in 2022, for example, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo
Damiba attended Flintlock exercises in 2010 and 2020,
according to AFRICOM. A fellow Flintlock 2010 attendee, Gen.
Gilbert Diendere, overthrew the government of Burkina Faso in
2015.
Just a year after he attended Flintlock 2019, Col. Assimi
Goita headed the junta that overthrew Mali's government.
After staging that coup, Goita stepped down and took the job
of vice president in a transitional government tasked with
returning Mali to civilian rule. But nine months later, he
seized power for a second time.
Another alum of Flintlock 2019, Col. Mamady Doumbouya,
served as a Guinean unit commander during the exercise,
according to AFRICOM. In 2021, members of Doumbouya's unit
took time out from being trained in small unit tactics and
the law of armed conflict by Green Berets to storm the
presidential palace and depose their country's 83-year-old
president, Alpha Conde. Doumbouya soon declared himself
Guinea's new leader. The U.S. ended the training and
distanced itself from the coup.
``Core values is what we start off with,'' Gen. Michael
Langley, the AFRICOM chief, told the House Armed Services
Committee last month.
``Do we share those values with Col. Doumbouya?'' asked
Gaetz.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, in this piece, it highlights five countries--
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia--where the very
people who led the coups were the very people who received this
training from the United States.
I would note that any comparison here to Afghanistan is sorely
misplaced. This legislation provides one year to remove 900 people.
That is far different than unwinding the double helix that was our
multidecade engagement with Afghanistan.
I agree with the sentiment that my colleague Mr. James stated, that
our friends must trust us and our enemies must fear us. But what I have
observed, after 20 years of American war in the Middle East and in
North Africa, is that our enemies often mock us when we try to be the
world's policeman and the world's piggy bank. That should not be the
goal of our country. We should not be engaged in nation-building in
Somalia, the Middle East, or elsewhere.
These 900 U.S. troops have no end state. They are engaging in largely
police force operations. I suggest they should come home, and a vote
for this resolution would do that.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I agree with my colleague, Mr. Gaetz. He makes a series
of great points. The greatest, I believe, is our military cannot be
used to fight an ideology. Unlimited war without checking by Congress
is unconstitutional, and we must come up with a better solution, which
is why the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and me, as the chairman
of the Subcommittee on Africa, recognizes that the DOD doesn't exist in
a vacuum. We recognize that the State Department and USAID are present
in building civilian leaders and institutions. We understand these
institutions must work together with different mandates, and we are not
shooting our way out of Somalia. We must provide additional ways to fix
the problem.
I agree we cannot fight ideology with military. I look forward to
working with all sides to figure out exactly how we can strengthen our
ties to make sure that we have partners and move from aid to trade with
a long-term partner.
We had a rousing speech from the President of South Korea just an
hour ago where he mentioned the great aid that the United States
taxpayers and the great investment that we have made over decades and
years in South Korea. Now as a shining example, they are the 10th most
wealthy country in the world because of America, our great generosity,
and because we are exceptional.
I think we have a remarkable opportunity to do that and show that
America truly should be the first choice and first option for folks
around the world.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Montana (Mr.
Zinke).
Mr. ZINKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition, but I agree with my
distinguished colleague from Florida that Congress has an obligation to
review it. Congress should not abdicate our responsibility. We should
ask the tough questions. Ultimately, we should provide the funding
necessary and the resources to win. That is our job, and I agree with
you 100 percent.
But as a commander, they are doing more than just guarding an
embassy. A force structure of 900 may seem like a large footprint, but
those of us who remember Black Hawk Down would suggest otherwise.
A force requires medevac. Those medevacs require people that service
those aircraft. In case we get in trouble, we need a quick reaction
force, a force large enough to defend our troops. I, like my
colleagues, know that if you were to put any American servicemen in
harm's way, you want to ensure we have the adequate force to make sure
they are recovered safely. They also have to be fed and have
communications. In order to have an effective force, you need a
footprint that can do its mission.
I also agree that we should have a plan. Before we unplug our
obligations, we should know what unplugging it does and when, and also
we should have a plan on what our obligations are.
So much of this discussion is a discussion among similar views. We do
have an obligation for freedom. We have a commitment to democracy that
when we provide a force to defend that democracy, and it is American
force and our allies, that we provide them with a force package that
can win.
Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose this well-intended
resolution. I do ask that we work as a body to uphold our duty as
Congress to make sure that the authorizations we give the executive are
both appropriate, timely, and do so to win.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me just say, this debate is long overdue. We happen
to be talking about the AUMF. I would hope that we end up having more
debates on this floor talking about the continent of Africa, who has
long been left off the debate in the United States Congress, which is a
continent that we have got to focus on. I look forward to working with
Mr. James as the chair of that subcommittee.
We need to focus on the stability of Africa, the stability of its
governments and its institutions, because if we don't, it is at our own
danger. We should be doing it because it is the right thing. We should
be listening to those allies that we have on the continent and to those
Presidents, because
[[Page H2060]]
they are the ones who are at threat and in danger of being destroyed by
terrorist groups who have now moved over the continent.
We have got to have this debate more and more and make sure that
Africa is on our front burner, not our back burner. Because if Africa
continues to be on our back burner, we will see Russia and China, as
Mr. James has indicated, and others jumping in. We will see Wagner
coming in to secure these countries. Let's have this debate.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms.
Omar), who came to the United States from the continent of Africa.
{time} 1300
Ms. OMAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H. Con. Res. 30,
the Somalia war powers resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I agree with the chairman, a real debate about U.S.
policy in Somalia and in Africa is long overdue. It is debate that
should include a serious discussion of our long-term strategy for
supporting stability and self-governance. It should include clear-eyed
analysis of U.S. counterterrorism policies, including air strikes and
drones, and the consistent problem of civilian casualties of U.S.
operations.
Congress is also overdue for a debate about the expansive use of the
2001 AUMF, which the executive branch claims includes operations in
Somalia.
Mr. Speaker, the resolution before the House today does not address
these significant issues. It is a narrow question of the withdrawal of
a few hundred troops.
Given President Hassan's renewed efforts to eradicate Al-Shabaab, the
resolution does include a long enough timeline to ensure that
operations that we are partnering with can be ended responsibly.
While we should not mistake this poorly crafted resolution for an
honest assessment of U.S. policy in Somalia, it is important that we
support the question before us.
Mr. Speaker, I and many Somali Americans support this resolution, and
I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I can assure the gentleman from New York that
we will have a more fulsome discussion regarding the continent of
Africa because the next in our legislative series may very well be
Niger. We will have that opportunity, as well.
To my colleague from Minnesota, I think she really hits the nail on
the head that the partnerships between the existing government in
Somalia and the clans that exist throughout the country is the
essential glue to resist the violence and destabilization that we see
from Al-Shabaab.
It is my belief that the government's entrees to those groups to get
them to not side with Al-Shabaab are not facilitated by extensive U.S.
presence. I just don't believe that to get one group of Somalis to stop
killing another group of Somalis that the essential ingredient is us.
It may be other African influencers to a positive extent, but there
is great wisdom in what the gentlewoman shared regarding the utility of
those partnerships and relationships.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Mills).
Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague from
Florida (Mr. Gaetz) for yielding. I also thank my colleagues, Mr. James
and Mr. Zinke for their service. They, like myself, are combat veterans
who understand the total cost of warfare.
Mr. Speaker, before I get into my statement, I will address a couple
of things that were mentioned by my colleagues here today. We talked
about the idea that we are here to preserve freedoms and we are here to
preserve democracy. Let's talk about our role in democracy.
We went into Iraq in 2003 under the auspice that we were there for
weapons of mass destruction and to liberate the people of Iraq. Only 2
years later did we supplement this with the 2005 Iraq Constitution,
whereby article 76, in its own design, created sectarian democracy that
gave rise to the Iranian control which ultimately gave rise to China's
domination.
We are not a nation-building element. We are warfighters. We are
there to conduct counterterrorism operations when needed, but only at
the expense that it is to the benefit of the American national security
and U.S. interests.
He talked about timely. I ask you, Mr. Speaker, we started our
operations in Mogadishu in the early 1990s. We started the operations
in Afghanistan in 2001, and we started the operations in Iraq in 2003.
So by what definition do we determine is timely?
The idea that my colleague--and rightfully so, and I agree with him--
Mr. James said about the repeal and replace piece of the AUMF, which I
do view as an abdication of our roles and responsibilities as
legislators under the Constitution in Article I, Clause 8, it does have
a replacement, and I just stated it. It is called the United States
Constitution war authorities.
At no point in time can you find in the Constitution whereby it says
we can repeal our rights as legislators under the Constitution to put
in something which abdicates our roles and responsibilities for 20-plus
years on an AUMF that was designed, and now being abused, by Presidents
on the left and the right, who have been using it for its unintended
purposes.
While I agree with my colleague, Mr. Gaetz, that Afghanistan is
completely not relevant to the discussion that was made, we are talking
about an area whereby President Biden utilized political optics over
military strategy, endangering the lives of our military, when we know
that it was a conditions-based withdrawal.
One thing was actually stated that is correct, which is the threat in
which China possesses when it comes to the African Continent and that a
vacuum could be created. Let's go ahead and focus on what China's
ultimate goal is because it is not kinetics. It is not about the bomb-
to-bomb, gun-to-gun, or bullet-to-bullet mechanism.
It is about the economic and resource warfare impact. It is about the
Belt and Road Initiative, which expands out the Eurasian border, takes
over Africa, Oceania, cuts off the Western Hemisphere's supply chain in
an effort to utilize the WHO, WEF, and OPEC to eliminate the U.S.
dollar from the global currency.
Let us address that issue. It is not one that is done by kinetics and
warfighters, but by a whole-of-nation approach that deals with
Treasury, that deals with the economic build-out, that deals with
strengthening the industrial base at home, which stops the reliance on
the very adversaries that we pay to slap us around every day.
The idea that we are going to play this terrorist whack-a-mole where
every time one pops, we send a new force, it does nothing to actually
try and help with stabilization. Let's talk about our interactions.
We had a terrorist organization known as al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula, which was based in a small portion in the Gulf of Aden out
in Yemen. It wasn't until our drone strikes that caused numerous
civilian casualties did we not play right into the ideology that
Americans are here to destroy us and kill us due to our religious
beliefs.
We were actually the reason that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
continued to grow. My colleague on the left--who I have a great deal of
respect for and we sit on the Foreign Affairs Committee--Mr. Meeks, he
talks about the fact that we have had no Americans killed in Somalia.
That is absolutely false.
In fact, we just had another soldier killed in 2018 as a result of an
explosion that resulted in three more. Also in 2017, we had three more
killed that were there. As someone who has had to go visit Arlington
Cemetery on many occasions to see my brothers that are no longer here
with me today, I don't think that we need to spare one more life of
American bloodshed in an effort that we don't have a clear, strategic
military objective to begin with.
Mr. Speaker, I ask that we look at not being isolationists, as we are
always called and considered, but also not interventionists. Our goal
is to be protectionists; protection of our constitutional rights, our
sovereignty, and the American people. That is our role.
We keep talking about this 2001 AUMF that we are to repeal. Let's go
through this. In 2019, the amendment to the 2020 NDAA to repeal the
2002 AUMF was stripped out in its final version. On November 14, 2018,
the resolution introduced to assert Congress' war power authorities in
Yemen, the Rules Committee stripped the resolution and its procedural
privilege.
[[Page H2061]]
Soon after, the Rules Committee stripped privilege from all war power
resolutions for the remainder of the 115th Congress.
We keep talking about what we are going to do, but I have seen very
little action. This is one of the reasons I ran for Congress because
there are too many politicians who like to talk and not enough
statesmen who are willing to act.
I know a little thing about action, considering that between my
military and government experience I spent over 7 years of my life in
Iraq, almost 3 years of my life in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Pakistan, and
guess what, northern Somalia and the Puntland areas of Hargeisa and
Berbera.
I can tell you very clearly that what we are doing right now in our
procedures is not making us safer. We must start to look at a real
change in order to protect America, stop abdicating our roles and
responsibilities, and start leading from the front.
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I think this is what we call a violent
agreement. We need to fix the ills of the past with a solution for the
future.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr.
McCormick).
Mr. McCORMICK. Mr. Speaker, this is one of my favorite debates. In my
short time in Congress, and even in observing Congress, here you have
people from both sides of the aisle actually taking opposition to each
other so we can have a real conversation. There are people that I
respect on my side of the aisle and people that I respect and disagree
with on the other side of the aisle having a real debate that has
little to do with partisanship but really about principle. It is
refreshing.
Much like H.R. 21, which was probably the most fascinating vote we
have taken to date since I have been in Congress, we actually had a
Republican, somebody whose credentials as a conservative are not
questioned at all, who had more people from the Democratic Party vote
for his bill than from the Republican Party. He had the squad vote for
him and his bill. That is bipartisanship in a certain way.
Yet, we have this debate right now in a similar fashion on Somalia.
This is not a place that is unknown to me. I was there during part of
the U.N. withdrawal in 1994 off the coast on the 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit. I spent time in Entebbe, Uganda, as part of
Operation Restore Hope when we had our problem with Rwanda. Africa is a
place of many troubled nations. There is no doubt about it.
The question we have today is: What is good for America?
This isn't about nation-building. This is about protecting our
Nation. This is a debate over whether we are going to save lives or
lose lives that are American by what our actions are in the near
future; and into the future of how we plan our force structure and what
we deploy with around the world.
I am very much concerned that if we are not in these regions,
especially in Somalia, which is one of the most war-torn areas we know
of, that we will have an increase in terrorist activities. When you see
a country like Afghanistan and the way it is deteriorating right now--
you have 27 terrorist cells training there--because of the lack of
presence of good guys trying to make sure that bad guys don't propagate
and proliferate and making sure they are not recruiting people and
sending people over here to do harm to us, it is a minor miracle that
we haven't had another 9/11 in so long.
If you think about it, the incredible work that we have had done by
our intel community and our Special Forces and other Americans around
the world to circumvent that from happening is nothing short of
Herculean.
I would make the case that because we have forces all around the
world, we have been a safer place. We have saved American lives. This
isn't about building a nation of 17 million people. This is about
protecting the Nation of 330 million people.
I want to make sure that we are clear in this argument that this is
not about seeking war. No one who spent time in the military wants war.
I spent over 20 years in the military myself. I spent years away from
my family, as well. I served with three different forces: Marine Corps,
Army, and Navy. Nobody wants war less than I do.
Nobody wants to see Americans killed more than any military
commander. As a matter of fact, when we send these people, it is not
because a politician wants to go over there. Usually it is because a
general or an area commander has requested these troops in
collaboration with each other. We are talking about decades of
experience in the region, and they understand what is at stake. They
don't want war. They don't want American troops to lose their lives.
As a matter of fact, they are judged historically on how many
American lives they save, on how many American troops that they don't
put in harm's way. This isn't about seeking war. This is about avoiding
war. This isn't about protecting their nation. It is protecting our
Nation.
We have an obligation to watch over this great Nation of ours. I
think it is not by pulling back, but engaging in other countries in a
way we can work together to protect American lives, both civilian and
military.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to clarify for Mr. Mills that when I
mentioned we had not had any deaths in Somalia, I said in the last 4
years. I was acknowledging what happened before. In the last 4 years we
have not lost any American troops in Somalia.
Let me also say, as I said earlier, I am happy that we are having
this debate and talking about the continent of Africa. If we do that,
we have to listen to the African--I can just recall, and sometimes many
of my colleagues, especially on the other side of the aisle, argue that
we don't get the votes we need at times in the U.N. from African
countries.
I recall when we were trying to get votes in regard to Russia's
illegal invasion into Ukraine, and I had to call on African
ambassadors. They said: Now you are calling? We haven't heard from the
United States for a while. Now you want something from me?
{time} 1315
We have been asking for assistance in regard to security, and then I
watched to see what was taking place when we looked at our diplomacy.
It took over two decades before, in the 117th Congress, we passed a
State Department authorization bill, and we had to do that through the
NDAA as opposed to saying we were going to stand strongly on diplomacy.
Guess what China did during that period of time? They doubled their
diplomacy budget.
Guess what else is happening? For the first time, China has more
consulates than the United States of America.
General Kelly said that either we do and get engaged in more
diplomacy, or we are going to have to spend more money on bullets.
We have an opportunity to engage and listen to allies and work with
our allies. Many allies have more, and should have more, responsibility
on the continent because they colonized it and are working with us
collectively to try to make sure that the Chinas and the Russias of the
world are not invested and that we are invested, and we are not.
It is our challenge, and I hope that when we get past this debate, we
will be able to have another one. I look forward to doing it,
particularly in our committee, so that we can figure out collectively,
as Ms. Ilhan Omar said, how we can work together and listen to make
sure that we have an overall strategy.
I say this in regard to both parties. I say this to the
administration that should be doing more on the continent of Africa.
So, yes, this is not a partisan debate. This is an American debate.
This is an opportunity to be attentive to a continent that is the
fastest growing and the youngest on this planet but that we have
ignored for far too long.
We have to wake up and do more for the continent of Africa and figure
out diplomacy, figure out how we can help protect them from being
victimized by terrorism, and figure out how we can strengthen
institutions.
We have a lot of work to do. We have to figure out how we reauthorize
AGOA, figure out how we work with the African Union, and figure out how
we work with the African organizations. That is our challenge because,
if not, we imperil ourselves.
I could agree that this is not just an investment in the continent;
it is an
[[Page H2062]]
investment for America and America's leadership.
Let's lead.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas
(Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, let me thank the gentleman for his
distinguished leadership as the manager on this floor and, certainly,
the proponent of this resolution. I know it came with good intentions.
Let me indicate the wisdom of a young college student some many years
ago when I offered to my college for my winning traveling fellowship
that I would go to the continent of Africa. Everyone else would go to
places well defined and well recognized. I told them that I wanted to
take the fellowship that I had received to travel to West Africa, and I
did, from then-Togo-and-Dahomey--obviously, changed names to Cote
d'Ivoire--to Ghana and Nigeria, and I studied, seeing the potential
even then.
I am gratified to be in this Congress to be able to have the
leadership of our chairman and our ranking member on the Foreign
Affairs Committee to recognize the cruciality of our purpose on the
continent.
It was members of the Congressional Black Caucus who organized to say
how important it was under the George W. Bush administration that the
Africa Command be set up. It was crucial in the bloody fight in Liberia
for that command to be set up, and only without shooting one gun were
they able to begin to bring peace.
So, I rise with great concern and opposition to H. Con. Res. 30
because I have realized the importance of the Africa Command because it
has elements of diplomacy.
I am glad that President Biden reversed Trump's get-out-of-town and
get-out-of-Dodge-quick resolution to, in fact, leave a footprint of
500, who are helping us bring down Al-Shabaab, bring down al-Qaida, and
boost up the Somalian partners of which our soldiers are working
through and working to degrade Al-Shabaab's ability to plot external
operations while building the capacities of our partner.
The rest of Africa is watching. If they try to be peaceful and to
stand up a democratic entity, do they have a powerful force like the
United States?
I, too, want a full debate on the Authorization for Use of Military
Force. I have been here for 9/11 and afterward, and I, too, believe
that it is our duty.
What I will say at this time is that we should not remove those
troops from Somalia.
I ask my colleague to join with his committee and engage in debate on
the AUMF, but I want to protect the Somalian people, Africa, and I want
to protect the interests of democracy and the United States of America.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.Con. Res. 30--Directing
the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution,
to remove all United States Armed Forces, other than United States
Armed Forces assigned to protect the United States Embassy, from
Somalia.
This concurrent resolution directs the President to remove all U.S.
Armed Forces from Somalia, other than those assigned to protect the
U.S. embassy in Somalia, within 365 days of the adoption of this
concurrent resolution.
Premature withdrawal would risk reversal of critical counterterrorism
and governance gain.
Al-Shabaab is al-Qaida's largest and best--financed affiliate in the
world and has repeatedly demonstrated its intent and capability to
launch lethal and complex attacks against U.S. citizens in east Africa
and beyond.
Al-Shabaab has killed more than a dozen U.S. citizens since 2014--
more than all of al-Qaida's other affiliates combined during the same
period.
U.S. forces, 500-900 working through Somali partners, seek to degrade
Al-Shabaab's ability to plot external operations while building the
capacities of our partners.
The small but effective U.S. military presence supports a critical
counterterrorism mission by working with partners forces.
There is no legal basis for this legislation.
The resolution is based on section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution.
But section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution applies only when our
forces are engaged in hostilities without statutory basis.
In this case, there a statutory basis for U.S. actions in Somalia, as
U.S. forces are supporting hostilities against Al-Shabaab and al-Qaida
in Somalia--both of which are covered by the 2001 Authorization to Use
Military Force.
Since July 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia has retaken more
territory than the previous five years combined.
U.S. military presence is a vital component of efforts to improve
local partners capacity and local conditions to the point that our
presence is no longer needed.
The persistent presence of a modest number of U.S. forces increases
the effectiveness of the DoD's training efforts and bolsters its
credibility as a consistent and durable partner for Somali forces.
The DoD's presence in Somalia forms the backbone of a whole--of--
government approach that layer's diplomacy, security assistance,
stabilization programing, and intelligence operations to counter Al-
Shabaab and address the conditions that have allowed it to thrive.
I urge all my colleagues to oppose H.Con. Res. 30.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, if what it takes to protect the 17 million people in
Somalia is 900 U.S. troops forever, then I don't have high hopes for
them. I have far more confidence in the strategy that Congresswoman
Omar laid out, which was the Somali Government working to create some
sense of national identity among Somali clans, and no one has made a
compelling argument that we are essential to that process.
I take some exception to my colleague from Texas calling this a get-
out-quick resolution. It gives us a year. Can't we move 900 people in a
year?
My colleague from Georgia argued that Somali troop presence was
essential to keep America safe. Let me be clear: I fear China and some
crazy Russian general with nuclear codes far more than I fear Somali
warlords fighting over who controls aid streams.
It is not just my opinion. It is the opinion of our military leaders
at AFRICOM. It was Brigadier General Bailey who said recently:
What we have seen is not necessarily holding land or
territory. It is more extortion, closer to an organized crime
organization.
That was on February 27, 2023, on ``Nightly News with Lester Holt.''
Even General Bailey doesn't view this as a way to get land, seize
land, and keep it away from Al-Shabaab. He is saying that they are not
really holding land. They are just engaged in low-level thuggery, and
it seems unworthy of a sustained U.S. troop presence.
Let's make clear that while the debate was elegant and compelling
about the need to engage Africa, the vote on this resolution is whether
900 U.S. troops should stay in Somalia or come home.
Those who vote against my resolution are functionally taking the
position that the 2001 AUMF, which was voted on when 89 percent of us
who are currently in the House were not even here to vote on it and
which was voted on before Al-Shabaab even existed, has become a global
permission slip for U.S. interventionism everywhere.
Al-Shabaab had nothing to do with 9/11. The fact that they have co-
branded with al-Qaida is not indicative of any interoperability.
Mr. Speaker, as we are evaluating whether or not we have to keep 900
troops in Somalia for the safety and security of Americans, the
principal goal of Al-Shabaab is to rule greater Somalia under sharia
law and overthrow the government.
That is not my opinion. That is a February 2023 Congressional
Research Service conclusion. That very same CRS report indicates that
Al-Shabaab does not have the capability to attack the United States.
I guess it is easy to stand up and say that we should be the police
force everywhere because anywhere some bad person could harbor the
desire to kill us, but the best research we have says that that is not
in line with their existing capabilities.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the February 2023 Congressional
Research Service report.
[From Congressional Research Service, updated Feb. 14, 2023]
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab (Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin
Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist
group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2022 labeled
``the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al Qaeda affiliate
in the world today.'' AFRICOM reports that the group poses
the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and interests in East
Africa, and is a threat to the United States.
background
Al Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s amidst a vacuum of
state authority in Somalia. It evolved out of a militant wing
of the
[[Page H2063]]
federation of Islamic Courts that took control of Mogadishu
and much of southern Somalia in 2006. When Ethiopia, which
backed Somalia's nascent transitional government, intervened
militarily--with U.S. support--to oust the Courts, Al Shabaab
used historical anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis to
draw recruits and support, including among the diaspora in
the United States.
Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including
the capital, from the late 2000s until African Union (AU)
forces gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011-2012
and reclaimed some territory from the group. Shabaab has
nevertheless retained control over parts of the country,
despite international recognition of Somalia's federal
government in 2012 and a range of multilateral efforts to
degrade its capacity. The group also maintains influence and
the ability to conduct attacks in government-held areas.
relationship with al qaeda
Some of Al Shabaab's founding members trained with Al Qaeda
(AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East Africa,
including Fazul Mohammed--the late mastermind of the U.S.
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania--have been associated
with the group. After expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda
in Al Shabaab's early years, the groups announced a formal
affiliation in 2012.
While Al Shabaab's leaders appear to broadly share Al
Qaeda's transnational agenda, the group operates
independently. Among other AQ affiliates, the group maintains
ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with
which it runs a smuggling network.
In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for a shift in
allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership
rejected the proposal and launched a deadly crackdown against
IS supporters. A small IS faction in northern Somalia
survived the purge. Al Shabaab remains the dominant group and
appears to view the IS cell as a rival.
the threat
Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the
Somali government, AU forces, and foreign targets in Somalia.
Per UN data, 2022 was its deadliest year since 2017, when a
truck bomb in Mogadishu killed over 500 people (Al Shabaab's
deadliest single attack to date).
While the group has focused primarily on Somalia, it is
also threatens the countries participating in the African
Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, previously known as
AMISOM) and has conducted attacks in neighboring countries
and Uganda. Al Shabaab has been most active in Kenya, which
launched a military operation in Somalia against the group in
2011 (Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012). The group has killed
hundreds of Kenyans, many through hit-and-run attacks near
the Somali border. Its 2015 assault on a university in
northeast Kenya, which killed at least 147 people, was the
deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since Al Qaeda's 1998
bombing of the U.S. embassy.
Al Shabaab's July 2022 incursion into Ethiopia is its
largest operation outside Somalia to date, reportedly
involving some 2,000 Al Shabaab fighters. UN experts estimate
that as many as 1,000 fighters remain in Ethiopia, giving it
a foothold, despite Ethiopian claims of routing the group.
Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in the
region and called for attacks against the United States.
Attacks on international targets in Kenya's capital--the 2013
Westgate Mall siege and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel assault--
raised the group's international profile. Over 50 U.S.
citizens were reportedly in the Westgate mall when the attack
started--all escaped but six were injured. In 2020, Al
Shabaab killed a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors during
a raid on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military facility used
by the U.S. military near the Somali border.
The group has not claimed any attacks in the United States.
It has, however, encouraged lone-wolf attacks in its
propaganda, and in 2015, it produced a video identifying
shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential
targets. In 2019, a Kenyan national was arrested in the
Philippines and later extradited to the United States on
charges of conspiring to hijack an aircraft on behalf of Al
Shabaab to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States.
objectives
Al Shabaab rejects democracy, broadly ascribing to a vision
of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Djibouti, Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Somalia in an Islamic state under its version
of Sharia law. It characterizes the Somali government as an
illegitimate apostate authority that is beholden to foreign
powers. Al Shabaab leaders have repeatedly expressed their
commitment to global jihad. They justify attacks outside
Somalia as retaliation against countries conducting military
operations in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses
against Muslims. Al Shabaab described the Manda Bay and
DusitD2 attacks in Kenya as consistent with Al Qaeda
directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, and referred
to the airfield as one of the ``launch pads for the American
crusade against Islam in the region.'' Al Shabaab activities
in Kenya more broadly appear focused on sowing internal
dissent and fomenting an insurgency. Its fighters have
specifically targeted non-Muslims in some attacks there.
leadership
Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has led
Al Shabaab since 2014. He succeeded Ahmed Abdi Godane, who
was killed in a U.S. airstrike that the Obama Administration
described as responding to an ``imminent threat,'' citing
Godane's oversight of ``plots targeting Westerners, including
U.S. persons in East Africa.'' Godane's predecessor was
killed in a U.S. strike in 2008.
Al Shabaab faced infighting under Godane, who consolidated
power by assassinating rivals, reportedly including American
jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013. Some prominent commanders left
the group or surrendered to Somali authorities in exchange
for amnesty during that time. Former deputy leader Mukhtar
Robow defected, and later ran for state office, drawing on
support from his clan. He was detained during his 2018
campaign and held without charge until 2022. He was released
by Somalia's new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and
appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. In his new role,
Robow is tasked with countering Al Shabaab's extremist
ideology.
area of operations and capabilities
AMISOM and neighboring militaries pushed Al Shabaab from
Mogadishu and other urban centers and ports between 2011 and
2014. Al Shabaab 's control oflarge areas of south and
central Somalia, however, remained largely unchanged from
2015, when AMISOM's major offensive operations ceased, until
2022, when the Somali government launched a new offensive in
coordination with local militias and a grassroots uprising.
Al Shabaab has since lost significant territory in central
Somalia, but it continues to conduct reprisal attacks there.
While Al Shabaab's loss of Mogadishu and other port cities
initially restricted its revenue, the group has developed an
extensive taxation system covering all aspects of the Somali
economy, per UN and other reporting. Al Shabaab extorts
businesses even in government areas. It generates between $50
and $100 million annually, according to UN monitors, and uses
at least 25 percent on military purchases; Al Shabaab also
supports Al Qaeda directly with its tax proceeds.
UN monitors report that Al Shabaab is estimated to have
7,000-12,000 fighters. The group capitalizes on grievances
and distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills
local governance roles, providing basic services and
resolving disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters,
including children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda tools
to spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya,
reportedly its largest source of foreign fighters, Al Shabaab
plays on narratives of collective punishment by the Kenyan
government against Muslims, among other themes. Kenyan
nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2 attack.
Despite territorial losses, Al Shabaab maintains the
ability to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu and other
areas beyond its control, including through complex vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In 2016, an Al
Shabaab suicide bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a bomb
concealed in a laptop computer. (It did not destroy the
plane.) Advances in Al Shabaab's explosives-making capacity
led the UN Security Council to ban the transfer of explosive
precursors to Somalia in 2019.
u.s. responses
The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) in 2008 and has designated over two dozen
related persons for sanctions, either under Executive Order
(E.O.) 13536 (on Somalia) or as under E.O. 13224 (on
terrorism). Among those designated are several Kenyan clerics
implicated in fundraising and recruiting for the group and
members of its smuggling and weapons trafficking network in
Yemen. The United States has prosecuted several U.S. citizens
for fundraising on Al Shabaab's behalf.
The United States provides security assistance to AU and
Somali forces, and has supported counter-radicalization
programs in the region. In addition to airstrikes, U.S.
forces have engaged in ``advise, assist, and accompany''
missions with Somali and AU forces since 2016.
In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al
Shabaab an ``associated force'' of Al Qaeda in the context of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L.
107-40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until 2015,
when President Obama broadened the justification for U.S.
military action in the country--previously ``to counter Al
Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab''--to cover
support for AU, Somali, and U.S. forces operating there. The
tempo of airstrikes rose. President Trump changed the rules
of engagement for U.S. operations in Somalia in 2017,
authorizing offensive airstrikes and designating parts of the
country as an ``area of active hostilities.'' Airstrikes have
continued, after a brief pause, under President Biden:
AFRICOM conducted over a dozen airstrikes in Somalia in 2022,
citing most as ``collective self-defense,'' in support of the
Somali army.
In late 2019, three months before the Manda Bay attack, Al
Shabaab launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield used
by the U.S. military in central Somalia--it was the largest
attack on U.S. forces in the country in nearly thirty years.
No U.S. or Somali forces were killed. Trump ordered the
withdrawal of U.S. forces--then estimated at 700--from
Somalia at the end of his term; Biden authorized the
redeployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in May 2022.
[[Page H2064]]
outlook
After over 15 years of counterinsurgency operations against
it, Al Shabaab still poses a serious threat in Somalia and
East Africa, despite the ongoing deployment of 18,000 AU
troops. Airstrikes have eliminated some ``high-value''
targets and supported partner operations, but Al Shabaab
maintains the capacity to conduct complex, asymmetric attacks
in Somalia and assaults in neighboring countries.
Over the past decade, political infighting and corruption
have hampered the Somali government's ability to extend state
authority. Donor fatigue and frustration has reduced support
for the AU mission, which is due to withdraw by the end of
2024. The ``total war'' Somalia's new government launched
against Al Shabaab in 2022 could be a turning point, but
Somalia has struggled to ``clear and hold'' when AU forces
have managed to gain ground in the past. For more, see CRS In
Focus IF10155, Somalia.
Mr. GAETZ. Moreover, Mr. Speaker, we are seeing the government in
Somalia achieve gains in large part because of local discontent with
Al-Shabaab.
Because of climate change, we are not seeing the same amount of
agricultural and livestock opportunities for people in Somalia, so many
of the groups that were paying extortion money to Al-Shabaab are not
able to pay it anymore because a lot of the land is dried up. That
resulted in Al-Shabaab being incredibly brutal to those local clans and
tribes. They poisoned the water, killed family members, and publicly
executed people. Then what happened was a lot of those local tribes
pushed back and said they would rather align with the government.
That is not a victory delivered at the end of a U.S. missile or
weapon. That is a victory that is occurring as a consequence of the
conditions in Somalia and the choices that Somalis are making.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the ACLED piece that
details how the government is making gains in ground and Al-Shabaab is
losing them. It is titled: ``Somalia: Counterinsurgency Operation Gains
Regional Support in Phase Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political
Differences Persist.''
[From ACLED, Apr. 21, 2023]
Somalia: Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase
Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist
somalia at a glance: 18 march-14 april 2023
Vital Trends
ACLED records more than 180 political violence events and
over 420 reported fatalities from 18 March to 14 April 2023.
Most political violence centered in Banadir region, where al-
Shabaab launched attacks targeting Somali security forces and
civilians.
Middle Shabelle region had the highest number of reported
fatalities, with over 120 recorded during the reporting
period. Sool region followed, with more than 80 reported
fatalities. Violence involving al-Shabaab was linked to over
74 percent of total fatalities. Clashes between Sool, Sanaag,
and Cayn (SSC) militia and Somaliland security forces around
Laascaanood town resulted in most of the remaining
fatalities.
The most common event type was battles, with over 100
events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with nearly
60 events. Over 46 percent of explosion/remote violence
events occurred in Banadir region, a nearly 70 percent
increase compared to the previous four weeks.
Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as al-
Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced the second phase
of the military offensive against al-Shabaab at the end of
March. The new phase reportedly aims to flush out al-Shabaab
from the remaining parts of the country under its control,
following the first phase that began in August 2022. While
the operation initially focused on central Somalia, starting
in Hirshabelle and then expanding to Galmudug state, the
second phase aims to expand to southern regions--Southwest
and Jubaland states.
In the first phase, the government sought support from clan
militias from the Hawiye clan, and regained substantial
territory from al-Shabaab. Subsequently, clan militias have
played a vital role in the government-led operation. Since
August 2022, these groups have been involved in more than 155
political violence events against al-Shabaab. Additionally,
they have supported security forces in nearly 60 percent of
events where government forces have regained territory from
al-Shabaab. During the first phase of the offensive against
al-Shabaab, Somali security forces regained control of over
215 locations previously under al-Shabaab's control, mostly
in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. However, Somali security
forces, who failed to fully drive out al-Shabaab militants
from both states, still lack the military capacity to hold
newly liberated areas. Al-Shabaab, in turn, took advantage of
this weakness to maintain bases and launch complex attacks
against government troops. In particular, they regained lost
territories in Hirshabelle as the government expanded the
offensive to Galmudug state.
As the federal government anticipates a lack of support
from clans in the south for the second phase of operations,
it is seeking more support from neighboring states who are
already present in Somalia under the African Union Transition
Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)--possibly indicating a plan to
scale down the role of clan militias in the operation.
Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have reportedly promised over
30,000 soldiers to support the offensive in the coming
months. This situation update analyzes the activities of al-
Shabaab and the security forces during the second phase of
the offensive and assesses the risk that political
differences between the federal government and some of member
states, like Jubaland and Puntland, may undermine the
operations.
Al-Shabaab Aims for Hirshabelle While Continuing Attacks in
Banadir
After the counter-insurgency operation against al-Shabaab
expanded to Galmudug state in early 2023, Hirshabelle state
became a vulnerable target for al-Shabaab attacks. These
vulnerabilities have forced Somali security forces to stay
focused on Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions in the second
phase of the offensive rather than expanding to Jubaland and
Southwest states. From 18 March to 14 April, ACLED records 19
political violence events involving al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle
state, resulting in at least 145 reported fatalities (see map
below). Over 68 percent of these incidents were remote
violence events, which record an increase of 30 percent
compared to the previous four weeks.
In Middle Shabelle region, al-Shabaab launched several
attacks in Adan Yabaal district--in most instances using
explosives. On 25 March, al-Shabaab detonated three under-
vehicle IEDs (UVIED), targeting security forces and Abgal
clan militias at a base in Run-nirgod village. The explosion
and heavy gunfire exchange that followed resulted in over 50
reported fatalities. A few days earlier, on 20 March, another
al-Shabaab attack at a base in Daarul-
Naciim village reportedly killed at least 55 people from
both sides. The attacks came before the visit of the Somali
President on 26 March to Adan Yabaal town, where he announced
the launch of the second phase of the offensive against al-
Shabaab. The same day, a high-level Ethiopian delegation that
included the head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and
senior government officials arrived in the capital of Hiiraan
region, Belet Weyne town, to help Somali forces plan the next
phase. Ethiopian troops have been fighting Islamist militants
in Somalia since 2006 independently, and as part of the AU
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since January 2014. AMISOM was
eventually replaced by ATMIS in 2022.
Meanwhile, security forces continued offensive operations
in Hiiraan to avert al-Shabaab attacks. The government
deployed troops from Mogadishu to the region, traveling along
the main supply route that connects Mogadishu to Hiiraan. On
25 March, security forces captured Jibiley village in
Jalalaqsi district and Quracley village in Bulo Burto
district from al-Shabaab. While militants peacefully vacated
those villages, they continued to launch attacks on security
forces and clan militias' new bases near Belet Weyne town. On
29 March, an al-Shabaab suicide vehicle-borne IED attack
targeted security forces and Hawadle clan militias at a base-
in Baardheere village, followed by clashes.
Further, al-Shabaab continued measures to end the alliance
between government forces and the Hawadle sub-clan in the
second phase of the offensive. The Hawadle sub-clan of the
Hawiye clan is the largest and most prominent sub-clan in
Hiiraan. There are four main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Darod,
Dir, and Rahanweyn, with each having several sub-clans and
those sub-divisions, some supporting al-Shabaab, and others
supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab. Since
al-Shabaab controls several remote villages in Hiiraan and
other regions, sub-clans consider it necessary to reach an
agreement with al-Shabaab for their safety, and in return for
their support or neutrality, al-Sahabab offers them peace
deals. On 5 April, al-Shabaab claimed to have signed an
agreement with Hawadle Galible Hassan Agoon sub-clan in Buqda
Caqable village, Bula Burto district. The agreement
stipulates that the sub-clan would not be part of the ongoing
offensive in Hiiraan region. Similar agreements were
reportedly signed between al-Shabaab and at least seven other
sub-divisions of the Hawadle sub-clan in Buqda Caqable
village this year. Al-Shabaab also reached an agreement with
clan elders from Habar Gedir Salebaan sub-clan in Xarardheere
town, Mudug region, in December 2022.
Meanwhile, al-Shabaab continues its efforts to destabilize
the government operation by launching attacks in urban towns.
The capital Mogadishu records the highest number of al-
Shabaab attacks compared to other urban areas in Somalia,
with 49 political violence events and at least 21 reported
fatalities. Al-Shabaab's use of explosions and remote
violence increased in the capital by over 87 percent during
the reporting period compared to the same time period prior;
the group's use of grenades, in particular, increased more
than four-fold.
On 5 April, al-Shabaab carried out coordinated hand grenade
attacks in all 17 districts
[[Page H2065]]
of Mogadishu. The grenade attacks targeted security force
checkpoints, the house of the mayor of Mogadishu and governor
of Banadir, the house of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali
Khaire, and the house of a federal senator. Further, the
militants launched mortar shells targeting the presidential
palace, with some striking the house of the petroleum
minister, reportedly killing a security officer.
Political Differences Undermine the Offensive
As part of the second phase of the offensive, the federal
government plans to expand the offensive to Jubaland and
Southwest states in southern Somalia. Political differences
due to power-sharing disputes in Jubaland and Puntland,
however, undermine the operation.
Amid an ongoing dispute with the Jubaland administration
based in Kismayo, Gedo region politicians and government
officials unilaterally announced the recruitment and
mobilization of local clan militias to participate in the
military operation against al-Shabaab in the region. On the
other hand, Jubaland State Minister of Security Yusuf Hussein
Dhuumal reportedly rejected such plans to involve local clan
militias. The most prominent sub-clan in Gedo region is the
Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, which opposes Jubaland
President Ahmed Mohamed Islam--also known as `Madobe'--from
the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clan. Marehan and Ogaden
sub-clans have been fighting over the control of Kismayo
since the 1990s. The current dispute between Gedo
politicians, who are mostly from the Marehan sub-clan, and
the Madobe administration escalated in 2020 when a leadership
dispute led to the federal government's decision to deploy
troops in the region. Jubaland administration fears that
arming Marehan clan militias in Gedo would trip the balance
of power in favor of the Marehan sub-clan. Nevertheless,
Jubaland security forces continued conducting military
operations against al-Shabaab despite the lack of support
from local communities. Further, on 3 April, Ethiopian
security forces deployed troops in Doolow town, Gedo region,
as part of Ethiopia's commitment to increase its military
presence in Somalia during the second phase of the counter-
insurgency operation.
Political differences between the Puntland administration
and the federal government have also complicated plans for
the counter-insurgency operation. In mid-March, the federal
government and member states held a national consultative
council meeting in Baidoa town to discuss the fight against
al-Shabaab and to foster cooperation between the federal and
member state governments. Puntland state president did not
attend the meeting citing political differences with the
federal government, including the appointment of the new
special envoy for Somaliland affairs. On 9 January, Puntland
state suspended cooperation with the federal government after
skipping the signing of two outcomes of a national
consultative council meeting held in Mogadishu in late
December. Although al-Shabaab activity decreased in Puntland
during the reporting period compared to the previous four
weeks, fighting between al-Shabaab and IS militants led to
the reported deaths of at least 40 al-Shabaab militants,
including senior members. The fighting erupted after several
al-Shabaab militants moved to the mountainous Bari region,
likely fleeing from the government's offensive.
Different administrations in Somalia have adopted distinct
approaches to the fight against al-Shabaab, often deeply tied
to the clan affiliations of Somali leaders. The previous
government--in power from 2017 to 2022--focused on foreign
policy, rebuilding security forces, and leading
reconciliation between clans. Meanwhile, the current
administration has enlisted support, first from clan militias
and now from neighboring countries, in an intensive offensive
to flush out al-Shabaab militants. President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud is from the Hawiye clan that has sub-clans supporting
the government operation against al-Shabaab, including
Hawadle and Abgal in Hirshabelle and Habar Gedir in Galmudug.
Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as
`Farmajo,' who is from the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod
clan, failed to get support from the Majerteen sub-clan in
Puntland, and Ogaden sub-clan in Jubaland, with the latter
intensifying the dispute between Gedo and Kismayo
administration.
The progress made through the government operation has put
Somalia in a more positive position compared to the last six
years. These efforts could help the country recover the
decades-long political and security instability, but only if
effectively managed through power sharing, reconciliation,
and integration of clan militias into security forces.
Nonetheless, the greater role of forces from neighboring
countries in the offensive might lead to a divide between
clan militias and government forces, and claims of a `foreign
invasion' may be used by al-Shabaab in its propaganda in
order to recruit fighters. Consequently, military support
from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya might not be a solution
but rather a setback in the fight against al-Shabaab. The
regional countries are already present in Somalia under
ATMIS, although they have not participated in the ongoing
offensive due to funding issues and have only offered
logistical support and medical evacuation. The Abgal, Habar
Gedir, and Hawadle clan militias have played an important
role in the security forces' success since August 2022, and
scaling down their involvement will likely undermine the
government's efforts to defeat al-Shabaab. For the government
to claim ownership of the offensive, integrating clan
militias into security forces should be considered a
priority.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Mills).
Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding those 2
minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I want to approach a couple of things here. We keep
talking about the idea that our presence and these 900 people in
Somalia are somehow leading to a stabilization effort. However, the
reality is this: When was our actual presence required for
stabilization as opposed to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operational tactics?
We talk about the threats, but the real threat is China, which is
existential to all of us. We allow them to go into Ghana, into the
Ashanti belt, and completely pillage resources with no U.S. response.
Where were our 900 troops that were there to help with this
stabilization when our greatest adversary was there robbing and
pillaging?
By the way, where are we with regard to: If we are there to fight and
combat Al-Shabaab, then why are we not taking a greater presence when
it comes to the oil resource protection in Lake Turkana out in Kenya?
It is a place I know very well because I spent time in Nairobi and also
in Karen.
We continue to try to act as if we are stabilizers, but do we not
remember what took place in Libya, where we actually helped with
supporting the destabilization that now has led to the Misrata militia,
the Sirte militia, and further economic turmoil?
Mr. Speaker, you can't point to a single agenda, whether it was
Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia, or whether it was Libyan support--you
can't point to a single one where our presence has actually led to
greater stability.
What it has led to is more U.S. lives being lost, more economic
deficiency for America, and more of us trying to be the world's police
and creating more adversaries and enemies throughout the world stage.
Again, I continue to ask the same question to every one of my
colleagues on the left and the right: How does our presence actually
strengthen us from stabilization, provide us stronger allies, and give
us the actual economic strength that we need to outpace China, which is
our greatest existential threat? How does this 2001 AUMF that is being
misused and abused for an open, carte blanche of warfare support
America's goals?
Mr. JAMES. Again, Mr. Speaker, I believe we are in violent agreement.
The gentleman from Georgia mentioned, I believe, and it is extremely
appropriate, that this isn't about protecting another nation. It is
about protecting ours.
Today, I think that we are just standing here, and I think if we were
to take the vote on the floor, I am pretty sure that most of our
colleagues would agree that the executive branch is abusing its power
and that we as Congress have ceded our constitutional authority to hold
them to account.
We should absolutely hold the executive branch to account for their
two decades of missteps, but a number of my colleagues and I in the
freshman class have been here but a mere 110 days. I am sure I can
speak for most of us that we refuse to be held bound to the mistakes of
the past.
{time} 1330
We are inspired and excited to make sure that we correct those
mistakes of the past with strong policy to benefit the American people
and our allies in the future.
That requires not repealing something without a replacement.
That requires the executive branch to come to us for permission, as
they are constitutionally obligated to do.
It is our duty to retain these authorities, but not proceeding
without an event-based strategy rather than a time-based strategy.
Regrettably, I restate that this resolution does nothing toward those
ends. It merely directs the removal of U.S. forces from Somalia within
a time frame without regard for what may be going on on the ground.
[[Page H2066]]
Again, I applaud and appreciate forcing this debate. It is long
overdue. I respect and thank the gentlemen, Representative Mills for
his service and Representative Gaetz for forcing this very important
debate.
I am looking forward to taking this up with the help of the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Meeks), my friend, in the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to make sure that we can satisfy our obligations, first to
the American people and also to our allies who count on us to take up
the mantle and use global leadership not to be isolationist and also
not to be imperialist but to make sure that we are staying strong at
home first.
Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers. I have the right to
close, and I will continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to my remaining time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida has 19\1/2\
minutes remaining.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
In response to the argument of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
James), who says that our withdrawals must be event based rather than
time based, I would ask: What events are we waiting for in Somalia
exactly?
Are we waiting for a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge there?
Are we waiting for the sectarian violence that has dominated to
automatically just dissolve into the sands?
Are we waiting for some other foreign power?
I would suggest that in many of these places what we are actually
waiting for is for these countries to take care of themselves and to
demonstrate their own capabilities because the only way you form a
nation is if your own fellow countrymen fight for and win that peace.
That is how you develop national heroes, like those we see throughout
this great Capitol. That is what a nation makes.
A nation is not a bunch of Europeans drawing lines in Africa and then
saying this is what is what. We did that after World War II, and it is
why Africa has been in some degree of turmoil since. I continue to
present to the body that the government in Somalia is actually on the
upswing. They are gaining territory. They are unifying people, and it
is not as a consequence of U.S. presence.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from the International
Crisis Group, ``Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive against Al-
Shabaab,'' and it is from 21 March 2023.
[From International Crisis Group, Mar. 21, 2023]
Gains in Somalia's Offensive Against Al-Shabaab
What's new? The Somali government has gained ground in its
war with the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in
central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu's
leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form
alliances with clan militias.
Why does it matter? The joint campaign has dislodged
militants from a swathe of territory in the centre of the
country, reestablishing the government's presence in regions
that Al-Shabaab had controlled for a decade or more. Troops
are now planning to move into the insurgency's southern
bastions.
What should be done? Mogadishu must consolidate its gains
in central Somalia as it goes on the offensive elsewhere. It
should establish holding forces, work for communal
reconciliation and, to the greatest degree possible, meet
local expectations around service delivery.
Overview
Starting in August 2022, the Somali government launched a
fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, capitalising on mounting
discontent with the Islamist insurgency, particularly among
the politically dominant Hawiye clan. The operation has
yielded the most comprehensive territorial gains since the
mid-2010s, as soldiers fighting alongside clan militias
dislodge Al-Shabaab militants from significant parts of
central Somalia. Emboldened by clan backing and foreign
support, Mogadishu now aims to send soldiers into Al-
Shabaab's southern strongholds. As it proceeds, it should
bear in mind the need to consolidate its hold on places it
has recaptured from the insurgency. The government should
assign holding forces to provide security in recovered areas,
support local reconciliation efforts and step up service
delivery, while carefully managing residents' expectations.
If it does not take these measures, it may give Al-Shabaab,
which has proven resilient, a chance to rebound.
The government's push marks a breakthrough in a war that
has raged for more than fifteen years. Historically,
overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in
urban locales, while Al-Shabaab secured a firm foothold in
rural areas. International forces, in particular the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)--which was rebranded as the
African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022--
, have led the fight with Al-Shabaab. In contrast, the new
offensive is spearheaded by the Somali military, in
conjunction with local clans.
A unique set of circumstances aided the government advance.
Al-Shabaab overplayed its hand, antagonising clans in central
Somalia. Demands that young male children join their ranks
spurred local clans to take up arms alongside the Somali
military. The insurgents' taxation of communities under their
control hardly helped, as the country suffers impoverishment
and food insecurity amid a record drought. Furthermore,
terrorist attacks in the capital and along Somalia's borders
appear to have prodded Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
to take a tougher line against the group.
The government now plans to continue the offensive in
southern Somalia, even though it has not fully consolidated
its hold in the centre. Southern Somalia presents a different
set of challenges--for one thing, clans in the south have not
shown the same discontent with the Islamist movement that
prevails in the centre. But even as its plans advance to meet
a new set of challenges, the government should not lose sight
of needs in the centre, as otherwise these areas could slip
back into Al-Shabaab's hands. Before it launches major new
attacks, it should make sure it has adequate holding forces
in recovered areas. It should also conduct reconciliation
efforts and improve basic services of which residents have
long been deprived. For cash-strapped Mogadishu, that could
prove difficult, and international donors will need to step
in to provide support.
Even if the government is successful in holding down
central Somalia and reclaiming territory in the south, Al-
Shabaab will probably survive. The group is playing the long
game, exploiting government weaknesses wherever it can. The
government should thus keep open the possibility of
negotiations as a means of winding down the war for good, as
Crisis Group has argued in the past. The government's recent
wins on the battlefield will, if sustained, strengthen its
position if it indeed decides to engage in talks.
From Local Anger to ``All-out War''
The Birth of an Offensive
The Somali government's move to wrest back control from Al-
Shabaab in parts of central Somalia is unusual in that the
military has joined forces with clan militias. The offensive
derives its strength from mounting local frustration with Al-
Shabaab's persistent, onerous demands for money and recruits,
as well as the group's violent measures of collective
punishment for non-compliance. Several sub-clans in central
Somalia have resisted the militants previously, but later cut
deals with them to forge a form of coexistence, finding the
cost of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. Still, overall, the
government has made headway.
The insurgents themselves contributed to these dynamics. In
recent years, Al-Shabaab has extended its influence by taking
advantage of political infighting in Mogadishu, which
diverted the attention of Somali elites from the task of
counter-insurgency. As politicians in the capital squabbled,
sub-clans in central Somalia grew increasingly weary of Al-
Shabaab's tactics. The Haber Gedir/Salebaan sub-clan is a
case in point. People from this sub-clan, part of the wider
Hawiye clan family, of which Somali President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud is a member, live in and around the town of Baxdo,
situated in the central region of Galgaduud (Galmudug state).
They tolerated Al-Shabaab's presence in their area, for the
most part, until 2019, when its commanders ordered families
to provide young men to be enrolled as fighters. An
influential community member told Crisis Group that this
directive proved too much to stomach. Baxdo is a town with
strong Sufi roots; the community perceived Al-Shabaab's
demand as a ploy to inculcate the Salafi-jihadist doctrine in
the younger generation.
The Salebaan's refusal to comply with this de facto draft
triggered a spiral of retaliation, starting with insurgents
confiscating livestock and abducting elders. It culminated in
Al-Shabaab assaulting Baxdo on 17 June 2022, which proved to
be a tactical misstep: a militia from the sub-clan inflicted
heavy casualties among the invading militants, killing an
estimated 70 of them. Still, even after its defeat, Al-
Shabaab carried out raids on smaller and less protected
villages nearby in revenge.
Around the same time, in the eastern part of Hiraan region
(Hirshabelle state) west of Galgaduud, the Hawiye/Hawadle
sub-clan's historically uneasy relationship with Al-Shabaab
became outright hostile. The roots of the Hawadle's
aggravation can be traced to 2021, when the militants took
control of the road connecting Hiraan's capital Beledweyne to
the Galgaduud region. Al-Shabaab had already blocked a
southern route linking Beledweyne to Mogadishu, impeding the
flow of vital supplies to a part of Somalia that has suffered
severe drought for years. Now its checkpoint on the road
headed east choked off the area, in effect. Local
[[Page H2067]]
anger rose, becoming even more pronounced in May 2022, when
the militants killed a Hawadle elder in Beledweyne,
reportedly for having participated in government elections.
The community in Hiraan mobilised to push back against the
group, emboldened at a crucial moment by Ethiopian military
support. Al-Shabaab has long viewed Ethiopia, which invaded
Somalia in 2006 to overthrow its precursor group, the Islamic
Courts Union, as a major adversary; the insurgents have
attempted to infiltrate the country in the past, mostly to no
avail. In July 2022, however, the group launched an
unprecedented incursion into Ethiopia's Somali region.
Alarmed, Addis Ababa beefed up the deployment in the buffer
zone it maintains between its border with Somalia and areas
where Al-Shabaab is active. Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab
positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early
August, while the head of the Ethiopian Army's Somali Command
Post, General Tesfaye Ayalew, visited Beledweyne.
Interlocutors on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border
confirmed to Crisis Group that Addis Ababa gave military
supplies to local Hawadle at this time, coordinating with
regional officials.
Al-Shabaab responded to the mobilisation by unleashing a
wave of repression upon the sub-clan, which generated still
more resentment. In early August, Al-Shabaab torched Hawadle
villages in Hiraan's Mahas district, destroying wells. Weeks
later, on 2 September, militants ambushed a convoy bringing
food to the area, killing numerous civilians, including women
and children. More clan members joined the militias as a
result.
Another Al-Shabaab attack, this time in Mogadishu, provoked
a strong reaction from the national government. On 20 August
2022, Al-Shabaab stormed the well-known Hayat Hotel in the
Somali capital--a common meeting place for government
officials--putting the premises under siege for 30 hours
before security forces could dislodge them. The operation--
which led to the death of more than twenty people--may have
been an attempt to intimidate President Mohamud, who had been
elected to a second nonconsecutive term that May, out of
taking an aggressive posture toward the group.
If so, Al-Shabaab's leadership miscalculated. While Mohamud
had struck a somewhat conciliatory tone when he first
returned to office--repeatedly talking about the need for
``different security strategies and tough negotiations'' with
Al-Shabaab--his stance changed dramatically after critics
accused him of mounting a confused, ineffective response to
the siege. He proceeded to declare an ``all-out war'' on Al-
Shabaab that combines military pressure with efforts to rein
in the group's extortion rackets in and around Mogadishu. He
also committed to undercutting the group's Salafi-jihadist
ideology. Previous attempts to combat Al-Shabaab had failed,
he claimed, because they tried to contain rather than
eradicate the group.
The government deployed armed forces to Hiraan that worked
in concert with Hawadle forces to flush militants out of
villages and towns in August. The initial focus was on
securing the main road from Mogadishu to Beledweyne and a
triangular patch of territory between Beledweyne, Mahas and
Bulo Burte. By October, the army and militias had freed much
of Hiraan east of the Shabelle River from Al-Shabaab's
physical control.
Expansion in Central Somalia
The government was eager to replicate the success in
eastern Hiraan, based on the template the Somali army and
clan militias had used there. It encouraged other clans in
central Somalia to mobilise volunteer fighters, or macawisley
(``those who wear the macawis'', a Somali sarong), relying on
prominent personalities to rally their clansmen. Somali
soldiers, particularly special forces units, still lead the
fight with Al-Shabaab, but Mogadishu has provided the clan
militias with logistical support such as ammunition, food and
medical evacuations. The macawisley participate in joint
operations, giving government forces backup from fighters who
know the terrain better. They also provide a crucial link to
the local population, sparing the government from going it
alone or trying to mobilise community support after the fact.
The clan participation also reinforces the narrative that
sections of Somali society are turning against Al-Shabaab,
Foreign partners have also bolstered the campaign against
Al-Shabaab. U.S. airstrikes are helping the Danab, a special
unit of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. as a
quick strike force, recapture territory from the insurgents
in the regions of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud and
Mudug. The U.S. has also donated military assistance, with
its ambassador for Somalia praising the war effort as
``historic''. Turkiye has carried out drone strikes in Lower
and Middle Shabelle, further boosting the government's
firepower. Meanwhile, ATMIS has stayed out of direct combat
thus far,
The combined efforts of the Somali army, clan militias and
international partners have led Al-Shabaab's footprint in
central Somalia to contract. The government seized the
insurgency's regional centre of operations at Adan Yabaal in
Middle Shabelle in December 2022. The next month, it captured
the strategic towns of Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere in
Galgaduud--although militants remain on the outskirts. The
military is likely planning to uproot Al-Shabaab from its
remaining strongholds in the southern Galgaduud districts of
Ceel Buur and Galhareeri. If successful, its campaign would
essentially dislodge the militants from a swathe of territory
east of the Shabelle River.
The playbook from eastern Hiraan has not worked smoothly
everywhere, however. While clans in that region rose up
spontaneously against Al-Shabaab, in other areas the
government had to coax clans to join forces. Military efforts
in Middle Shabelle struggled to get off the ground and were
side-tracked by clashes between two sub-clans in the Adale
district in November. In western Galgaduud, overly
enthusiastic pro-government forces marched on the town of
Wabxo in early November, only to pull out days later in the
face of stiff resistance from Al-Shabaab. They could not hold
the area without support from Somali special forces.
Other advances have also stalled. The army had to stop
south of Qaayib, in Galgaduud, amid Al-Shabaab outreach to
sub-clans to counter government mobilisation. Government
efforts to rally clans in Xarardheere, in the Mudug region,
floundered because of sub-clan frictions and perceptions that
the government had previously failed to support them in
fighting the insurgents. The military ultimately moved to
capture Xarardheere with limited clan militia participation.
Moreover, a string of recent incidents shows that Al-
Shabaab can still inflict severe damage in areas it has lost,
even if it is not reoccupying them. In January alone, the
insurgents deployed at least twelve suicide car bombs in
central Somalia towns, in some cases causing heavy
casualties. A 20 January attack in Galcad (Galmudug state)
was particularly damaging, with Danab forces taking
significant losses, including of a deputy commander. That
incident spurred an internal reconsideration of strategy,
with the offensive in central Somalia slowing in the ensuing
weeks. Additionally, Al-Shabaab militants continue to cross
from west of the Shabelle River to attack macawisley
positions in smaller settlements in Hiraan. The infiltration
raises concerns about the government's ability to hold the
territory it recaptures, especially as it takes over more
areas. It also demonstrates the peril of measuring success in
fighting Al-Shabaab solely with the yardstick of territorial
control.
Still, the government has advantages in its current
offensive, when compared to previous campaigns. For one
thing, the military's collaboration with clan militias is
strengthening ties with local communities, while allowing for
greater government penetration of rural areas. Previous
offensives typically focused on securing cities,
inadvertently deepening the rural-urban divide that has
played to Al-Shabaab's strengths as a mobile organisation
reliant on local communities for recruitment and financing.
Secondly, today's campaign is Somali-led, unlike those from
2011 to 2015, when the government's forces played a secondary
role to what is now ATMIS. This time around, ATMIS has stayed
in the background, essentially serving as the holding force
for urban locales while Somali soldiers venture into less
densely populated areas.
There is also evidence that both the federal government and
the clans are committed to sustaining their momentum. The
current government in Mogadishu has arguably staked its
reputation on defeating Al-Shabaab. Moreover, several of the
operations to date have involved cross-clan collaboration,
demonstrating an unusually high degree of consensus among
those fighting the insurgents in central Somalia.
Progress, however, should not be chalked up exclusively to
Mogadishu or local mobilisation, but rather to the
combination of the two. The campaign has been most successful
where community resistance to Al-Shabaab is strongest, and
the government can be a force multiplier, as in eastern
Hiraan. In cases where local engagement is less apparent, the
government has struggled to advance. In this sense, the
offensive might be characterised as a series of wars between
clans and Al-Shabaab, with the government backing the former.
Al-Shabaab Adjusts to the Pressure
Al-Shabaab has suffered important losses in central
Somalia, but it continues to put up significant resistance,
showing the value it places on the region. An intelligence
source told Crisis Group that the insurgency is likely to
reinforce its fighters in central Somalia with personnel now
stationed in the south, likely sending the wounded south to
recuperate. Somali government officials say militants have
defected, but not in significant numbers. Meanwhile, Al-
Shabaab has sought to increase pressure on the government
with large-scale attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, in
addition to making regular incursions into areas the
government has seized.
Al-Shabaab's flexibility suggests that the organisation is
more likely to adapt to the government campaign than be
defeated by it. For example, the group already appears to be
changing its approach to the population in central Somalia,
realising its coercive model for securing obedience has
backfired. It has started offering more carrots than sticks,
emphasising the need to promulgate the public good (maslaha)
in its rhetoric, rather than exhorting communities to seek
forgiveness (tauba) for having antagonised the group. This
approach has borne fruit: in late December, in a setback for
Mogadishu, a group of Salebaan elders in Galmudug reached a
fresh agreement with Al-Shabaab
[[Page H2068]]
to avoid confrontation, withdrawing support for the
government in return for the release of hostages and seized
property.
The federal government's collaboration with the macawisley
likely prompted Al-Shabaab's shift in tone. In the past, the
group has been more willing to offer concessions to clans
when it feels weak, only to roll them back later when it is
in a stronger position. It remains to be seen if it will
renege on its commitments this time, but Al-Shabaab likely
realised it needed to change tack in order to maintain
community relations.
Al-Shabaab has a track record of turning to guerrilla
warfare when it is on the back foot and it has resorted to
these tactics of late. Thus far, Somali forces have fought
few major battles with the insurgents. The group prefers to
preserve its strength, withdrawing from towns before the
army's advance in favour of conducting hit-and-run attacks on
recovered areas afterward. Sustained military pressure could
certainly erode the group's capacity to act as a de facto
authority in central Somalia. But Al-Shabaab's ability to
exploit government weaknesses leads some observers to believe
that the military cannot expect to quash the insurgency, even
if it maintains a united front with the clan militias.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, we must continue to bring to this floor areas
in the world where U.S. troops are present where there is no clear end
game, where there is not an end state that is clearly achievable.
What our generation has learned as a consequence of observing the
great patriotism expressed by many of my colleagues who participated in
this debate today is that we don't have the ability to beat an ideology
out of anyone. We don't have the ability to go into these places that
oftentimes have been riddled with bloodshed and violence and somehow
convince them that a democracy or a parliamentary system is more
beneficial than the greed that has been driving them for far too long.
That is the story of the Middle East. That is the story of North
Africa. If my constituents have to go to Somalia and Syria, then I
think everyone here should have to vote one way or the other, and I
don't expect to win that vote, but I was expecting probably during this
discussion to maybe hear a little bit more about what it is that we
expect these people to do in Somalia to ultimately get them out.
What we have heard is some version of the argument that we have got
to fight them over there so we don't fight them over here, even though
all the evidence in the Record suggests that they don't have the
capability to even strike us here, and that the harboring of terrorism
that seems to justify the 2001 AUMF permission slip for American
intervention in no way relates to the activities, capabilities, goals,
ambitions of this particular group.
What this group wants to do is they want to be able to overthrow the
government in Somalia and orient greater Somalia under their sharia
law, and they are losing in that fight.
What we see online and what many of us have received in briefings in
Congress is that when U.S. troops are present, that serves as a
propaganda vehicle for a lot of these groups to be able to go out and
recruit and add folks to their ranks, and that is certainly not what we
want to see.
If the African Union had a greater role, if the African Union stepped
up and worked to fill that vacuum with greater credibility with
particular partners and particular localized clans, then that might
achieve this objective in the absence of the death, the danger, and the
deployment that has had our military spread far too thin for far too
long.
Mr. Speaker, I heard in my colleague's opening that we have to reject
the siren song of isolationism. I would observe that globalism is no
lullaby. It is often soaked in blood and mired in civil war and
violence, resulting in worse conditions than we found ourselves in.
There are 17 million Somalis. I am rooting for them. I hope that when
my life ends, Somalia isn't synonymous with famine and failed states
and civil wars and coups. I really hope that. However, we must also
exercise sufficient humility in this body to understand the
capabilities of persuasion for a relatively small batch of American
troops given the problem set.
I return to the argument that I made earlier in this discussion.
There is an opportunity cost to this in people. There are specific
units that call my district home that are having to split between
AFRICOM and INDOPACOM when the reality is whether or not our children
are speaking Mandarin, our grandchildren are being dominated by the
Chinese Communist Party is not going to be the result of who wins the
battle of Mogadishu. It is going to be the result of who holds the high
ground against our true pacing adversaries. Becoming the neighborhood
block captain of Somalia is certainly not the behavior of a serious
country engaged in various serious challenges against serious
adversaries.
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I certainly
thank the leadership for permitting me such time, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the
purpose of closing.
I, again, oppose this resolution because it is not an effective or
constitutionally sound approach to resolving the war powers questions
in Somalia that many of us here are, in fact, looking to address.
This resolution will harm U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa and
make the American people less safe.
Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues who are serious about asserting
Congress' constitutional role on issues of war and peace: I have some
encouragement from this debate that we will have further debates
talking about Congress' responsibility.
I look forward to joining with the gentleman from Florida where I
heard him talk about how climate change is affecting many of the areas
on the continent. I look forward to working with him in that regard.
I look forward to working with him and hope that we can get the
Speaker to bring over the repeal of the AUMF of 2002 that the Senate
recently has voted on that we passed 2 years ago in the 117th Congress.
I will come out of here looking at some areas on which we can work
collectively.
I urge the gentleman to join me to talk and work so that we can
repeal and replace the 2001 AUMF with a narrower and time-bound scope.
The issues we are discussing here today are pressing and relevant,
but there is a better approach. I look forward to undertaking that
approach with both of my colleagues on the floor and all of my
colleagues on a bipartisan basis and hope that we will have this
conversation and work closely together.
Let me also make a correction. I gave credit to General Kelly on the
statement of if we don't put more money into diplomacy, we have got to
spend more on bullets. That was General James Mattis. I want to make
sure I give proper credit to the proper person in our military.
Let's work together. I think we have a real window of opportunity.
The President of South Korea, who just gave a wonderful speech here,
talked about how we won World War II and the Korean war together with
our allies, saving democracies, putting our values first. Let's do it.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this
resolution, and let's work together in a bipartisan manner,
particularly to help the continent of Africa, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
Mr. Speaker, again, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Gaetz) and the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills) are both very well-intentioned on
this resolution today, and I firmly agree that Congress must reassert
its Article I constitutional responsibility to declare war.
This body must replace the 22-year-old counterterrorism AUMF with an
authorization that focuses specifically on the threats that we face
today. Yes, it must be both time and event based because, frankly, when
I heard Representative Gaetz, my colleague and a great patriot as well,
mention this may not be a threat, I got shivers down my spine, and I
remembered something when I heard former President Obama talk about
ISIS as the JV team.
Under this administration, we have wide open borders, and frankly, it
is a direct security threat. I am not comfortable taking our eye off
the ball with an Al-Shabaab that is well funded that has designs on
killing Americans.
This resolution, as a blanket statement, I do not believe
accomplishes very specific, targeted time- and event-
[[Page H2069]]
based goals to keep Americans at home safe.
Our troop presence in Somalia is small, serving primarily in a
training role. It has made critical national security gains. As I will
mention again, I am a big Lions fan, and I learned growing up as a
Lions fan that the reason we all knew the names of the offensive
linemen is because our quarterbacks kept getting sacked. I learned very
early that sometimes the best offensive linemen, the best small units
are the ones you never know their name.
I believe that those nameless, faceless heroes all over the world in
corners that the administration has not justified in 22 years deserve
updated AUMFs with congressional authority and approval in order to
justify their presence putting their lives on the line, being at risk,
and being away from their families.
We all agree that the way we are doing things is wrong and must be
fixed. Let's work together to fix it. We would not even be having this
conversation if not for the courage of my colleagues to stand up and
force the issue, so I personally thank them for forcing this debate. It
is long overdue, and I am excited to do well by our servicemen and -
women all over the country.
I again call on my colleagues to please join me in opposition to this
resolution and commit to working with all of our colleagues to make
sure that if the administration wants to send our men and women into
harm's way, they better doggone well come to Congress first.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1345
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, April 26, 2023, the
previous question is ordered on the concurrent resolution.
The question is on the adoption of the concurrent resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question are postponed.
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