[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 55 (Monday, March 27, 2023)]
[House]
[Pages H1451-H1452]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UNDERSEA CABLE CONTROL ACT
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 1189) to require the development of a strategy to eliminate the
availability to foreign adversaries of goods and technologies capable
of supporting undersea cables, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1189
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Undersea Cable Control
Act''.
SEC. 2. STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE THE AVAILABILITY TO FOREIGN
ADVERSARIES OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES CAPABLE
OF SUPPORTING UNDERSEA CABLES.
(a) In General.--The President, acting through the
Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce, shall develop a strategy to eliminate the
availability to foreign adversaries of goods and technologies
capable of supporting undersea cables consistent with United
States policy described in section 1752 of the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811).
(b) Matters To Be Included.--The strategy required under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of goods and technologies capable of
supporting the construction, maintenance, or operation of an
undersea cable project.
(2) An identification of United States and multilateral
export controls and licensing policies for goods and
technologies identified pursuant to paragraph (1) with
respect to foreign adversaries.
(3) An identification of United States allies and partners
that have a share of the global market with respect to the
goods and technologies so identified, including a detailed
description of the availability of such goods and
technologies without restriction in sufficient quantities and
comparable in quality to those produced in the United States.
(4) A description of ongoing negotiations with other
countries to achieve unified export controls and licensing
policies for goods and technologies so identified to
eliminate availability to foreign adversaries.
(5) An identification of all entities under the control,
ownership, or influence of a foreign adversary that support
the construction, operation, or maintenance of undersea
cables.
(6) A description of efforts taken to promote United States
leadership at international standards-setting bodies for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks
relevant to undersea cables, taking into account the
different processes followed by such bodies.
(7) A description of the presence and activities of foreign
adversaries at international standards-setting bodies
relevant to undersea cables, including information on the
differences in the scope and scale of the engagement of
foreign adversaries at such bodies compared to engagement at
such bodies by the United States and its allies and partners,
and the security risks raised by the proposals of foreign
adversaries at such bodies.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 3
years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains the strategy
required under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--Each report required under this subsection
shall--
(A) be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex; and
(B) be made available on a publicly accessible Federal
Government website.
(d) Agreement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall seek to--
(A) establish bilateral or plurilateral agreements with
allies and partners identified pursuant to subsection (b)(3)
to seek to eliminate the availability to foreign adversaries
of goods and technologies identified pursuant to subsection
(b)(1); and
(B) include in such agreements penalty provisions for non-
compliance.
(2) Briefings.--The President shall brief the congressional
committees specified in subsection (c)(1) on negotiations to
establish agreements described in paragraph (1) beginning not
later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act and every 180 days thereafter until each such agreement
is established.
(e) Actions.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Commerce shall evaluate
the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of the
technologies identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for
appropriate controls under the Export Administration
Regulations, including by evaluating, for each technology so
identified, whether to add the technology to the Commerce
Control List maintained under title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(2) Levels of control.--
(A) In general.--In determining the level of control
appropriate for technologies identified pursuant to
subsection (b)(1), including requirements for a license or
other authorization for the export, reexport, or in-country
transfer of any such technology, the Secretary of Commerce
(in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, and the heads of other Federal agencies, as
appropriate) shall take into account the potential end uses
and end users of the technology.
(B) Statement of policy.--At a minimum, it is the policy of
the United States to work with its allies and partners to
control the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of
technologies identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1) to or
in a country subject to an embargo, including an arms
embargo, imposed by the United States.
(3) Notification.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years,
the President, acting through the Secretary of Commerce,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
unclassified notification describing the results of actions
taken pursuant to this subsection in the preceding period,
including a description of--
(A) the individual items evaluated for controls;
(B) the rationale, including foreign availability and
economic impact assessments, for adding or not adding an item
to the Commerce Control List maintained under title 15, Code
of Federal Regulations, pursuant to the evaluation under
paragraph (1) with respect to such item; and
(C) reviews by the End-User Review Committee specified in
Supplement No. 9 to part 748 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations, with respect to the use of items identified
pursuant to subsection (b)(1) by entities under the
influence, control, or ownership of a foreign adversary.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
(2) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary''--
(A) has the meaning given such term in section 8(c) of the
Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47
U.S.C. 1607(c)); and
(B) includes the People's Republic of China.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Mast) and the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Wild)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
General Leave
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to
include extraneous material on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1189, the Undersea Cable
Control Act.
What is this about at a higher level? It is about this: Don't enable
our adversaries. Don't allow them to become stronger than us, or to
make us reliant upon them, or to catch up to us in any way whatsoever,
especially China.
How does this relate to the bill? Undersea cables, if you are not
familiar, carry about 99 percent of transoceanic
[[Page H1452]]
digital communications--think things like voice communications, data,
internet, trillions of daily international financial transactions,
things that you don't want China getting ahold of. They serve as the
backbone--a framework, really--for the global internet.
These cables enable consumers, businesses, governments, and the
military to communicate securely with each other and to access the
internet. That is pretty dadgum important.
The United States derives significant benefits from its leading
position in global subsea cable networks, which carry the vast majority
of voice and internet traffic between continents. However, in recent
years, Chinese companies--heavily subsidized, of course, by the PRC,
the Communist government--have started investing heavily in owning and
supplying subsea cables.
I would say it in this way: Imagine if we allowed, during the Cold
War, the Soviet Union to buy up radio component companies in the United
States of America and other places. What would things have been like?
What kind of danger would that have been? That is the way that we
should look at this.
The U.S. has to look at the supply, the ownership, of these cables as
another front in our competition with the PRC, where their aim is to
supplant, like anything, the United States of America's position.
This is not just an economic issue. The Chinese will steal
information. They will make it unsecure. They want our transmissions.
They weaponize all forms of telecommunications that they can. They
weaponize every bit of social media that they can. They try to make
these capabilities fit their own nefarious ends.
Do we really think for a second that they would not do the same with
undersea cables?
I am not going to be fooled into thinking that. That is why I have
introduced the Undersea Cable Control Act. It is a bipartisan bill that
will direct the President to develop a strategy to eliminate American
technologies capable of supporting undersea cables from falling into
the hands of our adversaries, blocking our adversaries' abilities to
develop and perfect undersea cable capabilities. It is a critical step
for our security.
Mr. Speaker, I thank you for listening to my opinions on this issue,
and I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. WILD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and
I rise in support of H.R. 1189.
The United States faces a strategic competitor in China that, as
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has stated, ``is determined to
overtake U.S. technological leadership and willing to devote nearly
limitless resources to that goal.'' This technological competition will
have a tremendous impact on our national security and economic
interests.
Beijing is trying to take the lead in building the world's digital
infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Increasingly,
this push includes a focus on undersea cables, which carry over 95
percent of all international internet traffic, according to a recent
Reuters report.
These cables transmit mundane things like emails and Facebook
postings, but they also transmit more sensitive things such as
financial transactions, as well as proprietary information or
government secrets.
It is in our interest and in the interest of our partners and allies
that these crucial data pathways are not vulnerable to attacks and
espionage, which is harder to do if they are built and operated by PRC
entities.
We got an example of that last month when two communications cables
that connected Taiwan to two of its islands were cut by civilian PRC
vessels, disconnecting 14,000 residents from the internet.
This bipartisan measure by Representative Brian Mast and
Representative Andy Kim aims to put the United States in a position
to reduce such risks and win the competition over who gets to develop
the physical infrastructure that will drive the digital commerce of the
coming decades.
{time} 1745
H.R. 1189 requires the development of a strategy to eliminate the
availability to foreign adversaries of goods and technologies capable
of supporting undersea cables. It also calls on the Bureau of Industry
and Security to apply export controls on the goods identified in the
strategy and work with our partners to ensure those goods and
technologies are not being exported to China.
The United States needs to be proactive in the competition with the
PRC. This important bipartisan measure is an example of how we can
secure American and global interests by using U.S. policy tools in an
effective and timely fashion.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill. H.R.
1189 is a timely and forward-thinking bill. The United States is
already engaged in a commercial competition with the PRC to win
contracts to build undersea cables and create the technologies that
power this vital infrastructure. It is important that the United States
Government have a proactive strategy to win this critical area of
competition with the PRC.
Some PRC companies involved in undersea cable development are
actively engaged in helping to modernize the People's Liberation Army
as part of China's civil-military fusion strategy. This raises clear
national security concerns that warrant the use of export controls to
ensure that American goods and technologies are not contributing to
that effort. This bill will result in coordination with our partners
and our allies to ensure that Beijing is not able to compromise our
national security through the development of PRC-sponsored undersea
cables.
Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this
important bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, in closing, I encourage us to look at the
world in this way: Everything with China and everything with communists
is competition. It is competition against America. It is competition
against our democratic values, our way of life, the way that we
operate, the way that we pride ourselves on freedom. I don't kick well,
but I am prepared to kick their ass in anything.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mast) that the House suspend the rules and
pass the bill, H.R. 1189.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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