[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 55 (Monday, March 27, 2023)]
[House]
[Pages H1451-H1452]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       UNDERSEA CABLE CONTROL ACT

  Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 1189) to require the development of a strategy to eliminate the 
availability to foreign adversaries of goods and technologies capable 
of supporting undersea cables, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 1189

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Undersea Cable Control 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE THE AVAILABILITY TO FOREIGN 
                   ADVERSARIES OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES CAPABLE 
                   OF SUPPORTING UNDERSEA CABLES.

       (a) In General.--The President, acting through the 
     Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Commerce, shall develop a strategy to eliminate the 
     availability to foreign adversaries of goods and technologies 
     capable of supporting undersea cables consistent with United 
     States policy described in section 1752 of the Export Control 
     Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811).
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--The strategy required under 
     subsection (a) shall include the following:
       (1) An identification of goods and technologies capable of 
     supporting the construction, maintenance, or operation of an 
     undersea cable project.
       (2) An identification of United States and multilateral 
     export controls and licensing policies for goods and 
     technologies identified pursuant to paragraph (1) with 
     respect to foreign adversaries.
       (3) An identification of United States allies and partners 
     that have a share of the global market with respect to the 
     goods and technologies so identified, including a detailed 
     description of the availability of such goods and 
     technologies without restriction in sufficient quantities and 
     comparable in quality to those produced in the United States.
       (4) A description of ongoing negotiations with other 
     countries to achieve unified export controls and licensing 
     policies for goods and technologies so identified to 
     eliminate availability to foreign adversaries.
       (5) An identification of all entities under the control, 
     ownership, or influence of a foreign adversary that support 
     the construction, operation, or maintenance of undersea 
     cables.
       (6) A description of efforts taken to promote United States 
     leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 
     equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks 
     relevant to undersea cables, taking into account the 
     different processes followed by such bodies.
       (7) A description of the presence and activities of foreign 
     adversaries at international standards-setting bodies 
     relevant to undersea cables, including information on the 
     differences in the scope and scale of the engagement of 
     foreign adversaries at such bodies compared to engagement at 
     such bodies by the United States and its allies and partners, 
     and the security risks raised by the proposals of foreign 
     adversaries at such bodies.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 3 
     years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report that contains the strategy 
     required under subsection (a).
       (2) Form.--Each report required under this subsection 
     shall--
       (A) be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex; and
       (B) be made available on a publicly accessible Federal 
     Government website.
       (d) Agreement.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall seek to--
       (A) establish bilateral or plurilateral agreements with 
     allies and partners identified pursuant to subsection (b)(3) 
     to seek to eliminate the availability to foreign adversaries 
     of goods and technologies identified pursuant to subsection 
     (b)(1); and
       (B) include in such agreements penalty provisions for non-
     compliance.
       (2) Briefings.--The President shall brief the congressional 
     committees specified in subsection (c)(1) on negotiations to 
     establish agreements described in paragraph (1) beginning not 
     later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act and every 180 days thereafter until each such agreement 
     is established.
       (e) Actions.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Commerce shall evaluate 
     the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of the 
     technologies identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for 
     appropriate controls under the Export Administration 
     Regulations, including by evaluating, for each technology so 
     identified, whether to add the technology to the Commerce 
     Control List maintained under title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.
       (2) Levels of control.--
       (A) In general.--In determining the level of control 
     appropriate for technologies identified pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(1), including requirements for a license or 
     other authorization for the export, reexport, or in-country 
     transfer of any such technology, the Secretary of Commerce 
     (in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
     of State, and the heads of other Federal agencies, as 
     appropriate) shall take into account the potential end uses 
     and end users of the technology.
       (B) Statement of policy.--At a minimum, it is the policy of 
     the United States to work with its allies and partners to 
     control the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of 
     technologies identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1) to or 
     in a country subject to an embargo, including an arms 
     embargo, imposed by the United States.
       (3) Notification.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, 
     the President, acting through the Secretary of Commerce, 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an 
     unclassified notification describing the results of actions 
     taken pursuant to this subsection in the preceding period, 
     including a description of--
       (A) the individual items evaluated for controls;
       (B) the rationale, including foreign availability and 
     economic impact assessments, for adding or not adding an item 
     to the Commerce Control List maintained under title 15, Code 
     of Federal Regulations, pursuant to the evaluation under 
     paragraph (1) with respect to such item; and
       (C) reviews by the End-User Review Committee specified in 
     Supplement No. 9 to part 748 of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, with respect to the use of items identified 
     pursuant to subsection (b)(1) by entities under the 
     influence, control, or ownership of a foreign adversary.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
       (2) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary''--
       (A) has the meaning given such term in section 8(c) of the 
     Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 
     U.S.C. 1607(c)); and
       (B) includes the People's Republic of China.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Mast) and the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Wild) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous material on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1189, the Undersea Cable 
Control Act.
  What is this about at a higher level? It is about this: Don't enable 
our adversaries. Don't allow them to become stronger than us, or to 
make us reliant upon them, or to catch up to us in any way whatsoever, 
especially China.
  How does this relate to the bill? Undersea cables, if you are not 
familiar, carry about 99 percent of transoceanic

[[Page H1452]]

digital communications--think things like voice communications, data, 
internet, trillions of daily international financial transactions, 
things that you don't want China getting ahold of. They serve as the 
backbone--a framework, really--for the global internet.
  These cables enable consumers, businesses, governments, and the 
military to communicate securely with each other and to access the 
internet. That is pretty dadgum important.
  The United States derives significant benefits from its leading 
position in global subsea cable networks, which carry the vast majority 
of voice and internet traffic between continents. However, in recent 
years, Chinese companies--heavily subsidized, of course, by the PRC, 
the Communist government--have started investing heavily in owning and 
supplying subsea cables.
  I would say it in this way: Imagine if we allowed, during the Cold 
War, the Soviet Union to buy up radio component companies in the United 
States of America and other places. What would things have been like? 
What kind of danger would that have been? That is the way that we 
should look at this.
  The U.S. has to look at the supply, the ownership, of these cables as 
another front in our competition with the PRC, where their aim is to 
supplant, like anything, the United States of America's position.
  This is not just an economic issue. The Chinese will steal 
information. They will make it unsecure. They want our transmissions. 
They weaponize all forms of telecommunications that they can. They 
weaponize every bit of social media that they can. They try to make 
these capabilities fit their own nefarious ends.
  Do we really think for a second that they would not do the same with 
undersea cables?
  I am not going to be fooled into thinking that. That is why I have 
introduced the Undersea Cable Control Act. It is a bipartisan bill that 
will direct the President to develop a strategy to eliminate American 
technologies capable of supporting undersea cables from falling into 
the hands of our adversaries, blocking our adversaries' abilities to 
develop and perfect undersea cable capabilities. It is a critical step 
for our security.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank you for listening to my opinions on this issue, 
and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. WILD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and 
I rise in support of H.R. 1189.
  The United States faces a strategic competitor in China that, as 
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has stated, ``is determined to 
overtake U.S. technological leadership and willing to devote nearly 
limitless resources to that goal.'' This technological competition will 
have a tremendous impact on our national security and economic 
interests.
  Beijing is trying to take the lead in building the world's digital 
infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Increasingly, 
this push includes a focus on undersea cables, which carry over 95 
percent of all international internet traffic, according to a recent 
Reuters report.
  These cables transmit mundane things like emails and Facebook 
postings, but they also transmit more sensitive things such as 
financial transactions, as well as proprietary information or 
government secrets.
  It is in our interest and in the interest of our partners and allies 
that these crucial data pathways are not vulnerable to attacks and 
espionage, which is harder to do if they are built and operated by PRC 
entities.
  We got an example of that last month when two communications cables 
that connected Taiwan to two of its islands were cut by civilian PRC 
vessels, disconnecting 14,000 residents from the internet.
  This bipartisan measure by Representative Brian Mast and 
Representative   Andy Kim aims to put the United States in a position 
to reduce such risks and win the competition over who gets to develop 
the physical infrastructure that will drive the digital commerce of the 
coming decades.

                              {time}  1745

  H.R. 1189 requires the development of a strategy to eliminate the 
availability to foreign adversaries of goods and technologies capable 
of supporting undersea cables. It also calls on the Bureau of Industry 
and Security to apply export controls on the goods identified in the 
strategy and work with our partners to ensure those goods and 
technologies are not being exported to China.
  The United States needs to be proactive in the competition with the 
PRC. This important bipartisan measure is an example of how we can 
secure American and global interests by using U.S. policy tools in an 
effective and timely fashion.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill. H.R. 
1189 is a timely and forward-thinking bill. The United States is 
already engaged in a commercial competition with the PRC to win 
contracts to build undersea cables and create the technologies that 
power this vital infrastructure. It is important that the United States 
Government have a proactive strategy to win this critical area of 
competition with the PRC.
  Some PRC companies involved in undersea cable development are 
actively engaged in helping to modernize the People's Liberation Army 
as part of China's civil-military fusion strategy. This raises clear 
national security concerns that warrant the use of export controls to 
ensure that American goods and technologies are not contributing to 
that effort. This bill will result in coordination with our partners 
and our allies to ensure that Beijing is not able to compromise our 
national security through the development of PRC-sponsored undersea 
cables.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this 
important bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, in closing, I encourage us to look at the 
world in this way: Everything with China and everything with communists 
is competition. It is competition against America. It is competition 
against our democratic values, our way of life, the way that we 
operate, the way that we pride ourselves on freedom. I don't kick well, 
but I am prepared to kick their ass in anything.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mast) that the House suspend the rules and 
pass the bill, H.R. 1189.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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