[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 52 (Wednesday, March 22, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S885-S886]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                              RESTRICT Act

  Mr. President, I wanted to discuss something because there has been a 
lot of talk about TikTok in the Halls of Congress lately and I think 
with good reason because it is becoming increasingly clear that TikTok 
poses serious national security concerns.
  TikTok and its parent company, ByteDance, are Chinese-owned entities 
with ties to the Chinese Communist Party; and after a Chinese spy 
balloon floated over our country a few weeks ago, I think it is obvious 
to everyone that the Chinese Communist Party is hostile to the 
interests of the United States and spies on American citizens. I can 
think of few better or easier ways to spy on American citizens or 
manipulate American public opinion than to make use of a popular app 
that is used by over 100 million Americans.
  In the United States, of course, we have the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution to protect the data Americans provide to apps from being 
seized by the government, but the Chinese Communist Party has no such 
restraints. In fact, Chinese law requires social media and technology 
companies to provide information, including individually identifiable 
personal information, to the Chinese Government when asked. So there is 
no legal framework in China to effectively protect TikTok users or 
users of any China-based app from having their personal information 
turned over to the Chinese Communist Party.

  There are already concerning signs that TikTok users' personal 
information is not secure. It was reported last year that China-based 
employees of ByteDance had repeatedly accessed private data from TikTok 
users in the United States despite TikTok's claim to the contrary; and 
in December 2022, it was found that ByteDance's employees inside China 
used the app to obtain the locations of journalists who worked on 
stories highlighting TikTok's national security risks. This, obviously, 
has implications for Americans' personal security and privacy, and it 
raises troubling questions about how the Chinese Communist Party could 
use TikTok for its own ends whether that is using personal data to 
develop sources for espionage or manipulating content to advance the 
Communist Party's agenda.
  TikTok is not the first time technology from a hostile nation has 
posed a serious security concern. Before there was TikTok, we had to 
engage in a protracted effort to remove technology from Chinese 
companies Huawei and ZTE from our telecommunications networks after 
U.S. security officials raised concerns that much of Huawei's and ZTE's 
equipment was built with ``backdoors,'' giving the Chinese Communist 
Party access to global communications networks.
  The digital age has come with enormous benefits, but it also comes 
with substantial new threats, not least the threat of a hostile foreign 
government exploiting communications technology for nefarious purposes. 
And that threat increases substantially when we are talking about 
technology, from hardware to social media apps, produced by companies 
in hostile nations and affiliated with hostile governments.
  In recent years, a number of foreign companies in the information and 
communications technology space--many of them subject to the control of 
hostile governments--has gained significant market share. Current law 
provides some remedies for confronting the dangers these companies 
present.
  For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States, or what we call CFIUS, can block attempted investments from 
foreign companies if these investments are determined to present a 
national security threat, but the authorities the Federal Government 
currently has were fashioned in a predigital age and, therefore, are 
not designed for the specific threats posed by digital technology 
controlled by foreign adversary nations. As a result, the Federal 
Government is limited in what it can do in situations like the one we 
currently face with TikTok.
  What is needed is a comprehensive framework for responding to 
national security risks posed by foreign adversary-owned digital 
technology whether that is TikTok or some other app or mobile phone 
technology or internet hardware.
  While CFIUS has the ability to address some risks, the reality is 
that the mere presence of a technology from a foreign adversary in the 
United States does not trigger a CFIUS review. For a tech platform that 
does not acquire, merge with, or invest in a U.S. company, the CFIUS 
review simply does not apply. For example, WeChat, the other Chinese-
controlled app that President Trump sought to ban back in 2020, is, 
apparently, not subject to a CFIUS review. Legislation is necessary to 
fill this important gap in authority.

  That is why earlier this month, Democrat Senator Mark Warner, 
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I introduced the 
Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats That Risk Information and 
Communications Technology Act--the long way of saying or the acronym--
the RESTRICT Act, which now has the support of 18 Senators from both 
parties.
  Our legislation would create a comprehensive process, based at the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, for identifying and mitigating foreign 
threats to information and communications technology products and 
services. Now, I want to emphasize that the authorities of the RESTRICT 
Act only apply to six foreign adversary countries: China, Russia, North 
Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba.
  Under our bill, the Department of Commerce would review any 
information and communications technology product from these countries 
that is deemed to present a possible security threat, with an emphasis 
on products used in critical telecommunications infrastructure or with 
serious national security implications. And the Secretary of Commerce 
would be required to develop a range of measures to mitigate the danger 
posed by these products, up to and including a total ban on the product 
in question.
  The bill would also ensure transparency by requiring the Commerce 
Secretary to coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence to 
provide declassified information on why any measures taken against 
foreign adversary-owned technology products were necessary in the first 
place. Importantly, the RESTRICT Act also requires the Secretary of 
Commerce to act within 180 days after initiating a review.
  A common complaint about the ongoing CFIUS review of TikTok is that 
it has been open-ended and taken years to complete. By comparison, the 
RESTRICT Act requires quick action to take the necessary steps to 
mitigate an undue risk from technology of a foreign adversary nation.
  Mr. President, there is bipartisan acknowledgement that TikTok poses 
a

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national security threat, and the RESTRICT Act provides a framework for 
confronting both current and future risks. I am grateful to both 
Republican and Democratic colleagues for joining Senator Warner and me 
to introduce this bill.
  It is time to update our laws to ensure that we are able to confront 
the national security threats posed by foreign adversary technology. I 
look forward to working with colleagues from both parties in both 
Chambers to advance the RESTRICT Act and get it to the President's 
desk.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hickenlooper). The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.