[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 19 (Monday, January 30, 2023)]
[Senate]
[Pages S140-S141]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

  Mr. CORNYN. Madam President, on another matter, last Friday I was in 
Austin, my home, and had the opportunity to speak at a conference that 
included some of the leading experts in all things dealing with 
declassification and government transparency.
  It was cohosted by a number of academic institutions in Texas and the 
Public Interest Declassification Board, or PIDB.
  Most of us had never heard of this group before, but the PIDB leads 
incredible work to help advise the President and the executive branch 
on ways to modernize the classification and declassification processes 
which safeguard our national security but also protect public trust in 
our institutions.
  I joined an onstage conversation with my friend Will Inboden, who 
leads the Clements Center for National Security at the University of 
Texas at Austin.
  We talked about the circumstances under which classification is 
important. Controlling access to certain sensitive information enables 
the United States to remain at least one step ahead of our adversaries. 
It also protects sources and methods that allow us to collect 
clandestine intelligence and protect the lives of those intelligence 
professionals who are engaged in collecting that information, as well 
as the avenues into those sources that are important to collecting this 
intelligence. Obviously, we don't want to jeopardize either the 
individuals involved or dissuade anyone from wanting to work with us in 
the future or to allow some of our access to dry up because it then 
becomes a matter of public knowledge.
  But we know classification is not always the right answer. There are 
many circumstances in which declassification safeguards our national 
security.
  One example is the way in which the United States Government 
declassified and shared information with our allies in the run-up to 
Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine.
  The decision to declassify some important intelligence gave Ukraine 
enough battlefield awareness to push back after the initial attack and 
save countless lives. It also unified Western response, leading to 
quick condemnation of Russia's attack and resources for Ukrainian 
forces.
  Declassification is an important tool with which we share information 
with our friends and allies around the world, but it is also another 
way to show the American people what their government is doing. It 
builds trust and transparency. It inspires confidence in the incredible 
work that our intelligence professionals are doing, and it equips 
scholars with the information they need to conduct academic research 
that informs decision making.
  Obviously, there is a very delicate balance between transparency, 
which drives democratic self-governance, and secrecy, which is 
sometimes necessary to protect sources and methods of information that 
are important to protect our national security.
  Policymakers and scholars have long debated this balance, but it 
doesn't often garner much attention in the public square. At least that 
was the case until recently.
  Over the last several months, law enforcement have uncovered 
classified documents in unsecured locations. For example, documents 
were discovered at President Trump's home in Florida. They were 
uncovered at President Biden's home in Delaware and in his private 
office in Washington, DC. And they were found at the home of former 
Vice President Pence in Indiana.
  All of these discoveries paint a deeply concerning picture, because 
those of us with access to classified information know that the only 
appropriate place to view classified information is in a secure 
setting.
  Now, we have no idea--we, as Congress--no idea what these classified 
documents contain. We don't know who had access to them. We have no 
insight into the possible ramifications for national security. So there 
are a lot of unanswered questions that need answers.
  This really addresses Congress's unique role, as a coequal branch of 
government, to provide oversight of the Federal Government. As elected 
representatives, we have the duty to our constituents and to our 
country to ensure their government is working for them, and oversight 
of the intelligence community is a big part of that job, and it is part 
of the system of checks and balances.
  Now, in most cases, oversight happens out in the open at 
congressional hearings, but this is, obviously, a different sort of 
case. We are talking about classified documents that were never meant 
for public consumption.
  That is why we have the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that 
I serve on and the House Committee on Intelligence, both of which were 
created after the Church Committee made recommendations about oversight 
that needed to be put in place over the intelligence community--both 
the police, the community itself, to make sure that those tools were 
not abused, but also to restore public confidence that

[[Page S141]]

that oversight was occurring and that abuses were not occurring at the 
same time.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee is one of the most bipartisan on 
Capitol Hill, and I credit our leadership for keeping us above the 
political fray.
  Chairman Warner, a Democrat from Virginia, and Vice Chairman Rubio, a 
Republican from Florida, operate arm in arm to lead the kind of 
oversight that I believe helps instill confidence in the intelligence 
community and in our intelligence professionals.
  The committee has a responsibility to examine the facts of these 
cases and understand the potential risk it could create for national 
security.
  Unfortunately, in a hearing we had with the Director of National 
Intelligence, we seem to have hit a brick wall, at least initially. 
Despite the high profile nature of these discoveries, the Biden 
administration will not allow Congress to perform its constitutional 
oversight duties.
  Back in August, Senator Warner and Senator Rubio sent a letter to the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General requesting 
the classified documents that were seized at Mar-a-Lago.
  Members of the Intelligence Committee are accustomed to reviewing, 
handling, and protecting classified information. It is something we do 
on virtually a daily basis. This document request was not to make this 
public. This was a request for committee members to review the 
documents in a classified setting. The administration refused.
  In the months since, classified documents have been discovered at 
more locations, and, again, the administration has refused to provide 
access to this intelligence.
  The Justice Department, as we know, has appointed special counsel to 
oversee two of these probes, but yet they refuse to share the documents 
or any information about them.
  Now, it is one thing in an investigation conducted by law enforcement 
to say: We are going to protect the person being investigated, and we 
are going to protect the integrity of the investigation by not making 
that public. We understand that, but this is something far different.
  When a current and former President of the United States and a former 
Vice President of the United States have classified documents in 
unsecured settings, we need to know who had access to it, what the 
intelligence reports contain, not because we are curious or we want to 
interfere with an investigation by the Justice Department but because 
we have an independent constitutional responsibility to protect the 
national security of the United States and to protect the intelligence 
community from unjustified criticism.
  Several years ago, the Intelligence Committee investigated Russia's 
efforts to interfere with the 2016 election. This was a case like now, 
where special counsel was appointed, but Congress did not have to wait. 
It wasn't forced to wait for that inquiry to be completed by former FBI 
Director Mueller. Those investigations happened concurrently. The 
special counsel's investigation happened at the same time as the Senate 
Intelligence Committee's investigation occurred. These investigations--
both that of the Intelligence Committee and that of the Department of 
Justice--should happen concurrently now as well.

  As I said last week, the Director of National Intelligence, Director 
Haines, testified before the Intelligence Committee. I was eager to 
learn more in a secure setting, protected from public dissemination, 
what was going on with these documents, what they meant, and who 
produced them. Were they stale or were they current intelligence? What 
sort of access did our adversaries have to them, and what did they 
learn if they did get access to them that we need to know about and 
prepare for?
  I don't think any of our colleagues expected a full analysis of these 
documents, but I was alarmed by the complete lack of transparency by 
the Director of National Intelligence to the oversight committees in 
Congress like the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Without 
going into detail, Director Haines essentially said that once the 
Department of Justice initiated its investigation, her office stood 
down and did not inquire any further as to what these documents 
contained. So far, the Department of Justice refuses to share details 
of these intelligence products that were discovered at these unsecured 
locations.
  As I said, we have no idea what is in these documents, who could have 
seen them, or how big of a risk it creates for national security, but 
we do need the answers to those questions that only a review in a 
classified setting in a secure facility by the oversight committees--we 
need the answers that only that sort of inquiry will reveal.
  We could have a major national security risk on our hands or it could 
be a nothing burger, but the Department needs to be expedient and fully 
transparent in sharing this information with Congress and the 
intelligence community, again, in a classified secure setting, not for 
public dissemination.
  If you worry about leaks, which are rampant here in Washington, DC, I 
must say, the record of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is 
pretty darn good when it comes to no leaks.
  Senator Rubio and Senator Warner have been clear that the Department 
of Justice will not stonewall Congress. This is not a partisan matter. 
It is not tenable for the position of the Department of Justice and for 
the Biden administration to take that position. As policymakers with an 
independent constitutional responsibility, we need to know the full 
details so we can conduct the risk assessment and determine how best to 
respond. President Biden's Department of Justice cannot stand in the 
way of Congress's constitutional oversight role.
  Now, many in the press have said: Well, what sort of things might the 
Senators on the Intelligence Committee do to compel the cooperation of 
the Department of Justice?
  Well, I hope we don't have to go there. I hope this produces a 
negotiation that will address the concerns both of the Department of 
Justice and of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It is well 
known what sort of tools are available to Congress--things like 
appropriations, things like nominations--but I sincerely hope it 
doesn't come to that. But we have a job to do, and we are going to do 
it, with the cooperation of the Biden administration or without their 
cooperation.
  So all options are on the table to ensure not that we get to see what 
we want to see for political or other inappropriate reasons but to make 
sure our national security is not at risk.
  Again, this is a bipartisan desire to see these documents and 
evaluate the risk they could pose to our security. It is time for the 
administration to cooperate with us in that effort.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________