[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 178 (Thursday, November 17, 2022)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1164-E1165]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY REPORT ON MYANMAR

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. ILHAN OMAR

                              of minnesota

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, November 17, 2022

  Ms. OMAR. Madam Speaker, I rise today as a member of the 
International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the 
crisis in Myanmar. Therefore, I include in the Record the executive 
summary of our final report.

 ``Time is Not on Our Side'': The Failed International Response to the 
                    Myanmar Coup (Executive Summary)

       Since the Myanmar military staged a coup on 1 February 
     2021, the situation in the country has steadily deteriorated. 
     The military junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, 
     has waged a brutal war of attrition against its own people, 
     committing countless atrocities and ruining the country's 
     economy. Military forces have killed at least 2,371 people 
     and displaced hundreds of thousands, bringing the total 
     number of internally displaced persons in the country to over 
     1.3 million. The junta has also jailed more than 15,000 
     political prisoners and made routine use of torture against 
     those arrested, all while launching a far-reaching crackdown 
     on freedoms of expression and association, including an 
     intense repression of independent media and civil society.
       Nevertheless, the people of Myanmar have resisted. The 
     massive peaceful demonstrations in the coup's immediate 
     aftermath, as well as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) 
     that saw hundreds of thousands join a general strike, 
     including throughout the bureaucracy, demonstrated the 
     population's overwhelming rejection of a return to military 
     rule. The coup has also inspired an unprecedented level of 
     unity among those opposed to the military, including across 
     ethnic lines.
       In April 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG) of 
     Myanmar was formed, bringing together parliamentarians ousted 
     in the coup, ethnic minority representatives and civil 
     society actors. The NUG rightly claims a mandate as the 
     legitimate representative of the Myanmar people. It enjoys 
     widespread popular legitimacy and support, especially in the 
     country's heartland, and represents the most inclusive 
     government in Myanmar's history. The NUG has expressed a 
     commitment to establishing a new constitution and a genuine 
     federal democracy in Myanmar, which would represent a major 
     step toward fulfilling the aspirations for autonomy of the 
     country's ethnic minorities.
       The junta's attempts to subdue the resistance with extreme 
     violence failed dramatically, and only served to exacerbate 
     existing tensions and drive some anti-junta activists to turn 
     to armed struggle to defend themselves. Anti-military militia 
     groups known as people's defense forces (PDFs)--some under 
     the command of the NUG--have been established across the 
     country, including in areas that had been relatively peaceful 
     before. The coup has also triggered a new wave of violence 
     between the military and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), 
     which have been fighting for autonomy for decades in the 
     country's borderlands. Some of these EAOs, such as the armed 
     wings of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin 
     Independence Organization (KIO), have allied themselves with 
     the NUG. Not all EAOs have formally joined the anti-military 
     struggle, as Myanmar's political landscape remains extremely 
     complex and fractured.
       The escalating violence has precipitated the near collapse 
     of the economy and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. 
     Myanmar's GDP has dropped 13 percent since 2019, and 40 
     percent of the country's population now lives below the 
     national poverty line. Despite the increased needs, 
     humanitarian actors have struggled to reach vulnerable and 
     remote populations, as the military has placed severe 
     limitations on humanitarian access.
       The international community has proven largely unable to 
     respond effectively to the crisis. The junta's international 
     allies--most prominently Russia and China--have emerged as 
     steadfast and uncritical supporters, supplying both weapons 
     and legitimacy to an otherwise isolated regime. Foreign 
     governments that profess support for democracy have not 
     backed up their rhetoric with the same force of action, 
     however. While a number of countries have imposed sanctions 
     targeting junta leaders and their personal assets, these 
     efforts remain uncoordinated and have failed to successfully 
     target key revenue-generating entities, such as the Myanmar 
     Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The United Nations has been 
     particularly hampered by internal divisions and has proved to 
     be unable to project influence. The NUG has attracted 
     supporters globally and continues to occupy Myanmar's seat at 
     the UN, but most governments have been hesitant to formally 
     recognize it, despite calls from parliaments and advocates to 
     do so.
       The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of 
     which Myanmar is a member, has been similarly plagued by 
     internal divisions and unable to respond effectively. The 
     bloc's ``Five-Point Consensus,'' signed in April 2021 and 
     aimed at addressing the crisis, has utterly failed, hampered 
     by a lack of will on the part of all ASEAN member-states to 
     enforce it, and a military leadership in Myanmar that did not 
     show any intention of implementing it from the beginning. 
     While some member-states, such as Malaysia, have called for a 
     new approach, including direct engagement with the NUG and 
     other pro-democracy forces, others, including Thailand or 
     Cambodia, have persisted as junta enablers.
       As Myanmar slides into civil war, the possibility for a 
     negotiated solution to the conflict has all but closed 
     completely. The dialogue prescribed in ASEAN's Five-Point 
     Consensus is impossible under the current conditions. 
     Responsibility lies with the junta, which has shown no 
     willingness to engage with those who oppose it and has 
     instead relied exclusively on brute force in its attempt to 
     stamp out any opposition. The execution of four political 
     prisoners in July 2022, the

[[Page E1165]]

     country's first judicial execution since 1988, highlighted 
     both the military's brutality and its complete disinterest in 
     negotiations. The coup brought the previous power-sharing 
     arrangement with the civilian leadership to an unceremonious 
     end. Now the vast majority of the Myanmar people have 
     expressed a clear desire not to return to the status quo 
     ante.
       Nineteen months after the coup, the military junta has been 
     unable to consolidate its power. Wide swaths of Myanmar's 
     territory are contested between the military and forces 
     associated with the NUG or EAOs, and it can be stated that 
     the coup has failed. In areas along the Thai border, EAOs 
     like the KNU and the Karenni National Progressive Patty 
     (KNPP) are working together, providing basic services to the 
     population, and showing what a future Myanmar, in which 
     different groups cooperate rather than fight amongst 
     themselves, could look like if the country is able to shake 
     off the tyranny of the military.
       As Myanmar's future hangs in the balance, external pressure 
     on the military and support for the resistance may well be 
     the deciding factor in the course of the conflict. The 
     international community can, and should, do more to help the 
     Myanmar people to send the military to the barracks and 
     establish a federal democracy. It should start with 
     substantially increasing its efforts to address the worsening 
     humanitarian crisis, intensifying its pressure on the illegal 
     junta through coordinated sanctions and arms embargoes, and 
     recognizing the NUG as the legitimate authority in Myanmar. 
     The NUG, as well as aligned EAOs, should be provided with 
     funding and capacity building programs on governance and 
     federalism. But action should be taken urgently. As Khin 
     Ohmar, Myanmar activist and Chair of Progressive Voice said 
     during one of the IPI oral hearings, ``time is not our 
     side''.


 =========================== NOTE =========================== 

  
  November 17, 2022, on page E1164-E1165, beginning in the second 
column, the following appeared: Myanmar. Therefore, I include in 
the Record the executive summary of our final report. Since the 
Myanmar military staged a coup . . . Ohmar, Myanmar activist and 
Chair of Progressive Voice said during one of the IPI oral 
hearings, ``time is not our side''.
  
  The online version has been corrected to read: Myanmar. 
Therefore, I include in the Record the executive summary of our 
final report. ``Time is Not on Our Side'': The Failed 
International Response to the Myanmar Coup (Executive Summary) 
Since the Myanmar military staged a coup . . . Ohmar, Myanmar 
activist and Chair of Progressive Voice said during one of the IPI 
oral hearings, ``time is not our side``.


 ========================= END NOTE ========================= 




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