[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 162 (Tuesday, October 11, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6556-S6559]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 6453. Mr. REED (for Mr. Graham (for himself and Mr. Menendez)) 
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5499 
proposed by Mr. Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) to the bill H.R. 
7900, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense and for military construction, 
and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1550. IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND TERRORISM 
                   MONITORING ACT OF 2022.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Iran 
     Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 
     2022''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     established the AMAD Project with the intent to manufacture 5 
     nuclear weapons and prepare an underground nuclear test site.
       (2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
     advanced its nuclear and ballistic

[[Page S6557]]

     missile programs, posing serious threats to the security 
     interests of the United States, Israel, and other allies and 
     partners.
       (3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, Iran, 
     were revealed to the public by the National Council of 
     Resistance of Iran.
       (4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to 
     a level close to 3.5 percent at the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.
       (5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed 
     sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for 
     its failure to suspend enrichment activities.
       (6) The United Nations Security Council subsequently 
     adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 
     (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of and 
     imposed additional sanctions with respect to the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran.
       (7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     announced that it had launched its first satellite, which 
     raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the 
     ballistic missile program.
       (8) In September 2009, the United States, the United 
     Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine 
     Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran, years after 
     construction started on the plant.
       (9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly had 
     enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent.
       (10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic 
     missile.
       (11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which 
     traveled an estimated 600 miles.
       (12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the 
     nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which 
     contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs 
     relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, 
     development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran.
       (13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence 
     of a warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz 
     Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse 
     by the International Atomic Energy Agency detected 
     radioactive particles, which the Government of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.
       (14) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile struck an Iraqi 
     military base where members of the United States Armed Forces 
     were stationed, resulting in 11 of such members being treated 
     for injuries.
       (15) On June 19, 2020, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing ``serious 
     concern. . . that Iran has not provided access to the Agency 
     under the Additional Protocol to two locations''.
       (16) On November 28, 2020, following the death of the head 
     of the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran vowed to ``to continue the martyr's 
     scientific and technological efforts in all the sectors where 
     he was active'' in the ``nuclear and defense fields''.
       (17) On April 17, 2021, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun 
     to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity.
       (18) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani 
     stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich 
     uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our 
     reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent 
     purity''.
       (19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war game that included 
     conventional navy, army, air force, and air defense forces 
     testing cruise missiles, torpedoes, and suicide drones in the 
     Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the 
     Indian Ocean.
       (20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     commenced a 5-day drill in which it launched a number of 
     short- and long-range ballistic missiles that it claimed 
     could destroy Israel, constituting an escalation in the 
     already genocidal rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     toward Israel.
       (21) On January 13, 2022, the head of the Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force claimed that the 
     military launched a solid-fuel, mobile satellite launch 
     rocket, with implications for development of an 
     intercontinental ballistic missile.
       (22) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels, backed by the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 missiles at Al Dhafra Air 
     Base in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 
     members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
       (23) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air interceptors of 
     the United Arab Emirates shot down a Houthi missile fired at 
     the United Arab Emirates during a visit by President of 
     Israel Isaac Herzog, the first-ever visit of an Israeli 
     President to the United Arab Emirates.
       (24) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile, named ``Kheibar 
     Shekan'', which has a reported range of 900 miles (1450 
     kilometers) and is capable of penetrating missile shields.
       (25) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which struck near a 
     consulate building of the United States.
       (26) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     confirmed the relocation of a production facility for 
     advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, 
     Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex.
       (27) On April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a 
     report stating that there are ``serious concerns'' about 
     ``possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
     Iran''.
       (28) On May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had 
     achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 
     pounds, of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough 
     material for a nuclear weapon.
       (29) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned 
     off surveillance cameras installed by the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency to monitor uranium enrichment activities 
     at nuclear sites in the country.
       (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Department of State has used evidence of the intent 
     of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program 
     to secure the support of the international community in 
     passing and implementing United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;
       (2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence of the 
     intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear 
     program, with evidence of a nuclear program prior to 2003;
       (3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear 
     weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national 
     security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and 
     partners;
       (4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than 
     cooperative with international inspectors from the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their 
     ability to inspect nuclear facilities across Iran;
       (5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance 
     missile programs, which are a threat to the national security 
     of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
       (6) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to support 
     proxies in the Middle East in a manner that--
       (A) undermines the sovereignty of regional governments;
       (B) threatens the safety of United States citizens;
       (C) threatens United States allies and partners; and
       (D) directly undermines the national security interests of 
     the United States;
       (7) the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in 
     assassination plots against former United States officials 
     and has been implicated in plots to kidnap United States 
     citizens within the United States;
       (8) the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged in unsafe and 
     unprofessional maritime activity that threatens the movement 
     of naval vessels of the United States and the free flow of 
     commerce through strategic maritime chokepoints in the Middle 
     East and North Africa;
       (9) the Islamic Republic of Iran has delivered hundreds of 
     armed drones to the Russian Federation, which will enable 
     Vladimir Putin to continue the assault against Ukraine in 
     direct opposition of the national security interests of the 
     United States; and
       (10) the United States must--
       (A) ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not 
     develop a nuclear weapons capability;
       (B) protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran manifested through its missiles program; and
       (C) counter regional and global terrorism of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran in a manner that minimizes the threat posed 
     by state and non-state actors to the interests of the United 
     States.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Comprehensive safeguards agreement.--The term 
     ``Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement 
     between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in 
     Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
     Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.
       (3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
       (4) Task force.--The term ``task force'' means the task 
     force established under subsection (e).
       (5) Unmanned aircraft system.--The term ``unmanned aircraft 
     system'' has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of 
     title 49, United States Code.
       (e) Establishment of Interagency Task Force on Nuclear 
     Activity and Global Regional Terrorism of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran.--

[[Page S6558]]

       (1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
     a task force to coordinate and synthesize efforts by the 
     United States Government regarding--
       (A) nuclear activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its 
     proxies; and
       (B) regional and global terrorism activity by the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran or its proxies.
       (2) Composition.--
       (A) Chairperson.--The Secretary of State shall be the 
     Chairperson of the task force.
       (B) Membership.--
       (i) In general.--The task force shall be composed of 
     individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of and 
     appointed to the task force by the head of one of the 
     following agencies:

       (I) The Department of State.
       (II) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (III) The Department of Defense.
       (IV) The Department of Energy.
       (V) The Central Intelligence Agency.

       (ii) Additional members.--The Chairperson may appoint to 
     the task force additional individuals from other Federal 
     agencies, as the Chairperson considers necessary.
       (3) Sunset.--The task force shall terminate on December 31, 
     2028.
       (f) Assessments.--
       (1) Intelligence assessment on nuclear activity.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until December 31, 2028, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an assessment regarding any uranium enrichment, 
     nuclear weapons development, delivery vehicle development, 
     and associated engineering and research activities of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran.
       (B) Contents.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall include--
       (i) a description and location of current fuel cycle 
     activities for the production of fissile material being 
     undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--

       (I) research and development activities to procure or 
     construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model 
     centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable 
     isotopes;
       (II) research and development of reprocessing capabilities, 
     including--

       (aa) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
       (bb) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium 
     targets;

       (III) activities with respect to designing or constructing 
     reactors, including--

       (aa) the construction of heavy water reactors;
       (bb) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components, 
     including the intended application of such components; and
       (cc) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;

       (IV) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel 
     fabrication, including--

       (aa) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual 
     recovery;
       (bb) recovery processes and ore concentrate production 
     capacity and annual recovery;
       (cc) research and development with respect to, and the 
     annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
       (dd) research and development with respect to the 
     fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted, 
     natural, and enriched uranium; and

       (V) activities with respect to--

       (aa) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their 
     alloys);
       (bb) conducting research and development on plutonium or 
     uranium (or their alloys);
       (cc) uranium metal; or
       (dd) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;
       (ii) with respect to any activity described in clause (i), 
     a description, as applicable, of--

       (I) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich 
     uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;
       (II) the number and location of any enrichment or 
     associated research and development facility used to engage 
     in such activity;
       (III) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced 
     by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major 
     reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent 
     assessments, the amount produced since the last assessment;
       (IV) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected 
     assemblies; and
       (V) the total amount of--

       (aa) uranium-235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent 
     purity;
       (bb) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity 
     and not greater than 20 percent purity;
       (cc) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity 
     and not greater than 60 percent purity;
       (dd) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity 
     and not greater than 90 percent purity; and
       (ee) uranium-235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
       (iii) a description of any weaponization plans and weapons 
     development capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
     including--

       (I) plans and capabilities with respect to--

       (aa) weapon design, including fission, warhead 
     miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon 
     design;
       (bb) high yield fission development;
       (cc) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer 
     models to simulate nuclear explosive devices;
       (dd) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use 
     of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized 
     materials for explosively driven neutron sources; and
       (ee) design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use 
     of precision machining and tooling that could enable the 
     production of nuclear explosive device components;

       (II) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy 
     a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a 
     nuclear warhead;
       (III) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a 
     crude nuclear weapon; and
       (IV) the status and location of any research and 
     development work site related to the preparation of an 
     underground nuclear test;

       (iv) an identification of any clandestine nuclear 
     facilities;
       (v) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     maintains locations to store equipment, research archives, or 
     other material previously used for a weapons program or that 
     would be of use to a weapons program that the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran has not declared to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency;
       (vi) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of 
     uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an 
     undeclared or clandestine facility;
       (vii) an assessment of activities related to developing or 
     acquiring the capabilities for the production of nuclear 
     weapons, conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry 
     of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive 
     Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in 
     knowledge due to the lack of inspections and nontransparency 
     of such facilities;
       (viii) a description of activities between the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran and other countries with respect to sharing 
     information on nuclear weapons or activities related to 
     weaponization;
       (ix) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or 
     hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a description of--

       (I) the type of missile;
       (II) the range of such missiles;
       (III) the capability of such missiles to deliver a nuclear 
     warhead;
       (IV) the number of such missiles; and
       (V) any testing of such missiles;

       (x) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned aircraft system 
     or other military equipment capable of delivering a nuclear 
     weapon;
       (xi) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     or any of its proxies has engaged in new or evolving nuclear 
     weapons development activities, or activities related to 
     developing the capabilities for the production of nuclear 
     weapons or potential delivery vehicles, that would pose a 
     threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, 
     or other partners or allies; and
       (xii) any other information that the task force determines 
     is necessary to ensure a complete understanding of the 
     capability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and 
     manufacture nuclear or other types of associated weapons 
     systems.
       (2) Assessment on regional and global terrorism of the 
     islamic republic of iran.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until December 31, 2028, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an assessment regarding the regional and global 
     terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
       (B) Contents.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall include--
       (i) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran, including training, equipment, and 
     associated intelligence support, to regional and global non-
     state terrorist groups and proxies;
       (ii) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran, including training and equipment, to state 
     actors;
       (iii) an assessment of financial support of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran to Middle Eastern non-state terrorist groups 
     and proxies and associated Iranian revenue streams funding 
     such support;
       (iv) an assessment of the threat posed by the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran and Iranian-supported groups to members of 
     the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic 
     facilities of the United States throughout the Middle East 
     and North Africa;
       (v) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran against members of the Armed Forces, 
     diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the 
     United States and the associated response by the United 
     States Government in the previous 120 days;
       (vi) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran against United States partners or 
     allies and the associated response by the United States 
     Government in the previous 120 days;
       (vii) an assessment of interference by the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran into the elections and political processes of 
     sovereign countries

[[Page S6559]]

     in the Middle East and North Africa in an effort to create 
     conditions for or shape agendas more favorable to the 
     policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
       (viii) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran against former and current United States officials;
       (ix) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran against United States citizens both abroad and within 
     the United States; and
       (x) a description of maritime activity of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran and associated impacts on the free flow of 
     commerce and the national security interests of the United 
     States.
       (3) Form; public availability; duplication.--
       (A) Form.--Each assessment required by this subsection 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex for information that, if released, would be 
     detrimental to the national security of the United States.
       (B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of an 
     assessment required by this subsection shall be made 
     available to the public on an internet website of the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (C) Duplication.--For any assessment required by this 
     subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may rely 
     upon existing products that reflect the current analytic 
     judgment of the intelligence community, including reports or 
     products produced in response to congressional mandate or 
     requests from executive branch officials.
       (g) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Identified Nuclear, 
     Ballistic Missile, and Terrorism Threats to the United 
     States.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     submission of the initial assessment under subsection (f)(1), 
     and annually thereafter until December 31, 2028, the 
     Secretary of State, in consultation with the task force, 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     diplomatic strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for 
     engaging with partners and allies of the United States 
     regarding uranium enrichment, nuclear weaponization, and 
     missile development activities and regional and global 
     terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
       (2) Contents.--The diplomatic strategy required by 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran--
       (i) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards 
     Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary 
     Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; and
       (ii) has denied access to sites that the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during previous 1-
     year period;
       (B) a description of any dual-use item (as defined under 
     section 730.3 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or 
     listed on the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 
     Materials, Software, and Related Technology issued by the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group or any successor list) the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran is using to further the nuclear weapon or 
     missile program;
       (C) a description of efforts of the United States to 
     counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project 
     political and military influence into the Middle East;
       (D) a description of efforts to address the increased 
     threat that new or evolving uranium enrichment, nuclear 
     weaponization, or missile development activities by the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens, the 
     diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, 
     and the national security interests of the United States;
       (E) a description of efforts to address the threat that 
     terrorism by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     poses to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of 
     the United States in the Middle East, and the national 
     security interests of the United States;
       (F) a description of efforts to address the impact of the 
     influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran on sovereign 
     governments on the safety and security of United States 
     citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the 
     Middle East, and the national security interests of the 
     United States;
       (G) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government 
     approach to use political, economic, and security related 
     tools to address such activities; and
       (H) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and 
     regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to 
     address such activities.
       (3) Updated strategy related to notification.--Not later 
     than 15 days after the submission of a notification to 
     Congress that there has been a significant development in the 
     nuclear weapons capability or delivery systems capability of 
     the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary of State shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update 
     to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted under 
     paragraph (1).
                                 ______