[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 158 (Thursday, September 29, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5738-S5745]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 6219. Mr. RISCH (for himself and Mr. Menendez) submitted an
amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr.
Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) and intended to be proposed to the
bill H.R. 7900, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, insert the following:
Subtitle G--International Pandemic Preparedness
SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``International Pandemic
Preparedness and COVID-19 Response Act of 2022''.
SEC. 1282. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Global health security agenda; ghsa.--The terms
``Global Health Security Agenda'' and ``GHSA'' mean the
multi-sectoral initiative launched in 2014, and renewed in
2018, that brings together countries, regions, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private
sector--
(A) to elevate global health security as a national-level
priority;
(B) to share best practices; and
(C) to facilitate national capacity to comply with and
adhere to--
(i) the International Health Regulations (2005);
(ii) the international standards and guidelines established
by the World Organisation for Animal Health;
(iii) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
(2004);
(iv) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow, April 10, 1972 (commonly referred to as the
``Biological Weapons Convention'');
(v) the Global Health Security Agenda 2024 Framework; and
(vi) other relevant frameworks that contribute to global
health security.
(3) Global health security index .--The term ``Global
Health Security Index'' means the comprehensive assessment
and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities
across the countries that make up the States Parties to the
International Health Regulations (2005).
(4) Global health security initiative.--The term ``Global
Health Security Initiative'' means the informal network of
countries and organizations that came together in 2001, to
undertake concerted global action to strengthen public health
preparedness and response to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats, including pandemic
influenza.
(5) IHR (2005) monitoring and evaluation framework.--The
term ``IHR (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework'' means
the framework through which the World Health Organization and
the State Parties to the International Health Regulations, as
amended in 2005, review, measure, and assess core country
public health capacities and ensure mutual accountability for
global health security under the International Health
Regulations (2005), including through the Joint External
Evaluations, simulation exercises, and after-action reviews.
(6) Joint external evaluation.--The term ``Joint External
Evaluation'' means the voluntary, collaborative, multi-
sectoral process facilitated by the World Health
Organization--
(A) to assess country capacity to prevent, detect, and
rapidly respond to public health risks occurring naturally or
due to deliberate or accidental events;
(B) to assess progress in achieving the targets under the
International Health Regulations (2005); and
(C) to recommend priority actions.
(7) Key stakeholders.--The term ``key stakeholders'' means
actors engaged in efforts to advance global health security
programs and objectives, including--
(A) national and local governments in partner countries;
(B) other bilateral donors;
(C) international, regional, and local organizations,
including private, voluntary, nongovernmental, and civil
society organizations, including faith-based and indigenous
organizations;
(D) international, regional, and local financial
institutions;
(E) representatives of historically marginalized groups,
including women, youth, and indigenous peoples;
(F) the private sector, including medical device,
technology, pharmaceutical, manufacturing, logistics, and
other relevant companies; and
(G) public and private research and academic institutions.
(8) One health approach.--The term ``One Health approach''
means the collaborative, multi-sectoral, and
transdisciplinary approach toward achieving optimal health
outcomes in a manner that recognizes the interconnection
between people, animals, plants, and their shared
environment.
(9) Pandemic preparedness.--The term ``pandemic
preparedness'' refers to the actions taken to establish and
sustain the capacity and capabilities necessary to rapidly
identify, prevent, protect against, and respond to the
emergence, reemergence, and spread of pathogens of pandemic
potential.
(10) Partner country.--The term ``partner country'' means a
foreign country in which the relevant Federal departments and
agencies are implementing United States foreign assistance
for global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness under this section.
(11) Relevant federal departments and agencies.--The term
``relevant Federal departments and agencies'' means any
Federal department or agency implementing United States
policies and programs relevant to the advancement of United
States global health security and diplomacy overseas, which
may include--
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the United States Agency for International Development;
(C) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(D) the Department of Defense;
(E) the Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
(F) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
(G) the Development Finance Corporation;
(H) the Peace Corps; and
(I) any other department or agency that the President
determines to be relevant for these purposes.
(12) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability
of people, households, communities, systems, institutions,
countries, and regions to reduce, mitigate, withstand, adapt
to, and quickly recover from shocks and stresses in a manner
that reduces chronic vulnerability to the emergence,
reemergence, and spread of pathogens of pandemic potential
and facilitates inclusive growth.
(13) Respond and response.--The terms ``respond'' and
``response'' mean the actions taken to counter an infectious
disease.
(14) USAID.--The term ``USAID'' means the United States
Agency for International Development.
SEC. 1283. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
(a) Statement of Policy Regarding International Cooperation
to End the COVID-19 Pandemic.--It is the policy of the United
States to lead and implement a comprehensive and coordinated
international response to end the COVID-19 pandemic in a
manner that recognizes the critical role that multilateral
and regional organizations can and should play in pandemic
prevention, preparedness, and response, including by--
(1) seeking adoption of a United Nations Security Council
resolution that--
(A) declares pandemics, including the COVID-19 pandemic, to
be threats to international peace and security; and
(B) urges member states to address such threats by aligning
their health preparedness plans with international best
practices, including practices established by the Global
Health Security Agenda, to improve country capacity to
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats of
pandemic potential;
(2) advancing efforts to reform the World Health
Organization to serve as an effective, normative, and
coordinating body that is capable of aligning member
countries around a strategic operating plan to detect,
contain, treat, and deter the further spread of COVID-19;
(3) providing timely, appropriate levels of financial
support to United Nations agencies, multilateral facilities,
and other partners responding to the COVID-19 pandemic;
(4) prioritizing United States foreign assistance for the
COVID-19 response in the world's most vulnerable countries
and regions;
(5) encouraging other donor governments to similarly
increase contributions to the United Nations agencies,
multilateral facilities, and other partners responding to the
COVID-19 pandemic in the world's poorest and most vulnerable
countries;
(6) working with key stakeholders to accelerate progress
toward meeting and exceeding, as practicable, global COVID-19
vaccination goals;
(7) engaging with key overseas stakeholders, including
through multilateral facilities such as the COVID-19 Vaccines
Global Access initiative (referred to in this section as
``COVAX'') and the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator
initiative;
(8) expanding bilateral efforts, including through the
United States International Development Finance Corporation,
to accelerate the development, manufacturing, local
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production, and efficient and equitable distribution of--
(A) vaccines and related raw materials to meet or exceed
the vaccination goals referred to in paragraph (6); and
(B) global health commodities, including supplies to combat
COVID-19 and to help immediately disrupt the transmission of
SARS-CoV-2;
(9) supporting global COVID-19 vaccine distribution
strategies that--
(A) strengthen underlying health systems for global health
security and pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response;
and
(B) ensure that people living in vulnerable and
marginalized communities, including women, do not face undue
barriers to vaccination;
(10) working with key stakeholders, including the World
Bank Group, the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, the United States International Development Finance
Corporation, and other relevant regional and bilateral
financial institutions, to address the economic and financial
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, while taking into
account the differentiated needs of disproportionately
affected, vulnerable, and marginalized populations;
(11) entering into discussions with vaccine manufacturing
companies to support partnerships, with the goal of ensuring
adequate global supply of vaccines, which may include
necessary components and raw materials;
(12) establishing clear timelines, benchmarks, and goals
for COVID-19 response strategies and activities under this
section; and
(13) generating commitments of resources in support of the
vaccination goals referred to in paragraph (6).
(b) Global COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution and Delivery.--
(1) Accelerating global vaccine distribution strategy.--The
President shall develop a strategy to expand access to, and
accelerate the global distribution of, COVID-19 vaccines to
other countries. This strategy shall--
(A) identify the countries that--
(i) have the highest infection and death rates due to
COVID-19;
(ii) have the lowest COVID-19 vaccination rates; and
(iii) face the most difficult political, logistical, and
financial challenges to obtaining and delivering COVID-19
vaccines;
(B) describe the basis and metrics used to identify the
countries described in subparagraph (A);
(C) identify which countries and regions will be
prioritized and targeted for COVID-19 vaccine delivery, and
the rationale for such prioritization;
(D) describe efforts that the United States is making to
increase COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing capacity, both
domestically and internationally, as appropriate, through
support for the establishment or refurbishment of regional
manufacturing hubs in South America, Southern Africa, and
South Asia, including through the provision of international
development finance;
(E) estimate when, how many, and which types of vaccines
will be provided by the United States Government bilaterally
and through COVAX;
(F) describe efforts to encourage international partners to
take actions similar to the efforts referred to in
subparagraph (D);
(G) describe how the United States Government will ensure
the efficient delivery of COVID-19 vaccines to intended
recipients, including United States citizens residing
overseas;
(H) identify complementary United States foreign assistance
that will facilitate vaccine readiness, distribution,
delivery, monitoring, and administration activities;
(I) describe how the United States Government will ensure
the efficient delivery and administration of COVID-19
vaccines to United States citizens residing overseas,
including through the donation of vaccine doses to United
States embassies and consulates, as appropriate, giving
priority to--
(i) countries in which United States citizens are deemed
ineligible or low priority in the national vaccination
deployment plan; and
(ii) countries that are not presently distributing a COVID-
19 vaccine that--
(I) has been licensed or authorized for emergency use by
the Food and Drug Administration; or
(II) has met the necessary criteria for safety and efficacy
established by the World Health Organization;
(J) summarize the United States Government's efforts to
encourage and facilitate technology sharing and the licensing
of intellectual property, to the extent necessary, to support
the adequate and timely supply of vaccines and vaccine
components to meet the vaccination goals specified in
subsection (a)(6), giving due consideration to avoiding
undermining intellectual property innovation and intellectual
property rights protections with respect to vaccine
development;
(K) describe the roles, responsibilities, tasks, and, as
appropriate, the authorities of the Secretary of State, the
USAID Administrator, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, and the heads
of other relevant Federal departments and agencies with
respect to the implementation of the strategy;
(L) describe how the Department of State and USAID will
coordinate with the Secretary of Health and Human Services
and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies--
(i) to expedite the export and distribution of Federally
purchased vaccines to countries in need; and
(ii) to ensure that such vaccines will not be wasted;
(M) summarize the United States public diplomacy strategies
for branding and addressing vaccine misinformation and
hesitancy within partner countries; and
(N) describe efforts that the United States is making to
help countries disrupt the current transmission of COVID-19,
utilizing medical products and medical supplies.
(2) Submission of strategy.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall submit the strategy described in paragraph (1) to--
(A) the appropriate congressional committees;
(B) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Leveraging United States Bilateral Global Health
Programs for the International COVID-19 Response.--Amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out section
104 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151b) may be
used in countries receiving United States foreign
assistance--
(1) to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including through the
sharing of COVID-19 vaccines; and
(2) to support related activities, including--
(A) strengthening vaccine readiness;
(B) reducing vaccine hesitancy and misinformation;
(C) delivering and administering COVID-19 vaccines;
(D) strengthening health systems and global supply chains
as necessary for global health security and pandemic
preparedness, prevention, and response;
(E) supporting global health workforce planning, training,
and management for pandemic preparedness, prevention, and
response;
(F) enhancing transparency, quality, and reliability of
public health data;
(G) increasing bidirectional testing, including screening
for symptomatic and asymptomatic cases; and
(H) building laboratory capacity.
(d) Roles of the Department of State, USAID, and the
Department of Health and Human Services in International
Pandemic Response.--
(1) Designation of lead agencies for coordination of the
united states' international response to infectious disease
outbreaks with severe or pandemic potential.--The President
shall designate relevant Federal departments and agencies,
including the Department of State, USAID, and the Department
of Health and Human Services (including the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention), to lead specific aspects of
the United States international response to outbreaks of
emerging high-consequence infectious disease threats.
(2) Notification.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate, and the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives of the designations made pursuant to
paragraph (1), including detailed descriptions of the roles
and responsibilities of each relevant department and agency.
(e) USAID Disaster Surge Capacity.--
(1) Disaster surge capacity.--Amounts appropriated or
otherwise made available to carry out part I and chapter 4 of
part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151
and 2346), including funds made available for ``Assistance
for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia'', may be used, in
addition to amounts otherwise made available for such
purposes, for the cost (including support costs) of
individuals detailed to or employed by USAID whose primary
responsibility is to carry out programs in response to global
health emergencies and natural or manmade disasters.
(2) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before making
funds available to address manmade disasters pursuant to
paragraph (1), the Secretary of State or the USAID
Administrator shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees of such intended action.
SEC. 1284. INTERNATIONAL PANDEMIC PREVENTION AND
PREPAREDNESS.
(a) United States International Activities to Advance
Global Health Security and Diplomacy Strategy and Report.--
(1) In general.--The President shall develop, update,
maintain, and advance a comprehensive strategy for improving
United States global health security and diplomacy for
pandemic prevention, preparedness which, consistent with the
purposes of this subtitle, shall --
(A) clearly articulate United States policy goals related
to pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, including
through actions to strengthen diplomatic leadership and the
effectiveness of United States foreign assistance for global
health security through advancement of a One Health approach,
the Global Health Security Agenda, the International Health
Regulations (2005),
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and other relevant frameworks that contribute to pandemic
prevention and preparedness;
(B) establish specific and measurable goals, benchmarks,
timetables, performance metrics, and monitoring and
evaluation plans for United States foreign policy and
assistance for global health security that promote learning
and adaptation and reflect international best practices
relating to global health security, transparency, and
accountability;
(C) establish transparent mechanisms to improve
coordination and avoid duplication of effort between and
among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, partner
countries, donor countries, the private sector, multilateral
organizations, and other key stakeholders;
(D) prioritize working with partner countries with--
(i) demonstrated need, as identified through the Joint
External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index
classification of health systems, national action plans for
health security, Global Health Security Agenda, other risk-
based assessments, and complementary or successor indicators
of global health security and pandemic preparedness; and
(ii) demonstrated commitment to transparency, including
budget and global health data transparency, complying with
the International Health Regulations (2005), investing in
domestic health systems, and achieving measurable results;
(E) reduce long-term reliance upon United States foreign
assistance for global health security by--
(i) ensuring that United States global health assistance
authorized under this subtitle is strategically planned and
coordinated in a manner that delivers immediate impact and
contributes to enduring results, including through efforts to
enhance community capacity and resilience to infectious
disease threats and emergencies; and
(ii) ensuring partner country ownership of global health
security strategies, data, programs, and outcomes and
improved domestic resource mobilization, co-financing, and
appropriate national budget allocations for global health
security and pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response;
(F) assist partner countries in building the technical
capacity of relevant ministries, systems, and networks to
prepare, execute, monitor, and evaluate national action plans
for global health security and pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response that are developed with input from
key stakeholders, including mechanism to enhance budget and
global health data transparency, as necessary and
appropriate;
(G) support and align United States foreign assistance
authorized under this subtitle with such national action
plans for health security and pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response, as appropriate;
(H) facilitate communication and collaboration, as
appropriate, among local stakeholders in support of country-
led strategies and initiatives to better identify and prevent
health impacts related to deforestation, climate-related
events, and increased unsafe interactions between wildlife,
livestock, and people contributing to the emergence,
reemergence, and spread of zoonoses;
(I) support global health budget and workforce planning in
partner countries, consistent with the purposes of this
subtitle, including training in financial management and
budget and global health data transparency;
(J) strengthen linkages between complementary bilateral and
multilateral foreign assistance programs, including efforts
of the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and Gavi, the
Vaccine Alliance, that contribute to the development of more
resilient health systems and global supply chains for global
health security and pandemic prevention, preparedness, and
response in partner countries with the capacity, resources,
and personnel required to prevent, detect, and respond to
infectious disease threats; and
(K) support innovation and partnerships with the private
sector, health organizations, civil society, nongovernmental,
faith-based and indigenous organizations, and health research
and academic institutions to improve pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response, including for the development and
deployment of effective and accessible infectious disease
tracking tools, diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.
(2) Submission of strategy.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation
with the heads of the relevant Federal departments and
agencies, shall submit the strategy required under paragraph
(1) to--
(i) the appropriate congressional committees;
(ii) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions of the Senate; and
(iii) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
(B) Agency-specific plans.--The strategy required under
paragraph (1) shall include specific implementation plans
from each relevant Federal department and agency that
describe--
(i) the anticipated contributions of the Federal department
or agency, including technical, financial, and in-kind
contributions, to implement the strategy; and
(ii) the efforts of the Federal department or agency to
ensure that the activities and programs carried out pursuant
to the strategy are designed to achieve maximum impact and
long-term sustainability.
(3) Annual report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the submission
of the strategy pursuant to paragraph (2), and not later than
October 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit
a report to the committees referred to in paragraph (2)(A)
that describes the status of the implementation of such
strategy.
(B) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall--
(i) identify any substantial changes made to the strategy
during the preceding calendar year;
(ii) describe the progress made in implementing the
strategy, including specific information related to the
progress toward improving countries' ability to detect,
prevent, and respond to infectious disease threats, such as
COVID-19 and Ebola;
(iii) identify--
(I) the indicators used to establish benchmarks and measure
results over time; and
(II) the mechanisms for reporting such results in an open
and transparent manner;
(iv) contain a transparent, open, and detailed accounting
of obligations by relevant Federal departments and agencies
to implement the strategy, including, to the extent
practicable, for each such Federal department and agency, the
statutory source of obligated funds, the amounts obligated,
implementing partners and sub-partners, targeted
beneficiaries, and activities supported; and
(v) the efforts of the relevant Federal department or
agency to ensure that the activities and programs carried out
pursuant to the strategy are designed to achieve maximum
impact and enduring results, including through specific
activities to strengthen health systems for global health
security and pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response,
as appropriate.
(C) Form.--The strategy and reports required under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(b) Establishment of the United States Global Health
Security Agenda Interagency Review Council.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(A) to promote and invest in global health security and
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response as a core
national and security interest;
(B) to advance the aims of the Global Health Security
Agenda;
(C) to collaborate with other countries to promote early
detection and mitigation of infectious disease threats before
such threats become pandemics; and
(D) to encourage and support other countries to advance
pandemic prevention and preparedness by investing in
resilient and sustainable health systems for global health
security and pandemic prevention and preparedness.
(2) Establishment.--The President shall establish a Global
Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council (referred
to in this section as the ``Council'') to carry out the
activities described in paragraphs (4) and (7).
(3) Meetings.--The Council shall meet not fewer than 4
times each year to advance its mission and fulfill its
responsibilities.
(4) General responsibilities.--The Council shall--
(A) provide policy-level recommendations to participating
agencies regarding Global Health Security Agenda goals,
objectives, and implementation, and other international
efforts to strengthen pandemic preparedness and response;
(B) facilitate interagency, multi-sectoral engagement to
carry out GHSA implementation;
(C) provide a forum for raising and working to resolve
interagency disagreements concerning the GHSA, and other
international efforts to strengthen pandemic preparedness and
response;
(D) review the progress toward, and work to resolve
challenges in achieving, United States commitments under the
GHSA, including commitments to assist other countries in
achieving the GHSA targets; and
(E) consider, among other issues--
(i) the status of United States financial commitments to
the GHSA in the context of commitments by other donors, and
the contributions of partner countries to achieve the GHSA
targets;
(ii) the progress toward the milestones outlined in--
(I) GHSA national plans for countries in which the United
States Government has committed to assist in implementing the
GHSA; and
(II) annual work plans outlining agency priorities for
implementing the GHSA; and
(iii) the external evaluations of United States and partner
country capabilities to address infectious disease threats,
including the ability to achieve the targets outlined within
the World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation
Tool, and gaps identified by such external evaluations.
(5) Participation.--The Council--
(A) shall be headed by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, in coordination with the heads of
relevant Federal agencies; and
(B) should consist of representatives each of the relevant
Federal departments and agencies, as determined by the
President.
(6) Responsibilities of federal departments and agencies.--
The Assistant to the
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President for National Security Affairs and the Council may
not assume any responsibilities or authorities of the head of
any Federal department, agency, or office, including the
foreign affairs responsibilities and authorities of the
Secretary of State to oversee the implementation of programs
and policies that advance global health security within
foreign countries.
(7) Specific roles and responsibilities.--
(A) In general.--The heads of the agencies referred to in
paragraph (5) shall--
(i) make the implementation of the GHSA and global pandemic
preparedness a high priority within their respective
agencies;
(ii) include activities related to the GHSA and global
pandemic preparedness within their respective agencies'
strategic planning and budget processes;
(iii) designate a senior-level official to be responsible
for the implementation of this subsection;
(iv) designate, in accordance with paragraph (5), an
appropriate representative at the Assistant Secretary level
or higher to participate on the Council;
(v) keep the Council apprised of GHSA-related activities
undertaken within their respective agencies;
(vi) maintain responsibility for agency-related
programmatic functions in coordination with other relevant
Federal agencies, governments in partner countries, country
teams, and GHSA in-country teams;
(vii) coordinate with other Federal agencies that are
identified in this section--
(I) to satisfy programmatic goals; and
(II) to further facilitate coordination of country teams,
implementers, and donors in partner countries; and
(viii) coordinate across national health security action
plans and with GHSA and other appropriate partners to which
the United States is providing assistance.
(B) Additional roles and responsibilities.--In addition to
the roles and responsibilities described subparagraph (A),
the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies should
carry out their respective roles and responsibilities
described in--
(i) Executive Order 13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701; relating to
Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a
World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats); and
(ii) National Security Directive on United States Global
Leadership to Strengthen the International COVID-19 Response
and to Advance Global Health Security and Biological
Preparedness, issued on January 21, 2021.
(c) Organization of United States International Activities
to Advance Global Health Security and Diplomacy.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established, within the
Department of State, the position of Special Representative
for United States International Activities to Advance Global
Health Security and Diplomacy Overseas (referred to in this
section as the ``Special Representative'').
(2) Appointment; qualifications.--The Special
Representative--
(A) shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate;
(B) shall report to the Secretary of State; and
(C) shall have--
(i) demonstrated knowledge and experience in the fields of
development and public health, epidemiology, or medicine; and
(ii) relevant diplomatic, policy, and political expertise.
(3) Authorities.--The Special Representative may--
(A) operate internationally to carry out the purposes of
this section;
(B) ensure effective coordination, management, and
oversight of United States foreign policy, diplomatic
efforts, and foreign assistance funded with amounts
appropriated to carry out this subtitle to advance the
relevant elements of the United States Global Health Security
and Diplomacy Strategy developed pursuant to subsection (a)
by--
(i) formulating, issuing, and updating related policy
guidance;
(ii) establishing, in coordination with USAID and the
Department of Health and Human Services, unified auditing,
monitoring, and evaluation plans;
(iii) avoiding duplication of effort and working to resolve
policy, program, and funding disputes among the relevant
Federal departments and agencies;
(iv) leading diplomatic efforts to identify and address
current and emerging threats to global health security;
(v) ensuring, in consultation with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services and the USAID Administrator, effective
representation of the United States in relevant international
forums, including the World Health Organization, the World
Health Assembly, and meetings of the Global Health Security
Agenda and of the Global Health Security Initiative;
(vi) working to enhance coordination with, and transparency
among, the governments of partner countries and key
stakeholders, including the private sector;
(vii) promoting greater donor and national investment in
partner countries to build health systems and supply chains
for global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness;
(viii) securing bilateral and multilateral financing
commitments to advance the Global Health Security Agenda, in
coordination with relevant Federal departments and agencies,
including through funding for the financing mechanism
described in section 1285; and
(ix) providing regular updates to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions of the Senate, and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives regarding
the fulfillment of the activities described in this
paragraph;
(C) represent the United States in the multilateral,
catalytic financing mechanism described in section 1285;
(D) utilize detailees, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, from relevant Federal departments and agencies and
hire personal service contractors, who may operate
domestically and internationally, to ensure that the Office
of the Special Representative has access to the highest
quality experts available to the United States Government to
carry out the functions under this subtitle; and
(E) perform such other functions as the Secretary of State
may assign.
(d) Strengthening Health Systems for Global Health Security
and Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to ensure that bilateral global health assistance
programs are effectively managed and coordinated, as
necessary and appropriate to achieve the purposes of this
subtitle, to contribute to the strengthening of health
systems for global health security and pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response in each country in which such
programs are carried out.
(2) Coordination.--The USAID Administrator shall work with
the Global Malaria Coordinator, the United States Global AIDS
Coordinator, the Special Representative for Global Health
Diplomacy at the Department of State, and, as appropriate,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to identify areas
of collaboration and coordination in countries with global
health programs and activities undertaken by USAID pursuant
to the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-25) and
other relevant statutes to ensure that such activities
contribute to the strengthening of health systems for global
health security and pandemic prevention and preparedness.
(e) International Pandemic Early Warning Network.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the USAID
Administrator, the Director of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and the heads of the other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, should work with the World
Health Organization and other key stakeholders to establish
or strengthen effective early warning systems, at the partner
country, regional, and international levels, that utilize
innovative information and analytical tools and robust review
processes to track, document, analyze, and forecast
infectious disease threats with epidemic and pandemic
potential.
(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 4 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads
of the other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees,
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of
the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives that describes United States
Government efforts and opportunities to establish or
strengthen effective early warning systems to detect
infectious disease threats internationally.
(f) International Emergency Operations.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that it
is essential to enhance the capacity of key stakeholders to
effectively operationalize early warning and execute multi-
sectoral emergency operations during an infectious disease
outbreak, particularly in countries and areas that
deliberately withhold critical global health data and delay
access during an infectious disease outbreak in advance of
the next infectious disease outbreak with pandemic potential.
(2) Public health emergencies of international concern.--
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, should work with the World Health
Organization and like-minded member states to adopt an
approach toward assessing infectious disease threats under
the International Health Regulations (2005) for the World
Health Organization to identify and transparently
communicate, on an ongoing basis, varying levels of risk
leading up to a declaration by the Director General of the
World Health Organization of a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern for the duration and in the aftermath
of such declaration.
(3) Emergency operations.--The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination with
the USAID Administrator, the Director of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, and the heads of other
relevant Federal departments and agencies, and consistent
with the requirements under the International Health
Regulations (2005) and the objectives of the World Health
Organization's Health Emergencies Programme, the Global
Health Security Agenda, and national actions plans for health
security, shall work, in cooperation with the World Health
Organization,
[[Page S5742]]
with partner countries and other key stakeholders to support
the establishment, strengthening, and rapid response capacity
of global health emergency operations centers, at the partner
country and international levels, including efforts--
(A) to collect and share public health data, assess risk,
and operationalize early warning;
(B) to secure, including through utilization of stand-by
arrangements and emergency funding mechanisms, the staff,
systems, and resources necessary to execute cross-sectoral
emergency operations during the 48-hour period immediately
following an infectious disease outbreak with pandemic
potential; and
(C) to organize and conduct emergency simulations.
SEC. 1285. INTERNATIONAL FINANCING MECHANISM FOR GLOBAL
HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC PREVENTION AND
PREPAREDNESS.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``eligible
partner country'' means a country in which the Fund for
Global Health Security and Pandemic Prevention and
Preparedness established pursuant to subsection (b) may
finance global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness assistance programs under this subtitle based
on--
(1) the country's demonstrated need, as identified through
the IHR (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the
Global Health Security Index classification of health
systems, national action plans for health security, the World
Organization for Animal Health's Performance of Veterinary
Services evaluation, and other complementary or successor
indicators of global health security and pandemic prevention
and preparedness; and
(2) the country's commitment to transparency, including--
(A) budget and global health data transparency;
(B) its compliance with the International Health
Regulations (2005);
(C) investments in domestic health systems; and
(D) the achievement of measurable results.
(b) Establishment of Fund for Global Health Security and
Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness.--
(1) Negotiations.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the USAID Administrator, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, and the heads of other relevant Federal
departments and agencies, as necessary and appropriate,
should seek to enter into negotiations with donors, relevant
United Nations agencies, including the World Health
Organization, and other key multilateral stakeholders, to
establish--
(A) a multilateral, catalytic financing mechanism for
global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness, which may be formed as financial intermediary
fund of the World Bank and be known as the Fund for Global
Health Security and Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness
(referred to in this section as ``the Fund''), in accordance
with the provisions of this subsection; and
(B) a Technical Advisory Panel to the Fund, in accordance
with subsection (e).
(2) Purposes.--The purposes of the Fund should be--
(A) to close critical gaps in global health security and
pandemic prevention and preparedness; and
(B) to work with, and build the capacity of, eligible
partner countries in the areas of global health security,
infectious disease control, and pandemic prevention and
preparedness in order to--
(i) prioritize capacity building and financing availability
in eligible partner countries;
(ii) incentivize countries to prioritize the use of
domestic resources for global health security and pandemic
prevention and preparedness;
(iii) leverage governmental, nongovernmental, and private
sector investments;
(iv) regularly respond to and evaluate progress based on
clear metrics and benchmarks, such as those developed through
the IHR (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the
Global Health Security Index;
(v) align with and complement ongoing bilateral and
multilateral efforts and financing, including through the
World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation, and Gavi, the Vaccine
Alliance; and
(vi) help countries accelerate and achieve compliance with
the International Health Regulations (2005) and fulfill the
Global Health Security Agenda 2024 Framework not later than 8
years after the date on which the Fund is established, in
coordination with the ongoing Joint External Evaluation
national action planning process.
(3) Executive board.--
(A) In general.--The Fund should be governed by a
transparent and accountable body (referred to in this section
as the ``Executive Board''), which should--
(i) function as a partnership with, and through full
engagement by, donor governments, eligible partner countries,
and independent civil society; and
(ii) be composed of not more than 21 representatives of
governments, foundations, academic institutions, independent
civil society, indigenous people, vulnerable communities,
frontline health workers, and the private sector with
demonstrated commitment to carrying out the purposes of the
Fund and upholding transparency and accountability
requirements.
(B) Duties.--The Executive Board should--
(i) be charged with approving strategies, operations, and
grant making authorities such that it is able to conduct
effective fiduciary, monitoring, and evaluation efforts, and
other oversight functions;
(ii) determine operational procedures to enable the Fund to
effectively fulfill its mission;
(iii) provide oversight and accountability for the Fund in
collaboration with the Inspector General established pursuant
to subsection (d)(5)(A)(i);
(iv) develop and utilize a mechanism to obtain formal input
from eligible partner countries, independent civil society,
and implementing entities relative to program design, review,
and implementation and associated lessons learned; and
(v) coordinate and align with other multilateral financing
and technical assistance activities, and with the activities
of the United States and other nations leading pandemic
prevention, preparedness, and response activities in partner
countries, as appropriate.
(C) Composition.--The Executive Board should include--
(i) representatives of the governments of founding member
countries who, in addition to meeting the requirements under
subparagraph (A), qualify based upon--
(I) meeting an established initial contribution threshold,
which should be not less than 10 percent of the country's
total initial contributions; and
(II) demonstrating a commitment to supporting the
International Health Regulations (2005);
(ii) a geographically diverse group of members from donor
countries, academic institutions, independent civil society,
including faith-based and indigenous organizations, and the
private sector who are selected on the basis of their
experience and commitment to innovation, best practices, and
the advancement of global health security objectives;
(iii) representatives of the World Health Organization, to
serve in an observer status; and
(iv) the chair of the Global Health Security Agenda
Steering Group, to serve in an observer status.
(D) Contributions.--Each government or private sector
entity represented on the Executive Board should agree to
make annual contributions to the Fund in an amount that is
not less than the minimum amount determined by the Executive
Board.
(E) Qualifications.--Individuals appointed to the Executive
Board should have demonstrated knowledge and experience
across a variety of sectors, including human and animal
health, agriculture, development, defense, finance, research,
and academia.
(F) Conflicts of interest.--All Executive Board members
should be required to recuse themselves from matters
presenting conflicts of interest, including financing
decisions relating to such countries, bodies, and
institutions.
(G) United states representation.--
(i) Founding member.--The Secretary of State should seek--
(I) to establish the United States as a founding member of
the Fund; and
(II) to ensure the United States is represented on the
Executive Board by an officer or employee of the United
States who has been appointed by the President.
(ii) Effective and termination dates.--
(I) Effective date.--This subparagraph shall take effect on
the date on which the Secretary of State submits to Congress
a certified copy of the agreement establishing the Fund.
(II) Termination date.--The membership established pursuant
to clause (i) shall terminate upon the date of termination of
the Fund.
(H) Removal procedures.--The Fund should establish
procedures for the removal of members of the Executive Board
who--
(i) engage in a consistent pattern of human rights abuses;
(ii) fail to uphold global health data transparency
requirements; or
(iii) otherwise violate the established standards of the
Fund, including in relation to corruption.
(4) Enforceability.--Any agreement concluded under the
authorities provided under this subsection shall be legally
effective and binding upon the United States, in accordance
with the terms of the agreement--
(A) upon the enactment of appropriate implementing
legislation that provides for the approval of the specific
agreement or agreements, including attachments, annexes, and
supporting documentation, as appropriate; or
(B) if concluded and submitted as a treaty, upon the
approval by the Senate of the resolution of ratification of
such treaty.
(c) Authorities.--
(1) Program objectives.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the purpose described in
subsection (b), the Fund, acting through the Executive Board,
should--
(i) develop grant making requirements to be administered by
an independent technical review panel comprised of entities
barred from applying for funding or support;
(ii) provide grants, including challenge grants, technical
assistance, concessional lending, catalytic investment funds,
and
[[Page S5743]]
other innovative funding mechanisms, in coordination with
ongoing bilateral and multilateral United States assistance
efforts, as appropriate--
(I) to help eligible partner countries close critical gaps
in health security, as identified through the IHR (2005)
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the Global Health
Security Index classification of health systems, and national
action plans for health security and other complementary or
successor indicators of global health security and pandemic
prevention and preparedness; and
(II) to support measures that enable such countries, at
both the national and subnational levels, and in partnership
with civil society and the private sector, to strengthen and
sustain resilient health systems and supply chains for global
health security and pandemic prevention and preparedness with
the resources, capacity, and personnel required to prevent,
detect, and respond to infectious disease threats before they
become pandemics;
(iii) leverage the expertise, capabilities, and resources
of proven, existing agencies and organizations to effectively
target and manage resources for impact, including through
alignment with, and co-financing of, complementary programs,
as appropriate, in accordance with subparagraph (C); and
(iv) develop recommendations for a mechanism for assisting
countries that are at high risk for the emergence or
reemergence of pathogens with pandemic potential to
participate in the Global Health Security Agenda and the
Joint External Evaluations.
(B) Activities supported.--The activities to be supported
by the Fund should include efforts--
(i) to enable eligible partner countries to formulate and
implement national health security and pandemic prevention
and preparedness action plans, advance action packages under
the Global Health Security Agenda, and adopt and uphold
commitments under the International Health Regulations (2005)
and complementary or successor indicators of global health
security and pandemic prevention and preparedness, as
appropriate;
(ii) to support global health security budget planning in
eligible partner countries, including training in public
financial management, integrated and transparent budget and
global health data and human resource information systems;
(iii) to strengthen the health security workforce,
including hiring, training, and deploying experts and other
essential staff, including community health workers, to
improve frontline prevention of, and monitoring and
preparedness for, unknown, new, emerging, or reemerging
pathogens of pandemic potential, including capacity to surge
and manage additional staff during emergencies;
(iv) to improve the quality of community health worker
programs as the foundation of pandemic preparedness and
response through application of appropriate assessment tools;
(v) to improve--
(I) infection prevention and control;
(II) the protection of healthcare workers, including
community health workers; and
(III) access to water and sanitation within healthcare
settings;
(vi) to combat the threat of antimicrobial resistance;
(vii) to strengthen laboratory capacity and promote
biosafety and biosecurity through the provision of material
and technical assistance;
(viii) to reduce the risk of--
(I) bioterrorism;
(II) the emergence, reemergence, or spread of zoonotic
disease (whether through loss of natural habitat, the
commercial trade in wildlife for human consumption, or other
means); and
(III) accidental biological release;
(ix) to build technical capacity to manage, as appropriate,
supply chains for global health security and pandemic
prevention and preparedness through effective forecasting,
procurement, warehousing, and delivery from central
warehouses to points of service in the public and private
sectors;
(x) to enable bilateral, regional, and international
partnerships and cooperation, including through pandemic
early warning systems and emergency operations centers, to
identify and address transnational infectious disease threats
exacerbated by natural and man-made disasters, human
displacement, and zoonotic infection;
(xi) to establish partnerships for the sharing of best
practices and enabling eligible countries to meet targets and
indicators under the IHR (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation
Framework, the Global Health Security Index classification of
health systems, and national action plans for health security
relating to the prevention, detection, and treatment of
neglected tropical diseases;
(xii) to develop and utilize metrics to monitor and
evaluate programmatic performance and identify best
practices, including in accordance with the IHR (2005)
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, including Joint External
Evaluation benchmarks, Global Health Security Agenda targets,
and Global Health Security Index indicators;
(xiii) to develop and deploy mechanisms to enhance and
independently monitor the transparency and accountability of
global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness programs and data, in compliance with the
International Health Regulations (2005), including through
the sharing of trends, risks, and lessons learned;
(xiv) to promote broad participation in health emergency
planning and advisory bodies, including by women and
frontline health workers;
(xv) to develop and implement simulation exercises, to
produce and release after action reports, and to address
related gaps;
(xvi) to support countries in conducting Joint External
Evaluations;
(xvii) to improve disease surveillance capacity in partner
counties, including at the community level, to improve such
countries' capacity to detect and respond to known and
unknown pathogens and zoonotic infectious diseases; and
(xviii) to support governments through coordinated and
prioritized assistance efforts to prevent the emergence,
reemergence, or spread of zoonotic diseases caused by
deforestation, commercial trade in wildlife for human
consumption, climate-related events, and unsafe interactions
between wildlife, livestock, and people.
(C) Implementation of program objectives.--In carrying out
the objectives described in subparagraph (A), the Fund should
work to eliminate duplication and waste by upholding strict
transparency and accountability standards and coordinating
its programs and activities with key partners working to
advance global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness, including--
(i) governments, independent civil society,
nongovernmental, faith-based, and indigenous organizations,
research and academic institutions, and private sector
entities in eligible partner countries;
(ii) the pandemic early warning systems and emergency
operations centers to be established under subsections (e)
and (f) of section 284;
(iii) the World Health Organization;
(iv) the Global Health Security Agenda;
(v) the Global Health Security Initiative;
(vi) the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria;
(vii) the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, and other relevant funds,
programs, and specialized agencies of the United Nations;
(viii) Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;
(ix) the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations;
(x) the World Organisation for Animal Health;
(xi) the United Nations Environment Programme;
(xii) the Food and Agriculture Organization;
(xiii) the Global Polio Eradication Initiative; and
(xiv) the Special Representative for United States
International Activities to Advance Global Health Security
and Diplomacy Overseas described in section 1284(c).
(2) Priority.--In providing assistance under this
subsection, the Fund should give priority to low-and lower
middle income countries with--
(A) low scores on the Global Health Security Index
classification of health systems;
(B) measurable gaps in global health security and pandemic
prevention and preparedness identified under the IHR (2005)
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and national action plans
for health security;
(C) demonstrated political and financial commitment to
pandemic prevention and preparedness; and
(D) demonstrated commitment to--
(i) upholding global health budget and data transparency
and accountability standards;
(ii) complying with the International Health Regulations
(2005);
(iii) investing in domestic health systems; and
(iv) achieving measurable results.
(3) Eligible grant recipients.--Governments and
nongovernmental, faith-based and indigenous organizations
should be eligible to receive grants described in this
subsection.
(d) Administration.--
(1) Appointments.--The Executive Board of the Fund should
appoint--
(A) an Administrator, who should be responsible for
managing the day-to-day operations of the Fund; and
(B) an independent Inspector General, who should be
responsible for monitoring grants implementation and
proactively safeguarding against conflicts of interests.
(2) Authority to accept and solicit contributions.--The
Fund should be authorized to solicit and accept contributions
from governments, the private sector, foundations,
individuals, and nongovernmental entities of all kinds.
(3) Accountability; conflicts of interest; criteria for
programs.--As part of the negotiations described in
subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of the State, consistent
with paragraph (4), shall--
(A) take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that
the Fund will have in effect adequate procedures and
standards to account for and monitor the use of funds
contributed to the Fund, including the cost of administering
the Fund;
(B) seek to ensure there is agreement to put in place a
conflict of interest policy to ensure fairness and a high
standard of ethical conduct in the Fund's decision-making
processes, including proactive procedures to screen staff for
conflicts of interest and measures to address any conflicts,
such as--
(i) potential divestments of interests;
(ii) prohibition from engaging in certain activities;
(iii) recusal from certain decision-making and
administrative processes; and
[[Page S5744]]
(iv) representation by an alternate board member; and
(C) seek agreement on the criteria that should be used to
determine the programs and activities that should be assisted
by the Fund.
(4) Selection of partner countries, projects, and
recipients.--The Executive Board should establish--
(A) eligible partner country selection criteria, including
transparent metrics to measure and assess global health
security and pandemic prevention and preparedness strengths
and vulnerabilities in countries seeking assistance;
(B) minimum standards for ensuring eligible partner country
ownership and commitment to long-term results, including
requirements for domestic budgeting, resource mobilization,
and co-investment;
(C) criteria for the selection of projects to receive
support from the Fund;
(D) standards and criteria regarding qualifications of
recipients of such support; and
(E) such rules and procedures as may be necessary--
(i) for cost-effective management of the Fund; and
(ii) to ensure transparency and accountability in the
grant-making process.
(5) Additional transparency and accountability
requirements.--
(A) Inspector general.--
(i) In general.--The Secretary of State shall seek to
ensure that the Fund maintains and independent Office of the
Inspector General, appointed pursuant to paragraph (1)(B),
who--
(I) is fully enabled to operate independently and
transparently;
(II) is supported by and with the requisite resources and
capacity to regularly conduct and publish, on a publicly
accessible website, rigorous financial, programmatic, and
reporting audits and investigations of the Fund and its
grantees, including subgrantees; and
(III) establishes an investigative unit that--
(aa) develops an oversight mechanism to ensure that grant
funds are not diverted to illicit or corrupt purposes or
activities; and
(bb) submits an annual report to the Executive Board
describing its activities, investigations, and results.
(ii) Sense of congress on corruption.--It is the sense of
Congress that--
(I) corruption within global health programs contribute
directly to the loss of human life and cannot be tolerated;
and
(II) in making financial recoveries relating to a corrupt
act or criminal conduct committed by a grant recipient, as
determined by the Inspector General, the responsible grant
recipient should be assessed at a recovery rate of up to 150
percent of such loss.
(B) Administrative expenses; financial tracking systems.--
The Secretary of State shall seek to ensure the Fund
establishes, maintains, and makes publicly available--
(i) a system to track the administrative and management
costs of the Fund on a quarterly basis; and
(ii) a system to track the amount of funds disbursed to
each grant recipient and subrecipient during each grant's
fiscal cycle.
(C) Exemption from duties and taxes.--The Secretary should
ensure that the Fund adopts rules that condition grants upon
agreement by the relevant national authorities in an eligible
partner country to exempt from duties and taxes all products
financed by such grants, including procurements by any
principal or subrecipient for the purpose of carrying out
such grants.
(e) Technical Advisory Panel.--
(1) In general.--There should be an Technical Advisory
Panel to the Fund.
(2) Appointments.--The members of the Technical Advisory
Panel should be composed of--
(A) a geographically diverse group of individuals that
includes representation from low- and middle-income
countries;
(B) individuals with experience and leadership in the
fields of development, global health, epidemiology, medicine,
biomedical research, and social sciences; and
(C) representatives of relevant United Nations agencies,
including the World Health Organization, and nongovernmental,
faith-based, and indigenous organizations with on-the ground
experience in implementing global health programs in low and
lower-middle income countries.
(3) Responsibilities.--The Technical Advisory Panel should
provide advice and guidance to the Executive Board of the
Fund on the development and implementation of programs and
projects to be assisted by the Fund and on leveraging
donations to the Fund.
(4) Prohibition on payment of compensation.--
(A) In general.--Except for travel expenses (including per
diem in lieu of subsistence), no member of the Technical
Advisory Panel should receive compensation for services
performed as a member of the Board.
(B) United states representative.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (including an international
agreement), a representative of the United States on the
Technical Advisory Panel may not accept compensation for
services performed as a member of the Technical Advisory
Panel, except that such representative may accept travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, while
away from the representative's home or regular place of
business in the performance of services for the Technical
Advisory Panel.
(5) Conflicts of interest.--Members of the Technical
Advisory Panel should be required--
(A) to disclose any potential conflicts of interest before
serving on the Technical Advisory Panel; and
(B) to recuse themselves from any matters that present any
conflicts of interest during their service on the Technical
Advisory Panel.
(f) Reports to Congress.--
(1) Status report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the USAID Administrator, and the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the progress of international negotiations to
establish the Fund.
(2) Annual report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date on
which the Fund is established, and annually thereafter for
the duration of the Fund, the Secretary of State shall submit
a report on the activities of the Fund to the appropriate
congressional committees.
(B) Report elements.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall describe--
(i) the goals of the Fund;
(ii) the programs, projects, and activities supported by
the Fund;
(iii) private and governmental contributions to the Fund;
and
(iv) the criteria utilized to determine the programs and
activities that should be assisted by the Fund, including
baselines, targets, desired outcomes, measurable goals, and
extent to which those goals are being achieved.
(3) GAO report on effectiveness.--Not later than 2 years
after the date on which the Fund is established, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees that
evaluates the effectiveness of the Fund, including--
(A) the effectiveness of the programs, projects, and
activities supported by the Fund; and
(B) an assessment of the merits of continued United States
participation in the Fund.
(g) United States Contributions.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (4)(C), the President
may release Federal funding that has been appropriated by
Congress for United States contributions to the Fund.
(2) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days
before making a contribution to the Fund of--
(A) the amount of the proposed contribution;
(B) the total of funds contributed by other donors; and
(C) the national interests served by United States
participation in the Fund.
(3) Limitation.--During the 5-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this Act, the cumulative total of
United States contributions to the Fund may not exceed 33
percent of the total contributions to the Fund from all
sources.
(4) Withholdings.--
(A) Support for acts of international terrorism.--If the
Secretary of State determines that the Fund has provided
assistance to a country, the government of which the
Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371)
has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism, the United States shall withhold from its
contribution to the Fund for the next fiscal year an amount
equal to the amount expended by the Fund to the government of
such country.
(B) Excessive salaries.--If the Secretary of State
determines that the salary during any of the first 5 fiscal
years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act
of any individual employed by the Fund exceeds the salary of
the Vice President of the United States for such fiscal year,
the United States should withhold from its contribution for
the following fiscal year an amount equal to the aggregate
difference between the 2 salaries.
(C) Accountability certification requirement.--The
Secretary of State may withhold not more than 20 percent of
planned United States contributions to the Fund until the
Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that the Fund has established procedures to
provide access by the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of State, as cognizant Inspector General, the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services, the USAID Inspector General, and the Comptroller
General of the United States to the Fund's financial data and
other information relevant to United States contributions to
the Fund (as determined by the Inspector General of the
Department of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
State).
SEC. 1286. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1,
2022, $5,000,000,000, which--
(A) shall be used to carry out sections 1284 and 1285, in
consultation with the appropriate congressional committees
and subject to the requirements under chapters 1 and 10 of
part I and section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.); and
[[Page S5745]]
(B) may include support for--
(i) enhancing pandemic prevention, preparedness, and
response in partner countries through implementation of the
Global Health Security and Diplomacy Strategy developed
pursuant to section 1284; and
(ii) United States contributions to a multilateral,
catalytic financing mechanism for global health security and
pandemic prevention and preparedness described in section
1285.
(2) Exception.--Section 110 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) shall not apply to
assistance made available pursuant to this subsection.
(b) Compliance With the Foreign Aid Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2016.--Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-
191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(F) the International Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19
Response Act of 2022.''.
SEC. 1287. SUNSET.
This subtitle, and the amendments to this subtitle, shall
cease to be effective on September 30, 2027.
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