[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 157 (Wednesday, September 28, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5345-S5346]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 5881. Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mr. Merkley) submitted an 
amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr. 
Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) and intended to be proposed to the 
bill H.R. 7900, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for 
military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end of title XII, add the following:

                  Subtitle G--Supporting SAUDI WMD Act

     SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Stopping Activities 
     Underpinning Development In Weapons of Mass Destruction Act'' 
     or the ``SAUDI WMD Act''.

     SEC. 1282. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The People's Republic of China (in this subtitle 
     referred to as ``China''), became a full-participant of the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, committing it to apply a 
     strong presumption of denial in exporting nuclear-related 
     items that a foreign country could divert to a nuclear 
     weapons program.
       (2) China also committed to the United States, in November 
     2000, to abide by the foundational principles of the 1987 
     Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to not ``assist, in 
     any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles 
     that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles 
     capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to 
     a distance of at least 300 kilometers)''.
       (3) In the 1980s, China secretly sold the Kingdom of Saudi 
     Arabia (in this subtitle referred to as ``Saudi Arabia'') 
     conventionally armed DF-3A ballistic missiles, and in 2007, 
     reportedly sold Saudi Arabia dual-use capable DF-21 medium-
     range ballistic missiles of a 300 kilometer, 500 kilogram 
     range and payload threshold which should have triggered a 
     denial of sale under the MTCR.
       (4) The 2020 Department of State Report on the Adherence to 
     and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
     Disarmament Agreements and Commitments found that China 
     ``continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile 
     programs of proliferation concern in 2019'' and that the 
     United States imposed sanctions on nine Chinese entities for 
     covered missile transfers to Iran.
       (5) A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that China 
     allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia in the 
     development of a ballistic missile facility, which if 
     confirmed, would violate the purpose of the MTCR and run 
     contrary to the longstanding United States policy priority to 
     prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the 
     Middle East.
       (6) The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 93-
     329) requires the President to sanction any foreign person or 
     government who knowingly ``exports, transfers, or otherwise 
     engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology'' to 
     a country that does not adhere to the MTCR.
       (7) China concluded two nuclear cooperation agreements with 
     Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, respectively, which may 
     facilitate China's bid to build two reactors in Saudi Arabia 
     to generate 2.9 Gigawatt-electric (GWe) of electricity.
       (8) On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed the alleged 
     existence of a previously undisclosed uranium yellowcake 
     extraction facility in Saudi Arabia allegedly constructed 
     with the assistance of China, which if confirmed, would 
     indicate significant progress by Saudi Arabia in developing 
     the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede 
     uranium enrichment.
       (9) Saudi Arabia's outdated Small Quantities Protocol and 
     its lack of an in force Additional Protocol to its 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive 
     Safeguards Agreement severely curtails IAEA inspections, 
     which has led the Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either 
     rescind or update its Small Quantities Protocol.
       (10) On January 19, 2021, in response to a question about 
     Saudi Arabia's reported ballistic missile cooperation with 
     China, incoming Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated 
     that ``we want to make sure that to the best of our ability 
     all of our partners and allies are living up to their 
     obligations under various nonproliferation and arms control 
     agreements and, certainly, in the case of Saudi Arabia that 
     is something we will want to look at''.
       (11) On March 15, 2018, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 
     Mohammad bin-Salman, stated that ``if Iran developed a 
     nuclear bomb, we would follow suit as soon as possible,''

[[Page S5346]]

     raising questions about whether a Saudi Arabian nuclear 
     program would remain exclusively peaceful, particularly in 
     the absence of robust international IAEA safeguards.
       (12) An August 9, 2019, study by the United Nations High 
     Commissioner for Human Rights found that the Saudi Arabia-led 
     military coalition airstrikes in Yemen and its restrictions 
     on the flow of humanitarian assistance to the country, both 
     of which have disproportionately impacted civilians, may be 
     violations of international humanitarian law.

     SEC. 1283. DETERMINATION OF POSSIBLE MTCR TRANSFERS TO SAUDI 
                   ARABIA.

       (a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress a written 
     determination, and any documentation to support that 
     determination detailing--
       (1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported, 
     transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under 
     Category I of the MTCR Annex item with Saudi Arabia in the 
     previous three fiscal years; and
       (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to 
     impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any 
     foreign person who knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, 
     or trade of that item or items.
       (b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding any provision of paragraphs 
     (3) through (7) of section 11(B)(b) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)), the President 
     may only waive the application of sanctions under such 
     section with respect to Saudi Arabia if that country is 
     verifiably determined to no longer possess an item designated 
     under Category I of the MTCR Annex received in the previous 
     three fiscal years.
       (c) Form of Report.--The determination required under 
     subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

     SEC. 1284. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO SAUDI 
                   ARABIA IF IT IMPORTS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT 
                   SAFEGUARDS.

       (a) In General.--The United States shall not sell, 
     transfer, or authorize licenses for export of any item 
     designated under Category III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United 
     States Munitions List pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) to Saudi 
     Arabia, other than ground-based missile defense systems, if 
     Saudi Arabia has, in the previous 3 fiscal years--
       (1) knowingly imported any item classified as ``plants for 
     the separation of isotopes of uranium'' or ``plants for the 
     reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements'' 
     under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export 
     licensing authority; or
       (2) engaged in nuclear cooperation related to the 
     construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or 
     activity that has not been notified to the IAEA and would be 
     subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was 
     in force.
       (b) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
     prohibition under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign 
     country if the Secretary submits to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a written certification that contains 
     a determination, and any relevant documentation on which the 
     determination is based, that Saudi Arabia--
       (1) has brought into force an Additional Protocol to the 
     IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement based on the model 
     described in IAEA INFCIRC/540;
       (2) has concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement 
     with the United States under section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or another supplier that 
     prohibits the enrichment of uranium or separation of 
     plutonium on its own territory; and
       (3) has rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol and is not 
     found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance 
     with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this subtitle shall 
     be construed as superseding the obligation of the President 
     under section 502B(a)(2) or section 620I(a) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. 2378-
     1(a)), respectively, to not furnish security assistance to 
     Saudi Arabia or any country if it--
       (1) engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
     internationally recognized human rights; or
       (2) prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or 
     indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States 
     humanitarian assistance.

     SEC. 1285. MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY.

       (a) In General.--Starting with the first report after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Director of 
     National Intelligence, shall provide the appropriate 
     committees of Congress, as an appendix to the Report on the 
     Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
     Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 
     a report on MTCR compliance and a United States strategy to 
     prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles in the 
     Middle East.
       (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following elements:
       (1) An assessment of China's compliance, in the previous 
     fiscal year, with its November 2000 commitment to abide by 
     the MTCR and United States diplomatic efforts to address non-
     compliance.
       (2) A description of every foreign person that, in the 
     previous fiscal year, engaged in the export, transfer, or 
     trade of MTCR items to a country that is a non-MTCR adherent, 
     and a description of the sanctions the President imposed 
     pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act 
     of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)).
       (3) A detailed strategy to prevent the proliferation of 
     ballistic missile and sensitive nuclear technology in the 
     Middle East and North Africa from China and other foreign 
     countries, including the following elements:
       (A) An assessment of the proliferation risks associated 
     with concluding or renewing a civilian nuclear cooperation 
     ``123'' agreement with any country in the Middle-East and 
     North Africa and the risks of such if that same equipment and 
     technology is sourced from a foreign state.
       (B) An update on United States bilateral and multilateral 
     diplomatic actions to commence negotiations on a Weapons of 
     Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) since the 2015 Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference.
       (C) A description of United States Government efforts to 
     achieve global adherence and compliance with the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group, MTCR, and the 2002 International Code of 
     Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation guidelines.
       (4) An account of the briefings to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress in the reporting period detailing 
     negotiations on any new or renewed civilian nuclear 
     cooperation ``123'' agreement with any country consistent 
     with the intent of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2011 et seq.).
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

     SEC. 1286. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representative; and
       (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person'' 
     and `` `person' '' mean--
       (A) a natural person that is an alien;
       (B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
     organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a 
     foreign country or has its principal place of business in a 
     foreign country;
       (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business 
     enterprise; and
       (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity 
     described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
       (3) Middle east and north africa.--The term ``Middle East 
     and North Africa'' means those countries that are included in 
     the Area of Responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Near Eastern Affairs.
                                 ______