[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 157 (Wednesday, September 28, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5342-S5344]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 5877. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr. Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe)
and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 7900, to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military activities of the
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was
ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1531. REDUCTIONS IN SPENDING ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
PROHIBITION ON PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF
LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WARHEADS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States continues to maintain an excessively
large and costly arsenal of nuclear delivery systems and
warheads that are a holdover from the Cold War.
(2) The current nuclear arsenal of the United States
includes approximately 3,800 total nuclear warheads in its
military stockpile, of which approximately 1,750 are deployed
with five delivery components: land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear
gravity bombs, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed
with nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, and short-
range fighter aircraft that can deliver nuclear gravity
bombs. The strategic bomber fleet of the United States
comprises 87 B-52 and 20 B-2 aircraft, over 60 of which
contribute to the nuclear mission. The United States also
maintains 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 14
Ohio-class submarines, up to 12 of which are deployed. Each
of those submarines is armed with approximately 90 nuclear
warheads.
(3) Between fiscal years 2021 and 2030, the United States
will spend an estimated $634,000,000,000 to maintain and
recapitalize its nuclear force, according to a January 2019
estimate from the Congressional Budget Office, an increase of
$140,000,000,000 from the Congressional Budget Office's 2019
estimate, with 36 percent of that additional cost stemming
``mainly from new plans for modernizing [the Department of
Energy's] production facilities and from [the Department of
Defense's] modernization programs moving more fully into
production''.
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(4) Adjusted for inflation, the Congressional Budget Office
estimates that the United States will spend
$1,700,000,000,000 through fiscal year 2046 on new nuclear
weapons and modernization and infrastructure programs.
(5) Inaccurate budget forecasting is likely to continue to
plague the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy, as evidenced by the fiscal year 2021 budget request
of the President for the National Nuclear Security
Administration ``Weapon Activities'' account, which far
exceeded what the National Nuclear Security Administration
had projected in its fiscal year 2020 request and what it had
projected in previous years.
(6) The projected growth in nuclear weapons spending is
coming due as the Department of Defense is seeking to replace
large portions of its conventional forces to better compete
with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of
China and as internal and external fiscal pressures are
likely to limit the growth of, and perhaps reduce, military
spending. As then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Dave
Goldfein said in 2020, ``I think a debate is that this will
be the first time that the nation has tried to simultaneously
modernize the nuclear enterprise while it's trying to
modernize an aging conventional enterprise. The current
budget does not allow you to do both.''.
(7) In 2017, the Government Accountability Office concluded
that National Nuclear Security Administration's budget
forecasts for out-year spending downplayed the fact that the
agency lacked the resources to complete multiple,
simultaneous billion dollar modernization projects and
recommended that the National Nuclear Security Administration
consider ``deferring the start of or cancelling specific
modernization programs''.
(8) According to the Government Accountability Office, the
National Nuclear Security Administration has still not
factored affordability concerns into its planning as was
recommended by the Government Accountability Office in 2017,
with the warning that ``it is essential for NNSA to present
information to Congress and other key decision maker
indicating whether the agency has prioritized certain
modernization programs or considered trade-offs (such as
deferring or cancelling specific modernization programs)''.
(9) A December 2020 Congressional Budget Office analysis
showed that the projected costs of nuclear forces over the
next decade can be reduced by $12,400,000,000 to
$13,600,000,000 by trimming back current plans, while still
maintaining a triad of delivery systems. Even larger savings
would accrue over the subsequent decade.
(10) The Department of Defense's June 2013 nuclear policy
guidance entitled ``Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of
the United States'' found that force levels under the April
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United
States and the Russian Federation (commonly known as the
``New START Treaty'') ``are more than adequate for what the
United States needs to fulfill its national security
objectives'' and can be reduced by up to \1/3\ below levels
under the New START Treaty to 1,000 to 1,100 warheads.
(11) Former President Trump expanded the role of, and
spending on, nuclear weapons in United States policy at the
same time that he withdrew from, unsigned, or otherwise
terminated a series of important arms control and
nonproliferation agreements.
(b) Reductions in Nuclear Forces.--
(1) Reduction of nuclear-armed submarines.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to
be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of
Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than
eight Columbia-class submarines.
(2) Reduction of ground-based missiles.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2023,
the forces of the Air Force shall include not more than 150
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(3) Reduction of deployed strategic warheads.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in
fiscal year 2023, the forces of the United States Military
shall include not more than 1,000 deployed strategic
warheads, as that term is defined in the New START Treaty.
(4) Limitation on new long-range penetrating bomber
aircraft.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for any of fiscal years 2023 through 2028 for the
Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for
purchasing more than 80 B-21 long-range penetrating bomber
aircraft.
(5) Prohibition on f-35 nuclear mission.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to
be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of
Defense or the Department of Energy may be used to make the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of carrying
nuclear weapons.
(6) Prohibition on new air-launched cruise missile.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the research, development, test,
and evaluation or procurement of the long-range stand-off
weapon or any other new air-launched cruise missile or for
the W80 warhead life extension program.
(7) Prohibition on new intercontinental ballistic
missile.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of
the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended
for the research, development, test, and evaluation or
procurement of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system, previously
known as the ground-based strategic deterrent, or any new
intercontinental ballistic missile.
(8) Termination of uranium processing facility.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the Uranium Processing Facility
located at the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.
(9) Prohibition on procurement and deployment of new low-
yield warhead.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year
thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of
Energy may be obligated or expended to deploy the W76-2 low-
yield nuclear warhead or any other low-yield or nonstrategic
nuclear warhead.
(10) Prohibition on new submarine-launched cruise
missile.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of
the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may
be obligated or expended for the research, development, test,
and evaluation or procurement of a new submarine-launched
cruise missile capable of carrying a low-yield or
nonstrategic nuclear warhead.
(11) Limitation on plutonium pit production.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for achieving production of more than
30 plutonium pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, New Mexico.
(12) Limitation on w87-1 warhead procurement and
deployment.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may
be obligated or expended for the procurement or deployment of
the W87-1 warhead for use on any missile that can feasibly
employ a W87 warhead.
(13) Limitation on sustainment of b83-1 bomb.--
Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the sustainment of the B83-1 bomb
beyond the time at which confidence in the B61-12 stockpile
is gained.
(14) Prohibition on space-based missile defense.--
Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2023 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be
obligated or expended for the research, development, test,
and evaluation or procurement of a space-based missile
defense system.
(15) Prohibition on the w-93 warhead.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2023
or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense
or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for
the procurement and deployment of a W-93 warhead on a
submarine launched ballistic missile.
(c) Reports Required.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the
plan of each Secretary to carry out subsection (b).
(2) Annual report.--Not later than March 1, 2023, and
annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each
Secretary to carry out subsection (b), including any updates
to previously submitted reports.
(3) Annual nuclear weapons accounting.--Not later than
September 30, 2023, and annually thereafter, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report containing a comprehensive accounting by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget of the amounts
obligated and expended by the Federal Government for each
nuclear weapon and related nuclear program during--
(A) the fiscal year covered by the report; and
(B) the life cycle of such weapon or program.
(4) Cost estimate report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense and the
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Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report outlining the estimated cost
savings that result from carrying out subsection (b).
(5) Report on funding national defense strategy.--Not later
than 180 days after the publication of the unclassified
National Defense Strategy under section 113(g) of title 10,
United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report explaining
how the Secretary proposes to fund the National Defense
Strategy under different levels of projected defense
spending, including scenarios in which--
(A) anticipated cost savings from reform do not
materialize; or
(B) defense spending decreases to the levels specified by
the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Public Law 112-25; 125 Stat.
240).
(6) Modification of period to be covered by estimates of
costs relating to nuclear weapons.--Section 492a of title 10,
United States Code, is amended in subsections (a)(2)(F) and
(b)(1)(A) by striking ``10-year period'' each place it
appears and inserting ``25-year period''.
(7) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on
Natural Resources of the House of Representatives.
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