[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 157 (Wednesday, September 28, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5324-S5326]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 5844. Mr. GRAHAM (for himself and Mr. Menendez) submitted an
amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr.
Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) and intended to be proposed to the
bill H.R. 7900, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1550. IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY MONITORING ACT OF
2022.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Iran
Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran
established the AMAD Project with the intent to manufacture 5
nuclear weapons and prepare an underground nuclear test site.
(2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing
serious threats to the security interests of the United
States, Israel, and other allies and partners.
(3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, Iran,
were revealed to the public by the National Council of
Resistance of Iran.
(4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran
announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to
a level close to 3.5 percent at the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.
(5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed
sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for
its failure to suspend enrichment activities.
(6) The United Nations Security Council subsequently
adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929
(2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of and
imposed additional sanctions with respect to the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
(7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran
announced that it had launched its first satellite, which
raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the
ballistic missile program.
(8) In September 2009, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran, years after
construction started on the plant.
(9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly had
enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent.
(10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran
launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic
missile.
(11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran
conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which
traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the Islamic
Republic of Iran the capability to threaten military
installations of the United States in the Middle East.
(12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the
nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs
relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design,
development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of
Iran, including such efforts occurring after 2003.
(13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence
of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material in the
Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the
warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency detected
radioactive particles, which the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.
(14) On June 19, 2020, the International Atomic Energy
Agency adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing ``serious
concern. . . that Iran has not provided access to the Agency
under the Additional Protocol to two locations''.
(15) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile struck an Iraqi
military base where members of the United States Armed Forces
were stationed, resulting in 11 of such members being treated
for injuries.
(16) On April 17, 2021, the International Atomic Energy
Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun
to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity.
(17) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani
stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich
uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our
reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent
purity''.
(18) According to the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has ``between six and
eight liquid-fuel ballistic missiles and up to 12 solid-fuel
systems'' as of 2021.
(19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran
completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war game that included
conventional navy, army, air force, and air defense forces
testing cruise missiles, torpedoes, and suicide drones in the
Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the
Indian Ocean.
(20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran
commenced a 5-day drill in which it launched a number of
short- and long-range ballistic missiles that it claimed
could destroy Israel, constituting an escalation in the
already genocidal rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran
toward Israel.
(21) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels, backed by the
Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 missiles at Al Dhafra Air
Base in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts around 2,000
members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
(22) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air interceptors of
the United Arab Emirates shot down a Houthi missile fired at
the United Arab Emirates during a visit by President of
Israel Isaac Herzog, the first-ever visit of an Israeli
President to the United Arab Emirates.
(23) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile, named ``Kheibar
Shekan'', which has a reported range of 900 miles (1450
kilometers) and is capable of penetrating missile shields.
(24) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which struck near a
consulate building of the United States.
(25) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
confirmed the relocation of a production facility for
advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj,
Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex.
(26) On April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a
report stating that there are ``serious concerns'' about
``possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran''.
(27) On May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy
Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had
achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5
pounds, of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough
material for a nuclear weapon.
(28) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned
off surveillance cameras installed by the International
Atomic Energy Agency to monitor uranium enrichment activities
at nuclear sites in the country.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
[[Page S5325]]
(1) the Department of State has used evidence of the intent
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program
to secure the support of the international community in
passing and implementing United Nations Security Council
Resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence of the
intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear
program, with direct evidence of an active nuclear weapons
program prior to 2003;
(3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear
weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national
security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and
partners;
(4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than
cooperative with international inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their
ability to inspect numerous nuclear facilities across Iran;
(5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance its
nuclear weapons and missile programs, which are a threat to
the national security of the United States, Israel, and other
allies and partners; and
(6) all possible action should be taken by the United
States--
(A) to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not
develop a nuclear weapons capability; and
(B) to protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic
of Iran manifested in its missiles program.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Comprehensive safeguards agreement.--The term
``Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.
(3) Task force.--The term ``task force'' means the task
force established under subsection (e).
(4) Unmanned aircraft system.--The term ``unmanned aircraft
system'' has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of
title 49, United States Code.
(e) Establishment of Interagency Task Force on Nuclear
Activity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish
a task force to consolidate and synthesize efforts by the
United States Government to monitor and assess nuclear
weapons activity being carried out by the Islamic Republic of
Iran or its proxies.
(2) Composition.--
(A) Chairperson.--The Secretary of State shall be the
Chairperson of the task force.
(B) Membership.--
(i) In general.--The task force shall be composed of
individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of and
appointed to the task force by the head of one of the
following agencies:
(I) The Department of State.
(II) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(III) The Department of Defense.
(IV) The Department of Energy.
(V) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(ii) Additional members.--The Chairperson may appoint to
the task force additional individuals from other Federal
agencies, as the Chairperson considers necessary.
(f) Reports to Congress.--
(1) Report on nuclear activity.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter
until December 31, 2028, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the task force, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on nuclear
activity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(B) Contents.--The report required by subparagraph (A)
shall include--
(i) a description and location of current fuel cycle
activities for the production of fissile material being
undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--
(I) research and development activities to procure or
construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model
centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable
isotopes;
(II) research and development of reprocessing capabilities,
including--
(aa) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
(bb) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium
targets;
(III) activities with respect to designing or constructing
reactors, including--
(aa) the construction of heavy water reactors;
(bb) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components,
including the intended application of such components; and
(cc) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;
(IV) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel
fabrication, including--
(aa) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual
recovery;
(bb) recovery processes and ore concentrate production
capacity and annual recovery;
(cc) research and development with respect to, and the
annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
(dd) research and development with respect to the
fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted,
natural, and enriched uranium; and
(V) activities with respect to--
(aa) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their
alloys);
(bb) conducting research and development on plutonium or
uranium (or their alloys);
(cc) uranium metal; or
(dd) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;
(ii) with respect to any activity described in clause (i),
a description, as applicable, of--
(I) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich
uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;
(II) the number and location of any enrichment or
associated research and development facility used to engage
in such activity;
(III) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced
by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major
reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent
reports, the amount produced since the last report;
(IV) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the
Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected
assemblies; and
(V) the total amount of--
(aa) uranium-235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent
purity;
(bb) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity
and not greater than 20 percent purity ;
(cc) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity
and not greater than 60 percent purity;
(dd) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity
and not greater than 90 percent purity; and
(ee) uranium-235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
(iii) a description of weaponization plans and capabilities
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--
(I) plans and capabilities with respect to--
(aa) weapon design, including fission, warhead
miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon
design;
(bb) high yield fission development;
(cc) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer
models to simulate nuclear explosive devices; and
(dd) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use
of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized
materials for explosively driven neutron sources;
(II) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy
a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a
nuclear warhead;
(III) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic
of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a
crude nuclear weapon;
(IV) the status and location of any research and
development work site related to the preparation of an
underground nuclear test; and
(V) any dual-use item (as defined under section 730.3 of
title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or listed on the List
of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software,
and Related Technology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
or any successor list) the Islamic Republic of Iran is using
to further the nuclear weapon or missile program;
(iv) an identification of clandestine nuclear facilities,
including nuclear facilities and activities discovered or
reported by Israel or other allies or partners of the United
States;
(v) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran--
(I) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; and
(II) has denied access to sites that the International
Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during the period
covered by the report;
(vi) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of
uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an
undeclared or clandestine facility;
(vii) an assessment of activities related to nuclear
weapons conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry of
Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive
Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in
knowledge due to the lack of inspections and nontransparency
of such facilities;
(viii) a description of activities between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and other countries, including the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or persons with
respect to sharing information on nuclear weapons or
activities related to weaponization;
(ix) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or
hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the Islamic
Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a description of--
(I) the type of missile;
(II) the range of such missiles;
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(III) the capability of such missiles to deliver a nuclear
warhead;
(IV) the number of such missiles; and
(V) any testing of such missiles;
(x) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran
or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned aircraft system
or other military equipment capable of delivering a nuclear
weapon;
(xi) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran
or any of its proxies has engaged in new or evolving nuclear
weapons development activities that would pose a threat to
the national security of the United States, Israel, or other
partners or allies; and
(xii) any other information that the task force determines
is necessary to ensure a complete understanding of the
nuclear or other weapons activities of the Islamic Republic
of Iran.
(C) Form; public availability.--
(i) Form.--Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex for information that, if released, would be
detrimental to the national security of the United States.
(ii) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of a
report required by subparagraph (A) shall be made available
to the public on an internet website of the Department of
State.
(2) Immediate report required.--If the task force receives
credible intelligence of a significant development in the
nuclear weapons capabilities or delivery systems capabilities
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which if not reported before
the delivery of the next report under paragraph (1)(A) would
be detrimental to the national security of the United States,
Israel, or other allies or partners, the task force shall,
within 72 hours of the receipt of such intelligence, submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such
development.
(g) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Identified Nuclear and
Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
submission of the initial report under subsection (f)(1), and
annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic
strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging with
partners and allies of the United States regarding the
nuclear weapons and missile activities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
(2) Contents.--The diplomatic strategy required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a description of efforts of the United States to
counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project
political and military influence into the Middle East;
(B) a response by the Secretary of State to the increased
threat that new or evolving nuclear weapons or missile
development activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose
to United States citizens and the diplomatic presence of the
United States in the Middle East;
(C) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government
approach to use political, economic, and security related
tools to address such activities; and
(D) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and
regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to
address such activities.
(3) Updated strategy related to immediate reports.--Not
later than 15 days after the submission of report under
subsection (f)(2), the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an update to the most
recent diplomatic strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
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