[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 157 (Wednesday, September 28, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5324-S5326]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 5844. Mr. GRAHAM (for himself and Mr. Menendez) submitted an 
amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr. 
Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) and intended to be proposed to the 
bill H.R. 7900, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for 
military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1550. IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY MONITORING ACT OF 
                   2022.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Iran 
     Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     established the AMAD Project with the intent to manufacture 5 
     nuclear weapons and prepare an underground nuclear test site.
       (2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
     advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing 
     serious threats to the security interests of the United 
     States, Israel, and other allies and partners.
       (3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, Iran, 
     were revealed to the public by the National Council of 
     Resistance of Iran.
       (4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to 
     a level close to 3.5 percent at the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.
       (5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security 
     Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed 
     sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for 
     its failure to suspend enrichment activities.
       (6) The United Nations Security Council subsequently 
     adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 
     (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of and 
     imposed additional sanctions with respect to the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran.
       (7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     announced that it had launched its first satellite, which 
     raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the 
     ballistic missile program.
       (8) In September 2009, the United States, the United 
     Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine 
     Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran, years after 
     construction started on the plant.
       (9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly had 
     enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent.
       (10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic 
     missile.
       (11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which 
     traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran the capability to threaten military 
     installations of the United States in the Middle East.
       (12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the 
     nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which 
     contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs 
     relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, 
     development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran, including such efforts occurring after 2003.
       (13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence 
     of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material in the 
     Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the 
     warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency detected 
     radioactive particles, which the Government of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.
       (14) On June 19, 2020, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing ``serious 
     concern. . . that Iran has not provided access to the Agency 
     under the Additional Protocol to two locations''.
       (15) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile struck an Iraqi 
     military base where members of the United States Armed Forces 
     were stationed, resulting in 11 of such members being treated 
     for injuries.
       (16) On April 17, 2021, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun 
     to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity.
       (17) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani 
     stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich 
     uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our 
     reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent 
     purity''.
       (18) According to the International Institute for Strategic 
     Studies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has ``between six and 
     eight liquid-fuel ballistic missiles and up to 12 solid-fuel 
     systems'' as of 2021.
       (19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war game that included 
     conventional navy, army, air force, and air defense forces 
     testing cruise missiles, torpedoes, and suicide drones in the 
     Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the 
     Indian Ocean.
       (20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     commenced a 5-day drill in which it launched a number of 
     short- and long-range ballistic missiles that it claimed 
     could destroy Israel, constituting an escalation in the 
     already genocidal rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     toward Israel.
       (21) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels, backed by the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 missiles at Al Dhafra Air 
     Base in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 
     members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
       (22) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air interceptors of 
     the United Arab Emirates shot down a Houthi missile fired at 
     the United Arab Emirates during a visit by President of 
     Israel Isaac Herzog, the first-ever visit of an Israeli 
     President to the United Arab Emirates.
       (23) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile, named ``Kheibar 
     Shekan'', which has a reported range of 900 miles (1450 
     kilometers) and is capable of penetrating missile shields.
       (24) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which struck near a 
     consulate building of the United States.
       (25) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     confirmed the relocation of a production facility for 
     advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, 
     Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex.
       (26) On April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a 
     report stating that there are ``serious concerns'' about 
     ``possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
     Iran''.
       (27) On May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had 
     achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 
     pounds, of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough 
     material for a nuclear weapon.
       (28) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned 
     off surveillance cameras installed by the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency to monitor uranium enrichment activities 
     at nuclear sites in the country.
       (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

[[Page S5325]]

       (1) the Department of State has used evidence of the intent 
     of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program 
     to secure the support of the international community in 
     passing and implementing United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;
       (2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence of the 
     intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear 
     program, with direct evidence of an active nuclear weapons 
     program prior to 2003;
       (3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear 
     weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national 
     security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and 
     partners;
       (4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than 
     cooperative with international inspectors from the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their 
     ability to inspect numerous nuclear facilities across Iran;
       (5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance its 
     nuclear weapons and missile programs, which are a threat to 
     the national security of the United States, Israel, and other 
     allies and partners; and
       (6) all possible action should be taken by the United 
     States--
       (A) to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not 
     develop a nuclear weapons capability; and
       (B) to protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran manifested in its missiles program.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Comprehensive safeguards agreement.--The term 
     ``Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement 
     between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in 
     Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
     Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.
       (3) Task force.--The term ``task force'' means the task 
     force established under subsection (e).
       (4) Unmanned aircraft system.--The term ``unmanned aircraft 
     system'' has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of 
     title 49, United States Code.
       (e) Establishment of Interagency Task Force on Nuclear 
     Activity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.--
       (1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
     a task force to consolidate and synthesize efforts by the 
     United States Government to monitor and assess nuclear 
     weapons activity being carried out by the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran or its proxies.
       (2) Composition.--
       (A) Chairperson.--The Secretary of State shall be the 
     Chairperson of the task force.
       (B) Membership.--
       (i) In general.--The task force shall be composed of 
     individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of and 
     appointed to the task force by the head of one of the 
     following agencies:

       (I) The Department of State.
       (II) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (III) The Department of Defense.
       (IV) The Department of Energy.
       (V) The Central Intelligence Agency.

       (ii) Additional members.--The Chairperson may appoint to 
     the task force additional individuals from other Federal 
     agencies, as the Chairperson considers necessary.
       (f) Reports to Congress.--
       (1) Report on nuclear activity.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until December 31, 2028, the Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the task force, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on nuclear 
     activity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
       (B) Contents.--The report required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall include--
       (i) a description and location of current fuel cycle 
     activities for the production of fissile material being 
     undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--

       (I) research and development activities to procure or 
     construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model 
     centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable 
     isotopes;
       (II) research and development of reprocessing capabilities, 
     including--

       (aa) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
       (bb) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium 
     targets;

       (III) activities with respect to designing or constructing 
     reactors, including--

       (aa) the construction of heavy water reactors;
       (bb) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components, 
     including the intended application of such components; and
       (cc) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;

       (IV) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel 
     fabrication, including--

       (aa) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual 
     recovery;
       (bb) recovery processes and ore concentrate production 
     capacity and annual recovery;
       (cc) research and development with respect to, and the 
     annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
       (dd) research and development with respect to the 
     fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted, 
     natural, and enriched uranium; and

       (V) activities with respect to--

       (aa) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their 
     alloys);
       (bb) conducting research and development on plutonium or 
     uranium (or their alloys);
       (cc) uranium metal; or
       (dd) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;
       (ii) with respect to any activity described in clause (i), 
     a description, as applicable, of--

       (I) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich 
     uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;
       (II) the number and location of any enrichment or 
     associated research and development facility used to engage 
     in such activity;
       (III) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced 
     by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major 
     reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent 
     reports, the amount produced since the last report;
       (IV) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected 
     assemblies; and
       (V) the total amount of--

       (aa) uranium-235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent 
     purity;
       (bb) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity 
     and not greater than 20 percent purity ;
       (cc) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity 
     and not greater than 60 percent purity;
       (dd) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity 
     and not greater than 90 percent purity; and
       (ee) uranium-235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
       (iii) a description of weaponization plans and capabilities 
     of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--

       (I) plans and capabilities with respect to--

       (aa) weapon design, including fission, warhead 
     miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon 
     design;
       (bb) high yield fission development;
       (cc) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer 
     models to simulate nuclear explosive devices; and
       (dd) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use 
     of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized 
     materials for explosively driven neutron sources;

       (II) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy 
     a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a 
     nuclear warhead;
       (III) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a 
     crude nuclear weapon;
       (IV) the status and location of any research and 
     development work site related to the preparation of an 
     underground nuclear test; and
       (V) any dual-use item (as defined under section 730.3 of 
     title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or listed on the List 
     of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, 
     and Related Technology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     or any successor list) the Islamic Republic of Iran is using 
     to further the nuclear weapon or missile program;

       (iv) an identification of clandestine nuclear facilities, 
     including nuclear facilities and activities discovered or 
     reported by Israel or other allies or partners of the United 
     States;
       (v) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran--

       (I) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards 
     Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary 
     Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; and
       (II) has denied access to sites that the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during the period 
     covered by the report;

       (vi) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of 
     uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an 
     undeclared or clandestine facility;
       (vii) an assessment of activities related to nuclear 
     weapons conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry of 
     Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive 
     Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in 
     knowledge due to the lack of inspections and nontransparency 
     of such facilities;
       (viii) a description of activities between the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran and other countries, including the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or persons with 
     respect to sharing information on nuclear weapons or 
     activities related to weaponization;
       (ix) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or 
     hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a description of--

       (I) the type of missile;
       (II) the range of such missiles;

[[Page S5326]]

       (III) the capability of such missiles to deliver a nuclear 
     warhead;
       (IV) the number of such missiles; and
       (V) any testing of such missiles;

       (x) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned aircraft system 
     or other military equipment capable of delivering a nuclear 
     weapon;
       (xi) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     or any of its proxies has engaged in new or evolving nuclear 
     weapons development activities that would pose a threat to 
     the national security of the United States, Israel, or other 
     partners or allies; and
       (xii) any other information that the task force determines 
     is necessary to ensure a complete understanding of the 
     nuclear or other weapons activities of the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran.
       (C) Form; public availability.--
       (i) Form.--Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex for information that, if released, would be 
     detrimental to the national security of the United States.
       (ii) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of a 
     report required by subparagraph (A) shall be made available 
     to the public on an internet website of the Department of 
     State.
       (2) Immediate report required.--If the task force receives 
     credible intelligence of a significant development in the 
     nuclear weapons capabilities or delivery systems capabilities 
     of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which if not reported before 
     the delivery of the next report under paragraph (1)(A) would 
     be detrimental to the national security of the United States, 
     Israel, or other allies or partners, the task force shall, 
     within 72 hours of the receipt of such intelligence, submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such 
     development.
       (g) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Identified Nuclear and 
     Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     submission of the initial report under subsection (f)(1), and 
     annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic 
     strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging with 
     partners and allies of the United States regarding the 
     nuclear weapons and missile activities of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran.
       (2) Contents.--The diplomatic strategy required by 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) a description of efforts of the United States to 
     counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project 
     political and military influence into the Middle East;
       (B) a response by the Secretary of State to the increased 
     threat that new or evolving nuclear weapons or missile 
     development activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose 
     to United States citizens and the diplomatic presence of the 
     United States in the Middle East;
       (C) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government 
     approach to use political, economic, and security related 
     tools to address such activities; and
       (D) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and 
     regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to 
     address such activities.
       (3) Updated strategy related to immediate reports.--Not 
     later than 15 days after the submission of report under 
     subsection (f)(2), the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an update to the most 
     recent diplomatic strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
                                 ______