[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 157 (Wednesday, September 28, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Page S5244]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 5758. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr. Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe)
and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 7900, to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military activities of the
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was
ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1254. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE
FUND.
(a) Countering the People's Republic of China Malign
Influence Fund.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 for
the Countering the People's Republic of China Malign
Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese
Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to
this authorization are authorized to remain available until
expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise
authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.
(b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds
appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the
malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally
shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent
with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
(1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
existing senior official of the Department of State at the
rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy
guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of
funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific
strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of
focus or functional categories of programming that funds are
to be concentrated within, consistent with the national
interests of the United States and the purposes of this
section;
(B) the coordination and approval of all programming
conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by
subsection (a), based on a determination that such
programming directly counters the malign influence of the
Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or
policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to
the strategic objectives of the United States, as established
in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional
strategies as appropriate;
(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a
sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese
Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to
the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and
(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the
effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure
that it advances United States interests and degrades the
ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities
that align with subsection (d) of this section.
(3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official
designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating
and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek--
(A) to conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and
(B) to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all
approved programming functions in concert with other Federal
activities to counter the malign influence and activities of
the Chinese Communist Party.
(4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development shall designate a
senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or
above to assist and consult with the senior official
designated pursuant to paragraph (1).
(d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign
influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party shall
be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese
Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that--
(1) undermine a free and open international order;
(2) advance an alternative, repressive international order
that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic
ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;
(3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the
United States or other countries; or
(4) undermine the economic security of the United States or
other countries, including by promoting corruption and
advancing coercive economic practices.
(e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section,
countering malign influence through the use of funds
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include
efforts--
(1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce
corruption, including in governance structures targeted by
the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;
(2) to support civil society and independent media to raise
awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative
impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative,
associated initiatives, other economic initiatives with
strategic or political purposes, and coercive economic
practices;
(3) to counter transnational criminal networks that
benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese
Communist Party;
(4) to encourage economic development structures that help
protect against predatory lending schemes, including support
for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such
as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
(5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to
the security forces of the People's Republic of China;
(6) to expose misinformation and disinformation of the
Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, including through
programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and
(7) to counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to
legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance
models.
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