[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 153 (Thursday, September 22, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4986-S4988]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 5592. Mr. HAWLEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to 
amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr. Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) 
and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 7900, to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military activities of the 
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel 
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was 
ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1254. ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Department of Defense has warned that the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China may conclude 
     that it can successfully invade and seize control of Taiwan 
     in the latter half of the 2020s.
       (2) In October 2021, the Minister of National Defense of 
     Taiwan, Chiu Kuo-cheng, echoed these warnings when he stated 
     that the People's Republic of China--
       (A) ``is capable now'' of invading Taiwan; and
       (B) will have ``lowered the costs and losses'' associated 
     with invading Taiwan ``to a minimum'' after 2025.
       (3) If the People's Republic of China were to invade and 
     seize control of Taiwan, it would deal a severe blow to 
     United States interests by--
       (A) destroying one of the world's leading democracies;
       (B) casting doubt on the ability and resolve of the United 
     States to uphold its security commitments;
       (C) incentivizing other countries in the Indo-Pacific 
     region to bandwagon with the People's Republic of China; and
       (D) facilitating the formation of a regional order 
     dominated by the People's Republic of China in which the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China may--
       (i) regulate or otherwise limit the ability of individuals 
     in the United States to trade in the Indo-Pacific region, 
     which would have dire effects on the livelihoods and freedoms 
     of such individuals; and
       (ii) use the Indo-Pacific region as a secure base from 
     which to project military power into other regions, including 
     the Western Hemisphere.
       (4) Taiwan's proximity to the People's Republic of China, 
     coupled with investments by the People's Republic of China in 
     capabilities designed to delay intervention by the United 
     States Armed Forces in support of Taiwan, means that Taiwan 
     may be forced to delay, degrade, and deny an invasion by the 
     People's Republic of China with limited support from the 
     United States Armed Forces for the initial days, weeks, or 
     months of such an invasion.
       (5) If Taiwan is unable to delay, degrade, and deny an 
     invasion by the People's Republic of China with limited 
     support from the United States Armed Forces, especially in 
     the initial period of war, then the People's Republic of 
     China may conclude that it is, or may actually be, capable 
     of--
       (A) invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the 
     United States or any other partner country of Taiwan is able 
     to respond effectively, thereby achieving a fait accompli; 
     and
       (B) potentially rendering any attempt by the United States 
     or any other partner country of Taiwan to reverse territorial 
     gains by the People's Republic of China prohibitively 
     difficult, costly, or both.
       (6) To defend itself effectively, especially in the initial 
     period of war, it is imperative that Taiwan accelerate 
     deployment of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense 
     capabilities, including mobile coastal and air defenses, 
     naval mines, missile boats, man-portable anti-armor weapons, 
     civil defense forces, and their enablers.
       (7) The deployment of such asymmetric defense capabilities 
     by Taiwan would not only improve the ability of Taiwan to 
     defend itself, but also reduce operational risk to members of 
     the United States Armed Forces under a Taiwan contingency.
       (8) The President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, has--
       (A) vowed to bolster the national defense of Taiwan and 
     demonstrate Taiwan's determination to defend itself so as to 
     ensure that Taiwan will not be forced to take the path that 
     the People's Republic of China has laid out for Taiwan; and
       (B) advocated the deployment of asymmetric defense 
     capabilities.
       (9) The Government of Taiwan has begun taking steps to 
     improve Taiwan's defenses, including by increasing Taiwan's 
     defense budget and through Taiwan's new proposed special 
     defense budget, but far more is needed, and quickly, to 
     ensure that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-
     defense capability.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the threat of an invasion of Taiwan by the People's 
     Republic of China is increasing rapidly and expected to reach 
     especially dangerous levels by the latter half of the 2020s;
       (2) the United States has a strong interest in preventing 
     the People's Republic of China from invading and seizing 
     control of Taiwan, especially by ensuring that Taiwan is able 
     to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
       (3) the United States should establish a security 
     assistance initiative so as to accelerate, to the greatest 
     extent possible, Taiwan's deployment of cost-effective and 
     resilient asymmetric defense capabilities;
       (4) the United States should provide such assistance on the 
     condition that Taiwan--
       (A) matches investments by the United States in its 
     asymmetric defense capabilities;
       (B) increases its defense spending to a level commensurate 
     with the threat it faces;
       (C) prioritizes acquiring cost-effective and resilient 
     asymmetric defense capabilities as rapidly as possible, 
     including from foreign suppliers, if necessary; and
       (D) demonstrates progress on defense reforms required to 
     maximize the effectiveness of its asymmetric defenses, with 
     special regard to Taiwan's reserve forces; and
       (5) in the course of executing such a security assistance 
     initiative, the United States should--
       (A) seek to co-produce or co-develop cost-effective and 
     resilient asymmetric defense capabilities with suppliers in 
     Taiwan, including by providing incentives to that effect, so 
     long as those suppliers can produce such capabilities at a 
     reasonable cost, in the quantities required, as rapidly, and 
     to the same quality and technical standards as suppliers in 
     the United States or other countries; and
       (B) encourage other countries, particularly United States 
     allies and partners, to sell, lease, or otherwise provide 
     appropriate asymmetric defense capabilities to Taiwan so as 
     to facilitate Taiwan's rapid deployment of the asymmetric 
     defense capabilities required to deter or, if necessary, 
     defeat an invasion by the People's Republic of China.
       (c) Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish 
     an initiative, to be known as the ``Taiwan Security 
     Assistance Initiative'' (referred to in this subsection as 
     the ``Initiative''), to accelerate Taiwan's deployment of 
     asymmetric defense capabilities required to deter or, if 
     necessary, defeat an invasion by the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $3,000,000,000 for the Department of 
     Defense for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 to provide 
     assistance to the Government of Taiwan under this subsection.
       (3) Authority to provide assistance.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
     with the Secretary of State, shall use the funds authorized 
     to be appropriated under subsection (b) to provide assistance 
     to the Government of Taiwan for the purpose described in 
     paragraph (4).
       (4) Purpose.--The purpose of the Initiative is to provide 
     assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, 
     to the Government of Taiwan so as to accelerate Taiwan's 
     deployment of asymmetric defense capabilities required to 
     achieve, with limited support from the United States Armed 
     Forces for the initial days, weeks, or months after the 
     initiation of an invasion by the People's Republic of China 
     of Taiwan, the following objectives:
       (A) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's 
     Liberation Army forces to enter

[[Page S4987]]

     or transit the Taiwan Strait and adjoining seas.
       (B) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's 
     Liberation Army forces to secure a lodgment on Taiwan and 
     expand or otherwise use that lodgment to seize control of a 
     population center or other key territory in Taiwan.
       (C) To prevent the People's Republic of China from 
     decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing 
     or rendering ineffective the Government of Taiwan.
       (5) Asymmetric defense capabilities.--In this section, the 
     term ``asymmetric defense capabilities'' includes, in such 
     quantities as the Secretary of Defense determines to be 
     necessary to achieve the purpose specified in paragraph (4), 
     the following:
       (A) Mobile, ground-based coastal defense cruise missiles 
     and launchers.
       (B) Mobile, ground-based short-range and medium-range air 
     defense systems.
       (C) Smart, self-propelled naval mines and coastal 
     minelaying platforms.
       (D) Missile boats and fast-attack craft equipped with anti-
     ship and anti-landing craft missiles.
       (E) Unmanned aerial and other mobile, resilient 
     surveillance systems to support coastal and air defense 
     operations.
       (F) Equipment to support target location, tracking, 
     identification, and targeting, especially at the local level, 
     in communications degraded or denied environments.
       (G) Man-portable anti-armor weapons, mortars, and small 
     arms for ground combat operations.
       (H) Equipment and technical assistance for the purpose of 
     developing civil defense forces, composed of civilian 
     volunteers and militia.
       (I) Training and equipment, including appropriate war 
     reserves, required for Taiwan forces to independently 
     maintain, sustain, and employ capabilities described in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (H).
       (J) Concept development for coastal defense, air defense, 
     decentralized command and control, civil defense, logistics, 
     planning, and other critical military functions, with an 
     emphasis on operations in a communications degraded or denied 
     environment.
       (K) Any other capability the Secretary of Defense considers 
     appropriate for the purpose described in paragraph (4).
       (6) Availability of funds.--
       (A) Plan.--Not later than December 1, 2022, and annually 
     thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
     the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a plan for using funds authorized to 
     be appropriated under paragraph (2) for the purpose specified 
     in paragraph (4).
       (B) Initial certification.--Amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under paragraph (2) for fiscal year 2023 may not 
     be obligated or expended until the date on which the 
     Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     State, certifies that the Government of Taiwan has 
     committed--
       (i) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric defense 
     capabilities in fiscal year 2023;
       (ii) to spending not less than three percent of Taiwan's 
     national gross domestic product on defense on an annual basis 
     by the end of fiscal year 2027, including expenditures under 
     the normal defense budget and any supplemental or special 
     defense budgets of Taiwan;
       (iii) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as 
     rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the United 
     States or other countries, if the Secretary of Defense 
     determines that such suppliers will be able to provide such 
     capabilities at a reasonable cost, in sufficient quantities, 
     of sufficient quality and technical standards, and more 
     rapidly than suppliers in Taiwan; and
       (iv) to undertaking the defense reforms required to 
     maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense against 
     an invasion by the People's Republic of China, including by 
     improving organization, mobilization, and training of the 
     reserve forces and other military personnel of Taiwan.
       (C) Subsequent certifications.--Amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under paragraph (2) for each of fiscal years 
     2024, 2025, 2026, and 2027 may not be obligated or expended 
     until the date on which the Secretary of Defense, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of State, certifies that the 
     Government of Taiwan has committed--
       (i) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric defense 
     capabilities in the applicable fiscal year and upheld its 
     commitment to spend an equivalent amount as the United States 
     in the preceding fiscal year on asymmetric defense 
     capabilities to be deployed by Taiwan;
       (ii) to spending not less than three percent of Taiwan's 
     national gross domestic product on defense on an annual basis 
     by the end of fiscal year 2027, including expenditures under 
     the normal defense budget and any supplemental or special 
     defense budgets of Taiwan, and demonstrated progress toward 
     that spending target in the preceding fiscal year;
       (iii) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as 
     rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the United 
     States or other countries, if the Secretary of Defense 
     determines that such suppliers will be able to provide such 
     capabilities at reasonable cost, in sufficient quantities, of 
     sufficient quality and technical standards, and more rapidly 
     than suppliers in Taiwan, and upheld its commitment to 
     acquire asymmetric defense capabilities as rapidly as 
     possible in the preceding fiscal year; and
       (iv) to undertaking the defense reforms required to 
     maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense against 
     an invasion by the People's Republic of China, including by 
     improving the organization, mobilization, and training of the 
     reserve forces and other military personnel of Taiwan, and 
     demonstrated progress on such reforms in the preceding fiscal 
     year.
       (D) Notification to congress.--Not later than 30 days after 
     making a certification under subparagraph (B) or (C), the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a notice and explanation of such 
     certification.
       (E) Remaining funds.--
       (i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), amounts 
     appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to the authorization 
     of appropriations under paragraph (2) that are not obligated 
     and expended during that fiscal year shall be added to the 
     amount that may be used for the Initiative in the subsequent 
     fiscal year.
       (ii) Rescission.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization of appropriation under paragraph (2) that 
     remain unobligated by the end of fiscal year 2027 shall be 
     rescinded and deposited into the general fund of the 
     Treasury.
       (7) Defense articles and services from united states 
     inventory and other sources.--
       (A) In general.--In addition to assistance provided 
     pursuant to paragraph (3), the Secretary of Defense, in 
     coordination with the Secretary of State, may make available 
     to the Government of Taiwan, in such quantities as the 
     Secretary of Defense considers appropriate for the purpose 
     described in paragraph (4), the following:
       (i) Weapons and other defense articles from the United 
     States inventory and other sources.
       (ii) Excess defense articles from the United States 
     inventory.
       (iii) Defense services.
       (B) Replacement.--Amounts for the replacement of any item 
     provided to the Government of Taiwan under subparagraph 
     (A)(i) may be made available from the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated under paragraph (2).
       (8) Termination of authority.--Assistance may not be 
     provided under this subsection after September 30, 2027.
       (d) Limitation on Conventional Arms Sales.--
       (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (A) historically, the Government of Taiwan has prioritized 
     the acquisition of conventional weapons that would be of 
     limited utility in deterring or defeating an invasion by the 
     People's Republic of China at the expense of the timely 
     acquisition of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric 
     defense capabilities;
       (B) the United States Government has often shared 
     responsibility for the misguided prioritization of defense 
     acquisitions described in subparagraph (A) by approving sales 
     of conventional weapons to Taiwan, despite knowledge that 
     such sales would do little to enhance, and may even 
     undermine, the ability of Taiwan to deter or defeat an 
     invasion by the People's Republic of China;
       (C) the misguided prioritization of defense acquisitions 
     described in subparagraph (A) has not only undermined the 
     ability of Taiwan to deter or defeat an invasion by the 
     People's Republic of China, but has also placed at greater 
     risk of death or injury members of the United States Armed 
     Forces who may come under attack or be asked to come to the 
     aid of Taiwan to repel such an invasion; and
       (D) any future sales, leases, or other provision of 
     conventional weaponry to Taiwan by the United States should 
     be conditioned on meaningful progress by the Government of 
     Taiwan on the acquisition of appropriate asymmetric defense 
     capabilities.
       (2) Statement of policy.--For each of fiscal years 2023 
     through 2027, the United States Government shall not sell, 
     lease, or otherwise provide military capabilities to Taiwan 
     other than asymmetric defense capabilities described in 
     paragraph (5) of subsection (c) until the earlier of--
       (A) the date on which the Secretary of Defense has 
     submitted a notification under paragraph (6)(D) of that 
     subsection for the fiscal year in which the Government of 
     Taiwan has requested the sale, lease, or other provision of 
     military capabilities other than such asymmetric defense 
     capabilities; or
       (B) the date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress that the sale, lease, 
     or other provision to Taiwan of military capabilities other 
     than such asymmetric defense capabilities--
       (i) is necessary to enhance the ability of Taiwan to deter 
     or, if necessary, defeat an invasion by the People's Republic 
     of China; or
       (ii) will not slow, delay, limit, or otherwise detract from 
     or undermine the ability of Taiwan to deploy such asymmetric 
     defense capabilities.
       (e) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In 
     this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

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