[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 153 (Thursday, September 22, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4986-S4988]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 5592. Mr. HAWLEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 5499 submitted by Mr. Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe)
and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 7900, to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military activities of the
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was
ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1254. ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Department of Defense has warned that the
Government of the People's Republic of China may conclude
that it can successfully invade and seize control of Taiwan
in the latter half of the 2020s.
(2) In October 2021, the Minister of National Defense of
Taiwan, Chiu Kuo-cheng, echoed these warnings when he stated
that the People's Republic of China--
(A) ``is capable now'' of invading Taiwan; and
(B) will have ``lowered the costs and losses'' associated
with invading Taiwan ``to a minimum'' after 2025.
(3) If the People's Republic of China were to invade and
seize control of Taiwan, it would deal a severe blow to
United States interests by--
(A) destroying one of the world's leading democracies;
(B) casting doubt on the ability and resolve of the United
States to uphold its security commitments;
(C) incentivizing other countries in the Indo-Pacific
region to bandwagon with the People's Republic of China; and
(D) facilitating the formation of a regional order
dominated by the People's Republic of China in which the
Government of the People's Republic of China may--
(i) regulate or otherwise limit the ability of individuals
in the United States to trade in the Indo-Pacific region,
which would have dire effects on the livelihoods and freedoms
of such individuals; and
(ii) use the Indo-Pacific region as a secure base from
which to project military power into other regions, including
the Western Hemisphere.
(4) Taiwan's proximity to the People's Republic of China,
coupled with investments by the People's Republic of China in
capabilities designed to delay intervention by the United
States Armed Forces in support of Taiwan, means that Taiwan
may be forced to delay, degrade, and deny an invasion by the
People's Republic of China with limited support from the
United States Armed Forces for the initial days, weeks, or
months of such an invasion.
(5) If Taiwan is unable to delay, degrade, and deny an
invasion by the People's Republic of China with limited
support from the United States Armed Forces, especially in
the initial period of war, then the People's Republic of
China may conclude that it is, or may actually be, capable
of--
(A) invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the
United States or any other partner country of Taiwan is able
to respond effectively, thereby achieving a fait accompli;
and
(B) potentially rendering any attempt by the United States
or any other partner country of Taiwan to reverse territorial
gains by the People's Republic of China prohibitively
difficult, costly, or both.
(6) To defend itself effectively, especially in the initial
period of war, it is imperative that Taiwan accelerate
deployment of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense
capabilities, including mobile coastal and air defenses,
naval mines, missile boats, man-portable anti-armor weapons,
civil defense forces, and their enablers.
(7) The deployment of such asymmetric defense capabilities
by Taiwan would not only improve the ability of Taiwan to
defend itself, but also reduce operational risk to members of
the United States Armed Forces under a Taiwan contingency.
(8) The President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, has--
(A) vowed to bolster the national defense of Taiwan and
demonstrate Taiwan's determination to defend itself so as to
ensure that Taiwan will not be forced to take the path that
the People's Republic of China has laid out for Taiwan; and
(B) advocated the deployment of asymmetric defense
capabilities.
(9) The Government of Taiwan has begun taking steps to
improve Taiwan's defenses, including by increasing Taiwan's
defense budget and through Taiwan's new proposed special
defense budget, but far more is needed, and quickly, to
ensure that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the threat of an invasion of Taiwan by the People's
Republic of China is increasing rapidly and expected to reach
especially dangerous levels by the latter half of the 2020s;
(2) the United States has a strong interest in preventing
the People's Republic of China from invading and seizing
control of Taiwan, especially by ensuring that Taiwan is able
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(3) the United States should establish a security
assistance initiative so as to accelerate, to the greatest
extent possible, Taiwan's deployment of cost-effective and
resilient asymmetric defense capabilities;
(4) the United States should provide such assistance on the
condition that Taiwan--
(A) matches investments by the United States in its
asymmetric defense capabilities;
(B) increases its defense spending to a level commensurate
with the threat it faces;
(C) prioritizes acquiring cost-effective and resilient
asymmetric defense capabilities as rapidly as possible,
including from foreign suppliers, if necessary; and
(D) demonstrates progress on defense reforms required to
maximize the effectiveness of its asymmetric defenses, with
special regard to Taiwan's reserve forces; and
(5) in the course of executing such a security assistance
initiative, the United States should--
(A) seek to co-produce or co-develop cost-effective and
resilient asymmetric defense capabilities with suppliers in
Taiwan, including by providing incentives to that effect, so
long as those suppliers can produce such capabilities at a
reasonable cost, in the quantities required, as rapidly, and
to the same quality and technical standards as suppliers in
the United States or other countries; and
(B) encourage other countries, particularly United States
allies and partners, to sell, lease, or otherwise provide
appropriate asymmetric defense capabilities to Taiwan so as
to facilitate Taiwan's rapid deployment of the asymmetric
defense capabilities required to deter or, if necessary,
defeat an invasion by the People's Republic of China.
(c) Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish
an initiative, to be known as the ``Taiwan Security
Assistance Initiative'' (referred to in this subsection as
the ``Initiative''), to accelerate Taiwan's deployment of
asymmetric defense capabilities required to deter or, if
necessary, defeat an invasion by the People's Republic of
China.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated $3,000,000,000 for the Department of
Defense for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 to provide
assistance to the Government of Taiwan under this subsection.
(3) Authority to provide assistance.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of State, shall use the funds authorized
to be appropriated under subsection (b) to provide assistance
to the Government of Taiwan for the purpose described in
paragraph (4).
(4) Purpose.--The purpose of the Initiative is to provide
assistance, including equipment, training, and other support,
to the Government of Taiwan so as to accelerate Taiwan's
deployment of asymmetric defense capabilities required to
achieve, with limited support from the United States Armed
Forces for the initial days, weeks, or months after the
initiation of an invasion by the People's Republic of China
of Taiwan, the following objectives:
(A) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's
Liberation Army forces to enter
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or transit the Taiwan Strait and adjoining seas.
(B) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's
Liberation Army forces to secure a lodgment on Taiwan and
expand or otherwise use that lodgment to seize control of a
population center or other key territory in Taiwan.
(C) To prevent the People's Republic of China from
decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing
or rendering ineffective the Government of Taiwan.
(5) Asymmetric defense capabilities.--In this section, the
term ``asymmetric defense capabilities'' includes, in such
quantities as the Secretary of Defense determines to be
necessary to achieve the purpose specified in paragraph (4),
the following:
(A) Mobile, ground-based coastal defense cruise missiles
and launchers.
(B) Mobile, ground-based short-range and medium-range air
defense systems.
(C) Smart, self-propelled naval mines and coastal
minelaying platforms.
(D) Missile boats and fast-attack craft equipped with anti-
ship and anti-landing craft missiles.
(E) Unmanned aerial and other mobile, resilient
surveillance systems to support coastal and air defense
operations.
(F) Equipment to support target location, tracking,
identification, and targeting, especially at the local level,
in communications degraded or denied environments.
(G) Man-portable anti-armor weapons, mortars, and small
arms for ground combat operations.
(H) Equipment and technical assistance for the purpose of
developing civil defense forces, composed of civilian
volunteers and militia.
(I) Training and equipment, including appropriate war
reserves, required for Taiwan forces to independently
maintain, sustain, and employ capabilities described in
subparagraphs (A) through (H).
(J) Concept development for coastal defense, air defense,
decentralized command and control, civil defense, logistics,
planning, and other critical military functions, with an
emphasis on operations in a communications degraded or denied
environment.
(K) Any other capability the Secretary of Defense considers
appropriate for the purpose described in paragraph (4).
(6) Availability of funds.--
(A) Plan.--Not later than December 1, 2022, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a plan for using funds authorized to
be appropriated under paragraph (2) for the purpose specified
in paragraph (4).
(B) Initial certification.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under paragraph (2) for fiscal year 2023 may not
be obligated or expended until the date on which the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, certifies that the Government of Taiwan has
committed--
(i) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric defense
capabilities in fiscal year 2023;
(ii) to spending not less than three percent of Taiwan's
national gross domestic product on defense on an annual basis
by the end of fiscal year 2027, including expenditures under
the normal defense budget and any supplemental or special
defense budgets of Taiwan;
(iii) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as
rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the United
States or other countries, if the Secretary of Defense
determines that such suppliers will be able to provide such
capabilities at a reasonable cost, in sufficient quantities,
of sufficient quality and technical standards, and more
rapidly than suppliers in Taiwan; and
(iv) to undertaking the defense reforms required to
maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense against
an invasion by the People's Republic of China, including by
improving organization, mobilization, and training of the
reserve forces and other military personnel of Taiwan.
(C) Subsequent certifications.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under paragraph (2) for each of fiscal years
2024, 2025, 2026, and 2027 may not be obligated or expended
until the date on which the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, certifies that the
Government of Taiwan has committed--
(i) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric defense
capabilities in the applicable fiscal year and upheld its
commitment to spend an equivalent amount as the United States
in the preceding fiscal year on asymmetric defense
capabilities to be deployed by Taiwan;
(ii) to spending not less than three percent of Taiwan's
national gross domestic product on defense on an annual basis
by the end of fiscal year 2027, including expenditures under
the normal defense budget and any supplemental or special
defense budgets of Taiwan, and demonstrated progress toward
that spending target in the preceding fiscal year;
(iii) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as
rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the United
States or other countries, if the Secretary of Defense
determines that such suppliers will be able to provide such
capabilities at reasonable cost, in sufficient quantities, of
sufficient quality and technical standards, and more rapidly
than suppliers in Taiwan, and upheld its commitment to
acquire asymmetric defense capabilities as rapidly as
possible in the preceding fiscal year; and
(iv) to undertaking the defense reforms required to
maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense against
an invasion by the People's Republic of China, including by
improving the organization, mobilization, and training of the
reserve forces and other military personnel of Taiwan, and
demonstrated progress on such reforms in the preceding fiscal
year.
(D) Notification to congress.--Not later than 30 days after
making a certification under subparagraph (B) or (C), the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a notice and explanation of such
certification.
(E) Remaining funds.--
(i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), amounts
appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to the authorization
of appropriations under paragraph (2) that are not obligated
and expended during that fiscal year shall be added to the
amount that may be used for the Initiative in the subsequent
fiscal year.
(ii) Rescission.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriation under paragraph (2) that
remain unobligated by the end of fiscal year 2027 shall be
rescinded and deposited into the general fund of the
Treasury.
(7) Defense articles and services from united states
inventory and other sources.--
(A) In general.--In addition to assistance provided
pursuant to paragraph (3), the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, may make available
to the Government of Taiwan, in such quantities as the
Secretary of Defense considers appropriate for the purpose
described in paragraph (4), the following:
(i) Weapons and other defense articles from the United
States inventory and other sources.
(ii) Excess defense articles from the United States
inventory.
(iii) Defense services.
(B) Replacement.--Amounts for the replacement of any item
provided to the Government of Taiwan under subparagraph
(A)(i) may be made available from the amount authorized to be
appropriated under paragraph (2).
(8) Termination of authority.--Assistance may not be
provided under this subsection after September 30, 2027.
(d) Limitation on Conventional Arms Sales.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) historically, the Government of Taiwan has prioritized
the acquisition of conventional weapons that would be of
limited utility in deterring or defeating an invasion by the
People's Republic of China at the expense of the timely
acquisition of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric
defense capabilities;
(B) the United States Government has often shared
responsibility for the misguided prioritization of defense
acquisitions described in subparagraph (A) by approving sales
of conventional weapons to Taiwan, despite knowledge that
such sales would do little to enhance, and may even
undermine, the ability of Taiwan to deter or defeat an
invasion by the People's Republic of China;
(C) the misguided prioritization of defense acquisitions
described in subparagraph (A) has not only undermined the
ability of Taiwan to deter or defeat an invasion by the
People's Republic of China, but has also placed at greater
risk of death or injury members of the United States Armed
Forces who may come under attack or be asked to come to the
aid of Taiwan to repel such an invasion; and
(D) any future sales, leases, or other provision of
conventional weaponry to Taiwan by the United States should
be conditioned on meaningful progress by the Government of
Taiwan on the acquisition of appropriate asymmetric defense
capabilities.
(2) Statement of policy.--For each of fiscal years 2023
through 2027, the United States Government shall not sell,
lease, or otherwise provide military capabilities to Taiwan
other than asymmetric defense capabilities described in
paragraph (5) of subsection (c) until the earlier of--
(A) the date on which the Secretary of Defense has
submitted a notification under paragraph (6)(D) of that
subsection for the fiscal year in which the Government of
Taiwan has requested the sale, lease, or other provision of
military capabilities other than such asymmetric defense
capabilities; or
(B) the date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to
the appropriate committees of Congress that the sale, lease,
or other provision to Taiwan of military capabilities other
than such asymmetric defense capabilities--
(i) is necessary to enhance the ability of Taiwan to deter
or, if necessary, defeat an invasion by the People's Republic
of China; or
(ii) will not slow, delay, limit, or otherwise detract from
or undermine the ability of Taiwan to deploy such asymmetric
defense capabilities.
(e) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
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