[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 148 (Wednesday, September 14, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4621-S4623]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

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 SENATE RESOLUTION 763--ESTABLISHING A SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE 
               UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
the Committee on Rules and Administration:

                               S. Res. 763

       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This resolution may be cited as the ``Senate Select 
     Committee on the Afghanistan Withdrawal Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

       There is established a select committee of the Senate, to 
     be known as the Select Committee on the United States 
     Withdrawal from Afghanistan (referred to in this resolution 
     as the ``Senate Select Committee''), to investigate and 
     report on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan.

     SEC. 3. MEMBERSHIP.

       (a) In General.--The Senate Select Committee shall be 
     composed of 20 Members of the Senate appointed according to 
     the following:
       (1) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 
     members.
       (2) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 
     members.
       (3) The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services shall 
     appoint 2 members.
       (4) The ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services 
     shall appoint 2 members.
       (5) The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
     shall appoint 2 members.
       (6) The ranking member of the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations shall appoint 2 members.
       (7) The chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members.
       (8) The ranking member of the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members.
       (9) The chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     shall appoint 2 members.
       (10) The ranking member of the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence shall appoint 2 members.
       (b) Appointment of Co-chairs.--The majority leader and the 
     minority leader of the Senate shall each appoint 1 co-chair 
     of the Senate Select Committee from the members appointed to 
     the Senate Select Committee.
       (c) Date.--Members of the Senate Select Committee shall be 
     appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date on 
     which the Senate agrees to this resolution.
       (d) Period of Appointment.--Members of the Senate Select 
     Committee shall be appointed for the life of the Senate 
     Select Committee.
       (e) Vacancies.--A vacancy in the Senate Select Committee--
       (1) shall not affect the powers of the Senate Select 
     Committee; and
       (2) shall be filled in the same manner as the original 
     appointment.

     SEC. 4. INVESTIGATION AND REPORT.

       (a) In General.--The Senate Select Committee shall 
     investigate and, not later than 1 year after the date of 
     agreement to this resolution, shall submit a report to the 
     Senate on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan.
       (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall address the following:
       (1) Intelligence products available to the United States 
     Government over the course of the withdrawal, including as 
     related to--

[[Page S4622]]

       (A) anticipated timelines for a Taliban takeover of 
     Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban seized control of 
     Afghanistan districts and provinces, often without fighting, 
     in early to mid 2021;
       (B) the ability of the Afghan National Defense and Security 
     Forces to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan after the 
     withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces and associated 
     combat, logistical, and other support;
       (C) the willingness of then-President of the Islamic 
     Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani and other Afghan 
     political leaders to remain in Afghanistan as the military 
     situation deteriorated, including any plans such leaders may 
     have made to escape Afghanistan as the Taliban advanced;
       (D) any other intelligence that may have informed decisions 
     by the United States Government regarding the timeline for 
     the withdrawal of its forces, moving of its embassy in Kabul, 
     initiation of a noncombatant evacuation operation, force 
     requirements for a noncombatant evacuation operation, or 
     related matters; and
       (E) any dissenting views shared in writing or other 
     formats, including verbally, by United States diplomats, 
     military commanders, or other government officials regarding 
     the topics described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).
       (2) The failure to secure Hamid Karzai International 
     Airport, relocate the United States Embassy in Kabul, and 
     initiate a noncombatant evacuation operation prior to Kabul's 
     imminent collapse, despite warnings by military commanders on 
     the ground that such a collapse was increasingly likely and 
     could occur rapidly, including--
       (A) the failure by the United States Government to 
     accelerate the fortification of the Hamid Karzai 
     International Airport, the relocation of the United States 
     Embassy in Kabul, or the initiation of the noncombatant 
     evacuation operation in response to warnings that the 
     Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was 
     increasingly likely to collapse and could do so rapidly;
       (B) the development of a ``trigger assessment tool'' or 
     other conditions-based planning aids to support monitoring of 
     and timely response to the deteriorating security environment 
     in Afghanistan, including use of such aids by Department of 
     Defense and Department of State officials in Afghanistan;
       (C) table-top exercises or other planning events held at 
     agency or interagency levels, with particular focus on 
     planning assumptions, associated timelines, and participant 
     reactions to the planning events;
       (D) any decision by the Department of State or other 
     Federal agency to delay or deprioritize planning for a 
     noncombatant evacuation operation, including for the purpose 
     of demonstrating confidence in the Government of the Islamic 
     Republic of Afghanistan;
       (E) any suggestion by Department of State or other United 
     States Government officials that executing a noncombatant 
     evacuation operation would constitute failure for the United 
     States in Afghanistan, as reported by the United States 
     Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing; and
       (F) any orders, instructions, or other guidance provided to 
     Department of Defense officials to prevent such officials 
     from planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation with 
     multinational partners, as reported by the United States 
     Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing.
       (3) The decision to prioritize evacuating as many 
     individuals as possible over protecting members of the United 
     States Armed Forces and thoroughly vetting all prospective 
     evacuees, as reported by the United States Central Command 
     investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing, including--
       (A) force protection measures, including obstacles, 
     barriers, and other measures, implemented at the Hamid Karzai 
     International Airport prior to and during execution of the 
     noncombatant evacuation operation; and
       (B) force protection measures not implemented at the Hamid 
     Karzai International Airport, with an explanation for why 
     such force protection measures were not implemented and 
     implications of the failure to implement such measures for 
     risk to force during execution of the noncombatant evacuation 
     operation.
       (4) Threat reporting prior to the suicide bombing at Abbey 
     Gate, additional force protection measures implemented in 
     response to such threat reporting, and additional force 
     protection measures not implemented in response to such 
     threat reporting, with an assessment of why certain 
     additional force protection measures were not taken.
       (5) The failure to thoroughly vet evacuees prior to their 
     transfer to United States territory, military installations, 
     or other locations outside of Afghanistan, including detailed 
     descriptions of--
       (A) any delays by the Department of State to send adequate 
     numbers of consular officials to Hamid Karzai International 
     Airport to facilitate thorough vetting of prospective 
     evacuees;
       (B) any changes to guidance issued by the Department of 
     State regarding the vetting of prospective evacuees over the 
     course of the noncombatant evacuation operation;
       (C) any guidance issued by the President or other United 
     States Government officials to reduce standards for or 
     expedite vetting of prospective evacuees prior to their 
     removal from Afghanistan;
       (D) any failure by the United States Government to utilize 
     all existing biometric databases or proper identification 
     standards when processing individuals to be removed from 
     Afghanistan; and
       (E) any criminal incidents involving evacuees following 
     their transfer to United States territory.
       (6) The total number of United States nationals left in 
     Afghanistan following the United States withdrawal from 
     Afghanistan, and the knowledge on the part of United States 
     Government officials of the total number of United States 
     nationals left in Afghanistan when such officials informed 
     Congress that the United States Government had not left 
     Americans behind in Afghanistan.
       (7) Equipment provided by the United States to the Afghan 
     National Defense and Security Forces and recovered by the 
     Taliban following the collapse of the Afghan National Defense 
     and Security Forces, including the type and amount of such 
     equipment recovered by the Taliban as well as the manner in 
     which the Taliban has been able to use such equipment.
       (8) Detailed descriptions of--
       (A) orders issued by the President related to the United 
     States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including with regard to 
     the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul and the 
     initiation and execution of the noncombatant evacuation 
     operation;
       (B) analysis or recommendations provided by the Assistant 
     to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary 
     of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of United States Central 
     Command, and other national security leaders related to the 
     United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including as 
     related to--
       (i) the deteriorating military situation in Afghanistan; 
     and
       (ii) the consequent need to accelerate the relocation of 
     the United States Embassy in Kabul and the initiation of the 
     noncombatant evacuation operation; and
       (C) requests for forces or other requests for additional 
     authorities or resources made to the President by the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or other 
     national security leaders during the United States withdrawal 
     from Afghanistan, and the President's responses to any such 
     requests.
       (9) Any other matters identified by members of the Senate 
     Select Committee.
       (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 5. MEETINGS, HEARINGS, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION.

       (a) Meetings.--
       (1) In general.--The Senate Select Committee shall meet at 
     the call of the co-chairs or at the request of at least 3 
     members.
       (2) Quorum.--Half of the members of the Senate Select 
     Committee shall constitute a quorum.
       (3) Voting.--Proxy voting shall be allowed on behalf of the 
     members of the Senate Select Committee.
       (b) Hearings.--
       (1) In general.--The Senate Select Committee shall, for the 
     purposes described in section 4, hold such hearings, compel 
     attendance of such witnesses, take or compel such testimony, 
     receive or compel such evidence, and administer such oaths as 
     the Senate Select Committee considers advisable.
       (2) Frequency.--The Senate Select Committee shall hold an 
     open hearing no less frequently than once per month until it 
     has received open testimony from all of the witnesses listed 
     in paragraph (3).
       (3) Witnesses.--The co-chairs shall hear testimony from the 
     following before the Senate Select Committee in open session, 
     even if the person holds a different public office or no 
     longer holds public office at the time of the hearing:
       (A) Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs Jake Sullivan.
       (B) Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
       (C) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
       (D) Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas.
       (E) Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.
       (F) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William 
     Burns.
       (G) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark 
     Milley.
       (H) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl.
       (I) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan 
     Ambassador John Bass.
       (J) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan 
     Ambassador Ross Wilson.
       (K) Former Commander of United States Forces Afghanistan - 
     Forward Rear Admiral Peter Vasely.
       (L) Former Commanding General of Joint Task Force - Crisis 
     Response Brigadier General Farrell J. Sullivan.
       (M) Former Commanding General of 82nd Airborne Division 
     Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue.
       (N) Any other individuals, including former United States 
     Government officials, identified by the co-chairs or a group 
     of 3 members of the Senate Select Committee.
       (4) Transparency.--The Senate Select Committee may receive 
     classified testimony in a closed session, but any witnesses 
     questioned in a closed session shall also testify in an open 
     session, in the interest of public transparency.
       (5) Questioning.--Co-chairs shall permit members of the 
     Senate Select Committee to question witnesses at a hearing 
     for periods

[[Page S4623]]

     longer than 5 minutes or multiple periods of 5 minutes, at 
     the request of a member.
       (6) Procedures.--
       (A) Announcement.--The co-chairs of the Senate Select 
     Committee shall make a public announcement of the date, time, 
     place, and subject matter of any hearing to be conducted, not 
     less than 7 days in advance of such hearing, unless the co-
     chairs determine that there is good cause to begin such 
     hearing at any earlier date.
       (B) Written statement.--A witness appearing before the 
     Senate Select Committee shall file a written statement of 
     proposed testimony and respond in writing to any advance 
     questions from the Senate Select Committee at least 2 
     calendar days before the appearance of the witness unless the 
     requirement is waived by the co-chairs.
       (c) Cooperation From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) Technical assistance.--Upon written request of the co-
     chairs, a Federal agency shall provide technical assistance 
     to the Senate Select Committee in order for the Senate Select 
     Committee to carry out its duties.
       (2) Provision of information.--The National Security 
     Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
     community, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies 
     shall expeditiously provide information requested by the 
     Senate Select Committee related to the investigation and 
     report under required under section 4, and in no case later 
     than 3 weeks after a request by a member of the Senate Select 
     Committee.
       (3) Limitation on exclusions.--Federal agencies shall not 
     withhold information from the Senate Select Committee, 
     including for reasons of classification, executive privilege, 
     or attorney-client privilege.
       (d) Subpoena Authority.--Members of the Senate Select 
     Committee are authorized to--
       (1) compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by 
     United States Government officials and other individuals, 
     including former United States Government officials; and
       (2) take or order the taking of depositions, including 
     pursuant to subpoena, in the same manner as a standing 
     committee of the Senate.

     SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATION.

       (a) Funding.--There shall be paid, out of the contingent 
     fund of the Senate from the appropriations account 
     ``Miscellaneous Items,'' such sums as may be necessary for 
     the expenses of the Senate Select Committee, subject to the 
     rules and regulations of the Senate.
       (b) Expenses.--In carrying out its functions, the Senate 
     Select Committee is authorized to incur expenses in the same 
     manner and under the same conditions as the Joint Economic 
     Committee is authorized under section 11 of the Employment 
     Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1024).
       (c) Staffing.--
       (1) Staff director.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, shall 
     hire the staff director of the Senate Select Committee.
       (2) Other staff.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, may employ 
     such additional staff as they determine necessary for the 
     Senate Select Committee to carry out its duties.
       (3) Compensation.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, may 
     appoint and fix the compensation of the staff director and 
     additional staff as they determine necessary, within the 
     guidelines for employees of the Senate and following all 
     applicable rules and employment requirements of the Senate.
       (4) Ethical standards.--Members and staff of the Senate 
     Select Committee shall comply with the ethics rules of the 
     Senate.
       (d) Facilities.--The Senate Select Committee shall have 
     priority access to--
       (1) rooms of the Senate for purposes of meetings, hearings, 
     and other Senate Select Committee functions; and
       (2) secure facilities for purpose of receiving classified 
     testimony and handling other classified materials.
       (e) Termination.--The Senate Select Committee shall 
     terminate on the later of the following:
       (1) 30 days after the submission of the report required 
     under section 4(a).
       (2) 30 days after the Senate Select Committee has held open 
     hearings with all of the witnesses listed under section 
     5(b)(3).
       (3) The expiration of the Congressional session during 
     which the Senate agrees to this resolution.
       (f) Disposition of Records.--Upon the termination of the 
     Senate Select Committee, the records of the Senate Select 
     Committee shall become the records of the Committee on Armed 
     Services.

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