[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 121 (Thursday, July 21, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3605-S3607]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
ACTS-SCK-DO
Subject: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S.
Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International
Airport on 26 August 2021.
(b) Training.
(i) Prior to deploying to the CENTCOM AOR in the spring of
2021, the units assigned to the SPMAGTF completed typical
pre-deployment training, focused on their core METs (exhibits
53, 55, 56, 57, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81). Additionally, 2/1
conducted training at the Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIT) at
Camp Pendleton, where they trained on embassy reinforcement
and crowd control operations (exhibits 76, 77, 86). While
deployed, 2/1's companies were distributed throughout the
AOR, and conducted various training events that would prove
beneficial while operating at HKIA later in their deployment.
(ii) Echo Company, 2/1 conducted two Mission Rehearsal
Exercises (MRXs), along with STP, CLD-21 and MWSD-373, at
PSAB in July 2021, where they focused on ECC operations and
security and response to a MASCAL event (exhibits 53, 54, 56,
57, 76). Echo Company, 2/1 also conducted non-lethal weapons
training at PSAB and additional medical training in Kuwait
(exhibit 82).
(iii) Golf Company, 2/1 deployed three platoons to Jordan,
and one platoon initially to Djibouti, and then to PSAB,
where it supported the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and
Personnel (TRAP) mission. In Jordan, Golf Company focused on
its core METs, but had the unique opportunity to train
alongside the U.K.'s 2 PARA, and the 77th Royal Jordanian
Marine Battalion (77th RJMB). Training with 2 PARA helped
build a level of interoperability and familiarity that proved
useful when Golf Company, 2/1 served alongside 2 PARA at
Abbey Gate, HKIA, whereas training with 77th RJMB helped Golf
Company Marines grow accustomed to operating with non-native
English speakers, a skill that also proved useful at HKIA
(exhibits 53, 76, 77, 80, 86, 89, 90). Third Platoon, Golf
Company, 2/1 received extensive medical training while
serving as the TRAP platoon, to include Tactical Combat
Casualty Care (TCCC), Combat Trauma Management (CTM)
training, and Valkyrie walking blood bank training (exhibits
86, 98). The rest of Golf Company conducted Combat Life Saver
(CLS) refresher training, TCCC refresher training, and MASCAL
training in Jordan, while Golf Company's junior Hospital
Corpsmen conducted CTM and Valkyrie training prior to
deploying to HKIA in support of the NEO (exhibits 77, 98).
(iv) Fox Company, 2/1 deployed to the BEC, where the
company executed fixed site security and crowd control
operations, and trained on non-lethal weapons employment, all
of which prepared them to operate at Abbey Gate (exhibit 81).
All 2/1 companies discussed ROE and the importance of
treating people at the gates of HKIA with empathy and respect
prior to deploying to HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 56, 57, 76, 77,
78, 81). The STP completed multiple MASCAL drills while
deployed at Al Jaber, Kuwait and PSAB, prior to deploying to
HKIA (exhibit 66).
e. Leadership.
(1) Key Finding. COMREL and Task Organization. The task
organization worked. This was in large part due to pre-
existing or quickly forged relationships among leaders at the
highest echelons and adaptability at the lower echelons.
(a) The 82nd Airborne Division, led by MG Donahue, executed
their mission with a clear chain of command (exhibits 10,
121, 124, 125). The Division rapidly adapted to the changing
situation, as they were responsible for security of the
airhead, support to the NEO, planning for the retrograde of
all personnel and equipment, demilitarization of arms and
equipment, and executing the JTE (exhibits 121, 125). In
addition to security, the Division conducted initial
screening and recovery of AMCITs, LPRs, locally hired embassy
personnel, SIV applicants, and at risk Afghans at South and
West Gates (exhibit 143). Once identified and screened, these
evacuees were processed through the ECC for manifesting and
departure from HKIA (exhibits 121, 125).
(b) General McKenzie established the NEO COMREL, and
officially granted 82nd Airborne TACON of JTF-CR (exhibit 10,
11, 238). In reality, JTF-CR was TACON to USFOR-A FWD, and
merely coordinated with the 82nd Airborne Division (exhibits
18, 21, 40, 125). This adjusted COMREL, along with the mixing
of tactical responsibilities, resulted in the 82nd conducting
airfield security and NEO for one sector, and JTF-CR
conducting airfield security and NEO in another sector
(exhibits 15, 121, 125, 143, 155). The senior officers made
this division of tasks work under the circumstances with
adjusted COMREL, mutual trust, and shared understanding.
(2) Engaged and Responsive Leaders.
(a) The leadership of the U.S. Forces tasked with
conducting a NEO at HKIA worked collaboratively to adapt in
an uncertain, chaotic, ambiguous, and high-threat
environment. U.S. Forces experienced rapidly changing,
complex relationships and compressed timelines to conduct a
NEO. These leadership challenges were exacerbated by the
reality that the Taliban, who could be described as a
supporting effort, were operating under a unity of effort as
opposed to a unity of command (exhibits 53, 125). This was
demonstrated at each location around the perimeter of HKIA,
where Taliban assistance ranged from actively supporting
crowd control, to non-support, and even actively taunting the
Marines (exhibits 23, 53, 100, 102, 125, 146). RADM Vasely,
MG Donahue, and BGen Sullivan conducted Key Leader
Engagements (KLE) to coordinate activities, ensure mission
accomplishment, and protect the force (exhibits 21, 23, 125).
Their coordination with the Taliban facilitated crowd control
and force protection, and minimized the incidence of kinetic
engagements between U.S. Forces, and Taliban (exhibits 53,
104, 125). While the ROE may not have been entirely clear at
all times, due to the rapidly changing situation, U.S. Forces
retained the right to self-defense, the ability to engage
individuals committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile
intent, and the ability to utilize riot-control measures in
defense to protect the force and civilians.
(b) Military leadership at every level was engaged and
responsive, enabling security of the airhead, executing the
NEO, and planning to execute the Joint Tactical Exfiltration
(JTE). There were numerous examples of great leadership
during an operation amounting to simultaneous combat,
evacuation, and humanitarian tasks during a compressed time,
with constrained resources, and severe restrictions on
terrain. There are three examples to highlight, the first
being how leadership engaged the NSU and Taliban forces to
assist with inner and outer perimeter security and checkpoint
screening. Another example was the emplacement of the Chevron
obstacle at Abbey Gate, which in combination with outside
influences, had a profound impact on the flow of evacuees.
The last example was the battlefield rotations conducted
before 26 August and immediately before the blast at Abbey
Gate. It should be noted that several leaders and Marines
interviewed stated operations at
[[Page S3606]]
HKIA were so chaotic, that even with the tremendous amounts
of training conducted prior to deployment, no training would
be able to prepare someone for what they faced (exhibits 107,
101 ). All of these examples tested leaders' ability to
remain flexible in a dynamic environment and challenged them
to rise above adversity.
(c) These challenges began when civilians breached the
perimeter and started to occupy the southern area of HKIA on
15 August (exhibits 15, 53, 54, 56). This caused the JTF-CR
to send 50 out of 53 personnel, emptying their JOC, to assist
in pushing back the crowd (exhibit 15). It took almost
everyone on the airfield to get the civilians off the runway
in order to continue operations (exhibit 15, 53, 54, 56).
Leadership recognized that they had to build and leverage
relationships in order to provide better security and
screening. This led to negotiations between RADM Vasely, the
NSU, and the Taliban (exhibit 53). The NSU helped to clear
the airfield and manned their gate, while MG Donahue
instructed the Taliban regarding which areas they would need
to control and clear to facilitate the NEO (exhibit 18, 21,
123, 125). The Taliban would later establish outer
checkpoints and, more notably, provide security at the
Chevron outside the outer corridor of Abbey Gate (exhibits
54, 77, 81, 84, 85 86, 89).
(d) The coordination to install the Chevron, which
ultimately changed the dynamics at Abbey Gate, involved the
U.K., Taliban and the Commander of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines,
(TEXT REDACTED) The U.K. Forces devised the idea and the
placement location, but were having trouble executing (TEXT
REDACTED) and other members of the senior leadership were
conducting KLEs with the Taliban to discuss security and
future operations (exhibit 54, 18). (TEXT REDACTED) had the
Taliban move the broken vehicles that were in the way and
preventing the Chevron from being emplaced, and help to help
to control Afghan civilians (exhibit 77). The Taliban would
later provide security in front of and on top of the Chevron
containers (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85 86, 89). (TEXT
REDACTED) also coordinated with the MEU engineers to use
their equipment to move jersey barriers and emplace the
containers forming the Chevron (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85,
89, 103). This helped to create standoff between troops and
the crowd and control the flow of personnel coming into the
Abbey Gate for processing.
(e) Leadership, from USFOR-A FWD down to the company level,
would visit the gates to ensure the Service members were
cared for and to gather situational awareness of the rapidly
changing environment. The USFOR-A FWD team would visit
gates multiple times a day (exhibit 21, 22, 23). The
USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) would visit the gates to check
on Marines/Soldiers and to provide reports on the current
conditions and situation at the gates (exhibits 17, 21,
96). On 26 August, just before 1700, BGen Sullivan, (TEXT
REDACTED) (all of JTF-CR) had visited Abbey Gate and left
the area 20 minutes before the blast (exhibits 17, 19).
(TEXT REDACTED) 3/10 IBCT, (TEXT REDACTED) 2/501 PIR, and
(TEXT REDACTED) 1/8 visited Abbey Gate on 26 August as
well (exhibits 104, 123, 126). The (TEXT REDACTED) of 2/1,
(TEXT REDACTED) attended a meeting at the Barron Hotel
with Taliban and U.K. Forces to discuss the impending
closure of Abbey Gate at 1600 on 26 August. As he was
leaving Abbey Gate, (TEXT REDACTED) was caught in the
blast (exhibits 53, 90).
(f) Leaders on the ground engaged with their teams in order
to work through the evolving situation. They were
coordinating support with friendly units while also
negotiating with the NSU and Taliban to provide security for
gate operations and retrograde planning. Junior leaders were
empowered to make and execute decisions, as demonstrated
through the emplacement of the Chevron. Overall, military
leaders executed the mission and protected their Marines and
Soldiers to the best of their ability.
f. Medical Considerations.
(1) Key Finding. The wounds sustained by the KIA were so
catastrophic none could be saved. Medical providers at
multiple echelons stated access to additional advanced
treatment and equipment would not have saved more lives. The
capability at HKIA's Role II-E saved several Service Members
who otherwise would have succumbed to their wounds. Providers
stated the capability at HKIA was the most robust they had
experienced in an operational setting. Every Service Member
who could have been saved with medical treatment survived due
to the medical capability at HKIA.
(2) Capabilities.
(a) Role II. Throughout the Afghanistan NEO, there were two
Role II facilities at HKIA, one on North HKIA (NHKIA),
referred to at times as the NATO Role II, Role II-E, or the
Military Treatment Facility (MTF), had the most robust
capability, while a second facility at Camp Alvarado was
operated by 1/82 IBCT medical personnel (exhibits 66, 98,
128, 130, 131). The MTF hosted eight surgical teams,
including three Army Forward Resuscitative Surgical Teams
(FRST), one Army light surgical team, two U.S. SOSTs, one
Norwegian SOST, and one U.K. surgical team. The MTF had two
ORs, with the ability to surge to four patients
simultaneously, and space for seven intensive care unit (ICU)
and 14 ward patients, with the ability to surge on both. The
MTF also had CT scanning and x-ray capability, a lab, a
pharmacy, and an ER that operated 24 hours a day (exhibits
128, 131). According to multiple medical officers, the MTF at
HKIA had more assets and capability than any field facility
they had ever seen (exhibits 66, 128, 130, 131). The second
Role II facility, located at Camp Alvarado, was operated by
personnel from 1/82 IBCT and hosted an Army FRSD. The FRSD
was capable of providing limited damage control surgery and
resuscitation (exhibit 130).
(b) Role I. There were two Role I-E facilities at HKIA
throughout the NEO. The 24th MEU's STP operated next to the
PAX Terminal on NHKIA, while the SPMAGTF's STP operated out
of a building between East Gate and Abbey Gate. The MEU STP
had two physician assistants (PA), two nurses, and 15
corpsmen (exhibit 16). The SPMAGTF STP had two ER doctors,
one PA, two nurses, and 12 corpsmen (exhibit 66). In addition
to the two Role I-E facilities, the U.K. operated a Role I
facility out of the Barron Hotel, in vicinity of Abbey Gate
(exhibits 77, 98).
(3) MASCAL Plan. Prior to executing the NEO, the MASCAL
plan for HKIA was not comprehensive, in that it did not
incorporate every compound surrounding the airfield. Instead,
the existing MASCAL plan only referred to NHKIA, where the
aforementioned NATO Role II/MTF was located. Leading up to
the NEO, TF MED leadership began refining the MASCAL plan,
and attempted to designate CCPs and evacuation routes
throughout the airfield (exhibit 128). The updated plan was
not finalized prior to the beginning of the NEO, and as a
result, during the NEO the MASCAL plan was reduced to, ``In
the event of a MASCAL event, utilize all available vehicles
to transport casualties to the MTF as quickly as possible
(exhibits 66, 128, 130, 131)''. The lack of a comprehensive
MASCAL plan caused some frustration and concern for units
operating away from NHKIA (exhibit 66). Despite the lack of a
comprehensive plan, each unit conducted internal MASCAL
rehearsals that undoubtedly contributed to the rapid,
successful response witnessed following the Abbey Gate attack
of 26 August (exhibits 66, 98, 128, 130, 131).
(4) Medical Rules of Engagement (MEDROE). At the start of
the NEO, the MEDROE were unclear among the various medical
providers (exhibits 66, 130, 131). The SPMAGTF STP and 1/82
IBCT Role II were initially under the impression they were to
adhere to the standing CENTCOM MEDROE, which was complicated
by the fact that service members were coming into close,
regular contact with large numbers of civilians at the HKIA
gates (exhibits 66, 130). After operating for several days
under an ambiguous MEDROE, TF MED's (TEXT REDACTED) passed
guidance to all providers at HKIA stating that they were
responsible for providing care to anyone within the gates of
the airfield (exhibits 66, 130, 131). The lack of initial
clarity regarding MEDROE presented a challenge for some
medical providers, and served as a source of frustration
(exhibit 66).
(5) MASCAL Preparations Prior to 26 August. Upon his
arrival at HKIA, 82nd Airborne's Commander, MG Donahue,
identified the likelihood of a MASCAL event during the course
of the NEO, and tasked the 82nd's senior medical officer with
preparing for a MASCAL (exhibit 125). In the days leading up
to the attack on 26 August, units at all echelons conducted
MASCAL rehearsals (exhibits 16, 18, 21, 66, 98, 128, 130,
131). In response to the increased threat leading up to 26
August, the SPMAGTF STP (TEXT REDACTED) ran MASCAL rehearsals
in her clinic, and staged an ambulance with an en route care
team inside the inner gate at Abbey Gate on the evening of 25
August (exhibit 66). Beginning on the morning of 26 August,
Golf Company, 2/1 established a CCP inside the outer gate,
and consolidated medical supplies, litters, and corpsmen at
the CCP in anticipation of a potential attack and MASCAL
event (exhibits 77, 98). Following a phone call from the
USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) at 1310 on 26 August warning of a
likely attack, TF MED (TEXT REDACTED) consolidated all
medical personnel at the MTF, and kept them on standby
throughout the afternoon so that they were prepared to
respond rapidly to a MASCAL (exhibit 131).
g. Chronology/Timeline of Events. See enclosure 9.
4. Recommendations.
a. TBI Screening. During the course of the investigation,
it became apparent Service Members received inconsistent
evaluation for concussion and TBI after the attack at Abbey
Gate. Since the initial medical evacuation of the wounded,
twelve Service Members have been added to the list of those
wounded in action; many for TBI. I therefore recommend
forwarding findings and recommendations to all CENTCOM
Service Component Commanders for consideration that all
Service Members at Abbey Gate during the attack, and present
in any blast zone depicted in exhibit 137, slide 7, be
evaluated for TBI.
b. Mental Health Evaluation. A consistent trend during
interviews with young Marines were stories involving
traumatic injuries and death of children, separation of
families at gates, and outright rejection of evacuees
culminating in their distraught return to the civilian
population outside the gate. During the response to the
attack at Abbey Gate, young Marines heroically recovered the
wounded and rendered life-saving care. Others carried the
bodies of their deceased friends away from the canal. In
consideration of the mental and emotional strain placed on
these young Marines and other Service Members, I recommend
forwarding
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the findings and recommendations to all CENTCOM Service
Component Commanders. Recommend mental health evaluations and
treatment options for all personnel executing entry control
point operations at Abbey Gate from 17-26 August. Evaluations
and treatment options should also be pursued for personnel
involved in the medical response to the attack on Abbey Gate
on 26 August.
c. Interagency NEO Doctrine. Many leaders observed planning
and execution with interagency partners was difficult,
because there was no shared understanding or baseline
concepts common to the various entities involved in the
execution of NEO. To address this shortcoming, I recommend
forwarding this investigation to the Joint Staff for
consideration in drafting and publication of interagency
doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.
d. Further Investigation. During an interview with Platoon
Commanders of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, a Platoon Commander
stated a civilian was killed by a flash bang grenade. The
investigator did not pursue the line of questioning, because
of the group setting and potential for misconduct and a
rights advisement. After speaking with my legal advisor, I
assessed this line of inquiry was outside my scope to
investigate and would incur a significant delay in meeting my
timeline and mandate. I recommend forwarding exhibits 84 and
128 to MARCENT for potential investigation into statements
made by the Platoon Commander from Golf Company, 2/1 Marines,
concerning a possible civilian casualty caused by use of a
flash bang grenade.
5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the
undersigned at (TEXT REDACTED) or at (TEXT REDACTED) (TEXT
REDACTED) LANCE G. CURTIS BG, USA Investigating Officer
____________________