[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 121 (Thursday, July 21, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3605-S3607]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an 
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey 
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     ACTS-SCK-DO
     Subject: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S. 
         Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International 
         Airport on 26 August 2021.

       (b) Training.
       (i) Prior to deploying to the CENTCOM AOR in the spring of 
     2021, the units assigned to the SPMAGTF completed typical 
     pre-deployment training, focused on their core METs (exhibits 
     53, 55, 56, 57, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81). Additionally, 2/1 
     conducted training at the Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIT) at 
     Camp Pendleton, where they trained on embassy reinforcement 
     and crowd control operations (exhibits 76, 77, 86). While 
     deployed, 2/1's companies were distributed throughout the 
     AOR, and conducted various training events that would prove 
     beneficial while operating at HKIA later in their deployment.
       (ii) Echo Company, 2/1 conducted two Mission Rehearsal 
     Exercises (MRXs), along with STP, CLD-21 and MWSD-373, at 
     PSAB in July 2021, where they focused on ECC operations and 
     security and response to a MASCAL event (exhibits 53, 54, 56, 
     57, 76). Echo Company, 2/1 also conducted non-lethal weapons 
     training at PSAB and additional medical training in Kuwait 
     (exhibit 82).
       (iii) Golf Company, 2/1 deployed three platoons to Jordan, 
     and one platoon initially to Djibouti, and then to PSAB, 
     where it supported the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 
     Personnel (TRAP) mission. In Jordan, Golf Company focused on 
     its core METs, but had the unique opportunity to train 
     alongside the U.K.'s 2 PARA, and the 77th Royal Jordanian 
     Marine Battalion (77th RJMB). Training with 2 PARA helped 
     build a level of interoperability and familiarity that proved 
     useful when Golf Company, 2/1 served alongside 2 PARA at 
     Abbey Gate, HKIA, whereas training with 77th RJMB helped Golf 
     Company Marines grow accustomed to operating with non-native 
     English speakers, a skill that also proved useful at HKIA 
     (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 80, 86, 89, 90). Third Platoon, Golf 
     Company, 2/1 received extensive medical training while 
     serving as the TRAP platoon, to include Tactical Combat 
     Casualty Care (TCCC), Combat Trauma Management (CTM) 
     training, and Valkyrie walking blood bank training (exhibits 
     86, 98). The rest of Golf Company conducted Combat Life Saver 
     (CLS) refresher training, TCCC refresher training, and MASCAL 
     training in Jordan, while Golf Company's junior Hospital 
     Corpsmen conducted CTM and Valkyrie training prior to 
     deploying to HKIA in support of the NEO (exhibits 77, 98).
       (iv) Fox Company, 2/1 deployed to the BEC, where the 
     company executed fixed site security and crowd control 
     operations, and trained on non-lethal weapons employment, all 
     of which prepared them to operate at Abbey Gate (exhibit 81). 
     All 2/1 companies discussed ROE and the importance of 
     treating people at the gates of HKIA with empathy and respect 
     prior to deploying to HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 56, 57, 76, 77, 
     78, 81). The STP completed multiple MASCAL drills while 
     deployed at Al Jaber, Kuwait and PSAB, prior to deploying to 
     HKIA (exhibit 66).
       e. Leadership.
       (1) Key Finding. COMREL and Task Organization. The task 
     organization worked. This was in large part due to pre-
     existing or quickly forged relationships among leaders at the 
     highest echelons and adaptability at the lower echelons.
       (a) The 82nd Airborne Division, led by MG Donahue, executed 
     their mission with a clear chain of command (exhibits 10, 
     121, 124, 125). The Division rapidly adapted to the changing 
     situation, as they were responsible for security of the 
     airhead, support to the NEO, planning for the retrograde of 
     all personnel and equipment, demilitarization of arms and 
     equipment, and executing the JTE (exhibits 121, 125). In 
     addition to security, the Division conducted initial 
     screening and recovery of AMCITs, LPRs, locally hired embassy 
     personnel, SIV applicants, and at risk Afghans at South and 
     West Gates (exhibit 143). Once identified and screened, these 
     evacuees were processed through the ECC for manifesting and 
     departure from HKIA (exhibits 121, 125).
       (b) General McKenzie established the NEO COMREL, and 
     officially granted 82nd Airborne TACON of JTF-CR (exhibit 10, 
     11, 238). In reality, JTF-CR was TACON to USFOR-A FWD, and 
     merely coordinated with the 82nd Airborne Division (exhibits 
     18, 21, 40, 125). This adjusted COMREL, along with the mixing 
     of tactical responsibilities, resulted in the 82nd conducting 
     airfield security and NEO for one sector, and JTF-CR 
     conducting airfield security and NEO in another sector 
     (exhibits 15, 121, 125, 143, 155). The senior officers made 
     this division of tasks work under the circumstances with 
     adjusted COMREL, mutual trust, and shared understanding.
       (2) Engaged and Responsive Leaders.
       (a) The leadership of the U.S. Forces tasked with 
     conducting a NEO at HKIA worked collaboratively to adapt in 
     an uncertain, chaotic, ambiguous, and high-threat 
     environment. U.S. Forces experienced rapidly changing, 
     complex relationships and compressed timelines to conduct a 
     NEO. These leadership challenges were exacerbated by the 
     reality that the Taliban, who could be described as a 
     supporting effort, were operating under a unity of effort as 
     opposed to a unity of command (exhibits 53, 125). This was 
     demonstrated at each location around the perimeter of HKIA, 
     where Taliban assistance ranged from actively supporting 
     crowd control, to non-support, and even actively taunting the 
     Marines (exhibits 23, 53, 100, 102, 125, 146). RADM Vasely, 
     MG Donahue, and BGen Sullivan conducted Key Leader 
     Engagements (KLE) to coordinate activities, ensure mission 
     accomplishment, and protect the force (exhibits 21, 23, 125). 
     Their coordination with the Taliban facilitated crowd control 
     and force protection, and minimized the incidence of kinetic 
     engagements between U.S. Forces, and Taliban (exhibits 53, 
     104, 125). While the ROE may not have been entirely clear at 
     all times, due to the rapidly changing situation, U.S. Forces 
     retained the right to self-defense, the ability to engage 
     individuals committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile 
     intent, and the ability to utilize riot-control measures in 
     defense to protect the force and civilians.
       (b) Military leadership at every level was engaged and 
     responsive, enabling security of the airhead, executing the 
     NEO, and planning to execute the Joint Tactical Exfiltration 
     (JTE). There were numerous examples of great leadership 
     during an operation amounting to simultaneous combat, 
     evacuation, and humanitarian tasks during a compressed time, 
     with constrained resources, and severe restrictions on 
     terrain. There are three examples to highlight, the first 
     being how leadership engaged the NSU and Taliban forces to 
     assist with inner and outer perimeter security and checkpoint 
     screening. Another example was the emplacement of the Chevron 
     obstacle at Abbey Gate, which in combination with outside 
     influences, had a profound impact on the flow of evacuees. 
     The last example was the battlefield rotations conducted 
     before 26 August and immediately before the blast at Abbey 
     Gate. It should be noted that several leaders and Marines 
     interviewed stated operations at

[[Page S3606]]

     HKIA were so chaotic, that even with the tremendous amounts 
     of training conducted prior to deployment, no training would 
     be able to prepare someone for what they faced (exhibits 107, 
     101 ). All of these examples tested leaders' ability to 
     remain flexible in a dynamic environment and challenged them 
     to rise above adversity.
       (c) These challenges began when civilians breached the 
     perimeter and started to occupy the southern area of HKIA on 
     15 August (exhibits 15, 53, 54, 56). This caused the JTF-CR 
     to send 50 out of 53 personnel, emptying their JOC, to assist 
     in pushing back the crowd (exhibit 15). It took almost 
     everyone on the airfield to get the civilians off the runway 
     in order to continue operations (exhibit 15, 53, 54, 56). 
     Leadership recognized that they had to build and leverage 
     relationships in order to provide better security and 
     screening. This led to negotiations between RADM Vasely, the 
     NSU, and the Taliban (exhibit 53). The NSU helped to clear 
     the airfield and manned their gate, while MG Donahue 
     instructed the Taliban regarding which areas they would need 
     to control and clear to facilitate the NEO (exhibit 18, 21, 
     123, 125). The Taliban would later establish outer 
     checkpoints and, more notably, provide security at the 
     Chevron outside the outer corridor of Abbey Gate (exhibits 
     54, 77, 81, 84, 85 86, 89).
       (d) The coordination to install the Chevron, which 
     ultimately changed the dynamics at Abbey Gate, involved the 
     U.K., Taliban and the Commander of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, 
     (TEXT REDACTED) The U.K. Forces devised the idea and the 
     placement location, but were having trouble executing (TEXT 
     REDACTED) and other members of the senior leadership were 
     conducting KLEs with the Taliban to discuss security and 
     future operations (exhibit 54, 18). (TEXT REDACTED) had the 
     Taliban move the broken vehicles that were in the way and 
     preventing the Chevron from being emplaced, and help to help 
     to control Afghan civilians (exhibit 77). The Taliban would 
     later provide security in front of and on top of the Chevron 
     containers (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85 86, 89). (TEXT 
     REDACTED) also coordinated with the MEU engineers to use 
     their equipment to move jersey barriers and emplace the 
     containers forming the Chevron (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85, 
     89, 103). This helped to create standoff between troops and 
     the crowd and control the flow of personnel coming into the 
     Abbey Gate for processing.
       (e) Leadership, from USFOR-A FWD down to the company level, 
     would visit the gates to ensure the Service members were 
     cared for and to gather situational awareness of the rapidly 
     changing environment. The USFOR-A FWD team would visit 
     gates multiple times a day (exhibit 21, 22, 23). The 
     USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) would visit the gates to check 
     on Marines/Soldiers and to provide reports on the current 
     conditions and situation at the gates (exhibits 17, 21, 
     96). On 26 August, just before 1700, BGen Sullivan, (TEXT 
     REDACTED) (all of JTF-CR) had visited Abbey Gate and left 
     the area 20 minutes before the blast (exhibits 17, 19). 
     (TEXT REDACTED) 3/10 IBCT, (TEXT REDACTED) 2/501 PIR, and 
     (TEXT REDACTED) 1/8 visited Abbey Gate on 26 August as 
     well (exhibits 104, 123, 126). The (TEXT REDACTED) of 2/1, 
     (TEXT REDACTED) attended a meeting at the Barron Hotel 
     with Taliban and U.K. Forces to discuss the impending 
     closure of Abbey Gate at 1600 on 26 August. As he was 
     leaving Abbey Gate, (TEXT REDACTED) was caught in the 
     blast (exhibits 53, 90).
       (f) Leaders on the ground engaged with their teams in order 
     to work through the evolving situation. They were 
     coordinating support with friendly units while also 
     negotiating with the NSU and Taliban to provide security for 
     gate operations and retrograde planning. Junior leaders were 
     empowered to make and execute decisions, as demonstrated 
     through the emplacement of the Chevron. Overall, military 
     leaders executed the mission and protected their Marines and 
     Soldiers to the best of their ability.
       f. Medical Considerations.
       (1) Key Finding. The wounds sustained by the KIA were so 
     catastrophic none could be saved. Medical providers at 
     multiple echelons stated access to additional advanced 
     treatment and equipment would not have saved more lives. The 
     capability at HKIA's Role II-E saved several Service Members 
     who otherwise would have succumbed to their wounds. Providers 
     stated the capability at HKIA was the most robust they had 
     experienced in an operational setting. Every Service Member 
     who could have been saved with medical treatment survived due 
     to the medical capability at HKIA.
       (2) Capabilities.
       (a) Role II. Throughout the Afghanistan NEO, there were two 
     Role II facilities at HKIA, one on North HKIA (NHKIA), 
     referred to at times as the NATO Role II, Role II-E, or the 
     Military Treatment Facility (MTF), had the most robust 
     capability, while a second facility at Camp Alvarado was 
     operated by 1/82 IBCT medical personnel (exhibits 66, 98, 
     128, 130, 131). The MTF hosted eight surgical teams, 
     including three Army Forward Resuscitative Surgical Teams 
     (FRST), one Army light surgical team, two U.S. SOSTs, one 
     Norwegian SOST, and one U.K. surgical team. The MTF had two 
     ORs, with the ability to surge to four patients 
     simultaneously, and space for seven intensive care unit (ICU) 
     and 14 ward patients, with the ability to surge on both. The 
     MTF also had CT scanning and x-ray capability, a lab, a 
     pharmacy, and an ER that operated 24 hours a day (exhibits 
     128, 131). According to multiple medical officers, the MTF at 
     HKIA had more assets and capability than any field facility 
     they had ever seen (exhibits 66, 128, 130, 131). The second 
     Role II facility, located at Camp Alvarado, was operated by 
     personnel from 1/82 IBCT and hosted an Army FRSD. The FRSD 
     was capable of providing limited damage control surgery and 
     resuscitation (exhibit 130).
       (b) Role I. There were two Role I-E facilities at HKIA 
     throughout the NEO. The 24th MEU's STP operated next to the 
     PAX Terminal on NHKIA, while the SPMAGTF's STP operated out 
     of a building between East Gate and Abbey Gate. The MEU STP 
     had two physician assistants (PA), two nurses, and 15 
     corpsmen (exhibit 16). The SPMAGTF STP had two ER doctors, 
     one PA, two nurses, and 12 corpsmen (exhibit 66). In addition 
     to the two Role I-E facilities, the U.K. operated a Role I 
     facility out of the Barron Hotel, in vicinity of Abbey Gate 
     (exhibits 77, 98).
       (3) MASCAL Plan. Prior to executing the NEO, the MASCAL 
     plan for HKIA was not comprehensive, in that it did not 
     incorporate every compound surrounding the airfield. Instead, 
     the existing MASCAL plan only referred to NHKIA, where the 
     aforementioned NATO Role II/MTF was located. Leading up to 
     the NEO, TF MED leadership began refining the MASCAL plan, 
     and attempted to designate CCPs and evacuation routes 
     throughout the airfield (exhibit 128). The updated plan was 
     not finalized prior to the beginning of the NEO, and as a 
     result, during the NEO the MASCAL plan was reduced to, ``In 
     the event of a MASCAL event, utilize all available vehicles 
     to transport casualties to the MTF as quickly as possible 
     (exhibits 66, 128, 130, 131)''. The lack of a comprehensive 
     MASCAL plan caused some frustration and concern for units 
     operating away from NHKIA (exhibit 66). Despite the lack of a 
     comprehensive plan, each unit conducted internal MASCAL 
     rehearsals that undoubtedly contributed to the rapid, 
     successful response witnessed following the Abbey Gate attack 
     of 26 August (exhibits 66, 98, 128, 130, 131).
       (4) Medical Rules of Engagement (MEDROE). At the start of 
     the NEO, the MEDROE were unclear among the various medical 
     providers (exhibits 66, 130, 131). The SPMAGTF STP and 1/82 
     IBCT Role II were initially under the impression they were to 
     adhere to the standing CENTCOM MEDROE, which was complicated 
     by the fact that service members were coming into close, 
     regular contact with large numbers of civilians at the HKIA 
     gates (exhibits 66, 130). After operating for several days 
     under an ambiguous MEDROE, TF MED's (TEXT REDACTED) passed 
     guidance to all providers at HKIA stating that they were 
     responsible for providing care to anyone within the gates of 
     the airfield (exhibits 66, 130, 131). The lack of initial 
     clarity regarding MEDROE presented a challenge for some 
     medical providers, and served as a source of frustration 
     (exhibit 66).
       (5) MASCAL Preparations Prior to 26 August. Upon his 
     arrival at HKIA, 82nd Airborne's Commander, MG Donahue, 
     identified the likelihood of a MASCAL event during the course 
     of the NEO, and tasked the 82nd's senior medical officer with 
     preparing for a MASCAL (exhibit 125). In the days leading up 
     to the attack on 26 August, units at all echelons conducted 
     MASCAL rehearsals (exhibits 16, 18, 21, 66, 98, 128, 130, 
     131). In response to the increased threat leading up to 26 
     August, the SPMAGTF STP (TEXT REDACTED) ran MASCAL rehearsals 
     in her clinic, and staged an ambulance with an en route care 
     team inside the inner gate at Abbey Gate on the evening of 25 
     August (exhibit 66). Beginning on the morning of 26 August, 
     Golf Company, 2/1 established a CCP inside the outer gate, 
     and consolidated medical supplies, litters, and corpsmen at 
     the CCP in anticipation of a potential attack and MASCAL 
     event (exhibits 77, 98). Following a phone call from the 
     USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) at 1310 on 26 August warning of a 
     likely attack, TF MED (TEXT REDACTED) consolidated all 
     medical personnel at the MTF, and kept them on standby 
     throughout the afternoon so that they were prepared to 
     respond rapidly to a MASCAL (exhibit 131).
       g. Chronology/Timeline of Events. See enclosure 9.
       4. Recommendations.
       a. TBI Screening. During the course of the investigation, 
     it became apparent Service Members received inconsistent 
     evaluation for concussion and TBI after the attack at Abbey 
     Gate. Since the initial medical evacuation of the wounded, 
     twelve Service Members have been added to the list of those 
     wounded in action; many for TBI. I therefore recommend 
     forwarding findings and recommendations to all CENTCOM 
     Service Component Commanders for consideration that all 
     Service Members at Abbey Gate during the attack, and present 
     in any blast zone depicted in exhibit 137, slide 7, be 
     evaluated for TBI.
       b. Mental Health Evaluation. A consistent trend during 
     interviews with young Marines were stories involving 
     traumatic injuries and death of children, separation of 
     families at gates, and outright rejection of evacuees 
     culminating in their distraught return to the civilian 
     population outside the gate. During the response to the 
     attack at Abbey Gate, young Marines heroically recovered the 
     wounded and rendered life-saving care. Others carried the 
     bodies of their deceased friends away from the canal. In 
     consideration of the mental and emotional strain placed on 
     these young Marines and other Service Members, I recommend 
     forwarding

[[Page S3607]]

     the findings and recommendations to all CENTCOM Service 
     Component Commanders. Recommend mental health evaluations and 
     treatment options for all personnel executing entry control 
     point operations at Abbey Gate from 17-26 August. Evaluations 
     and treatment options should also be pursued for personnel 
     involved in the medical response to the attack on Abbey Gate 
     on 26 August.
       c. Interagency NEO Doctrine. Many leaders observed planning 
     and execution with interagency partners was difficult, 
     because there was no shared understanding or baseline 
     concepts common to the various entities involved in the 
     execution of NEO. To address this shortcoming, I recommend 
     forwarding this investigation to the Joint Staff for 
     consideration in drafting and publication of interagency 
     doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.
       d. Further Investigation. During an interview with Platoon 
     Commanders of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, a Platoon Commander 
     stated a civilian was killed by a flash bang grenade. The 
     investigator did not pursue the line of questioning, because 
     of the group setting and potential for misconduct and a 
     rights advisement. After speaking with my legal advisor, I 
     assessed this line of inquiry was outside my scope to 
     investigate and would incur a significant delay in meeting my 
     timeline and mandate. I recommend forwarding exhibits 84 and 
     128 to MARCENT for potential investigation into statements 
     made by the Platoon Commander from Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, 
     concerning a possible civilian casualty caused by use of a 
     flash bang grenade.
       5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the 
     undersigned at (TEXT REDACTED) or at (TEXT REDACTED) (TEXT 
     REDACTED) LANCE G. CURTIS BG, USA Investigating Officer

                          ____________________