[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 20, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3537-S3538]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an 
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey 
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     ACTS-SCK-DO
     SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S. 
         Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International 
         Airport on 26 August 2021.
       (3) Gate Operations.
       (a) Occupation of Abbey Gate. At approximately 0800 on 19 
     August, Golf Company, reinforced by Fox Company platoons, 
     arrived at Abbey Gate and found U.K. and other foreign forces 
     standing in the inner corridor (exhibits 77, 89). Golf 
     Company attempted to open the gate to process evacuees and 
     enable U.K. Forces to move to the Barron Hotel (exhibits 77, 
     89). This attempt failed because the large and desperate 
     crowd in the outer corridor nearly breached the gate and 
     forced Golf Company to stop in less than an hour (exhibits 
     77, 89). On 20 August during the period of darkness, Golf 
     Company, reinforced by Fox Company platoons, moved the crowd 
     approximately 150 meters south passed the entrance of the 
     Barron Hotel (exhibits 77, 83, 89). 24th MEU engineers 
     emplaced several shipping containers to form an obstacle, 
     known as the Chevron, in the road (exhibits 77, 83, 86, 87, 
     89). The Taliban were employed to man the outside of the 
     obstacle and conducted initial screening and crowd control 
     (exhibits 77, 83, 89). Later on 20 August, crowds in the 
     canal breached the southern end of the fence separating the 
     canal from the outer corridor (exhibits 83, 172). Marines 
     identified the need to clear the nearside of the canal and 
     keep crowds on the opposite side (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 83).
       (b) Steady State Gate Operations.
       (i) After the establishment of the Chevron and clearing the 
     nearside of the canal, 2/1 established a steady state 
     operation of screening evacuees and movement to the PAX 
     Terminal (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 89). Steady state was between 
     21-25 August. Marines on the canal would search for persons 
     with documents (passports, immigration forms) meeting the 
     current eligibility requirements for evacuation (exhibits 77, 
     83). Marines at the Chevron would do a similar screening 
     (exhibits 78, 79). After pulling them into the outer corridor 
     perimeter, they would conduct a cursory search of the 
     potential evacuees, and place them into the holding area 
     (exhibits 77, 83). 2/1 Marines established the holding area 
     in the outer corridor traffic lane, against the HKIA exterior 
     wall (exhibits 57, 60, 61, 77, 83). When DoS Consular 
     officers were available, Marines would escort evacuees from 
     the holding area to the search area in the inner corridor 
     (exhibits 57, 60, 61, 77, 83). After thoroughly searching the 
     potential evacuees, Marines would escort them to an area 
     further into the inner corridor to be screened by the 
     Consular officer (exhibits 57, 60, 61, 77, 83). The Consular 
     officer would determine if the evacuees met the eligibility 
     criteria and approve moving the evacuees forward to the PAX 
     Terminal, or reject them, and the Marines would return them 
     to the canal (exhibits 56, 57, 60, 61, 77, 79, 80, 82). The 
     FST would assist in the searches and the escort of rejected 
     civilians back to the canal (exhibits 77, 83, 107). Corpsmen 
     were staged a CCP in the inner corridor and treated 
     casualties at the canal or Chevron (exhibits 77, 83, 98).
       (ii) U.K. Forces conducted NEO from the Barron Hotel, but 
     also provided personnel for security on the canal and the 
     Chevron (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 127). U.K. support to 
     steady state gate operations reduced as the NEO progressed 
     (exhibits 77). Other partner nations provided no assistance 
     with security at Abbey Gate (exhibits 56, 57, 60-63. 77, 79-
     88). Partner forces utilized Abbey Gate to escort their own 
     consular officers or to pull evacuees from the crowd 
     (exhibits 77, 79-89). Partner nations often did not 
     coordinate their activities with Marines at Abbey Gate, and 
     did not adhere to the established processing or security 
     procedures (exhibits 79-89).
       (c) Increased Crowds and Attack.
       (i) On 25 August, Echo Company recognized an increase in 
     the size and desperation of the crowd (exhibits 53, 56). The 
     Echo Company [TEXT REDACTED] was concerned with the crowd 
     pushing past the jersey barriers at the base of the sniper 
     tower and not having space to operate (exhibit 56). In 
     response, Echo Company cleared the crowd on the nearside of 
     the canal (exhibits 56, 60-62). Echo Company positioned 
     Marines approximately 150 meters down the canal, running 
     northeast, to maintain control of the nearside (exhibit 56, 
     77). At approximately 1600, Golf Company relieved Echo 
     company and assumed the same positions along the canal, the 
     outer corridor, and inner corridor (exhibit 77) [TEXT 
     REDACTED] received several updates concerning SVIED attacks 
     at gates and determined the positions down the canal 
     presented unacceptable risk to force and isolated Marines 
     from support, to include CASEVAC (exhibit 77). Golf Company 
     withdrew the Marines back down the nearside of the canal and 
     crowds backfilled the space almost immediately (exhibits 77, 
     83). [TEXT REDACTED] stopped the flow of evacuees and took 
     the defensive posture previously mentioned (exhibits 77, 83).
       (ii) The next day, crowds were even larger and more unruly 
     (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 83). Golf Company was forced to push 
     additional Marines to the canal to keep them from crossing 
     the jersey barriers at the base of the sniper tower (exhibits 
     53, 76, 77). Echo Company assumed inner gate responsibilities 
     so Golf Company could maintain the positions on the canal 
     (exhibits 56, 57). The crowds grew so desperate, they began 
     to crush people against the sniper tower walls and jersey 
     barriers (exhibits 53, 75, 77, 105). Golf Company Marines 
     consolidated at the base of the tower in response (exhibits 
     53, 76, 77, 83, Brit Video). At 1736, the single explosion 
     occurred, and detonated directly across from the platoon 
     gathered at the base of the tower (exhibits 5, 53, 76, 77, 
     83, 89). Shortly after, Abbey Gate closed, the 1/82nd IBCT 
     took over security of the Gate, U.K. Forces passed through 
     for the final time from the Barron Hotel, and gate operations 
     ended (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 124, 127).
       (4) Preventability of the Abbey Gate Attack. The attack was 
     not preventable at the tactical level without degrading the 
     mission to maximize the number of evacuees. Given the 
     priority of effort, time, resources, partner nation 
     requirements, and terrain restraints, the only mitigation 
     possible would have jeopardized the flow of evacuees and 
     potentially risk mission failure.
       (a) The priority for the Marines at Abbey Gate was 
     maximizing the flow of evacuees through the gate to the ECC 
     (exhibits 11, 15, 18, 56, 77, 88). Any time spent emplacing 
     obstacles was time not spent searching and screening civilian 
     evacuees. Additionally, many force protection measures that 
     could have been implemented, such as additional T-Walls or 
     HESCO barriers, would have inherently reduced the flow of 
     evacuees. Closing the gate was also not an option because of 
     U.K. efforts to conclude evacuation operations at the nearby 
     Barron Hotel (exhibits 18, 54, 121, 127). Closing the gates 
     would have isolated U.K. Forces and jeopardized the JTE force 
     flow and timeline, potentially initiating renewed armed 
     conflict with the Taliban (exhibits 15, 18, 21, 23, 125).
       (b) Leaders at Abbey Gate on 26 August made frequent 
     decisions (multiple times daily) to increase the force 
     protection posture. Electronic countermeasures were already 
     emplaced to prevent enemy coordination and radio controlled 
     device use (exhibit 65). Several times during the 18 hours 
     prior to the attack, the company commander stopped the flow 
     at the gate and had Marines take covered positions (exhibits 
     77, 83, 84). Medics were consolidated in the inner corridor 
     to ensure their safety and quick reaction to any attack, and 
     additional medical assets were surged forward (exhibits 66, 
     77, 98). An Afghan interpreter was recruited to pacify the 
     crowd using PSYOP capabilities (exhibit 107). ISR was 
     increased and the Taliban were tasked to screen for the 
     specific threat (exhibits 18, 125). Leaders struck the 
     balance of protecting the force and maximizing the flow of 
     evacuees as best as possible under the circumstances.


                              d. Readiness

       (1) Key Findings.
       (a) Most units that deployed to HKIA in support of the 
     Afghanistan NEO, with the exception of USFOR-A FWD and JTF-
     CR, had adequate manning levels for the assigned mission. 
     USFOR-A FWD and JTF-CR staffs were task-saturated due to the 
     nature of the NEO. The effects were further exacerbated by 
     the fact that many of their personnel were forced to expend 
     significant energy trying to find specific evacuees, or 
     groups of evacuees, at the gates of HKIA, on behalf of

[[Page S3538]]

     various U.S. government officials, senior military officers, 
     or special interest groups.
       (b) All units deployed to HKIA in support of the 
     Afghanistan NEO had trained on their respective mission 
     essential tasks (METs) prior to deployment. In some cases, 
     this included NEG-specific training, while in others it did 
     not. Leaders at all levels stated no training could 
     adequately prepare them for what they experienced at HKIA.
       (2) USFOR-A FWD.
       (a) Manning. USFOR-A FWD, led by RADM Pete Vasely, USN, 
     Commander, USFOR-A FWD, and Brigadier Thomas Day, United 
     Kingdom, Deputy Commander, USFOR-A FWD, was originally task 
     organized and manned as a SOJTF in anticipation of taking 
     over the NSOCC-A mission. In June 2021, they transitioned 
     Into Diplomatic Assurance Platform-Afghanistan (DAP-A), with 
     a focus on the medical, flight, and security requirements of 
     USEK (exhibit 20). In July 2021, RADM Vasely took command 
     from General Miller, and assumed the functions of Resolute 
     Support Headquarters (RSHQ) and USFOR-A, albeit with a 
     drastically reduced footprint due to a reduced boots on the 
     ground (BOG) force cap of 650 being implemented. In addition 
     to USFOR-A FWD's organic staff, they had TACON of one company 
     from 2nd IBCT, 10th Mountain Division, and two companies from 
     3rd IBCT, 10th Mountain Division (exhibits 20, 21).
       (b) Training. USFOR-A FWD trained to deploy as a SOJTF, and 
     did not train to assume the role of RSHQ and USFOR-A, nor did 
     they train to conduct a NEO. While deployed, USFOR-A FWD 
     participated in the 28 June Operational Planning Team (OPT) 
     at USEK, focused on pre-NEO planning. USFOR-A FWD then 
     participated in the CENTCOM-led NEO tabletop exercise (TTX) 
     on 29 June, and a National Security Council (NSC)-led NEO TTX 
     on 6 August (exhibits 20, 21).
       (3) 82nd Airborne Division.
       (a) Manning. 82nd Airborne Division HQ, led by MG 
     Christopher Donahue, initially deployed with a small team of 
     six staff members, and arrived at HKIA on 18 August. The 
     remainder of the Division HQ staff arrived on 20 August, 
     bringing the 82nd's total manpower to 106 personnel (exhibits 
     125, 152). The 1st IBCT, 82nd Airborne Division (1/82 IBCT), 
     led by [TEXT REDACTED] deployed as part of the IRF, began to 
     arrive at HKIA on 15 August, and had roughly 1000 soldiers on 
     hand by 16 August. The number of personnel TACON to 1/82 IBCT 
     would swell to 2360 throughout the NEO (exhibits 130, 152). 
     The 1/82 IBCT HQ was comprised of 65 personnel, and it had 
     TACON of elements from 1/504 PIR (515 personnel), 2/504 PIR 
     (378 personnel), 2/501 PIR (504 personnel), 3/319 Artillery 
     (257 personnel), 307th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) (56 
     personnel), 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion (24 personnel), 
     50th Expeditionary Signal Battalion (4 personnel), 16th 
     Military Police Brigade (150 personnel), and 1/194 Armor 
     Regiment (412 personnel) (exhibits 152, 153).
       (b) Training. The 82nd Airborne Division HQ is trained to 
     deploy rapidly, as part of the IRF, and did so in support of 
     the NEO. While deployed to HKIA, the Division HQ participated 
     in MASCAL TTXs and Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills, as well 
     as Rules of Engagement (ROE) ROC drills with subordinate and 
     adjacent units (exhibit 125). 1/82 IBCT began its IRF 
     preparation training in March 2021 during its Joint Readiness 
     Training Center (JRTC) rotation. During the IBCT's time at 
     JRTC, units rehearsed civic engagement, conducted mock 
     interagency engagements, utilized role players, and trained 
     on entry control point operations. They did not train on 
     crowd control or NEO (exhibits 121, 123). The 1/82 IBCT 
     conducted Leader Professional Development sessions, where 
     they executed tactical decision games focused on NEO 
     (exhibits 121, 123). The brigade also trained to secure 
     airfields (exhibits 121, 123, 124). 2/501 PIR executed three 
     deployment readiness exercises (DREs), where they practiced 
     deploying out of Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina 
     (exhibit 123).
       (4) JTF-CR.
       (a) Manning. JTF-CR activated in anticipation of the 
     Afghanistan NEO, and initially had a joint manning document 
     (JMD) with 187 personnel associated with it. The JTF sent 
     three Liaison Officers (LNOs) forward to Afghanistan in May 
     2021 to coordinate with USFOR-A, USEK, and HKIA. 
     Additionally, the JTF sent a quartering party comprised of 
     three Marines to HKIA to begin preparations for receiving the 
     JTF in the event of a NEO (exhibit 15). On 19 July, JTF-CR 
     sent an EEAT comprised of 49 personnel to HKIA to assist DoS 
     with processing SIV applicants for travel to the U.S., and to 
     continue preparations for receiving the JTF at HKIA in the 
     event of a NEO (exhibits 15, 18). By the third week of July, 
     JTF-CR had 55 personnel on the ground at HKIA, and would send 
     an additional 28 personnel forward from Bahrain on 4 August 
     (exhibit 15). By 26 August, the JTF-CR staff was back down to 
     59 personnel, as some staff members had redeployed. JTF-CR 
     staff personnel were chosen for their versatility, so they 
     could multi-task, and the JTF opted to place a heavy emphasis 
     on planning ability, due to the anticipated requirement of 
     multiple, competing planning efforts throughout the execution 
     of the NEO (exhibit 15). When the NEO began, the JTF-CR was 
     forced to employ most of its staff as a security force, due 
     to multiple breaches in the HKIA perimeter and a limited 
     number of security forces being on deck at HKIA (exhibits 15, 
     18).
       (b) Training. JTF-CR was certified as a JTF in 2019 
     (exhibits 15, 18), and again in 2020 (exhibit 18). In 
     addition to its certification via exercises and training, the 
     JTF had activated three times within the past year, to 
     include its planning response to the Beirut Port explosion in 
     August 2020, and its deployment in support of Operation 
     OCTAVE QUARTZ off the coast of Somalia in the spring of 2021 
     (exhibit 18). JTF-CR participated in NEO TTXs with CENTCOM at 
     the end of June, and the NSC on 6 August, but JTF-CR staff 
     members considered both to be ineffective, due to faulty 
     planning assumptions (exhibits 17, 18). During NEO execution 
     at HKIA, JTF-CR conducted MASCAL rehearsals with the Role II 
     clinic and USFOR-A FWD, which ultimately paid dividends on 26 
     August (exhibits 15, 16, 18). Multiple leaders from JTF-CR 
     stated that no training could have truly prepared service 
     members for the tasks they executed at HKIA throughout the 
     NEO (exhibits 17, 18).
       (5) 24th MEU.
       (a) Manning. The 24th MEU, led by [TEXT REDACTED] began 
     sending Marines into HKIA as part of its quartering party in 
     mid-July, and its CE began flowing into HKIA on 15 August. At 
     full strength, the MEU had 1249 Marines and Sailors at HKIA, 
     the bulk of which resided within BLT 1/8 and CLB-24 (exhibits 
     100, 101, 104). BLT 1/8 deployed 996 Marines and Sailors 
     across three rifle companies, a weapons company, an artillery 
     battery, a light armored reconnaissance company (-), an 
     engineer platoon, and a reconnaissance company (-) (exhibits 
     100, 104). CLB-24 deployed to HKIA with 225 Marines and 
     Sailors, task organized to support 24-hour ECC operations, 
     with roughly 70 Marines supporting three, 8-hour shifts each 
     day. CLB-24 personnel provided combat service support to 
     other units across HKIA, when they were not operating at the 
     ECC. CLB-24 also task organized a FST, comprised of 35 female 
     Marines and Sailors, with augmentation from BLT 1/8. CLB-24 
     had SPMAGTF's Combat Logistics Detachment-21 (CLD-21), and 
     Marine Wing Support Detachment-373 (MWSD-373) attached to 
     support ECC operations (exhibit 101).
       (b) Training. 24th MEU completed the standard pre-
     deployment training program focused on the MEU's 13 core 
     METs, including NEO (exhibits 100, 101, 104). The unit 
     conducted an additional, four-day NEO training package, 
     sponsored by Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) 
     in January 2021, which included DoS and civilian role player 
     participants (exhibits 100, 101, 104). In June 2021, while 
     ashore in Jordan, 24th MEU's CE and BLT conducted embassy 
     reinforcement and NEO training at the U.S. Embassy in Amman 
     (exhibits 100, 104). In July, the MEU offloaded in Kuwait to 
     posture for a potential NEO in Afghanistan, and throughout 
     the month of July and into August, the CE, BLT, and CLB 
     trained daily on various aspects of NEO, to include embassy 
     reinforcement, fixed site security, ECC operations, and NEO 
     Tracking System operations (exhibits 100, 101, 104). 
     Additionally, the FST Marines and Sailors trained on proper 
     search techniques to be employed at an ECC or ECP (exhibits 
     101, 107). MEU leadership agreed that the NEO training they 
     conducted did not adequately train their Marines and Sailors 
     for the conditions they faced at HKIA (exhibits 100, 101, 
     104).
       (6) SPMAGTF.
       (a) Manning. The SPMAGTF deployed a ``heavy package'' to 
     HKIA with components of the GCE, comprised of 2nd Battalion, 
     1st Marines (2/1), the Logistics Combat Element (LCE), 
     comprised of CLD-21, and Aviation Combat Element (ACE), 
     comprised of MWSD-373. Additionally, the SPMAGTF ``heavy 
     package'' included an STP and two EOD teams (exhibits 55, 65, 
     66). 2/1 deployed its entire battalion, with the exception of 
     one platoon from Golf Company, which provided escort security 
     aboard SPMAGTF flights to/from HKIA, two platoons from Fox 
     Company, which remained at the Baghdad Embassy Complex (BEC) 
     in Iraq to provide security, and their Combat Engineer 
     Platoon, which stayed at the BEC to support force protection 
     improvements there (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 56, 77, 78, 79, 81). 
     As a result of the Engineer Platoon not deploying to HKIA, 2/
     1 was forced to depend on CLD-21's engineer section, whose 
     focus at HKIA was ECC operations, and the BLT's Engineer 
     Platoon, whose focus was supporting the BLT at North and East 
     Gates.
       (b) Training.

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