[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 20, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3537-S3538]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S.
Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International
Airport on 26 August 2021.
(3) Gate Operations.
(a) Occupation of Abbey Gate. At approximately 0800 on 19
August, Golf Company, reinforced by Fox Company platoons,
arrived at Abbey Gate and found U.K. and other foreign forces
standing in the inner corridor (exhibits 77, 89). Golf
Company attempted to open the gate to process evacuees and
enable U.K. Forces to move to the Barron Hotel (exhibits 77,
89). This attempt failed because the large and desperate
crowd in the outer corridor nearly breached the gate and
forced Golf Company to stop in less than an hour (exhibits
77, 89). On 20 August during the period of darkness, Golf
Company, reinforced by Fox Company platoons, moved the crowd
approximately 150 meters south passed the entrance of the
Barron Hotel (exhibits 77, 83, 89). 24th MEU engineers
emplaced several shipping containers to form an obstacle,
known as the Chevron, in the road (exhibits 77, 83, 86, 87,
89). The Taliban were employed to man the outside of the
obstacle and conducted initial screening and crowd control
(exhibits 77, 83, 89). Later on 20 August, crowds in the
canal breached the southern end of the fence separating the
canal from the outer corridor (exhibits 83, 172). Marines
identified the need to clear the nearside of the canal and
keep crowds on the opposite side (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 83).
(b) Steady State Gate Operations.
(i) After the establishment of the Chevron and clearing the
nearside of the canal, 2/1 established a steady state
operation of screening evacuees and movement to the PAX
Terminal (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 89). Steady state was between
21-25 August. Marines on the canal would search for persons
with documents (passports, immigration forms) meeting the
current eligibility requirements for evacuation (exhibits 77,
83). Marines at the Chevron would do a similar screening
(exhibits 78, 79). After pulling them into the outer corridor
perimeter, they would conduct a cursory search of the
potential evacuees, and place them into the holding area
(exhibits 77, 83). 2/1 Marines established the holding area
in the outer corridor traffic lane, against the HKIA exterior
wall (exhibits 57, 60, 61, 77, 83). When DoS Consular
officers were available, Marines would escort evacuees from
the holding area to the search area in the inner corridor
(exhibits 57, 60, 61, 77, 83). After thoroughly searching the
potential evacuees, Marines would escort them to an area
further into the inner corridor to be screened by the
Consular officer (exhibits 57, 60, 61, 77, 83). The Consular
officer would determine if the evacuees met the eligibility
criteria and approve moving the evacuees forward to the PAX
Terminal, or reject them, and the Marines would return them
to the canal (exhibits 56, 57, 60, 61, 77, 79, 80, 82). The
FST would assist in the searches and the escort of rejected
civilians back to the canal (exhibits 77, 83, 107). Corpsmen
were staged a CCP in the inner corridor and treated
casualties at the canal or Chevron (exhibits 77, 83, 98).
(ii) U.K. Forces conducted NEO from the Barron Hotel, but
also provided personnel for security on the canal and the
Chevron (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 127). U.K. support to
steady state gate operations reduced as the NEO progressed
(exhibits 77). Other partner nations provided no assistance
with security at Abbey Gate (exhibits 56, 57, 60-63. 77, 79-
88). Partner forces utilized Abbey Gate to escort their own
consular officers or to pull evacuees from the crowd
(exhibits 77, 79-89). Partner nations often did not
coordinate their activities with Marines at Abbey Gate, and
did not adhere to the established processing or security
procedures (exhibits 79-89).
(c) Increased Crowds and Attack.
(i) On 25 August, Echo Company recognized an increase in
the size and desperation of the crowd (exhibits 53, 56). The
Echo Company [TEXT REDACTED] was concerned with the crowd
pushing past the jersey barriers at the base of the sniper
tower and not having space to operate (exhibit 56). In
response, Echo Company cleared the crowd on the nearside of
the canal (exhibits 56, 60-62). Echo Company positioned
Marines approximately 150 meters down the canal, running
northeast, to maintain control of the nearside (exhibit 56,
77). At approximately 1600, Golf Company relieved Echo
company and assumed the same positions along the canal, the
outer corridor, and inner corridor (exhibit 77) [TEXT
REDACTED] received several updates concerning SVIED attacks
at gates and determined the positions down the canal
presented unacceptable risk to force and isolated Marines
from support, to include CASEVAC (exhibit 77). Golf Company
withdrew the Marines back down the nearside of the canal and
crowds backfilled the space almost immediately (exhibits 77,
83). [TEXT REDACTED] stopped the flow of evacuees and took
the defensive posture previously mentioned (exhibits 77, 83).
(ii) The next day, crowds were even larger and more unruly
(exhibits 53, 56, 77, 83). Golf Company was forced to push
additional Marines to the canal to keep them from crossing
the jersey barriers at the base of the sniper tower (exhibits
53, 76, 77). Echo Company assumed inner gate responsibilities
so Golf Company could maintain the positions on the canal
(exhibits 56, 57). The crowds grew so desperate, they began
to crush people against the sniper tower walls and jersey
barriers (exhibits 53, 75, 77, 105). Golf Company Marines
consolidated at the base of the tower in response (exhibits
53, 76, 77, 83, Brit Video). At 1736, the single explosion
occurred, and detonated directly across from the platoon
gathered at the base of the tower (exhibits 5, 53, 76, 77,
83, 89). Shortly after, Abbey Gate closed, the 1/82nd IBCT
took over security of the Gate, U.K. Forces passed through
for the final time from the Barron Hotel, and gate operations
ended (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 124, 127).
(4) Preventability of the Abbey Gate Attack. The attack was
not preventable at the tactical level without degrading the
mission to maximize the number of evacuees. Given the
priority of effort, time, resources, partner nation
requirements, and terrain restraints, the only mitigation
possible would have jeopardized the flow of evacuees and
potentially risk mission failure.
(a) The priority for the Marines at Abbey Gate was
maximizing the flow of evacuees through the gate to the ECC
(exhibits 11, 15, 18, 56, 77, 88). Any time spent emplacing
obstacles was time not spent searching and screening civilian
evacuees. Additionally, many force protection measures that
could have been implemented, such as additional T-Walls or
HESCO barriers, would have inherently reduced the flow of
evacuees. Closing the gate was also not an option because of
U.K. efforts to conclude evacuation operations at the nearby
Barron Hotel (exhibits 18, 54, 121, 127). Closing the gates
would have isolated U.K. Forces and jeopardized the JTE force
flow and timeline, potentially initiating renewed armed
conflict with the Taliban (exhibits 15, 18, 21, 23, 125).
(b) Leaders at Abbey Gate on 26 August made frequent
decisions (multiple times daily) to increase the force
protection posture. Electronic countermeasures were already
emplaced to prevent enemy coordination and radio controlled
device use (exhibit 65). Several times during the 18 hours
prior to the attack, the company commander stopped the flow
at the gate and had Marines take covered positions (exhibits
77, 83, 84). Medics were consolidated in the inner corridor
to ensure their safety and quick reaction to any attack, and
additional medical assets were surged forward (exhibits 66,
77, 98). An Afghan interpreter was recruited to pacify the
crowd using PSYOP capabilities (exhibit 107). ISR was
increased and the Taliban were tasked to screen for the
specific threat (exhibits 18, 125). Leaders struck the
balance of protecting the force and maximizing the flow of
evacuees as best as possible under the circumstances.
d. Readiness
(1) Key Findings.
(a) Most units that deployed to HKIA in support of the
Afghanistan NEO, with the exception of USFOR-A FWD and JTF-
CR, had adequate manning levels for the assigned mission.
USFOR-A FWD and JTF-CR staffs were task-saturated due to the
nature of the NEO. The effects were further exacerbated by
the fact that many of their personnel were forced to expend
significant energy trying to find specific evacuees, or
groups of evacuees, at the gates of HKIA, on behalf of
[[Page S3538]]
various U.S. government officials, senior military officers,
or special interest groups.
(b) All units deployed to HKIA in support of the
Afghanistan NEO had trained on their respective mission
essential tasks (METs) prior to deployment. In some cases,
this included NEG-specific training, while in others it did
not. Leaders at all levels stated no training could
adequately prepare them for what they experienced at HKIA.
(2) USFOR-A FWD.
(a) Manning. USFOR-A FWD, led by RADM Pete Vasely, USN,
Commander, USFOR-A FWD, and Brigadier Thomas Day, United
Kingdom, Deputy Commander, USFOR-A FWD, was originally task
organized and manned as a SOJTF in anticipation of taking
over the NSOCC-A mission. In June 2021, they transitioned
Into Diplomatic Assurance Platform-Afghanistan (DAP-A), with
a focus on the medical, flight, and security requirements of
USEK (exhibit 20). In July 2021, RADM Vasely took command
from General Miller, and assumed the functions of Resolute
Support Headquarters (RSHQ) and USFOR-A, albeit with a
drastically reduced footprint due to a reduced boots on the
ground (BOG) force cap of 650 being implemented. In addition
to USFOR-A FWD's organic staff, they had TACON of one company
from 2nd IBCT, 10th Mountain Division, and two companies from
3rd IBCT, 10th Mountain Division (exhibits 20, 21).
(b) Training. USFOR-A FWD trained to deploy as a SOJTF, and
did not train to assume the role of RSHQ and USFOR-A, nor did
they train to conduct a NEO. While deployed, USFOR-A FWD
participated in the 28 June Operational Planning Team (OPT)
at USEK, focused on pre-NEO planning. USFOR-A FWD then
participated in the CENTCOM-led NEO tabletop exercise (TTX)
on 29 June, and a National Security Council (NSC)-led NEO TTX
on 6 August (exhibits 20, 21).
(3) 82nd Airborne Division.
(a) Manning. 82nd Airborne Division HQ, led by MG
Christopher Donahue, initially deployed with a small team of
six staff members, and arrived at HKIA on 18 August. The
remainder of the Division HQ staff arrived on 20 August,
bringing the 82nd's total manpower to 106 personnel (exhibits
125, 152). The 1st IBCT, 82nd Airborne Division (1/82 IBCT),
led by [TEXT REDACTED] deployed as part of the IRF, began to
arrive at HKIA on 15 August, and had roughly 1000 soldiers on
hand by 16 August. The number of personnel TACON to 1/82 IBCT
would swell to 2360 throughout the NEO (exhibits 130, 152).
The 1/82 IBCT HQ was comprised of 65 personnel, and it had
TACON of elements from 1/504 PIR (515 personnel), 2/504 PIR
(378 personnel), 2/501 PIR (504 personnel), 3/319 Artillery
(257 personnel), 307th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) (56
personnel), 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion (24 personnel),
50th Expeditionary Signal Battalion (4 personnel), 16th
Military Police Brigade (150 personnel), and 1/194 Armor
Regiment (412 personnel) (exhibits 152, 153).
(b) Training. The 82nd Airborne Division HQ is trained to
deploy rapidly, as part of the IRF, and did so in support of
the NEO. While deployed to HKIA, the Division HQ participated
in MASCAL TTXs and Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills, as well
as Rules of Engagement (ROE) ROC drills with subordinate and
adjacent units (exhibit 125). 1/82 IBCT began its IRF
preparation training in March 2021 during its Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC) rotation. During the IBCT's time at
JRTC, units rehearsed civic engagement, conducted mock
interagency engagements, utilized role players, and trained
on entry control point operations. They did not train on
crowd control or NEO (exhibits 121, 123). The 1/82 IBCT
conducted Leader Professional Development sessions, where
they executed tactical decision games focused on NEO
(exhibits 121, 123). The brigade also trained to secure
airfields (exhibits 121, 123, 124). 2/501 PIR executed three
deployment readiness exercises (DREs), where they practiced
deploying out of Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina
(exhibit 123).
(4) JTF-CR.
(a) Manning. JTF-CR activated in anticipation of the
Afghanistan NEO, and initially had a joint manning document
(JMD) with 187 personnel associated with it. The JTF sent
three Liaison Officers (LNOs) forward to Afghanistan in May
2021 to coordinate with USFOR-A, USEK, and HKIA.
Additionally, the JTF sent a quartering party comprised of
three Marines to HKIA to begin preparations for receiving the
JTF in the event of a NEO (exhibit 15). On 19 July, JTF-CR
sent an EEAT comprised of 49 personnel to HKIA to assist DoS
with processing SIV applicants for travel to the U.S., and to
continue preparations for receiving the JTF at HKIA in the
event of a NEO (exhibits 15, 18). By the third week of July,
JTF-CR had 55 personnel on the ground at HKIA, and would send
an additional 28 personnel forward from Bahrain on 4 August
(exhibit 15). By 26 August, the JTF-CR staff was back down to
59 personnel, as some staff members had redeployed. JTF-CR
staff personnel were chosen for their versatility, so they
could multi-task, and the JTF opted to place a heavy emphasis
on planning ability, due to the anticipated requirement of
multiple, competing planning efforts throughout the execution
of the NEO (exhibit 15). When the NEO began, the JTF-CR was
forced to employ most of its staff as a security force, due
to multiple breaches in the HKIA perimeter and a limited
number of security forces being on deck at HKIA (exhibits 15,
18).
(b) Training. JTF-CR was certified as a JTF in 2019
(exhibits 15, 18), and again in 2020 (exhibit 18). In
addition to its certification via exercises and training, the
JTF had activated three times within the past year, to
include its planning response to the Beirut Port explosion in
August 2020, and its deployment in support of Operation
OCTAVE QUARTZ off the coast of Somalia in the spring of 2021
(exhibit 18). JTF-CR participated in NEO TTXs with CENTCOM at
the end of June, and the NSC on 6 August, but JTF-CR staff
members considered both to be ineffective, due to faulty
planning assumptions (exhibits 17, 18). During NEO execution
at HKIA, JTF-CR conducted MASCAL rehearsals with the Role II
clinic and USFOR-A FWD, which ultimately paid dividends on 26
August (exhibits 15, 16, 18). Multiple leaders from JTF-CR
stated that no training could have truly prepared service
members for the tasks they executed at HKIA throughout the
NEO (exhibits 17, 18).
(5) 24th MEU.
(a) Manning. The 24th MEU, led by [TEXT REDACTED] began
sending Marines into HKIA as part of its quartering party in
mid-July, and its CE began flowing into HKIA on 15 August. At
full strength, the MEU had 1249 Marines and Sailors at HKIA,
the bulk of which resided within BLT 1/8 and CLB-24 (exhibits
100, 101, 104). BLT 1/8 deployed 996 Marines and Sailors
across three rifle companies, a weapons company, an artillery
battery, a light armored reconnaissance company (-), an
engineer platoon, and a reconnaissance company (-) (exhibits
100, 104). CLB-24 deployed to HKIA with 225 Marines and
Sailors, task organized to support 24-hour ECC operations,
with roughly 70 Marines supporting three, 8-hour shifts each
day. CLB-24 personnel provided combat service support to
other units across HKIA, when they were not operating at the
ECC. CLB-24 also task organized a FST, comprised of 35 female
Marines and Sailors, with augmentation from BLT 1/8. CLB-24
had SPMAGTF's Combat Logistics Detachment-21 (CLD-21), and
Marine Wing Support Detachment-373 (MWSD-373) attached to
support ECC operations (exhibit 101).
(b) Training. 24th MEU completed the standard pre-
deployment training program focused on the MEU's 13 core
METs, including NEO (exhibits 100, 101, 104). The unit
conducted an additional, four-day NEO training package,
sponsored by Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG)
in January 2021, which included DoS and civilian role player
participants (exhibits 100, 101, 104). In June 2021, while
ashore in Jordan, 24th MEU's CE and BLT conducted embassy
reinforcement and NEO training at the U.S. Embassy in Amman
(exhibits 100, 104). In July, the MEU offloaded in Kuwait to
posture for a potential NEO in Afghanistan, and throughout
the month of July and into August, the CE, BLT, and CLB
trained daily on various aspects of NEO, to include embassy
reinforcement, fixed site security, ECC operations, and NEO
Tracking System operations (exhibits 100, 101, 104).
Additionally, the FST Marines and Sailors trained on proper
search techniques to be employed at an ECC or ECP (exhibits
101, 107). MEU leadership agreed that the NEO training they
conducted did not adequately train their Marines and Sailors
for the conditions they faced at HKIA (exhibits 100, 101,
104).
(6) SPMAGTF.
(a) Manning. The SPMAGTF deployed a ``heavy package'' to
HKIA with components of the GCE, comprised of 2nd Battalion,
1st Marines (2/1), the Logistics Combat Element (LCE),
comprised of CLD-21, and Aviation Combat Element (ACE),
comprised of MWSD-373. Additionally, the SPMAGTF ``heavy
package'' included an STP and two EOD teams (exhibits 55, 65,
66). 2/1 deployed its entire battalion, with the exception of
one platoon from Golf Company, which provided escort security
aboard SPMAGTF flights to/from HKIA, two platoons from Fox
Company, which remained at the Baghdad Embassy Complex (BEC)
in Iraq to provide security, and their Combat Engineer
Platoon, which stayed at the BEC to support force protection
improvements there (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 56, 77, 78, 79, 81).
As a result of the Engineer Platoon not deploying to HKIA, 2/
1 was forced to depend on CLD-21's engineer section, whose
focus at HKIA was ECC operations, and the BLT's Engineer
Platoon, whose focus was supporting the BLT at North and East
Gates.
(b) Training.
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