[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 19, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3367-S3369]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an 
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey 
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       ACTS-SCK-DO
       SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S. 
     Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport 
     on 26 August 2021
       (r) The SPMAGTF EOD Team, attached to 2/1, conducted a post 
     blast analysis at 0620 on 27 August with U.K. Forces EOD and 
     Taliban security (exhibits 5, 65). EOD concluded the blast 
     was either a vest or backpack detonated on the far side of 
     the canal held above the waist, directly across from 1st 
     Platoon, Golf Company Marines (exhibit 5). EOD deduced this 
     location from the fragmentation pattern in the nearside canal 
     wall, fragmentation in the PSYOP vehicle, and blast burns on 
     the wall on the far side of the canal (exhibit 5). The 
     fragmentation from the vest or backpack was primarily ball 
     bearings (exhibits 5, 95). Open source news reported the 
     Taliban had recently freed the individual bomber, (TEXT 
     REDACTED) on 15 August from the Parwan Detention Facility 
     near Bagram Air Base (exhibit 165). The investigation found 
     no evidence to support a conclusion the bomber used U.S. 
     identification to clear Taliban checkpoints on the approaches 
     to the Abbey Gate canal. There were multiple avenues of 
     approach to the canal, continuously used by Afghans to bypass 
     Taliban checkpoints (exhibits 76, 102). The bomber likely 
     used one of these avenues. Further, no Marine mentioned that 
     any person used U.S. identification to move closer to their 
     position in relation to the attack.
       (s) There was no complex attack; it was a single suicide 
     bomber not accompanied by enemy small arms fire.
       (i) Immediately following the blast, nearly all Marines and 
     personnel reported small arms fire (see all exhibits with 2/1 
     Marines, 24th MEU). There is wide variation of thought on 
     where the firing originated and who was actually doing the 
     firing. Many Marines described personnel near the canal as 
     the source of outgoing small arms fire immediately following 
     the blast. Many Marines, to

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     include snipers in the tower, also recall fire from the 
     Chevron area into the outer gate and from the East (see all 
     exhibits with 2/1 Marines, 24th MEU). Marines from Golf 
     Company described seeing individuals on a roof near a water 
     tank to their east, one with a camera and one with a rifle 
     (exhibits 86, 87). These Marines stated they fired on the 
     individuals after confirming they posed a threat, and that 
     they suppressed the threat (exhibits 86, 87, 88). Golf 
     Company Marines reported U.K. Forces occupied the position in 
     that building shortly after the attack, but (TEXT REDACTED) 2 
     PARA, stated his soldiers never occupied a position in that 
     building (exhibits 86, 87, 88, 127, 148). Several key leaders 
     from 2/1 stated it was unlikely Marines received fire from 
     the East, as Taliban members had occupied those buildings 
     throughout the NEO (exhibits 53, 76, 77). The 2/1 Marines S2 
     stated that friendly forces occupied all elevated positions 
     around Abbey Gate (exhibit 76). Soldiers from the 82nd 
     Airborne Division provided overwatch of Abbey Gate from a 
     tower 75 meters north of the outer gate tower. (TEXT 
     REDACTED) was in the tower during and after the blast, and 
     was confident small arms fire came from the vicinity of the 
     Barron Hotel and not the Chevron or the East (exhibit 144). 
     (TEXT REDACTED) also had visual of one Afghan civilian on a 
     rooftop near Abbey Gate, but this individual posed no threat 
     (exhibit 144). It is unlikely Marines received fire from 
     buildings to the East of Abbey Gate. If they did, it was far 
     more likely to have originated from a rogue Taliban member, 
     than it was part of a complex attack.
       (ii) Marines who reported hearing small arms fire after the 
     blast most likely heard friendly warning shots. Golf Company, 
     2/1 Marines specifically identified members of the Recon 
     Company, 24th MEU as shooting from near the canal after the 
     explosion (exhibits 77, 87, 88). (TEXT REDACTED) of the 2nd 
     Marine Recon Company, stated during their interview that 
     (TEXT REDACTED) fired unsuppressed warning shots (two 
     hammered pairs) at an individual who positioned himself to 
     observe the Marines' reaction to the blast and had been in 
     the crowd acting suspiciously before the blast (exhibit 
     106, 184, 237). (TEXT REDACTED) fired the rounds 
     southwest, down the canal, toward the Barron Hotel. The 
     rounds would have crossed the frontage of Marines, who 
     were entering the canal to recover casualties and take up 
     security positions, which would have contributed to their 
     perception that they were taking fire (106, 237). No 
     Marines beyond the Recon element Staff NCOs, and those 
     firing at the individuals near the water tank, describe 
     having positive identification of any targets (exhibits 
     62, 66, 86, 87, 88, 106). This includes the snipers in the 
     Abbey Gate tower and Soldiers in the tower to the North, 
     who had the best vantage point (exhibit 62, 144).
       (iii) In addition to the Recon element firing warning 
     shots, (TEXT REDACTED) 2 PARA, confirmed U.K. Troops fired 
     warning shots to help control the crowd in vicinity of the 
     Barron Hotel (exhibits 127, 148). The Bravo Company, 2/501 
     PIR (TEXT REDACTED) was in the outer corridor, south of the 
     blast area, and described seeing two U.K. Soldiers firing 
     their weapons at a 45-degree angle into the air, towards the 
     northeast (exhibit 124). These roundsalso would have crossed 
     in front of Golf 2/1 Marines, contributing to their confusion 
     about taking fire.
       (iv) Claims by the Marines to have heard or felt fire 
     originating from outside Abbey Gate should be attributed to 
     both the 2 PARA and Marine Recon personnel firing warning 
     shots, and their potential for disorientation post blast 
     (exhibits 76, 95, 106, 127, 148). Many of the Marines we 
     interviewed were at Abbey Gate. The vast majority of those 
     Marines were within the blast radius and suffered potential 
     TBIs or concussions from the event (exhibits 62, 63, 77, 88, 
     91, 92, 93, 95, 164). There was a tremendous amount of smoke, 
     and tear gas canisters were ruptured and pouring chemicals 
     into the blast area, further limiting visibility, and 
     responsiveness (exhibits 63, 89, 127), Nearby observers noted 
     the overwhelming noise from the wounded and civilian crowd 
     fleeing the area (exhibit 148). Marines at the canal were 
     already exhausted and were now experiencing sensory overload 
     (exhibits 77, 127). It is unknown whom Marines engaged 
     holding a weapon on a rooftop immediately following the 
     blast, or even if this actually occurred. (exhibits 76, 77, 
     87, 88). During the interviews, fellow Marines expressed 
     skepticism and doubt about possible positive identification 
     of targets (exhibits 87, 88). It is worth noting the only 
     Marines who reported receiving fire following the explosion 
     were junior Marines, with no prior combat experience. (TEXT 
     REDACTED) and other leaders concluded there was no complex 
     attack, merely the belief there was one (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 
     102, 148).
       (t) Interviews with Marines at Abbey Gate post-attack 
     revealed no information supporting a conclusion fratricide or 
     civilian casualties resulted from reaction to the blast. Open 
     source research found no reporting to support a conclusion 
     warning shots or engagement of targets in response to the 
     attack caused additional harm to civilians. Marines did 
     report stopping civilians from running through the gate after 
     the attack, and presenting deadly force to stop civilians 
     with bags from approaching or using hones, but no shots were 
     fired in these instances (exhibited 63). A Platoon (TEXT 
     REDACTED) from 2/1 Marines, (TEXT REDACTED) stated during a 
     group interviewed he witnessed a flash bang grenade detonate 
     near a civilian's head (exhibit 84). He stated the incident 
     did not appear intentional and assumed the injury resulted in 
     death (exhibit 84). This incident took place during the 
     confrontation at Abbey Gate on 20 August between Golf Company 
     and unruly civilians who breached the gate (exhibit 84). 
     (TEXT REDACTED) Surgeon at the Role II-E, recalled treating a 
     civilian with an eye injury that may have been from Abbey 
     Gate (exhibit 128).
       (u) The reaction to the blast, and the immediate CASEVAC, 
     by the 2/1 Marines, and adjacent Army and Marine units, were 
     nothing short of incredible. All wounded personnel were 
     evacuated from the canal blast site to the inner gate CCP in 
     15 minutes (exhibit 53). All the wounded were evacuated by 
     vehicle to the Role II-E at North HKIA in less than one hour 
     (exhibit 66). Marines flooded the blast area, worked through 
     tear gas, and expeditiously moved over 30 personnel nearly 
     100 meters to the CCP (exhibits 62, 63, 64, 65, 76, 77, 88, 
     92). Marines used riot control shields as makeshift litters 
     and a Marine immediately cut multiple holes in the fence to 
     shorten the distance from the blast site to the CCP (exhibits 
     62, 63, 88, 92). At the CCP, Navy corpsmen, and Marines with 
     additional medical training, were assessing and stabilizing 
     the wounded rapidly (exhibits 63, 77, 98, 144). The situation 
     was chaotic. With many leaders injured, it was difficult to 
     determine if anyone was truly in charge, but collectively the 
     task of triage and movement was successfully accomplished 
     (exhibits 53, 57, 66, 76. 77, 78, 90, 98,124, 128, 131). At 
     least twenty vehicles rotated through Abbey Gate to move the 
     wounded either to the SPMAGTF's STP Role I-E facility, 
     positioned between Abbey and East Gates, or directly to the 
     Role II-E at North HKIA (exhibits 66, 124). The STP Role I-E 
     facility treated four urgent surgical patients, to include 2/
     1 Marine (TEXT REDACTED) during the MASCAL event (exhibit 
     66). The STP also treated injured Afghan civilians for over 
     an hour and half after the attack (exhibit 66). All wounded 
     from Abbey Gate were evacuated from HKIA rearward to CONUS by 
     0700 on 27 August.
       (v) After the blast and recovery of all Marines and U.S. 
     personnel, (TEXT REDACTED) Echo Company (TEXT REDACTED) took 
     control of the outer gate, closed the gate and focused on 
     internal security (exhibits 56, 77) (TEXT REDACTED) focused 
     internally on his company, which sustained heavy casualties 
     (exhibit 77). The SPMAGTF EOD Team attached to 2/1 conducted 
     a search for secondary devices and sensitive items after the 
     gate was closed (exhibit 65). U.K. Forces took over security 
     of the canal and outer corridor, but the blast dispersed the 
     crowd considerably (exhibits 15, 17, 18, 53, 56, 65, 77). At 
     approximately 0200 on 27 August, (TEXT REDACTED) Bravo 
     Company, 2/501 PIR, began to transition his company into 
     Abbey Gate to relieve Echo Company and 2/1 Marines (exhibit 
     124). By 0500, Bravo Company had taken responsibility for 
     security of Abbey Gate (exhibit 124). U.K. Forces did not 
     complete their operations at Barron Hotel and fully 
     retrograde through the inner gate of Abbey Gate until 0700 
     (exhibits 124, 127).
       (w) 2/1 Marines consolidated in North HKIA and received the 
     task of demilitarizing equipment in preparation for the JTE 
     (exhibits 54, 57, 77). At approximately 1300 on 27 August, 
     they attended the Ramp Ceremony and the KIA from the blast 
     were evacuated rearward (exhibits 14, 54, 100). Before 
     departing HKIA, but after completion of demilitarization, 2/1 
     Marines were tasked to police call the PAX Terminal area of 
     trash and debris (exhibits 54, 56). 2/1 Marines perceived 
     this order to be punishment for some of their excessive 
     demilitarization efforts, namely defacing and breaking 
     property that was not supposed to be broken (exhibit 56). MG 
     Donahue specifically commented on the excessive destruction 
     by 2/1 Marines, stating DoS and 82nd had to intervene 
     (exhibit 125). He overtly noted Golf Company Marines, led by 
     (TEXT REDACTED) were not involved in the destruction and had 
     set the standard for all units operating at the gates 
     throughout the NEO (exhibit 125). The 2/1 Marines departed in 
     two groups, with Fox Company (-), Golf Company, and Weapons 
     Company departing for Camp Buehring, Kuwait on 28 August and 
     2/1 Battalion HQ with Echo Company departing on 29 August for 
     PSAB (exhibit 54).
       c. Force Protection, specifically including pertinent 
     issues associated with; Force Posture. and Gate Operations.
       (1) Key Finding. The attack was not preventable at the 
     tactical level without degrading the mission to maximize the 
     number of evacuees.
       (2) Force Posture
       (a) Manning. Abbey Gate was operated by 2/1 Marines 
     throughout the NEO (exhibits 53, 56, 77,100). On 19 August, 
     Golf Company consisted of three platoons, and was reinforced 
     by two additional platoons of Fox Company, when they 
     established operations at Abbey Gate (exhibits 77, 81). From 
     19-22 August, Golf Company was responsible for Abbey Gate and 
     relieved by Echo Company on 22 August (exhibits 56, 77). From 
     22-25 August, Echo Company, with four platoons, reinforced by 
     two Weapons Company platoons, was responsible for Abbey Gate. 
     At approximately 1600 on 25 August, Golf Company reinforced 
     by Fox Company platoons, resumed responsibility of Abbey Gate 
     (exhibits 56, 77). Echo Company, reinforced by Weapons 
     Company platoons, was tasked to prepare Abbey Gate for 
     closure and RIP with 1/82 IBCT (exhibits 56, 57). On the 
     afternoon of 26 August,

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     the size and aggressiveness of the crowd increased (exhibits 
     53, 56, 77). (TEXT REDACTED) tasked Echo Company to assume 
     operation of the inner corridor to facilitate Golf Company's 
     need to allocate more platoons for crowd control in the outer 
     corridor (exhibits 53, 56, 77). At the time of the blast, 
     approximately seven platoons were operating Abbey Gate. This 
     consisted of three from Golf Company, two from Fox Company, 
     and two from Echo Company (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 81). Steady 
     state manning was generally five to six platoons (exhibits 
     53, 56, 77).
       (b) Rest Cycle. Companies rotated between Abbey Gate, QRF, 
     rest, and evacuee security for those waiting for processing 
     or flights (exhibits 53, 56, 57, 77). While establishing the 
     gate, rest cycles were initially by opportunity only, 
     resulting in infrequent and short periods for Marines to 
     sleep during 72-hour periods at the gate (exhibits 53, 56, 
     57, 77). After gate operations normalized, the companies were 
     able to establish a sustainable rest cycle, with one platoon 
     rotating to a rest shift for six or eight hours (exhibits 53, 
     56, 77, 81). Because of the tempo of operations, all units at 
     HKIA experienced challenges establishing rest cycles 
     (exhibits 13, 15, 53, 57, 76).
       (c) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Marines at Abbey 
     Gate consistently maintained full PPE while working in the 
     outer corridor and canal areas (exhibits 54, 89, 98). PPE 
     included plate carrier, small arms protective inserts (SAPI), 
     eye protection, ballistic helmet, and issued combat gloves 
     (exhibit 55, 89, 98). Marines could remove PPE during rest 
     periods. In the inner corridor, behind protective cover 
     (exhibits 83, 89). Marines occasionally removed their helmets 
     to humanize themselves and deescalate confrontations with 
     civilian evacuees (exhibits 83, 89). Marines affected by the 
     blast were universally wearing their PPE, as evidenced by 
     statements, autopsy results, and JTAPIC analysis (exhibits 
     77, 83, 89, 138, 145). The one known exception was (TEXT 
     REDACTED) 1st Platoon (TEXT REDACTED). At the time of the 
     blast, he removed his helmet to engage with a civilian 
     evacuee at the canal wall (exhibit 83, 92). JTAPIC analysis 
     demonstrated helmets and SAPls were effective in stopping all 
     fragmentation (exhibit 138).
       (d) Crowd Control Measures. The most effective method of 
     crowd control was physical presence and interaction by 
     Marines with the crowds (exhibits 56, 77, 80, 129). 
     Professional actions, verbal commands, physical force, and 
     riot control shields prevented crowds from breaching the gate 
     (exhibits 56, 77, 80, 89). Forces utilized warning shots with 
     varying degrees of success at HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 100, 
     117, 118). 2/1 Marines did not use warning shots and only 
     used flash bang grenades infrequently (exhibits 53, 54, 77, 
     80, 83). The employment of riot control agents (RCAs), such 
     as tear gas, required 0-6 approval for use in defensive 
     situations (exhibit 116, 117). 2/1 Marines employed cross 
     cultural engagement and de-escalation with the civilian 
     population to establish calm and decrease aggressiveness 
     (exhibits 57, 77). The employment of PSYOP capabilities 
     served to enhance the 2/1 Marines' techniques by 
     communicating threat warnings, document requirements, and 
     advisements for safety and temporary closures (exhibits 105, 
     129).
       (e) Force Protection Measures. Abbey Gate Corridor provided 
     some natural force protection and required additional effort 
     by 2/1 Marines to enhance survivability.
       (i) The canal running southwest to northeast initially 
     served as a natural obstacle. The canal was approximately 
     three meters wide and two-three meters deep, and held 
     approximately a foot of water throughout the NEO (exhibits 
     172, 176-178, 192). The wall and fence of Abbey Gate bordered 
     the canal on the northwest, or nearside, and a wall and fence 
     on the opposite side divided the area from private property, 
     which created a long alley (exhibits 167, 172, 176-178, 192). 
     The canal walls rose approximately three feet above the 
     ground on each side, providing protection to Marines on one 
     side, and creating an obstacle for the crowd on the other 
     side (exhibits 167, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 192). Jersey 
     barriers were located at the base of the sniper tower to 
     impede the flow of civilians from approaching the gate on the 
     nearside of the canal (exhibits 167, 172, 177, 178, 180, 182, 
     185, 192). The terrain limited the crowd from massing and 
     overwhelming Marine formations (exhibits 167, 172, 175-178, 
     192).
       (ii) 2/1 Marines made a significant improvement to force 
     protection when they emplaced the shipping containers, known 
     as the Chevron (exhibit 83, 89). This obstacle blocked the 
     road leading to Abbey Gate from the South, reducing risk of 
     VBIEDs and controlling the in-flow of crowds (exhibits 15, 
     18, 53, 77, 89). Another improvement was installation of 
     concertina wire across the nearside canal wall to prevent 
     civilians from climbing out of the canal (exhibits 167, 172, 
     176-178, 192). Snipers continuously operated from the tower 
     to provide overwatch of Marines executing screening and to 
     observe the crowd for potential risks to force (exhibit 62), 
     The SPMAGTF EOD section installed two ECM devices at Abbey 
     Gate to prevent the use of remote control detonated IEDs and 
     inhibit the cell phone communications of potential attackers 
     (exhibit 62, 65). When threat streams indicated an impending 
     attack, commanders regularly stopped processing evacuees, 
     pulled Marines back to cover, and reduced posture (exhibits 
     19, 77, 80, 89), Leaders utilized UAVs and RAID cameras to 
     observe avenues of approach and maintain situational 
     awareness to employ QRF for emergencies (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 
     54, 102, 125).

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