[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 19, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3367-S3369]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S.
Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport
on 26 August 2021
(r) The SPMAGTF EOD Team, attached to 2/1, conducted a post
blast analysis at 0620 on 27 August with U.K. Forces EOD and
Taliban security (exhibits 5, 65). EOD concluded the blast
was either a vest or backpack detonated on the far side of
the canal held above the waist, directly across from 1st
Platoon, Golf Company Marines (exhibit 5). EOD deduced this
location from the fragmentation pattern in the nearside canal
wall, fragmentation in the PSYOP vehicle, and blast burns on
the wall on the far side of the canal (exhibit 5). The
fragmentation from the vest or backpack was primarily ball
bearings (exhibits 5, 95). Open source news reported the
Taliban had recently freed the individual bomber, (TEXT
REDACTED) on 15 August from the Parwan Detention Facility
near Bagram Air Base (exhibit 165). The investigation found
no evidence to support a conclusion the bomber used U.S.
identification to clear Taliban checkpoints on the approaches
to the Abbey Gate canal. There were multiple avenues of
approach to the canal, continuously used by Afghans to bypass
Taliban checkpoints (exhibits 76, 102). The bomber likely
used one of these avenues. Further, no Marine mentioned that
any person used U.S. identification to move closer to their
position in relation to the attack.
(s) There was no complex attack; it was a single suicide
bomber not accompanied by enemy small arms fire.
(i) Immediately following the blast, nearly all Marines and
personnel reported small arms fire (see all exhibits with 2/1
Marines, 24th MEU). There is wide variation of thought on
where the firing originated and who was actually doing the
firing. Many Marines described personnel near the canal as
the source of outgoing small arms fire immediately following
the blast. Many Marines, to
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include snipers in the tower, also recall fire from the
Chevron area into the outer gate and from the East (see all
exhibits with 2/1 Marines, 24th MEU). Marines from Golf
Company described seeing individuals on a roof near a water
tank to their east, one with a camera and one with a rifle
(exhibits 86, 87). These Marines stated they fired on the
individuals after confirming they posed a threat, and that
they suppressed the threat (exhibits 86, 87, 88). Golf
Company Marines reported U.K. Forces occupied the position in
that building shortly after the attack, but (TEXT REDACTED) 2
PARA, stated his soldiers never occupied a position in that
building (exhibits 86, 87, 88, 127, 148). Several key leaders
from 2/1 stated it was unlikely Marines received fire from
the East, as Taliban members had occupied those buildings
throughout the NEO (exhibits 53, 76, 77). The 2/1 Marines S2
stated that friendly forces occupied all elevated positions
around Abbey Gate (exhibit 76). Soldiers from the 82nd
Airborne Division provided overwatch of Abbey Gate from a
tower 75 meters north of the outer gate tower. (TEXT
REDACTED) was in the tower during and after the blast, and
was confident small arms fire came from the vicinity of the
Barron Hotel and not the Chevron or the East (exhibit 144).
(TEXT REDACTED) also had visual of one Afghan civilian on a
rooftop near Abbey Gate, but this individual posed no threat
(exhibit 144). It is unlikely Marines received fire from
buildings to the East of Abbey Gate. If they did, it was far
more likely to have originated from a rogue Taliban member,
than it was part of a complex attack.
(ii) Marines who reported hearing small arms fire after the
blast most likely heard friendly warning shots. Golf Company,
2/1 Marines specifically identified members of the Recon
Company, 24th MEU as shooting from near the canal after the
explosion (exhibits 77, 87, 88). (TEXT REDACTED) of the 2nd
Marine Recon Company, stated during their interview that
(TEXT REDACTED) fired unsuppressed warning shots (two
hammered pairs) at an individual who positioned himself to
observe the Marines' reaction to the blast and had been in
the crowd acting suspiciously before the blast (exhibit
106, 184, 237). (TEXT REDACTED) fired the rounds
southwest, down the canal, toward the Barron Hotel. The
rounds would have crossed the frontage of Marines, who
were entering the canal to recover casualties and take up
security positions, which would have contributed to their
perception that they were taking fire (106, 237). No
Marines beyond the Recon element Staff NCOs, and those
firing at the individuals near the water tank, describe
having positive identification of any targets (exhibits
62, 66, 86, 87, 88, 106). This includes the snipers in the
Abbey Gate tower and Soldiers in the tower to the North,
who had the best vantage point (exhibit 62, 144).
(iii) In addition to the Recon element firing warning
shots, (TEXT REDACTED) 2 PARA, confirmed U.K. Troops fired
warning shots to help control the crowd in vicinity of the
Barron Hotel (exhibits 127, 148). The Bravo Company, 2/501
PIR (TEXT REDACTED) was in the outer corridor, south of the
blast area, and described seeing two U.K. Soldiers firing
their weapons at a 45-degree angle into the air, towards the
northeast (exhibit 124). These roundsalso would have crossed
in front of Golf 2/1 Marines, contributing to their confusion
about taking fire.
(iv) Claims by the Marines to have heard or felt fire
originating from outside Abbey Gate should be attributed to
both the 2 PARA and Marine Recon personnel firing warning
shots, and their potential for disorientation post blast
(exhibits 76, 95, 106, 127, 148). Many of the Marines we
interviewed were at Abbey Gate. The vast majority of those
Marines were within the blast radius and suffered potential
TBIs or concussions from the event (exhibits 62, 63, 77, 88,
91, 92, 93, 95, 164). There was a tremendous amount of smoke,
and tear gas canisters were ruptured and pouring chemicals
into the blast area, further limiting visibility, and
responsiveness (exhibits 63, 89, 127), Nearby observers noted
the overwhelming noise from the wounded and civilian crowd
fleeing the area (exhibit 148). Marines at the canal were
already exhausted and were now experiencing sensory overload
(exhibits 77, 127). It is unknown whom Marines engaged
holding a weapon on a rooftop immediately following the
blast, or even if this actually occurred. (exhibits 76, 77,
87, 88). During the interviews, fellow Marines expressed
skepticism and doubt about possible positive identification
of targets (exhibits 87, 88). It is worth noting the only
Marines who reported receiving fire following the explosion
were junior Marines, with no prior combat experience. (TEXT
REDACTED) and other leaders concluded there was no complex
attack, merely the belief there was one (exhibits 53, 76, 77,
102, 148).
(t) Interviews with Marines at Abbey Gate post-attack
revealed no information supporting a conclusion fratricide or
civilian casualties resulted from reaction to the blast. Open
source research found no reporting to support a conclusion
warning shots or engagement of targets in response to the
attack caused additional harm to civilians. Marines did
report stopping civilians from running through the gate after
the attack, and presenting deadly force to stop civilians
with bags from approaching or using hones, but no shots were
fired in these instances (exhibited 63). A Platoon (TEXT
REDACTED) from 2/1 Marines, (TEXT REDACTED) stated during a
group interviewed he witnessed a flash bang grenade detonate
near a civilian's head (exhibit 84). He stated the incident
did not appear intentional and assumed the injury resulted in
death (exhibit 84). This incident took place during the
confrontation at Abbey Gate on 20 August between Golf Company
and unruly civilians who breached the gate (exhibit 84).
(TEXT REDACTED) Surgeon at the Role II-E, recalled treating a
civilian with an eye injury that may have been from Abbey
Gate (exhibit 128).
(u) The reaction to the blast, and the immediate CASEVAC,
by the 2/1 Marines, and adjacent Army and Marine units, were
nothing short of incredible. All wounded personnel were
evacuated from the canal blast site to the inner gate CCP in
15 minutes (exhibit 53). All the wounded were evacuated by
vehicle to the Role II-E at North HKIA in less than one hour
(exhibit 66). Marines flooded the blast area, worked through
tear gas, and expeditiously moved over 30 personnel nearly
100 meters to the CCP (exhibits 62, 63, 64, 65, 76, 77, 88,
92). Marines used riot control shields as makeshift litters
and a Marine immediately cut multiple holes in the fence to
shorten the distance from the blast site to the CCP (exhibits
62, 63, 88, 92). At the CCP, Navy corpsmen, and Marines with
additional medical training, were assessing and stabilizing
the wounded rapidly (exhibits 63, 77, 98, 144). The situation
was chaotic. With many leaders injured, it was difficult to
determine if anyone was truly in charge, but collectively the
task of triage and movement was successfully accomplished
(exhibits 53, 57, 66, 76. 77, 78, 90, 98,124, 128, 131). At
least twenty vehicles rotated through Abbey Gate to move the
wounded either to the SPMAGTF's STP Role I-E facility,
positioned between Abbey and East Gates, or directly to the
Role II-E at North HKIA (exhibits 66, 124). The STP Role I-E
facility treated four urgent surgical patients, to include 2/
1 Marine (TEXT REDACTED) during the MASCAL event (exhibit
66). The STP also treated injured Afghan civilians for over
an hour and half after the attack (exhibit 66). All wounded
from Abbey Gate were evacuated from HKIA rearward to CONUS by
0700 on 27 August.
(v) After the blast and recovery of all Marines and U.S.
personnel, (TEXT REDACTED) Echo Company (TEXT REDACTED) took
control of the outer gate, closed the gate and focused on
internal security (exhibits 56, 77) (TEXT REDACTED) focused
internally on his company, which sustained heavy casualties
(exhibit 77). The SPMAGTF EOD Team attached to 2/1 conducted
a search for secondary devices and sensitive items after the
gate was closed (exhibit 65). U.K. Forces took over security
of the canal and outer corridor, but the blast dispersed the
crowd considerably (exhibits 15, 17, 18, 53, 56, 65, 77). At
approximately 0200 on 27 August, (TEXT REDACTED) Bravo
Company, 2/501 PIR, began to transition his company into
Abbey Gate to relieve Echo Company and 2/1 Marines (exhibit
124). By 0500, Bravo Company had taken responsibility for
security of Abbey Gate (exhibit 124). U.K. Forces did not
complete their operations at Barron Hotel and fully
retrograde through the inner gate of Abbey Gate until 0700
(exhibits 124, 127).
(w) 2/1 Marines consolidated in North HKIA and received the
task of demilitarizing equipment in preparation for the JTE
(exhibits 54, 57, 77). At approximately 1300 on 27 August,
they attended the Ramp Ceremony and the KIA from the blast
were evacuated rearward (exhibits 14, 54, 100). Before
departing HKIA, but after completion of demilitarization, 2/1
Marines were tasked to police call the PAX Terminal area of
trash and debris (exhibits 54, 56). 2/1 Marines perceived
this order to be punishment for some of their excessive
demilitarization efforts, namely defacing and breaking
property that was not supposed to be broken (exhibit 56). MG
Donahue specifically commented on the excessive destruction
by 2/1 Marines, stating DoS and 82nd had to intervene
(exhibit 125). He overtly noted Golf Company Marines, led by
(TEXT REDACTED) were not involved in the destruction and had
set the standard for all units operating at the gates
throughout the NEO (exhibit 125). The 2/1 Marines departed in
two groups, with Fox Company (-), Golf Company, and Weapons
Company departing for Camp Buehring, Kuwait on 28 August and
2/1 Battalion HQ with Echo Company departing on 29 August for
PSAB (exhibit 54).
c. Force Protection, specifically including pertinent
issues associated with; Force Posture. and Gate Operations.
(1) Key Finding. The attack was not preventable at the
tactical level without degrading the mission to maximize the
number of evacuees.
(2) Force Posture
(a) Manning. Abbey Gate was operated by 2/1 Marines
throughout the NEO (exhibits 53, 56, 77,100). On 19 August,
Golf Company consisted of three platoons, and was reinforced
by two additional platoons of Fox Company, when they
established operations at Abbey Gate (exhibits 77, 81). From
19-22 August, Golf Company was responsible for Abbey Gate and
relieved by Echo Company on 22 August (exhibits 56, 77). From
22-25 August, Echo Company, with four platoons, reinforced by
two Weapons Company platoons, was responsible for Abbey Gate.
At approximately 1600 on 25 August, Golf Company reinforced
by Fox Company platoons, resumed responsibility of Abbey Gate
(exhibits 56, 77). Echo Company, reinforced by Weapons
Company platoons, was tasked to prepare Abbey Gate for
closure and RIP with 1/82 IBCT (exhibits 56, 57). On the
afternoon of 26 August,
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the size and aggressiveness of the crowd increased (exhibits
53, 56, 77). (TEXT REDACTED) tasked Echo Company to assume
operation of the inner corridor to facilitate Golf Company's
need to allocate more platoons for crowd control in the outer
corridor (exhibits 53, 56, 77). At the time of the blast,
approximately seven platoons were operating Abbey Gate. This
consisted of three from Golf Company, two from Fox Company,
and two from Echo Company (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 81). Steady
state manning was generally five to six platoons (exhibits
53, 56, 77).
(b) Rest Cycle. Companies rotated between Abbey Gate, QRF,
rest, and evacuee security for those waiting for processing
or flights (exhibits 53, 56, 57, 77). While establishing the
gate, rest cycles were initially by opportunity only,
resulting in infrequent and short periods for Marines to
sleep during 72-hour periods at the gate (exhibits 53, 56,
57, 77). After gate operations normalized, the companies were
able to establish a sustainable rest cycle, with one platoon
rotating to a rest shift for six or eight hours (exhibits 53,
56, 77, 81). Because of the tempo of operations, all units at
HKIA experienced challenges establishing rest cycles
(exhibits 13, 15, 53, 57, 76).
(c) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Marines at Abbey
Gate consistently maintained full PPE while working in the
outer corridor and canal areas (exhibits 54, 89, 98). PPE
included plate carrier, small arms protective inserts (SAPI),
eye protection, ballistic helmet, and issued combat gloves
(exhibit 55, 89, 98). Marines could remove PPE during rest
periods. In the inner corridor, behind protective cover
(exhibits 83, 89). Marines occasionally removed their helmets
to humanize themselves and deescalate confrontations with
civilian evacuees (exhibits 83, 89). Marines affected by the
blast were universally wearing their PPE, as evidenced by
statements, autopsy results, and JTAPIC analysis (exhibits
77, 83, 89, 138, 145). The one known exception was (TEXT
REDACTED) 1st Platoon (TEXT REDACTED). At the time of the
blast, he removed his helmet to engage with a civilian
evacuee at the canal wall (exhibit 83, 92). JTAPIC analysis
demonstrated helmets and SAPls were effective in stopping all
fragmentation (exhibit 138).
(d) Crowd Control Measures. The most effective method of
crowd control was physical presence and interaction by
Marines with the crowds (exhibits 56, 77, 80, 129).
Professional actions, verbal commands, physical force, and
riot control shields prevented crowds from breaching the gate
(exhibits 56, 77, 80, 89). Forces utilized warning shots with
varying degrees of success at HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 100,
117, 118). 2/1 Marines did not use warning shots and only
used flash bang grenades infrequently (exhibits 53, 54, 77,
80, 83). The employment of riot control agents (RCAs), such
as tear gas, required 0-6 approval for use in defensive
situations (exhibit 116, 117). 2/1 Marines employed cross
cultural engagement and de-escalation with the civilian
population to establish calm and decrease aggressiveness
(exhibits 57, 77). The employment of PSYOP capabilities
served to enhance the 2/1 Marines' techniques by
communicating threat warnings, document requirements, and
advisements for safety and temporary closures (exhibits 105,
129).
(e) Force Protection Measures. Abbey Gate Corridor provided
some natural force protection and required additional effort
by 2/1 Marines to enhance survivability.
(i) The canal running southwest to northeast initially
served as a natural obstacle. The canal was approximately
three meters wide and two-three meters deep, and held
approximately a foot of water throughout the NEO (exhibits
172, 176-178, 192). The wall and fence of Abbey Gate bordered
the canal on the northwest, or nearside, and a wall and fence
on the opposite side divided the area from private property,
which created a long alley (exhibits 167, 172, 176-178, 192).
The canal walls rose approximately three feet above the
ground on each side, providing protection to Marines on one
side, and creating an obstacle for the crowd on the other
side (exhibits 167, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 192). Jersey
barriers were located at the base of the sniper tower to
impede the flow of civilians from approaching the gate on the
nearside of the canal (exhibits 167, 172, 177, 178, 180, 182,
185, 192). The terrain limited the crowd from massing and
overwhelming Marine formations (exhibits 167, 172, 175-178,
192).
(ii) 2/1 Marines made a significant improvement to force
protection when they emplaced the shipping containers, known
as the Chevron (exhibit 83, 89). This obstacle blocked the
road leading to Abbey Gate from the South, reducing risk of
VBIEDs and controlling the in-flow of crowds (exhibits 15,
18, 53, 77, 89). Another improvement was installation of
concertina wire across the nearside canal wall to prevent
civilians from climbing out of the canal (exhibits 167, 172,
176-178, 192). Snipers continuously operated from the tower
to provide overwatch of Marines executing screening and to
observe the crowd for potential risks to force (exhibit 62),
The SPMAGTF EOD section installed two ECM devices at Abbey
Gate to prevent the use of remote control detonated IEDs and
inhibit the cell phone communications of potential attackers
(exhibit 62, 65). When threat streams indicated an impending
attack, commanders regularly stopped processing evacuees,
pulled Marines back to cover, and reduced posture (exhibits
19, 77, 80, 89), Leaders utilized UAVs and RAID cameras to
observe avenues of approach and maintain situational
awareness to employ QRF for emergencies (exhibits 13, 15, 18,
54, 102, 125).
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