[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 118 (Monday, July 18, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3333-S3335]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S.
Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International
Airport on 26 August 2021
(e) Abbey Gate was structured from North to South, with the
inner Abbey Gate at the north end opening to the actual
airfield. There was a 265-meter corridor between the inner
gate and the outer gate, to the south, known as the inner
corridor. This area served as a sally port for searching and
processing vehicles. Two lanes divided by jersey barriers
were beyond the outer gate. The egress lane from the Barron
Hotel, which joined the gate road from the southeast, was
approximately 120 meters south of the outer gate. The Chevron
obstacle was approximately 155 meters south of the outer
gate. The area between the outer gate and the Chevron was
known as the outer corridor. A sewage canal ran generally
east to west parallel to the inner and outer corridors, on
the east side of the perimeter wall and fence. During
operations of Abbey Gate, 2/1 established a holding area in
the outer corridor lanes, a search and DoS processing
location in the inner corridor, and security/crowd control
positions at the canal and Chevron. Additionally, the sniper
section established
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an overwatch position in the tower at the outer gate. Marines
escorted evacuees through a break in the canal fence or
around the Chevron, and ushered them into the outer corridor
holding area for an initial search. Outside the Chevron, the
Taliban conducted crowd control and initial screening. U.K.
Forces processed their evacuees at the Barron Hotel and drove
them through the outer corridor lanes, through the Abbey
Gate, to the airfield (see all exhibits from
2/1 Marines, Echo Company, Golf Company, and enclosure 11-
13). Companies rotated responsibility for gate operations,
with Golf Company initially taking the canal security
positions, Fox Company taking the Chevron area, and dividing
the inner gate search and escort duties (exhibits 53, 76, 77,
79, 81, 89). Echo Company rotated into gate operations later
in the NEO to enable a rest cycle for all companies (exhibits
53, 56, 76).
(f) Between 20 and 25 August, gate operations took on a
structured and predictable battle rhythm. Crowds were
desperate but manageable, able to be kept calm at Abbey Gate
because Marines interacted with the people continuously and
used the PSYOP capability to communicate (exhibits 57, 79,
80, 83, 85, 88). Early in the NEO, crowds at Abbey Gate
numbered around 1500 between the canal and the Chevron
entrance, and another 500-1000 in the outer gate holding
area. There was a concern throughout 2/1 that the crowds
could riot and force the gate open at any time {exhibits 57,
83). The JTF-CR J2 described the crowd as the greatest threat
to mission, because at any time they could have forced their
way past Marines and onto the airfield, stopping air
operations, and ultimately the evacuation (exhibit 15).
Several factors undermined the Marines' and U.K. Forces'
efforts to keep the crowds calm.
(i) The Taliban used excessive force outside the Chevron,
which created the incentive for civilians to avoid the main
road entrance and move to Abbey Gate via the canal (exhibits
53, 77, 79, 80). Over time, the canal became extremely
crowded and people were being crushed and injured (exhibits
53, 77, 79, 80, 214, 220).
(ii) DoS Consular officers provided inconsistent support at
Abbey Gate, and the required documentation for evacuation
changed hourly (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88).
Marines often had to halt gate processing and flow, because
the Consular officers were not present to screen and approve
evacuees for movement to the PAX Terminal (exhibits 53, 77,
79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88). It is possible Consular officers
were absent from the gate because of threat reporting and to
better meter the flow of evacuees and not overcrowd the
airfield (exhibit 146). However, the crowd would eventually
notice the halt in processing and become highly agitated
(exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88).
(iii) Partner nation representatives/forces consistently
conducted uncoordinated evacuee extractions at Abbey Gate.
Partner nation forces frequently left potential evacuees
unsecured within 2/1 Marines' perimeter, or relied upon
Marines to escort their rejected evacuees back to the canal
(exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88). Partner nation representatives/
forces often pulled out large groups of people, usually
families (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88). The crowd would see
the disparate treatment of select personnel and become
agitated (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88).
(g) Threat reporting during the NEO was continuous and
generally non-specific. The USFOR-A FWD and JTF-CR staffs
estimated the threat streams to be credible reports during
the 10-day NEO (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21). The threats varied
from VBIED attacks and Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive
Devices (SVIEDs) against gates, to bags in the crowds or
aircraft hijackings with evacuees concealing bombs and
weapons on flights (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 102, 115). 2/1
Marines believed their only means to counter these threats,
without degrading the mission, was to increase overwatch and
actively search for civilians meeting the descriptions
provided (exhibits 15, 53, 56, 57, 77, 80). 2/1 Marines
attempted to balance the need to continue to interact with
the crowd to pull potential evacuees into the outer gate and
increase force protection (exhibits 53, 56, 77). On several
occasions, both prior to and throughout 26 August, 2/1
Marines providing security along the canal pulled back from
the crowd, took a knee behind jersey barriers, and stopped
the flow of processing based on reports indicating specific
times of attack (exhibits 53, 77, 89).
(h) By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the Main Effort for Gate
Operations at HKIA. The terrain and infrastructure at East
and North Gates, coupled with threats to force and large,
unruly crowds, made these gates untenable for evacuation
operations (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104). Both gates were
effectively closed between 20-25 August (exhibits 15, 18,
100, 102, 104). The West and South Gates were still
operational, but both were used for coordinated arrivals and
openings (exhibits 125, 126). The decreased access to
evacuation processing points at HKIA forced DoS and partner
nations to direct most small groups and individual evacuees
to Abbey Gate (exhibit 15, 125, 126, 127, 146). The canal at
Abbey Gate facilitated crowd control and provided some
standoff, and the Chevron minimized the VBIED threat
(exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 83, 84). There were effective
overwatch positions, and the Taliban screened the main
approach (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 83, 84). Over time, crowds
bypassed Taliban checkpoints to get to the canal and seek
access to HKIA (exhibits 77-88).
(i) On 25 August, the crowd in the canal outside Abbey Gate
was noticeably larger than the days prior, numbering around
2000-3000 (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). In addition to the
Taliban activity at the Chevron, Marines attributed this
swell in civilians at the canal to the closure of many of the
other gates at HKIA and the impending withdrawal date of 31
August (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). The 2 PARA Commander
observed the efficiency and accessibility of Abbey Gate had
become publicly known, drawing more people (exhibit 127). The
crowd was also noticeably more desperate (exhibits 53, 55,
77, 80). Echo Company operated the gate during the day on 25
August, and conducted a RIP at 1600 with Golf Company
(exhibits 56, 77). During Echo Company's time on the gate,
they pushed the crowd back from the sniper tower and jersey
barriers on the nearside of the canal to create standoff
(exhibit 56). With the assistance of U.K. Forces, Echo
Company pushed the crowds 150-meters down the nearside of the
canal, and Marines maintained control of the terrain between
the jersey barriers and newly established perimeter (exhibits
56, 59, 60, 61). After conducting his RIP, (TEXT REDACTED)
Golf Company (TEXT REDACTED) was concerned the Marines and
U.K. Forces were overextended based on recent threat
reporting, and decided to collapse the position back to the
base of the sniper tower at the outer gate (exhibit 77).
(j) During the evening of 25 August and into the morning of
26 August, the crowds in the canal continued to grow and
became increasingly desperate (exhibits 53, 77, 80, 89).
Threat reporting on 25 and 26 August indicated Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) would execute an attack
at a gate using a SVIED (exhibits 13, 15, 76, 77). Nearly
every Marine interviewed in 2/1 was aware of the reported
threat, but did not find the information to be out of the
ordinary compared to other earlier threats (exhibits 57, 59,
60, 61, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 86, 89). Many
noted the information was more specific, but changed
regularly (different bags and descriptions of the bomber)
(exhibit 88). At approximately 2330 on 25 August, after
collapsing the nearside canal security down to the sniper
tower, (TEXT REDACTED) had all Marines take a knee and reduce
their posture behind the canal wall and jersey barriers. This
lasted until daylight on 26 August (exhibits 77, 88). (TEXT
REDACTED) had the unit take the same force posture at
approximately 1400 for 30 minutes, based on additional threat
reporting (exhibits 77, 88, 89). After the brief stand-down,
2/1 Marines continued to process evacuees, having what some
considered to be their most productive day on 26 August
(exhibit 80).
(k) Throughout the evening of 25 August, into the morning
of 26 August, units prepared for the planned closure of Abbey
Gate to enable the JTE of Marine forces (exhibits 15, 18, 53,
56, 57, 76, 77). The U.K. Forces were unable to meet the
planned closure time of 1800 on 25 August, and subsequently
were unable to meet the new time of 0700 on 26 August
(exhibits 15, 18, 53, 56, 76, 77). During the afternoon of 25
August, the U.K. PARA units operating from the Barron Hotel
had near1y 1000 evacuees to process (exhibit 127). The 2 PARA
Commander on the ground received two timelines for completion
of evacuation operations, with the initial completion date of
25 August and the adjusted timeline of period of darkness 27
August (exhibit 127). The U.K. met this second completion
time (exhibits 124, 127). A higher authority within the U.K.
Forces, not present at HKIA, was responsible for the change
in the timeline, not the 2 PARA Commander (exhibit 127).
(l) On 26 August, at approximately 1600, Golf Company
rotated the platoons on the line an hour early due to 4th
Platoon growing fatigued, and 1st Platoon took over canal
security (exhibits 77, 89). Most of Golf Company worked the
outer gate because the crowds were growing desperate (exhibit
77). People were being crushed and injured at the jersey
barriers at the base of the sniper tower (exhibits 77, 83,
88, 89). Echo Company was working the inner gate, as of
1200-1300, to provide additional manpower at the gate area
and prepare for the closing of Abbey Gate that night
(exhibits 56, 77). (TEXT REDACTED) was concerned with the
threat reporting and ordered all 1stSgts and Corpsmen to
remain in the inner corridor area for force protection
(exhibit 77). However, some corpsmen were called forward
because of heat and trauma injuries suffered by civilians
in the crowd (exhibits 77, 92). At approximately 1600,
(TEXT REDACTED) attended a meeting with (TEXT REDACTED) 2/
501 PIR (TEXT REDACTED) the 2 PARA (TEXT REDACTED) and the
Taliban to discuss U.K. passage of lines from Barron
Hotel, handover of security of the outer gate to the
Taliban, and responsibility of the inner gate
transitioning to 2/501 PIR (exhibits 53, 77). At
approximately 1700, BGen Sullivan visited Abbey Gate and
discussed the closure timeline with (TEXT REDACTED)
exhibits 15, 17, 18, 53, 77). BGen Sullivan departed at
approximately 1715 (exhibits 15, 17, 18). At approximately
1725, (TEXT REDACTED) 24th MEU (TEXT REDACTED) convinced
an Afghan civilian to speak to the crowd through a non-
standard loud speaker for 10 minutes (exhibit 105). The
messaging pleaded with the crowed to stop pushing, and
stated that women and children were being crushed to death
(exhibit 105). Three snipers from the
2/1 Marines Sniper section, attached to Echo Company, but
in direct support of units at Abbey Gate, were in the
tower at the outer gate (exhibit 62). The snipers in the
tower were (TEXT REDACTED) was at the base of
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the tower near the fence (exhibits 62, 63). They were well
aware of the reported threats and scanned the large and
unruly crowd in the canal for individuals ``out of
baseline'' or demonstrating hostile intent (exhibit 62).
(m) At approximately 1730 on 26 August, the crowds at Abbey
Gate were desperate and growing agitated (exhibits 76, 77,
80, 84, 89). First Platoon, Golf Company, led by (TEXT
REDACTED) were consolidated at the jersey barriers beneath
the tower at the outer gate (exhibits 77, 88, 89, 91, 92).
The platoon was forced to move nearly all personnel into the
corner to hold back the massive and largely recalcitrant
crowd from coming over the barriers and breaching the gate
(exhibits 89, 91). Three members of the FST, Sgt Nicole Gee,
Sgt Johanny Rosario Pichardo, and (TEXT REDACTED) were
operating slightly behind the platoon (exhibits 89, 91, 92,
106, 107). (TEXT REDACTED) 2/1's (TEXT REDACTED) were
standing to the North of the PSYOP vehicle in the outer
corridor (exhibits 53, 76). (TEXT REDACTED) was near the
canal, approximately 30-40 meters from the sniper tower
(exhibits 77, 89, 92). Several members of Echo Company were
in the outer corridor area, escorting civilians or looking
for specific potential evacuees (exhibits 61, 62, 63). SSgt
Darin Hoover was near the fence at the base of the outer gate
tower (exhibit 63). (TEXT REDACTED) was escorting an
interpreter to the canal to look for his father in the crowd
(exhibit 63). Two corpsmen were also in the outer corridor.
HM3 Maxton Soviak was called forward to treat a civilian heat
causality and was rendering aid near the canal, but up
against the fence (exhibit 92). (TEXT REDACTED) came forward
from the inner gate to bring water to the 1st Platoon Marines
on the canal wall (exhibit 92). At approximately 1736 local
time, 26 August 2021, a single explosion occurred at Abbey
Gate (exhibits 66, 98, 72, 121, 236). Overhead persistent
infrared systems captured the time of the explosion at
precisely 13:06:52Z, or 17:36:52 local (exhibit 236). The STP
OIC received notification of the attack from 2/1 Marines by
radio at 1738, and used the Signal Application to warn the
North HKIA Role II-E of potential casualties at 1739 (exhibit
66, 98).
(n) The blast at Abbey Gate killed thirteen Service Members
total, to include eleven Marines, one Sailor, and one
Soldier:
(i) SSgt Darin Hoover, USMC, Echo Company 2/1 Marines
(ii) Sgt Nicole Gee, USMC, CLB-24, 24th MEU
(iii) Sgt Johanny Rosario Pichardo, USMC, JTF-CR (TF 51-5th
MEB)
(iv) Cpl Hunter Lopez, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(v) Cpl Daegan Page, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(vi) Cpl Humberto Sanchez, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(vii) LCpl David Espinoza, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(viii) LCpl Rylee McCollum, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(ix) LCpl Dylan Merola, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(x) LCpl Kareem Nikoui, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(xi) LCpl Jared Schmitz, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(xii) HM3 Maxton Soviak, USN, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
(xiii) SSG Ryan Knauss, USA, Bravo Company, 9th
Psychological Operations Battalion (A)
(o) Those killed in action were all located in vicinity of
the tower at the outer gate standing a security position at
the edge of the canal or jersey barriers, with the exception
of SSG Knauss and SSgt Hoover (exhibits 63, 91, 92, 105,
129). Three of the 1st Platoon Marines who were killed in the
blast were elevated on the canal wall, helping pull potential
evacuees into the outer gate: LCpl Rylee McCollum, LCpl Dylan
Merola, and LCpl Kareem Nikoui. SSgt Hoover was in the outer
corridor area, on the inside of the fence, near the tower
(exhibits 63, 91, 92). SSG Knauss was in the outer corridor
area with the PSYOP vehicle, on the passenger's side, to the
rear of the vehicle (exhibits 105, 129). The vehicle front
was pointed at the jersey barrier and canal intersection
below the tower where 1st Platoon was providing crowd control
and security. Autopsy summaries provided by the Armed Forces
Medical Examiner's Office confirmed all Service Members who
were KIA died of blast and ballistic injuries (exhibit 145).
There were no gunshot wounds on any of the KIA, but
significant penetrating ball bearing injuries (exhibit 145).
Injuries sustained to those KIA were primarily lacerations,
ruptures, and bruising to the head, torso, and pelvis
(exhibits 138, 145). Of the protective gear examined by Joint
Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat (JTAPIC),
small arms protective insert (SAPI) plates and helmets were
effective at stopping fragmentation and ball bearings
(exhibit 138).
(p) Those interviewed during the investigation could not
provide a number of civilian casualties caused by the attack.
Most were only aware of open source reporting and concurred
the number would be substantial. Open source reporting
estimates casualties at 160-170 (exhibits 251, 252).
(q) Numerous Marines were wounded because of the attack,
with most being part of 1st Platoon, Golf Company or members
of
2/1 Marines positioned in the canal or in the outer corridor
area, near the physical gate and PSYOP vehicle (exhibits 63,
91, 92, 105, 129, 224). The initial list of wounded is best
captured by the 2/1 S2 blast and injury analysis, sketches
from Echo and Golf Company NCOs, and Aeromedical Evacuation
Critical Care Air Transport Team (AE-CCATT) TRANSCOM
Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System
(TRAC2ES) flight data (exhibits 92, 137, 236). There appear
to be 27 service members reported as initially wounded during
the attack, but eight were not medically evacuated and
instead redeployed with the unit (exhibits 68, 92, 93, 95,
131). The remaining nineteen were redeployed due to their
wounds (exhibit 68). However, since redeploying, units have
reported additional TBI and concussion related wounds for 12
more Marines, for a total of 39 Service Members wounded in
the attack (exhibits 68, 92, 93, 95, 164). This new number
does not include members of the 82nd Airborne who were
conducting a leader's recon at Abbey Gate for the RIP, and
24th MEU personnel, who were also in the outer corridor area
(exhibits 107, 124, 129). The number of wounded from the
attack at Abbey Gate will almost certainly continue to grow.
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