[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 118 (Monday, July 18, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3333-S3335]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an 
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey 
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     ACTS-SCK-DO
     SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S. 
         Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International 
         Airport on 26 August 2021
       (e) Abbey Gate was structured from North to South, with the 
     inner Abbey Gate at the north end opening to the actual 
     airfield. There was a 265-meter corridor between the inner 
     gate and the outer gate, to the south, known as the inner 
     corridor. This area served as a sally port for searching and 
     processing vehicles. Two lanes divided by jersey barriers 
     were beyond the outer gate. The egress lane from the Barron 
     Hotel, which joined the gate road from the southeast, was 
     approximately 120 meters south of the outer gate. The Chevron 
     obstacle was approximately 155 meters south of the outer 
     gate. The area between the outer gate and the Chevron was 
     known as the outer corridor. A sewage canal ran generally 
     east to west parallel to the inner and outer corridors, on 
     the east side of the perimeter wall and fence. During 
     operations of Abbey Gate, 2/1 established a holding area in 
     the outer corridor lanes, a search and DoS processing 
     location in the inner corridor, and security/crowd control 
     positions at the canal and Chevron. Additionally, the sniper 
     section established

[[Page S3334]]

     an overwatch position in the tower at the outer gate. Marines 
     escorted evacuees through a break in the canal fence or 
     around the Chevron, and ushered them into the outer corridor 
     holding area for an initial search. Outside the Chevron, the 
     Taliban conducted crowd control and initial screening. U.K. 
     Forces processed their evacuees at the Barron Hotel and drove 
     them through the outer corridor lanes, through the Abbey 
     Gate, to the airfield (see all exhibits from 
     2/1 Marines, Echo Company, Golf Company, and enclosure 11-
     13). Companies rotated responsibility for gate operations, 
     with Golf Company initially taking the canal security 
     positions, Fox Company taking the Chevron area, and dividing 
     the inner gate search and escort duties (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 
     79, 81, 89). Echo Company rotated into gate operations later 
     in the NEO to enable a rest cycle for all companies (exhibits 
     53, 56, 76).
       (f) Between 20 and 25 August, gate operations took on a 
     structured and predictable battle rhythm. Crowds were 
     desperate but manageable, able to be kept calm at Abbey Gate 
     because Marines interacted with the people continuously and 
     used the PSYOP capability to communicate (exhibits 57, 79, 
     80, 83, 85, 88). Early in the NEO, crowds at Abbey Gate 
     numbered around 1500 between the canal and the Chevron 
     entrance, and another 500-1000 in the outer gate holding 
     area. There was a concern throughout 2/1 that the crowds 
     could riot and force the gate open at any time {exhibits 57, 
     83). The JTF-CR J2 described the crowd as the greatest threat 
     to mission, because at any time they could have forced their 
     way past Marines and onto the airfield, stopping air 
     operations, and ultimately the evacuation (exhibit 15). 
     Several factors undermined the Marines' and U.K. Forces' 
     efforts to keep the crowds calm.
       (i) The Taliban used excessive force outside the Chevron, 
     which created the incentive for civilians to avoid the main 
     road entrance and move to Abbey Gate via the canal (exhibits 
     53, 77, 79, 80). Over time, the canal became extremely 
     crowded and people were being crushed and injured (exhibits 
     53, 77, 79, 80, 214, 220).
       (ii) DoS Consular officers provided inconsistent support at 
     Abbey Gate, and the required documentation for evacuation 
     changed hourly (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88). 
     Marines often had to halt gate processing and flow, because 
     the Consular officers were not present to screen and approve 
     evacuees for movement to the PAX Terminal (exhibits 53, 77, 
     79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88). It is possible Consular officers 
     were absent from the gate because of threat reporting and to 
     better meter the flow of evacuees and not overcrowd the 
     airfield (exhibit 146). However, the crowd would eventually 
     notice the halt in processing and become highly agitated 
     (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88).
       (iii) Partner nation representatives/forces consistently 
     conducted uncoordinated evacuee extractions at Abbey Gate. 
     Partner nation forces frequently left potential evacuees 
     unsecured within 2/1 Marines' perimeter, or relied upon 
     Marines to escort their rejected evacuees back to the canal 
     (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88). Partner nation representatives/
     forces often pulled out large groups of people, usually 
     families (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88). The crowd would see 
     the disparate treatment of select personnel and become 
     agitated (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88).
       (g) Threat reporting during the NEO was continuous and 
     generally non-specific. The USFOR-A FWD and JTF-CR staffs 
     estimated the threat streams to be credible reports during 
     the 10-day NEO (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21). The threats varied 
     from VBIED attacks and Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive 
     Devices (SVIEDs) against gates, to bags in the crowds or 
     aircraft hijackings with evacuees concealing bombs and 
     weapons on flights (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 102, 115). 2/1 
     Marines believed their only means to counter these threats, 
     without degrading the mission, was to increase overwatch and 
     actively search for civilians meeting the descriptions 
     provided (exhibits 15, 53, 56, 57, 77, 80). 2/1 Marines 
     attempted to balance the need to continue to interact with 
     the crowd to pull potential evacuees into the outer gate and 
     increase force protection (exhibits 53, 56, 77). On several 
     occasions, both prior to and throughout 26 August, 2/1 
     Marines providing security along the canal pulled back from 
     the crowd, took a knee behind jersey barriers, and stopped 
     the flow of processing based on reports indicating specific 
     times of attack (exhibits 53, 77, 89).
       (h) By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the Main Effort for Gate 
     Operations at HKIA. The terrain and infrastructure at East 
     and North Gates, coupled with threats to force and large, 
     unruly crowds, made these gates untenable for evacuation 
     operations (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104). Both gates were 
     effectively closed between 20-25 August (exhibits 15, 18, 
     100, 102, 104). The West and South Gates were still 
     operational, but both were used for coordinated arrivals and 
     openings (exhibits 125, 126). The decreased access to 
     evacuation processing points at HKIA forced DoS and partner 
     nations to direct most small groups and individual evacuees 
     to Abbey Gate (exhibit 15, 125, 126, 127, 146). The canal at 
     Abbey Gate facilitated crowd control and provided some 
     standoff, and the Chevron minimized the VBIED threat 
     (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 83, 84). There were effective 
     overwatch positions, and the Taliban screened the main 
     approach (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 83, 84). Over time, crowds 
     bypassed Taliban checkpoints to get to the canal and seek 
     access to HKIA (exhibits 77-88).
       (i) On 25 August, the crowd in the canal outside Abbey Gate 
     was noticeably larger than the days prior, numbering around 
     2000-3000 (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). In addition to the 
     Taliban activity at the Chevron, Marines attributed this 
     swell in civilians at the canal to the closure of many of the 
     other gates at HKIA and the impending withdrawal date of 31 
     August (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). The 2 PARA Commander 
     observed the efficiency and accessibility of Abbey Gate had 
     become publicly known, drawing more people (exhibit 127). The 
     crowd was also noticeably more desperate (exhibits 53, 55, 
     77, 80). Echo Company operated the gate during the day on 25 
     August, and conducted a RIP at 1600 with Golf Company 
     (exhibits 56, 77). During Echo Company's time on the gate, 
     they pushed the crowd back from the sniper tower and jersey 
     barriers on the nearside of the canal to create standoff 
     (exhibit 56). With the assistance of U.K. Forces, Echo 
     Company pushed the crowds 150-meters down the nearside of the 
     canal, and Marines maintained control of the terrain between 
     the jersey barriers and newly established perimeter (exhibits 
     56, 59, 60, 61). After conducting his RIP, (TEXT REDACTED) 
     Golf Company (TEXT REDACTED) was concerned the Marines and 
     U.K. Forces were overextended based on recent threat 
     reporting, and decided to collapse the position back to the 
     base of the sniper tower at the outer gate (exhibit 77).
       (j) During the evening of 25 August and into the morning of 
     26 August, the crowds in the canal continued to grow and 
     became increasingly desperate (exhibits 53, 77, 80, 89). 
     Threat reporting on 25 and 26 August indicated Islamic State 
     of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) would execute an attack 
     at a gate using a SVIED (exhibits 13, 15, 76, 77). Nearly 
     every Marine interviewed in 2/1 was aware of the reported 
     threat, but did not find the information to be out of the 
     ordinary compared to other earlier threats (exhibits 57, 59, 
     60, 61, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 86, 89). Many 
     noted the information was more specific, but changed 
     regularly (different bags and descriptions of the bomber) 
     (exhibit 88). At approximately 2330 on 25 August, after 
     collapsing the nearside canal security down to the sniper 
     tower, (TEXT REDACTED) had all Marines take a knee and reduce 
     their posture behind the canal wall and jersey barriers. This 
     lasted until daylight on 26 August (exhibits 77, 88). (TEXT 
     REDACTED) had the unit take the same force posture at 
     approximately 1400 for 30 minutes, based on additional threat 
     reporting (exhibits 77, 88, 89). After the brief stand-down, 
     2/1 Marines continued to process evacuees, having what some 
     considered to be their most productive day on 26 August 
     (exhibit 80).
       (k) Throughout the evening of 25 August, into the morning 
     of 26 August, units prepared for the planned closure of Abbey 
     Gate to enable the JTE of Marine forces (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 
     56, 57, 76, 77). The U.K. Forces were unable to meet the 
     planned closure time of 1800 on 25 August, and subsequently 
     were unable to meet the new time of 0700 on 26 August 
     (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 56, 76, 77). During the afternoon of 25 
     August, the U.K. PARA units operating from the Barron Hotel 
     had near1y 1000 evacuees to process (exhibit 127). The 2 PARA 
     Commander on the ground received two timelines for completion 
     of evacuation operations, with the initial completion date of 
     25 August and the adjusted timeline of period of darkness 27 
     August (exhibit 127). The U.K. met this second completion 
     time (exhibits 124, 127). A higher authority within the U.K. 
     Forces, not present at HKIA, was responsible for the change 
     in the timeline, not the 2 PARA Commander (exhibit 127).
       (l) On 26 August, at approximately 1600, Golf Company 
     rotated the platoons on the line an hour early due to 4th 
     Platoon growing fatigued, and 1st Platoon took over canal 
     security (exhibits 77, 89). Most of Golf Company worked the 
     outer gate because the crowds were growing desperate (exhibit 
     77). People were being crushed and injured at the jersey 
     barriers at the base of the sniper tower (exhibits 77, 83, 
     88, 89). Echo Company was working the inner gate, as of 
     1200-1300, to provide additional manpower at the gate area 
     and prepare for the closing of Abbey Gate that night 
     (exhibits 56, 77). (TEXT REDACTED) was concerned with the 
     threat reporting and ordered all 1stSgts and Corpsmen to 
     remain in the inner corridor area for force protection 
     (exhibit 77). However, some corpsmen were called forward 
     because of heat and trauma injuries suffered by civilians 
     in the crowd (exhibits 77, 92). At approximately 1600, 
     (TEXT REDACTED) attended a meeting with (TEXT REDACTED) 2/
     501 PIR (TEXT REDACTED) the 2 PARA (TEXT REDACTED) and the 
     Taliban to discuss U.K. passage of lines from Barron 
     Hotel, handover of security of the outer gate to the 
     Taliban, and responsibility of the inner gate 
     transitioning to 2/501 PIR (exhibits 53, 77). At 
     approximately 1700, BGen Sullivan visited Abbey Gate and 
     discussed the closure timeline with (TEXT REDACTED) 
     exhibits 15, 17, 18, 53, 77). BGen Sullivan departed at 
     approximately 1715 (exhibits 15, 17, 18). At approximately 
     1725, (TEXT REDACTED) 24th MEU (TEXT REDACTED) convinced 
     an Afghan civilian to speak to the crowd through a non-
     standard loud speaker for 10 minutes (exhibit 105). The 
     messaging pleaded with the crowed to stop pushing, and 
     stated that women and children were being crushed to death 
     (exhibit 105). Three snipers from the 
     2/1 Marines Sniper section, attached to Echo Company, but 
     in direct support of units at Abbey Gate, were in the 
     tower at the outer gate (exhibit 62). The snipers in the 
     tower were (TEXT REDACTED) was at the base of

[[Page S3335]]

     the tower near the fence (exhibits 62, 63). They were well 
     aware of the reported threats and scanned the large and 
     unruly crowd in the canal for individuals ``out of 
     baseline'' or demonstrating hostile intent (exhibit 62).
       (m) At approximately 1730 on 26 August, the crowds at Abbey 
     Gate were desperate and growing agitated (exhibits 76, 77, 
     80, 84, 89). First Platoon, Golf Company, led by (TEXT 
     REDACTED) were consolidated at the jersey barriers beneath 
     the tower at the outer gate (exhibits 77, 88, 89, 91, 92). 
     The platoon was forced to move nearly all personnel into the 
     corner to hold back the massive and largely recalcitrant 
     crowd from coming over the barriers and breaching the gate 
     (exhibits 89, 91). Three members of the FST, Sgt Nicole Gee, 
     Sgt Johanny Rosario Pichardo, and (TEXT REDACTED) were 
     operating slightly behind the platoon (exhibits 89, 91, 92, 
     106, 107). (TEXT REDACTED) 2/1's (TEXT REDACTED) were 
     standing to the North of the PSYOP vehicle in the outer 
     corridor (exhibits 53, 76). (TEXT REDACTED) was near the 
     canal, approximately 30-40 meters from the sniper tower 
     (exhibits 77, 89, 92). Several members of Echo Company were 
     in the outer corridor area, escorting civilians or looking 
     for specific potential evacuees (exhibits 61, 62, 63). SSgt 
     Darin Hoover was near the fence at the base of the outer gate 
     tower (exhibit 63). (TEXT REDACTED) was escorting an 
     interpreter to the canal to look for his father in the crowd 
     (exhibit 63). Two corpsmen were also in the outer corridor. 
     HM3 Maxton Soviak was called forward to treat a civilian heat 
     causality and was rendering aid near the canal, but up 
     against the fence (exhibit 92). (TEXT REDACTED) came forward 
     from the inner gate to bring water to the 1st Platoon Marines 
     on the canal wall (exhibit 92). At approximately 1736 local 
     time, 26 August 2021, a single explosion occurred at Abbey 
     Gate (exhibits 66, 98, 72, 121, 236). Overhead persistent 
     infrared systems captured the time of the explosion at 
     precisely 13:06:52Z, or 17:36:52 local (exhibit 236). The STP 
     OIC received notification of the attack from 2/1 Marines by 
     radio at 1738, and used the Signal Application to warn the 
     North HKIA Role II-E of potential casualties at 1739 (exhibit 
     66, 98).
       (n) The blast at Abbey Gate killed thirteen Service Members 
     total, to include eleven Marines, one Sailor, and one 
     Soldier:
       (i) SSgt Darin Hoover, USMC, Echo Company 2/1 Marines
       (ii) Sgt Nicole Gee, USMC, CLB-24, 24th MEU
       (iii) Sgt Johanny Rosario Pichardo, USMC, JTF-CR (TF 51-5th 
     MEB)
       (iv) Cpl Hunter Lopez, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (v) Cpl Daegan Page, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (vi) Cpl Humberto Sanchez, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (vii) LCpl David Espinoza, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (viii) LCpl Rylee McCollum, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (ix) LCpl Dylan Merola, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (x) LCpl Kareem Nikoui, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (xi) LCpl Jared Schmitz, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (xii) HM3 Maxton Soviak, USN, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines
       (xiii) SSG Ryan Knauss, USA, Bravo Company, 9th 
     Psychological Operations Battalion (A)
       (o) Those killed in action were all located in vicinity of 
     the tower at the outer gate standing a security position at 
     the edge of the canal or jersey barriers, with the exception 
     of SSG Knauss and SSgt Hoover (exhibits 63, 91, 92, 105, 
     129). Three of the 1st Platoon Marines who were killed in the 
     blast were elevated on the canal wall, helping pull potential 
     evacuees into the outer gate: LCpl Rylee McCollum, LCpl Dylan 
     Merola, and LCpl Kareem Nikoui. SSgt Hoover was in the outer 
     corridor area, on the inside of the fence, near the tower 
     (exhibits 63, 91, 92). SSG Knauss was in the outer corridor 
     area with the PSYOP vehicle, on the passenger's side, to the 
     rear of the vehicle (exhibits 105, 129). The vehicle front 
     was pointed at the jersey barrier and canal intersection 
     below the tower where 1st Platoon was providing crowd control 
     and security. Autopsy summaries provided by the Armed Forces 
     Medical Examiner's Office confirmed all Service Members who 
     were KIA died of blast and ballistic injuries (exhibit 145). 
     There were no gunshot wounds on any of the KIA, but 
     significant penetrating ball bearing injuries (exhibit 145). 
     Injuries sustained to those KIA were primarily lacerations, 
     ruptures, and bruising to the head, torso, and pelvis 
     (exhibits 138, 145). Of the protective gear examined by Joint 
     Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat (JTAPIC), 
     small arms protective insert (SAPI) plates and helmets were 
     effective at stopping fragmentation and ball bearings 
     (exhibit 138).
       (p) Those interviewed during the investigation could not 
     provide a number of civilian casualties caused by the attack. 
     Most were only aware of open source reporting and concurred 
     the number would be substantial. Open source reporting 
     estimates casualties at 160-170 (exhibits 251, 252).
       (q) Numerous Marines were wounded because of the attack, 
     with most being part of 1st Platoon, Golf Company or members 
     of 
     2/1 Marines positioned in the canal or in the outer corridor 
     area, near the physical gate and PSYOP vehicle (exhibits 63, 
     91, 92, 105, 129, 224). The initial list of wounded is best 
     captured by the 2/1 S2 blast and injury analysis, sketches 
     from Echo and Golf Company NCOs, and Aeromedical Evacuation 
     Critical Care Air Transport Team (AE-CCATT) TRANSCOM 
     Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System 
     (TRAC2ES) flight data (exhibits 92, 137, 236). There appear 
     to be 27 service members reported as initially wounded during 
     the attack, but eight were not medically evacuated and 
     instead redeployed with the unit (exhibits 68, 92, 93, 95, 
     131). The remaining nineteen were redeployed due to their 
     wounds (exhibit 68). However, since redeploying, units have 
     reported additional TBI and concussion related wounds for 12 
     more Marines, for a total of 39 Service Members wounded in 
     the attack (exhibits 68, 92, 93, 95, 164). This new number 
     does not include members of the 82nd Airborne who were 
     conducting a leader's recon at Abbey Gate for the RIP, and 
     24th MEU personnel, who were also in the outer corridor area 
     (exhibits 107, 124, 129). The number of wounded from the 
     attack at Abbey Gate will almost certainly continue to grow.

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