[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 116 (Thursday, July 14, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3304-S3306]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. HAWLEY. Madam President, following my submission yesterday, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
ACTS-SCK-DO
Subject: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S.
Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International
Airport on 26 August 2021
(5) 82nd Airborne Division and 1/82 IBCT.
(a) The 82nd Airborne and 1/82 IBCT, (as the designated
Immediate Response Force (IRF)), were notified for deployment
at the request of Gen McKenzie (exhibits 10, 13, 21). 1/82
IBCT and 2/504 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) began the
flow of forces to HKIA on 15 August at 2200, and arrived with
approximately 300 personnel (exhibit 121). This force
coordinated with JTF-CR and occupied Camp Alvarado in the
northwest comer of HKIA (exhibit 121). During the period of
darkness on 16-17 August, 2/501 PIR arrived to HKIA (exhibit
123). Elements of the brigade's artillery battalion arrived
with the infantry battalion, making the total force about
1000 (exhibit 121). Shortly after their arrival, 2/504 began
securing the airfield, as civilians had breached the South
Terminal and were on the runway (exhibit 121). 2/501 were
immediately put into the line at the South Terminal when they
arrived a little over 24 hours later (exhibit 121). Both
units took up security positions on the South and West of
HKIA, and expanded to relieve Marines on the perimeter so
they could begin opening gates on 19 August (exhibits 121,
123). By 18 August, 1/82 had security responsibility for all
of the West side of HKIA. 2/501 had responsibility for
security from the perimeter at Abbey Gate westward to the
International Terminal (exhibit 123).
(b) The 82nd Airborne TAC, commanded by MG Donahue, arrived
on 18 August at approximately 1200 (exhibits 121, 125). Upon
arrival, MG Donahue conducted a leader's reconnaissance,
assessed the perimeter and gates, met with RADM Vasely to
shore up the task organization, and began initial planning
for withdrawal and JTE (exhibit 125). The 82nd started
clearing the HKIA road system to prepare for MASCAL events
and quick reaction force (QRF) movements (exhibit 125). As
part of their security task, the 82nd detained 40-50 people
each night who jumped the airfield fence (exhibit 125).
Additionally, 1/82 operated two gates and flowed in evacuees
via the South and West Gates (exhibit 121). From 19-25
August, 2/501 processed and directed convoys of evacuees the
Taliban had allowed to pass through the outer cordon at South
Gate (exhibit 121). 1/82 opened West Gate periodically to
allow precision evacuation passages of lines, which were
coordinated movements (exhibits 121, 125). During the latter
half of the NEO, South and West Gates accounted for a
significant number of daily evacuees, averaging greater than
200 daily from 24-30 August, with 1600 coming through on 26
August (exhibits 125, 143). The DoS Consular rarely worked
with 1/82 personnel at South Gate, so the convoys had to be
American citizens (AMCITs) or Lawful Permanent Residents
(LPRs) to get through (exhibit 123). Starting 19 August, MG
Donahue served as the primary coordinator with the Taliban
LNO, (TEXT REDACTED) and spoke with him on a near daily basis
(exhibit 23, 125). 1/82 IBCT subordinate unit commanders
coordinated directly with the Taliban local gate commanders
for security and to facilitate evacuee movements (exhibits
121, 123, 125).
[[Page S3305]]
(c) As part of withdrawal and JTE planning, the 82nd TAC
developed a plan for a relief in place (RIP) at the gates and
established timelines to facilitate withdrawal of the Marines
from HKIA (exhibit 125). U.S. and U.K. Forces negotiated the
timeline for closing Abbey Gate, and after changing the
timeline multiple times, eventually settled on 0900 on 27
August. While the U.S. Forces wanted to close the gate as
early as 24 August, the U.K. Forces needed more time to
finish processing their evacuees (exhibits 121, 125). On 25
August, Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR moved behind' Abbey Gate to
facilitate the RIP, however the timeline moved to the right
(exhibits 123, 124). (TEXT REDACTED) 2/501 PIR, attended a
meeting at 1600 on 26 August with the Taliban, the U.K., and
2/1 Marines to discuss the RIP and passage of lines for the
U.K. (exhibit 123). They agreed the U.K. would pass through
Abbey Gate in the early morning hours of 27 August, the
Marines would shut the gate, and Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR
would take over security of Abbey Gate (exhibit 124). Shortly
after the meeting, the attack on Abbey Gate occurred
(exhibits 66, 123, 125). (TEXT REDACTED) sent his QRF, Delta
Company, over to Abbey Gate, and dispatched his field litter
ambulances (FLAs) to assist in the casualty evacuation
(CASEVAC) (exhibit 123). Additionally, he set up his Role I
facility inside Abbey Gate to assist in treating the wounded
(exhibit 123). The Marines closed the gate immediately after
the attack and conducted the RIP with Bravo Company, 2/501
PIR at approximately 0500 on 27 August (exhibit 124). The
U.K. Forces passed through Abbey Gate at approximately 0700
on 27 August (exhibits 124, 127). Bravo Company maintained
security at Abbey Gate until their departure from HKIA at
approximately 2355 on 30 August.
(d) As part of JTE execution, 82nd Airborne took
responsibility for demilitarization efforts at HKIA (exhibits
125, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162). Millions of rounds
of ammunition, weapons, numerous military vehicles and
aircraft, and U.S. Government property had to be destroyed or
rendered inoperable (exhibit 125). The 82nd Airborne assigned
zones of responsibility to the various units occupying HKIA
to ensure they executed a methodical demilitarization plan
and no information or equipment was missed (exhibits 125,
156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162). Cyber element subject
matter experts ensured computer systems were corrupted or
destroyed, and engineers dug trenches to cover equipment with
cement and bury it before departure from HKIA (exhibits 125,
156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162).
(e) The 82nd Airborne departed HKIA and completed the JTE
at approximately 0002 local on 31 August (exhibit 246).
(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
(a) The 24th MEU was a II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)/
Camp Lejeune based unit, aligned to U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) for the first half of their deployment (exhibits 100,
102). In June 2021, the Secretary of Defense Orders Book
realigned the MEU to CENTCOM in anticipation of a NEO
(exhibits 100, 102). Throughout May and June, the MEU
conducted NEO planning with JTF-CR, and executed a PDSS to
HKIA in July (exhibits 100, 102). The MEU postured Marines
ashore at Ahmed al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait (Al-Jaber) in July
to prepare for the potential NEO (exhibits 100, 102).
Preparation included multiple rehearsals for a NEO, ECC
operations, airfield security, and gate operations (exhibits
100, 101). These rehearsals continued throughout July, into
August, until the MEU received notification they would deploy
to HKIA on 13 August (exhibits 100, 101, 102).
(b) The MEU originally planned to frontload its ECC forces
for deployment, but the dynamic situation at HKIA forced the
MEU to prioritize 1/8 Marines to ensure they had the
necessary combat power on the ground (exhibit 102). On 14
August at approximately 0200, one rifle company from 1/8
Marines, a 1/8 Marines HQ element, to include 1/8 Battalion
(TEXT REDACTED) and one logistics company from CLB-24 (CLB
from 24th MEU) arrived at HKIA (exhibit 102). The size of the
force on the ground increased with the arrival of two more
rifle companies, 1/8 Marines battalion enablers (snipers,
engineered, scouts), and some MEU CE personnel, to include
the MEU (TEXT REDACTED) that evening (exhibit 102). The 1/
8 Marines elements secured North Gate and sought to begin
processing evacuees through the ECG, but civilians came
through the South Terminal area and flooded the runway
(exhibits 102, 104). This MEU force rebuffed the breach of
the airfield on the night of 15 August and throughout the
day of 16 August (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104): Echo
Company, 2/1 Marines reinforced 1/8 early in the morning
of 16 August, and after they forced the crowds off the
runway, another breach occurred at a new opening in the
southern perimeter (exhibit 104). The Marines spent all of
16 August controlling crowds and clearing runways as more
forces, specifically Taliban and NSU, became available
(exhibit 104).
(c) On 17 August, 1/8 Marines began establishing security
at the North and East Gates and attempted to begin processing
evacuees (exhibit 104). North and East Gates had
approximately 3000-5000 people outside at any given time
starting on 17 August (exhibit 102). JTF-CR maintained TACON
of the MEU throughout the NEO, even after the change to
COMREL on 17 August (exhibits 10, 11). 24th MEU retained
TACON of 1/8 Marines, but only nominally had TACON of 2/1
Marines, whose Battalion Commander reported directly to the
JTF-CR Commander (exhibit 53, 77, 100).
(d) From 17 August until departure on 30 August, 24th MEU
managed tactical execution of the NEO, which primarily
included security and initial screening at North, East, and
Abbey Gates and processing evacuees at the ECC (exhibits 100,
104). 1/8 received nearly all of its combat power by the end
of 18 August (exhibit 104). CLB-24 established the ECC at the
PAX Terminal in North HKIA and was processing evacuees as
early as 15 August (exhibit 101). During the NEO, CLB-24
Marines also conducted various support activities to resupply
the gates, and assisted with base life support operations
(exhibit 101). CLB-24 planned for contractors, to continue
providing base support throughout the NEO, but many
contractors departed early on, forcing the CLB to absorb
those support responsibilities, in addition to operating the
ECC (exhibit 101). The SPMAGTF's Combat Logistics Detachment
assisted CLB-24 with providing combat service support to
units at HKIA (exhibit 101).
(e) BLT 1/8 Marines assumed responsibility for security of
North and East Gates, and the perimeter around the East side
of HKIA after the 82nd Airborne arrived (exhibit 104, 155).
Gate operations for North and East Gates were difficult and
sporadic (exhibits 100, 102, 104). North Gate was vulnerable
to attack due to a lack of standoff, an absence of obstacles
or barriers, and proximity to civilian roads (exhibits 100,
102, 104). North Gate quickly became the hardest gate to
control (exhibit 100). East Gate was a single gate, which was
always at risk of being forced open by the crowd, because
there was no standoff (exhibits 100, 102, 104). Marines at
East Gate dealt with crowds crushing people against the
perimeter wall, making it difficult to open the gate (exhibit
102). The Taliban provided support at both North and East
Gates, but the Taliban commander at North Gate was the least
helpful (exhibits 125, 146). North, East, and Abbey Gates
closed from 20-22 August due to a lack of flights and
capacity within HKIA. In total, there were 18000 evacuees
waiting to fly out, which created a humanitarian and security
problem (exhibits 102, 104). The JTF-CR Commander closed
North Gate from 23-25 August, except for some targeted
entries, because of the VBIED threat (exhibits 100, 102).
East Gate closed permanently on 24 August because of the
threat of mortars from the Taliban, and an inability to
process evacuees without losing control of the gate (exhibits
100, 102, 104). By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the only gate
operating in the MEU's sector of HKIA (exhibit 102).
(f) Aside from 1/8 Marines' rifle companies, additional MEU
elements supported gate operations. BLT 1/8's (TEXT REDACTED)
tasked his engineer platoon to support North, East, and Abbey
Gates (exhibits 103, 104). The engineers spent a
disproportionate amount of time improving East Gate, shoring
up gaps in the perimeter to prevent fence jumpers, and
removing towers on the exterior of the perimeter (exhibit
103). The engineers emplaced shipping containers to form the
obstacle at the southern end of Abbey Gate, later known as
the Chevron, on the morning of 20 August (exhibit 103).
Otherwise, support to Abbey Gate was limited (exhibit 103).
CLB-24 provided the bulk of the personnel assigned to the
Female Search Team (FST), and tasked them to support the
gates and the ECC (exhibit 101). The FST began with searching
women and children prior to DoS screening, then transitioned
to conducting initial searches outside the gates, escorting
rejected females out through the gates, and helping identify
eligible evacuees in the crowds (exhibit 107). The MEU
Commander re-task organized the 2nd Reconnaissance (Recon)
element to work directly for him later in the NEO,
specifically to conduct targeted recovery of privileged
personnel (exhibit 108). Recon element personnel were at the
gates constantly, working with 1/8 and 2/1 Marine leaders to
identify and pull specific people from the crowd for
processing (exhibit 108). The MEU also organized PSYOP and
cyber assets under the direction of the MEU (TEXT REDACTED)
for employment at the gates (exhibit 105). The PSYOP teams
employed capabilities at the gates to communicate with the
crowds, and provided updates on required documents or gate
closures (exhibit 105).
(g) On 26 August, all the gates in the MEU sector of HKIA
were closed, with the exception of Abbey Gate and occasional
targeted recoveries at North Gate (exhibits 102, 104). The
IED threat was well known across the MEU, but threats lacked
specifics on times and locations (exhibits 100, 102, 104,
105, 106, 107). MEU leadership ensured electronic
countermeasures (ECM) were active at the gates, dispersion of
personnel was enforced to the greatest extent possible,
snipers were in overwatch, PSYOP personnel communicated the
threat to the crowd and asked people to leave, and medical
assets were repositioned (exhibit 100). At the time of the
blast, only the PSYOP, FST, and Recon elements of the MEU
were at Abbey Gate (exhibits 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 107, 108). The paragraphs below detail the actions of
these personnel. The MEU JOC immediately put additional
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets
over Abbey Gate, scanning for additional threats (exhibit
102). Post-blast, 1/8 Marines shifted security elements to
Abbey Gate to help fill gaps, and provided numerous vehicles
for CASEVAC, assisting in movement to the HKIA Role 11-E.
CLB-24 also provided numerous CASEVAC vehicles to support the
MASCAL (exhibit 101).
[[Page S3306]]
(h) On 27 August, all gates were essentially shut in the
MEU sector and 1/82 IBCT secured Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 56,
57, 100, 102, 104). CLB-24 continued to operate the ECC until
30 August, processing evacuees until two hours before their
departure from HKIA. The MEU retrograded back to Kuwait
primarily on 29-30 August, with the last elements departing
at approximately 1000 on 30 August (exhibit 100).
(7) Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Ground
Combat Element (GCE), 2/1 Marines.
(a) 2/1 Marines were the GCE for the CENTCOM SPMAGTF,
located primarily in Camps across Kuwait and Prince Sultan
Airbase (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia (exhibit 53). In July 2021,
the SPMAGTF received notice it would potentially participate
in NEO in Afghanistan (exhibit 53). The SPMAGTF initially
task organized a ``NEO Light'' package, consisting of
elements of Combat Logistics Detachment (CLD) and the crisis
response company (Echo Company, 2/1) (exhibits 53, 54, 55).
The ``Light'' package elements executed two mission
rehearsals testing their ECC and gate operations, prior to
deployment to HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 55). In August, the
SPMAGTF would task organize and deploy a ``Heavy'' package,
that included the rest of 2/1 Marines' rifle companies
(exhibits 53, 54, 55).
(b) 2/1 first arrived to HKIA at approximately 0100-0200 on
16 August (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 56, 57). The first flight
included the Battalion HQ, Echo Company leadership, and one
platoon from Echo Company (exhibits 54, 56). Upon arrival,
the unit found the airfield breached by civilians, who were
moving onto the runways (exhibits 54, 56). The Battalion
(TEXT REDACTED) immediately tasked Echo Company to assist
with clearing the runway, in hopes of resuming flight
operations (exhibit 54). Over the next 24 hours, Echo Company
was part of the line holding the southern perimeter with 3/10
IBCT, 1/82 IBCT, and 1/8 Marines (exhibit 56). There were
several breaches of the perimeter and crowds gained access to
the runway, attempted to board C-17s, and pushed towards the
North HKIA compounds (exhibits 56, 76). Forces pushed the
crowds back after NSU units joined the line, and the crowds
recognized there were no more flights to board (exhibits 56,
76). 2/1 Marines, specifically Echo Company, were part of the
security perimeter at HKIA from approximately 0600 on 16
August until 19 August, when they were relieved by units from
1/82 IBCT (exhibit 53).
(c) Force flow over the next two days brought in parts of
the 2/1 Battalion HQ, Fox Company (-), Golf Company, Weapons
Company, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, the Shock
Trauma Platoon (STP), and finally the remainder of Echo
Company (exhibits 56, 76, 65, 66). These units focused on
securing the southern perimeter from the Domestic Terminal to
Abbey Gate from 17-19 August (exhibit 76). Once 1/82's relief
of the perimeter began, Golf Company, Fox Company (-),
Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoons, and Battalion
Snipers moved to Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 83,
89). U.K.'s 2 PARA were at the outer Abbey Gate, as well as
Air Force Pararescue (PJ) personnel and small partner nation
elements (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 89). After initially planning;
to push from Abbey Gate to Camp Sullivan, 2/1 Marines opted
not to execute due to the size of the crowds and lack of
Taliban support to extend the perimeter (exhibits 53, 76,
81). Instead, (TEXT REDACTED) tasked the battalion to open
the outer gate to begin processing evacuees (exhibits 53, 76,
81, 89). Opening the gate required an entire platoon,
sometimes reinforced, to keep the crowds from breaching the
outer gate and accessing the Abbey Gate's inner corridor
(exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89). 2/1 Marines processed
approximately 750 evacuees through Abbey Gate on 19 August,
but only after tremendous effort to hold the gate (exhibits
53, 76, 77, 81, 89).
(d) In order to enable safe and efficient gate operations,
(TEXT REDACTED) Golf Company, 2/1 (TEXT REDACTED) decided to
push the crowds back to an area beyond the Barron Hotel
egress lane. This would ensure U.K. Forces had better access
to the gate from their evacuee staging area (exhibits 53, 77,
89). In the early morning hours of 20 August, platoons from
Golf and Fox Companies opened the outer gate, and
methodically forced the smaller crowd back nearly 200 meters
(exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89). (TEXT REDACTED) coordinated
with U.K. Forces and MEU Engineers to emplace six shipping
containers in the main south to north roadway leading to
Abbey Gate to form a disrupting obstacle and aid in crowd
control (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The Taliban agreed
to provide outer security beyond the containers, and the U.K.
Forces and 2/1 provided security inside the containers,
guarding the Barron Hotel egress route and canal areas
(exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The containers became
known as the ``Chevron' (exhibits 18, 21, 53, 76, 77, 81, 88,
89). The emplacement of the Chevron on 20 August established
the structural layout of Abbey Gate for the duration of the
NEO, as depicted in enclosures 12 and 13.
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