[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 116 (Thursday, July 14, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3304-S3306]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY. Madam President, following my submission yesterday, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an 
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey 
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     ACTS-SCK-DO
     Subject: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S. 
         Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International 
         Airport on 26 August 2021
       (5) 82nd Airborne Division and 1/82 IBCT.
       (a) The 82nd Airborne and 1/82 IBCT, (as the designated 
     Immediate Response Force (IRF)), were notified for deployment 
     at the request of Gen McKenzie (exhibits 10, 13, 21). 1/82 
     IBCT and 2/504 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) began the 
     flow of forces to HKIA on 15 August at 2200, and arrived with 
     approximately 300 personnel (exhibit 121). This force 
     coordinated with JTF-CR and occupied Camp Alvarado in the 
     northwest comer of HKIA (exhibit 121). During the period of 
     darkness on 16-17 August, 2/501 PIR arrived to HKIA (exhibit 
     123). Elements of the brigade's artillery battalion arrived 
     with the infantry battalion, making the total force about 
     1000 (exhibit 121). Shortly after their arrival, 2/504 began 
     securing the airfield, as civilians had breached the South 
     Terminal and were on the runway (exhibit 121). 2/501 were 
     immediately put into the line at the South Terminal when they 
     arrived a little over 24 hours later (exhibit 121). Both 
     units took up security positions on the South and West of 
     HKIA, and expanded to relieve Marines on the perimeter so 
     they could begin opening gates on 19 August (exhibits 121, 
     123). By 18 August, 1/82 had security responsibility for all 
     of the West side of HKIA. 2/501 had responsibility for 
     security from the perimeter at Abbey Gate westward to the 
     International Terminal (exhibit 123).
       (b) The 82nd Airborne TAC, commanded by MG Donahue, arrived 
     on 18 August at approximately 1200 (exhibits 121, 125). Upon 
     arrival, MG Donahue conducted a leader's reconnaissance, 
     assessed the perimeter and gates, met with RADM Vasely to 
     shore up the task organization, and began initial planning 
     for withdrawal and JTE (exhibit 125). The 82nd started 
     clearing the HKIA road system to prepare for MASCAL events 
     and quick reaction force (QRF) movements (exhibit 125). As 
     part of their security task, the 82nd detained 40-50 people 
     each night who jumped the airfield fence (exhibit 125). 
     Additionally, 1/82 operated two gates and flowed in evacuees 
     via the South and West Gates (exhibit 121). From 19-25 
     August, 2/501 processed and directed convoys of evacuees the 
     Taliban had allowed to pass through the outer cordon at South 
     Gate (exhibit 121). 1/82 opened West Gate periodically to 
     allow precision evacuation passages of lines, which were 
     coordinated movements (exhibits 121, 125). During the latter 
     half of the NEO, South and West Gates accounted for a 
     significant number of daily evacuees, averaging greater than 
     200 daily from 24-30 August, with 1600 coming through on 26 
     August (exhibits 125, 143). The DoS Consular rarely worked 
     with 1/82 personnel at South Gate, so the convoys had to be 
     American citizens (AMCITs) or Lawful Permanent Residents 
     (LPRs) to get through (exhibit 123). Starting 19 August, MG 
     Donahue served as the primary coordinator with the Taliban 
     LNO, (TEXT REDACTED) and spoke with him on a near daily basis 
     (exhibit 23, 125). 1/82 IBCT subordinate unit commanders 
     coordinated directly with the Taliban local gate commanders 
     for security and to facilitate evacuee movements (exhibits 
     121, 123, 125).

[[Page S3305]]

       (c) As part of withdrawal and JTE planning, the 82nd TAC 
     developed a plan for a relief in place (RIP) at the gates and 
     established timelines to facilitate withdrawal of the Marines 
     from HKIA (exhibit 125). U.S. and U.K. Forces negotiated the 
     timeline for closing Abbey Gate, and after changing the 
     timeline multiple times, eventually settled on 0900 on 27 
     August. While the U.S. Forces wanted to close the gate as 
     early as 24 August, the U.K. Forces needed more time to 
     finish processing their evacuees (exhibits 121, 125). On 25 
     August, Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR moved behind' Abbey Gate to 
     facilitate the RIP, however the timeline moved to the right 
     (exhibits 123, 124). (TEXT REDACTED) 2/501 PIR, attended a 
     meeting at 1600 on 26 August with the Taliban, the U.K., and 
     2/1 Marines to discuss the RIP and passage of lines for the 
     U.K. (exhibit 123). They agreed the U.K. would pass through 
     Abbey Gate in the early morning hours of 27 August, the 
     Marines would shut the gate, and Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR 
     would take over security of Abbey Gate (exhibit 124). Shortly 
     after the meeting, the attack on Abbey Gate occurred 
     (exhibits 66, 123, 125). (TEXT REDACTED) sent his QRF, Delta 
     Company, over to Abbey Gate, and dispatched his field litter 
     ambulances (FLAs) to assist in the casualty evacuation 
     (CASEVAC) (exhibit 123). Additionally, he set up his Role I 
     facility inside Abbey Gate to assist in treating the wounded 
     (exhibit 123). The Marines closed the gate immediately after 
     the attack and conducted the RIP with Bravo Company, 2/501 
     PIR at approximately 0500 on 27 August (exhibit 124). The 
     U.K. Forces passed through Abbey Gate at approximately 0700 
     on 27 August (exhibits 124, 127). Bravo Company maintained 
     security at Abbey Gate until their departure from HKIA at 
     approximately 2355 on 30 August.
       (d) As part of JTE execution, 82nd Airborne took 
     responsibility for demilitarization efforts at HKIA (exhibits 
     125, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162). Millions of rounds 
     of ammunition, weapons, numerous military vehicles and 
     aircraft, and U.S. Government property had to be destroyed or 
     rendered inoperable (exhibit 125). The 82nd Airborne assigned 
     zones of responsibility to the various units occupying HKIA 
     to ensure they executed a methodical demilitarization plan 
     and no information or equipment was missed (exhibits 125, 
     156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162). Cyber element subject 
     matter experts ensured computer systems were corrupted or 
     destroyed, and engineers dug trenches to cover equipment with 
     cement and bury it before departure from HKIA (exhibits 125, 
     156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162).
       (e) The 82nd Airborne departed HKIA and completed the JTE 
     at approximately 0002 local on 31 August (exhibit 246).
       (6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
       (a) The 24th MEU was a II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)/
     Camp Lejeune based unit, aligned to U.S. European Command 
     (EUCOM) for the first half of their deployment (exhibits 100, 
     102). In June 2021, the Secretary of Defense Orders Book 
     realigned the MEU to CENTCOM in anticipation of a NEO 
     (exhibits 100, 102). Throughout May and June, the MEU 
     conducted NEO planning with JTF-CR, and executed a PDSS to 
     HKIA in July (exhibits 100, 102). The MEU postured Marines 
     ashore at Ahmed al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait (Al-Jaber) in July 
     to prepare for the potential NEO (exhibits 100, 102). 
     Preparation included multiple rehearsals for a NEO, ECC 
     operations, airfield security, and gate operations (exhibits 
     100, 101). These rehearsals continued throughout July, into 
     August, until the MEU received notification they would deploy 
     to HKIA on 13 August (exhibits 100, 101, 102).
       (b) The MEU originally planned to frontload its ECC forces 
     for deployment, but the dynamic situation at HKIA forced the 
     MEU to prioritize 1/8 Marines to ensure they had the 
     necessary combat power on the ground (exhibit 102). On 14 
     August at approximately 0200, one rifle company from 1/8 
     Marines, a 1/8 Marines HQ element, to include 1/8 Battalion 
     (TEXT REDACTED) and one logistics company from CLB-24 (CLB 
     from 24th MEU) arrived at HKIA (exhibit 102). The size of the 
     force on the ground increased with the arrival of two more 
     rifle companies, 1/8 Marines battalion enablers (snipers, 
     engineered, scouts), and some MEU CE personnel, to include 
     the MEU (TEXT REDACTED) that evening (exhibit 102). The 1/
     8 Marines elements secured North Gate and sought to begin 
     processing evacuees through the ECG, but civilians came 
     through the South Terminal area and flooded the runway 
     (exhibits 102, 104). This MEU force rebuffed the breach of 
     the airfield on the night of 15 August and throughout the 
     day of 16 August (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104): Echo 
     Company, 2/1 Marines reinforced 1/8 early in the morning 
     of 16 August, and after they forced the crowds off the 
     runway, another breach occurred at a new opening in the 
     southern perimeter (exhibit 104). The Marines spent all of 
     16 August controlling crowds and clearing runways as more 
     forces, specifically Taliban and NSU, became available 
     (exhibit 104).
       (c) On 17 August, 1/8 Marines began establishing security 
     at the North and East Gates and attempted to begin processing 
     evacuees (exhibit 104). North and East Gates had 
     approximately 3000-5000 people outside at any given time 
     starting on 17 August (exhibit 102). JTF-CR maintained TACON 
     of the MEU throughout the NEO, even after the change to 
     COMREL on 17 August (exhibits 10, 11). 24th MEU retained 
     TACON of 1/8 Marines, but only nominally had TACON of 2/1 
     Marines, whose Battalion Commander reported directly to the 
     JTF-CR Commander (exhibit 53, 77, 100).
       (d) From 17 August until departure on 30 August, 24th MEU 
     managed tactical execution of the NEO, which primarily 
     included security and initial screening at North, East, and 
     Abbey Gates and processing evacuees at the ECC (exhibits 100, 
     104). 1/8 received nearly all of its combat power by the end 
     of 18 August (exhibit 104). CLB-24 established the ECC at the 
     PAX Terminal in North HKIA and was processing evacuees as 
     early as 15 August (exhibit 101). During the NEO, CLB-24 
     Marines also conducted various support activities to resupply 
     the gates, and assisted with base life support operations 
     (exhibit 101). CLB-24 planned for contractors, to continue 
     providing base support throughout the NEO, but many 
     contractors departed early on, forcing the CLB to absorb 
     those support responsibilities, in addition to operating the 
     ECC (exhibit 101). The SPMAGTF's Combat Logistics Detachment 
     assisted CLB-24 with providing combat service support to 
     units at HKIA (exhibit 101).
       (e) BLT 1/8 Marines assumed responsibility for security of 
     North and East Gates, and the perimeter around the East side 
     of HKIA after the 82nd Airborne arrived (exhibit 104, 155). 
     Gate operations for North and East Gates were difficult and 
     sporadic (exhibits 100, 102, 104). North Gate was vulnerable 
     to attack due to a lack of standoff, an absence of obstacles 
     or barriers, and proximity to civilian roads (exhibits 100, 
     102, 104). North Gate quickly became the hardest gate to 
     control (exhibit 100). East Gate was a single gate, which was 
     always at risk of being forced open by the crowd, because 
     there was no standoff (exhibits 100, 102, 104). Marines at 
     East Gate dealt with crowds crushing people against the 
     perimeter wall, making it difficult to open the gate (exhibit 
     102). The Taliban provided support at both North and East 
     Gates, but the Taliban commander at North Gate was the least 
     helpful (exhibits 125, 146). North, East, and Abbey Gates 
     closed from 20-22 August due to a lack of flights and 
     capacity within HKIA. In total, there were 18000 evacuees 
     waiting to fly out, which created a humanitarian and security 
     problem (exhibits 102, 104). The JTF-CR Commander closed 
     North Gate from 23-25 August, except for some targeted 
     entries, because of the VBIED threat (exhibits 100, 102). 
     East Gate closed permanently on 24 August because of the 
     threat of mortars from the Taliban, and an inability to 
     process evacuees without losing control of the gate (exhibits 
     100, 102, 104). By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the only gate 
     operating in the MEU's sector of HKIA (exhibit 102).
       (f) Aside from 1/8 Marines' rifle companies, additional MEU 
     elements supported gate operations. BLT 1/8's (TEXT REDACTED) 
     tasked his engineer platoon to support North, East, and Abbey 
     Gates (exhibits 103, 104). The engineers spent a 
     disproportionate amount of time improving East Gate, shoring 
     up gaps in the perimeter to prevent fence jumpers, and 
     removing towers on the exterior of the perimeter (exhibit 
     103). The engineers emplaced shipping containers to form the 
     obstacle at the southern end of Abbey Gate, later known as 
     the Chevron, on the morning of 20 August (exhibit 103). 
     Otherwise, support to Abbey Gate was limited (exhibit 103). 
     CLB-24 provided the bulk of the personnel assigned to the 
     Female Search Team (FST), and tasked them to support the 
     gates and the ECC (exhibit 101). The FST began with searching 
     women and children prior to DoS screening, then transitioned 
     to conducting initial searches outside the gates, escorting 
     rejected females out through the gates, and helping identify 
     eligible evacuees in the crowds (exhibit 107). The MEU 
     Commander re-task organized the 2nd Reconnaissance (Recon) 
     element to work directly for him later in the NEO, 
     specifically to conduct targeted recovery of privileged 
     personnel (exhibit 108). Recon element personnel were at the 
     gates constantly, working with 1/8 and 2/1 Marine leaders to 
     identify and pull specific people from the crowd for 
     processing (exhibit 108). The MEU also organized PSYOP and 
     cyber assets under the direction of the MEU (TEXT REDACTED) 
     for employment at the gates (exhibit 105). The PSYOP teams 
     employed capabilities at the gates to communicate with the 
     crowds, and provided updates on required documents or gate 
     closures (exhibit 105).
       (g) On 26 August, all the gates in the MEU sector of HKIA 
     were closed, with the exception of Abbey Gate and occasional 
     targeted recoveries at North Gate (exhibits 102, 104). The 
     IED threat was well known across the MEU, but threats lacked 
     specifics on times and locations (exhibits 100, 102, 104, 
     105, 106, 107). MEU leadership ensured electronic 
     countermeasures (ECM) were active at the gates, dispersion of 
     personnel was enforced to the greatest extent possible, 
     snipers were in overwatch, PSYOP personnel communicated the 
     threat to the crowd and asked people to leave, and medical 
     assets were repositioned (exhibit 100). At the time of the 
     blast, only the PSYOP, FST, and Recon elements of the MEU 
     were at Abbey Gate (exhibits 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 
     106, 107, 108). The paragraphs below detail the actions of 
     these personnel. The MEU JOC immediately put additional 
     intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets 
     over Abbey Gate, scanning for additional threats (exhibit 
     102). Post-blast, 1/8 Marines shifted security elements to 
     Abbey Gate to help fill gaps, and provided numerous vehicles 
     for CASEVAC, assisting in movement to the HKIA Role 11-E. 
     CLB-24 also provided numerous CASEVAC vehicles to support the 
     MASCAL (exhibit 101).

[[Page S3306]]

       (h) On 27 August, all gates were essentially shut in the 
     MEU sector and 1/82 IBCT secured Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 56, 
     57, 100, 102, 104). CLB-24 continued to operate the ECC until 
     30 August, processing evacuees until two hours before their 
     departure from HKIA. The MEU retrograded back to Kuwait 
     primarily on 29-30 August, with the last elements departing 
     at approximately 1000 on 30 August (exhibit 100).
       (7) Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Ground 
     Combat Element (GCE), 2/1 Marines.
       (a) 2/1 Marines were the GCE for the CENTCOM SPMAGTF, 
     located primarily in Camps across Kuwait and Prince Sultan 
     Airbase (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia (exhibit 53). In July 2021, 
     the SPMAGTF received notice it would potentially participate 
     in NEO in Afghanistan (exhibit 53). The SPMAGTF initially 
     task organized a ``NEO Light'' package, consisting of 
     elements of Combat Logistics Detachment (CLD) and the crisis 
     response company (Echo Company, 2/1) (exhibits 53, 54, 55). 
     The ``Light'' package elements executed two mission 
     rehearsals testing their ECC and gate operations, prior to 
     deployment to HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 55). In August, the 
     SPMAGTF would task organize and deploy a ``Heavy'' package, 
     that included the rest of 2/1 Marines' rifle companies 
     (exhibits 53, 54, 55).
       (b) 2/1 first arrived to HKIA at approximately 0100-0200 on 
     16 August (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 56, 57). The first flight 
     included the Battalion HQ, Echo Company leadership, and one 
     platoon from Echo Company (exhibits 54, 56). Upon arrival, 
     the unit found the airfield breached by civilians, who were 
     moving onto the runways (exhibits 54, 56). The Battalion 
     (TEXT REDACTED) immediately tasked Echo Company to assist 
     with clearing the runway, in hopes of resuming flight 
     operations (exhibit 54). Over the next 24 hours, Echo Company 
     was part of the line holding the southern perimeter with 3/10 
     IBCT, 1/82 IBCT, and 1/8 Marines (exhibit 56). There were 
     several breaches of the perimeter and crowds gained access to 
     the runway, attempted to board C-17s, and pushed towards the 
     North HKIA compounds (exhibits 56, 76). Forces pushed the 
     crowds back after NSU units joined the line, and the crowds 
     recognized there were no more flights to board (exhibits 56, 
     76). 2/1 Marines, specifically Echo Company, were part of the 
     security perimeter at HKIA from approximately 0600 on 16 
     August until 19 August, when they were relieved by units from 
     1/82 IBCT (exhibit 53).
       (c) Force flow over the next two days brought in parts of 
     the 2/1 Battalion HQ, Fox Company (-), Golf Company, Weapons 
     Company, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, the Shock 
     Trauma Platoon (STP), and finally the remainder of Echo 
     Company (exhibits 56, 76, 65, 66). These units focused on 
     securing the southern perimeter from the Domestic Terminal to 
     Abbey Gate from 17-19 August (exhibit 76). Once 1/82's relief 
     of the perimeter began, Golf Company, Fox Company (-), 
     Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoons, and Battalion 
     Snipers moved to Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 83, 
     89). U.K.'s 2 PARA were at the outer Abbey Gate, as well as 
     Air Force Pararescue (PJ) personnel and small partner nation 
     elements (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 89). After initially planning; 
     to push from Abbey Gate to Camp Sullivan, 2/1 Marines opted 
     not to execute due to the size of the crowds and lack of 
     Taliban support to extend the perimeter (exhibits 53, 76, 
     81). Instead, (TEXT REDACTED) tasked the battalion to open 
     the outer gate to begin processing evacuees (exhibits 53, 76, 
     81, 89). Opening the gate required an entire platoon, 
     sometimes reinforced, to keep the crowds from breaching the 
     outer gate and accessing the Abbey Gate's inner corridor 
     (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89). 2/1 Marines processed 
     approximately 750 evacuees through Abbey Gate on 19 August, 
     but only after tremendous effort to hold the gate (exhibits 
     53, 76, 77, 81, 89).
       (d) In order to enable safe and efficient gate operations, 
     (TEXT REDACTED) Golf Company, 2/1 (TEXT REDACTED) decided to 
     push the crowds back to an area beyond the Barron Hotel 
     egress lane. This would ensure U.K. Forces had better access 
     to the gate from their evacuee staging area (exhibits 53, 77, 
     89). In the early morning hours of 20 August, platoons from 
     Golf and Fox Companies opened the outer gate, and 
     methodically forced the smaller crowd back nearly 200 meters 
     (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89). (TEXT REDACTED) coordinated 
     with U.K. Forces and MEU Engineers to emplace six shipping 
     containers in the main south to north roadway leading to 
     Abbey Gate to form a disrupting obstacle and aid in crowd 
     control (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The Taliban agreed 
     to provide outer security beyond the containers, and the U.K. 
     Forces and 2/1 provided security inside the containers, 
     guarding the Barron Hotel egress route and canal areas 
     (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The containers became 
     known as the ``Chevron' (exhibits 18, 21, 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 
     89). The emplacement of the Chevron on 20 August established 
     the structural layout of Abbey Gate for the duration of the 
     NEO, as depicted in enclosures 12 and 13.

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