[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 115 (Wednesday, July 13, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3265-S3267]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. HAWLEY. Madam President, following my submission yesterday, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
ACTS-SCK-DO
Subject: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S.
Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International
Airport on 26 August 2021
(i) Throughout the NEO, USFOR-A FWD spent a significant
amount of time coordinating special evacuation requests on
behalf of the interagency, congressional representatives and
senators, and the White House (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21,
22). The USFOR-A FWD staff estimated they received over 4000
such requests during the nine days ECPs were operating
(exhibits 13, 20, 21, 22). (TEXT REDACTED) USFOR-A FWD Deputy
Commanding General, referred to these evacuees as privileged
personnel exhibit 21). USFOR-A FWD's (TEXT REDACTED) and
Embassy (TEXT REDACTED) worked with subordinate staffs to
action many of these requests. They would coordinate with the
potential evacuees for challenge and password or other
identification, visit gates, seek out the evacuees,
physically pull them from the crowd, and get them processed
through DoS and the Evacuation Control Center (ECC} (exhibits
17, 20, 22, 100, 108, 122).
(ii) (TEXT REDACTED) along with members of the JTF-CR
staff, were primarily responsible for coordinating multi-
national activities and requests through the Multi-National
Coordination Cell (MNCC) (exhibits 15, 18, 20, 21, 22). The
MNCC met daily, along with other Ambassador groups, to
coordinate air and lift requirements for partner nations, and
Afghans sponsored by those nations to depart (exhibits 20,
21, 22). Many of the other nations working out of HKIA and
conducting NEO were completely dependent on the U.S. for
airlift (exhibit 21). USFOR-A FWD, with JTF-CR, formed the
International Coordination Cell (ICC), which was a broader
forum for handling the extensive privileged persons' requests
from partner nations (exhibit 21). (TEXT REDACTED) USSFOR-A
FWD Chief of Staff, and Commander. 3/10 IBCT, was responsible
for working these issues (exhibits 21, 126). The ICC also
provided a forum to synchronize bulk movement and arrival of
passport holders or cleared individuals from all nations
through South Gate (exhibit 126). This included building and
allocating movement tables and coordinating with Taliban
commanders for passage of vehicles (exhibit 126). (TEXT
REDACTED) coordinated with 1/82 IBCTs (TEXT REDACTED) to
request TF Wild Boar support for receiving these coordinated
arrivals at the various gates (exhibit 247). TF Polar Bear
was a force on the ground
[[Page S3266]]
at HKIA scheduled to conduct relief in place/transfer of
authority (RIP/TOA) with TF Wild Boar. The RIP was delayed
based on conditions, to retain both forces for the
approaching NEO (exhibit 126). After 17 August, both forces
were at HKIA and made TACON to 1/82 IBCT during the NEO
(exhibits 128,247). TF Polar Bear operated as the HKIA quick
reaction force (QRF) and had liaison officers (LNO) in the
JTF-CR Joint Operations Center (JOC) (exhibit 247). TF Wild
Boar also served as a QRF, but executed targeted recovery
missions with the MNCC and ICC when operations permitted
(exhibits 10, 126, 247).
(iii) USFOR-A FWD was responsible for coordination with
adjacent military, paramilitary, and former adversary forces
(exhibits 13, 20, 21, 22, 23). On 16 August, RADM Vasely
coordinated with other governmental agencies (OGA) for NSU
assistance with airfield security. NSU took over large swaths
of the perimeter on the South, West, and North of HKIA
(exhibits 13, 15, 181,20, 21, 22, 23). Shortly after, RADM
Vasely began coordinating with (TEXT REDACTED) the regional
Taliban Commander and Taliban-designated LNO, for Taliban
assistance with clearing the airfield and providing security
along the southern perimeter of HKIA (exhibits 13, 15, 18,
20, 21, 22, 23). Finally, RADM Vasely and his staff
coordinated with the Turkish Military to relieve them of
security and airfield operations responsibilities (exhibits
13, 15, 18, 21).
(iv) USFOR-A FWD, and subordinate units, continued to
coordinate with the Taliban throughout the NEO, however, only
USFOR-A FWD and MG Donahue had authority to release threat
reporting to the Taliban (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22,
23). Prior to the Abbey Gate attack, on 25-26 August, USFOR-A
FWD was continuously updating the Taliban with information
necessary to improve their security posture and provide
effective screening for exposed forces at the gates (exhibits
13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). USFOR-A FWD and MG Donahue
frequently provided updates in person to the Taliban at the
South Terminal and by phone (exhibits 13, 21, 23, 125).
(3) Task Force--Medical (TF MED).
(a) TF MED was initially located at Bagram Air Base and
served as the most capable US Role Ill medical facility in
Afghanistan (exhibits 14, 131). On approximately 15 June, the
facility at Bagram closed and TF MED moved to North HKIA to
continue to provide medical support to remaining U.S. Forces,
but with a reduced capability {exhibits 14, 128, 131). TF MED
co-located with Norwegian medical personnel at the HKIA Role
II military treatment facility (exhibit 14, 128, 131). (TEXT
REDACTED) USAF, commanded TF MED during the period of the
move to HKIA and throughout the NEO (exhibits 14, 131). The
facility at HKIA was a Role II Enhanced (Role 11-E), with
lab, pharmacy, two operating rooms (ORs), and computed
tomography (en scan capability (exhibits 14, 128, 131).
(b) During the NEO, the capabilities of this facility
swelled, eventually supported by nine surgical teams arriving
20-23 August (exhibits 131). These teams came from various
locations and nations: one Norwegian Special Operations
Surgical Team (SOST), two U.S. SOSTs, two U.S. Forward
Resuscitative Surgical Detachments (FRSD), surgical teams
organic to TF MED, one U.K. Military surgical team, and those
organic to the 82nd, which operated from the Role II at Camp
Alvarado (exhibits 14, 128, 131, 149). In addition to
surgical teams, TF MED also had an Aeromedical Evacuation
Liaison Team (AELT), responsible for medical airlift from
HKIA rearward. Io synchronize efforts, (TEXT REDACTED)
conducted daily huddles with the various contingents to
discuss threat reporting, posturing medical assets and
supplies, and patient flow (exhibits 131, 149). TF MED
created and exercised a mass casualty (MASCAL) plan for
medical response in June 2021, which included Norwegian
capabiltties and participation (exhibits 14, 131). During the
NEO, (TEXT REDACTED) made the decision to consolidate higher-
level medical care at the Role II-E an not push any assets to
the gates (exhibit 131). The units at the gates had medics/
corpsmen and the Role I capability had already pushed forward
(exhibits 66, 100, 104).
(c) On 25-26 August, Role II-E personnel were aware of
increased credible reporting for a vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device (VBIED) or suicide vest IED (SVIED) at a
gate (exhibits 14, 131). The USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED)
contacted approximately 26 August and warned him a MASCAL
event was imminent exhibit 131). (TEXT REDACTED) placed
medics and surgical teams on stand-by until 1700, and then
released them on immediate recall (exhibit 14, 131). At the
time of the blast (TEXT REDACTED) was in the Joint Operations
Center (JOC) and a Role I facility reported significant
numbers of casualties, which triggered the MASCAL response
(exhibit 131). (TEXT REDACTED) Trauma Team Leader, was in the
emergency room (ER) and did not hear the blast, but was
notified within minutes to prepare for a MASCAL (exhibit
128). TF MED received its first patient within 12 minutes and
treated patients for the next 10-12 hours (exhibits 14, 128
131, 149). The most seriously wounded patients arrived first,
a result of proper triage at the Role I facilities and
casualty collection points (CCPs) (exhibits 14, 128, 131
14Q). The Role II-E expanded its operating room to
accommodate four patients at a time and used hallway space to
provide additional required care (exhibits 128, 131, 149).
Patients with less severe injuries, not requiring immediate
care, were staged outsde or in ambulances with medics to
stabilize injuries (exhibits 14, 128, 131, 149). Of the 13
killed in action (KIA), every medical professional
interviewed concluded that no amount of additional measures,
equipment, or treatment could have saved their lives
(exhibits 14, 128, 131, 149). By approximately 0700 on 27
August, the Role II-E was empty of patients, with three
flights taking personnel to Qatar or Germany, to include 19
U.S. causalities (exhibit 14, 131, 236). The Role II-E had a
small morgue, capable of handling only eight deceased
(exhibits 68, 131). Because the MASCAL overwhelmed the
hospital morgue capacity, the KIA were moved to a pre-
coordinated refrigerated shipping container for preparation
and movement back to continental U.S. (CONUS) (exhibit 68,
131).
(4) JTF-CR.
(a) JTF-CR is a command and control organization derived
from a joint manning document, manned by TF 51/5th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) personnel, stationed in Bahrain,
and augmented with personnel from the CENTCOM area of
responsibility (AOR) (exhibits 15, 17, 18). TF 51/5th MEB
began initial planning in April for the potential NEO,
convened two operational planning teams, coordinated with
USFOR-A, CENTCOM, and MARCENT, and attended operations and
intelligence updates with USFOR-A FWD (exhibits 15, 17, 18).
JTF-CR activated in May and was TACON to USFOR-A FWD for NEO
planning (exhibits 15, 17, 18). In May and June, JTF-CR
conducted a pre-deployment site survey (POSS) to Afghanistan
to assess possible evacuation sites and coordinate with
stakeholders, specifically USEK (exhibits 15, 17, 18).
Initial planning accounted for two aerial ports of
embarkation (APOEs), HKIA and Bagram Air Base. In early June,
Bagram transitioned to ANDSF control and was no longer
considered for planning (exhibits 15, 17, 18). JTF-CR
deployed three LNOs forward in May, along with a small three
person quartering party to HKIA in late May to set
conditions for a possible NEO (exhibit 15, 18).
(b) JTF-CR deployed to HKIA on 19 July, starting with the
Early Entry Assistance Team (EEAT), followed by the JTF-CR
staff as a robust quartering party (exhibit 15}. The staff
continued to coordinate with USEK while in Afghanistan, in an
attempt to plan the NEO, but to little effect (exhibit 18).
With the fall of Afghanistan districts to the Taliban
throughout July and August, the JTF-CR continuously took
steps to prepare HKIA for NEO, such as building supply stocks
on HKIA to handle evacuees' basic needs (exhibit 18). During
early August, DoS began processing Special Immigrant Visas
(SIVs) and sending out evacuees by commercial air. They
evacuated approximately 750 before the NEO was called on 13
August (exhibits 18, 8, 24).
(c) During execution of the NEO, JTF-CR had initial
responsibility for securing HKIA and processing evacuees
designated eligible by DoS (exhibits 15, 17, 18). In the
early morning hours of 14 August, 24th MEU arrived with
nearly 200 personnel that included some of the headquarters
staff, snipers, ECC personnel, and a single rifle company
(exhibits 15, 100, 102, 104). At this time, elements of TF
Polar Bear and TF Wild Boar, who were subordinate elements of
3/10 IBCT providing security for USEK and HKIA, arrived to
HKIA (exhibits 15, 126, 247). 24th MEU later closed
additional capability during 14 August, with a similar mix of
personnel as the first lift (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 104). The
Turkish Military was providing security on North HKIA, with
approximately 400 troops, and the ANDSF were securing the
southern perimeter of HKIA, specifically the routes into the
commercial terminals (exhibit 15). Approximately a battalion
of U.K. Forces was also facilitating their own evacuation
operations out of the airport (exhibits 15, 18, 126). U.S.
Air Force C-17s were slow to arrive throughout 14-15 August
(exhibit 15). By the end of 14 August, there were
approximately 1600 U.S. and coalition forces at HKIA
(exhibits 13, 15, 18).
(i) On 15 August, Afghanistan's President Ghani departed
Kabul in a helicopter, abandoning the capital and the
government. Soon after, ANDSF leaders also fled (exhibits 13,
15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). This precipitated the dissolution of
the ANDSF, leaving the southern perimeter of the airport
unsecured. Simultaneously, USEK was evacuating personnel to
HKIA (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). Ghani's departure
and the Embassy evacuation created a panic in the Kabul
population, and civilians began to rush the airfield in an
attempt to board departing or stationary aircraft (exhibits
13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). On three separate occasions, on
15 August and into the hours of darkness of 16 August, large
crowds pushed across the HKIA flight line and near the North
HKIA footprint, forcing JTF-CR to empty their operations
center of personnel to push back the crowds (exhibits 15,
18). The presence of large crowds of civilians on the runways
halted air operations continuously throughout 16 August.
(ii) Three solutions to the airfield security problem
manifested during the next 24-48 hours. 1/82 IBCT forces
arrived on C-17s during the hours of darkness on 15-16
August, and JTF-CR immediately tasked them with airfield
security (exhibit 15). On 16 August, an OGA offered to bring
the NSU's approximately 1200-1300 personnel to provide
security at HKIA (on the condition of evacuating NSU
families) (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 23).
[[Page S3267]]
Later on 16 August, the Taliban offered to help remove
civilians from the airfield. RADM Vasely accepted the
Taliban's offer, and Taliban forces began clearing and
securing the airfield (exhibits 15, 18, 21, 23). The addition
of these three forces was sufficient to clear the runway and
resume flight operations (exhibits 15, 18).
(iii) Once the perimeter was reestablished on 16 and 17
August, the Taliban took the South, the NSU took the North
and West, and 1/82nd took the West and overall security
responsibilities (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 103). JTF-CR continued
to manage the flow of combat forces into HKIA and into the
line to hold the tenuous status quo (exhibits 15, 18, 53,
103). Force flow over the next two days delivered the
remainder of the 1/82 IBCT, all of the 24th MEU Command
Element, the remainder of 1/8 Marines, the MEU Combat
Logistics Battalion (CLB), 2/1 Marines with enablers from the
CENTCOM SPMAGTF, and the TAC of the 82nd Airborne Division
(exhibits 15, 18, 53, 100, 102, 104, 121, 125). JTF-CR had
TACON of all forces providing security of HKIA until 17
August, when Gen McKenzie, CENTCOM Commander, tasked the 82nd
Airborne Division with security of HKIA (exhibits 8, 10, 11,
13, 15, 18, 21, 238). The JTF-CR retained sole responsibility
of NEO tasks and duties (exhibits 10, 11, 15, 18, 138, 238).
(d) During the execution of NEO, the JTF-CR managed three
critical tasks at the JTF level or through its subordinate
units: Gate Operations, ECC, and the Multi-National
Coordination Cell (exhibits 15, 17, 18).
(i) After being relieved of airfield security duties, 1/8
Marines (24th MEU) occupied North and East Gates, and 2/1
Marines (SPMAGTF) occupied Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 103).
From 19-26 August, these gates were used to process and
screen tens of thousands of civilian evacuees (exhibits 15,
18). Commanders at each gate exercised their authority to
open or close their respective gates, as they deemed
appropriate, according to the situation on the ground
(exhibits 15, 53, 103). The JTF-CR Commander retained the
authority to reopen a gate if the gate commander had closed
it due to the threat environment or possible attack (exhibits
15, 18, 103). However, there was tremendous pressure from the
strategic level (Combatant Command (CCMD), Joint Staff (JS),
White House) to continue to process and evacuate civilians to
the maximum extent possible, so gate closures were done
rarely, locally, and temporarily (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 56,
77, 103, 121). For example, Abbey Gate did not physically
close until the night of 26 August (exhibit 53). JTF-CR's
management of gate operations also entailed reacting to the
overwhelming number of special requests to secure specific
evacuees from gates (exhibits 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22).
Members of the USFOR-A FWD, JTF-CR, MEU, 1/8, and 2/1 staffs
were constantly engaged in retrieving specially requested
individuals from the gates, with the lower echelons doing so
on behalf of JTF-CR (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 76,
108, 122).
(ii) The JTF-CR Commander was responsible for deciding when
to close Abbey Gate to facilitate the Joint Tactical
Exfiltration (JTE) (exhibits 13, 15, 17, 18, 22). Initially,
the JTF-CR sought to close the gate on the evening of 25
August (exhibits 18, 53, 77, 89, 126). However, U.K. Forces
were still operating at the Barron Hotel and could not meet
this timeline (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 77, 89, 126.). If the
JTF-CR Commander decided to close Abbey Gate while U.K.
Forces were still processing evacuees, it would have isolated
them at the Barron Hotel. This would have affected the JTE,
as the JTF-CR Commander estimated it would take 24-48 hours
to clear the outer corridor and facilitate U.K. Forces'
passage of lines into HKIA (exhibits 15, 18). Additionally,
if the JTF-CR closed Abbey Gate early, the crowds likely
would have breached the airfield, which posed a significant
risk to mission and risk to force (exhibits 15, 18).
(iii) The 24th MEU established the ECC at the passenger
(PAX) Terminal in North HKIA (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 101,
102). Evacuees waiting for flights consistently saturated
this area, creating a security concern (exhibits 100, 101).
As a result, JTF-CR tasked subordinate units to provide
security forces at the PAX Terminal to ensure evacuees did
not attempt to board the wrong flights or move into the
compounds on North HKIA (exhibits 15, 18, 101).
(iv) As the lead for NEO, JTF-CR hosted the MNCC (exhibits
18, 21, 145). At the MNCC, JTF-CR coordinated the
requirements of the multi-national partners to evacuate
personnel (exhibits 18, 21). This usually included
manifesting flights and coordinating appropriate arrival
destinations based on the status of evacuees (exhibits 18,
21).
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