[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 115 (Wednesday, July 13, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3265-S3267]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HAWLEY. Madam President, following my submission yesterday, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an 
investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey 
Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     ACTS-SCK-DO
     Subject: Findings and Recommendation--Attack Against U.S. 
         Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International 
         Airport on 26 August 2021

       (i) Throughout the NEO, USFOR-A FWD spent a significant 
     amount of time coordinating special evacuation requests on 
     behalf of the interagency, congressional representatives and 
     senators, and the White House (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 
     22). The USFOR-A FWD staff estimated they received over 4000 
     such requests during the nine days ECPs were operating 
     (exhibits 13, 20, 21, 22). (TEXT REDACTED) USFOR-A FWD Deputy 
     Commanding General, referred to these evacuees as privileged 
     personnel exhibit 21). USFOR-A FWD's (TEXT REDACTED) and 
     Embassy (TEXT REDACTED) worked with subordinate staffs to 
     action many of these requests. They would coordinate with the 
     potential evacuees for challenge and password or other 
     identification, visit gates, seek out the evacuees, 
     physically pull them from the crowd, and get them processed 
     through DoS and the Evacuation Control Center (ECC} (exhibits 
     17, 20, 22, 100, 108, 122).
       (ii) (TEXT REDACTED) along with members of the JTF-CR 
     staff, were primarily responsible for coordinating multi-
     national activities and requests through the Multi-National 
     Coordination Cell (MNCC) (exhibits 15, 18, 20, 21, 22). The 
     MNCC met daily, along with other Ambassador groups, to 
     coordinate air and lift requirements for partner nations, and 
     Afghans sponsored by those nations to depart (exhibits 20, 
     21, 22). Many of the other nations working out of HKIA and 
     conducting NEO were completely dependent on the U.S. for 
     airlift (exhibit 21). USFOR-A FWD, with JTF-CR, formed the 
     International Coordination Cell (ICC), which was a broader 
     forum for handling the extensive privileged persons' requests 
     from partner nations (exhibit 21). (TEXT REDACTED) USSFOR-A 
     FWD Chief of Staff, and Commander. 3/10 IBCT, was responsible 
     for working these issues (exhibits 21, 126). The ICC also 
     provided a forum to synchronize bulk movement and arrival of 
     passport holders or cleared individuals from all nations 
     through South Gate (exhibit 126). This included building and 
     allocating movement tables and coordinating with Taliban 
     commanders for passage of vehicles (exhibit 126). (TEXT 
     REDACTED) coordinated with 1/82 IBCTs (TEXT REDACTED) to 
     request TF Wild Boar support for receiving these coordinated 
     arrivals at the various gates (exhibit 247). TF Polar Bear 
     was a force on the ground

[[Page S3266]]

     at HKIA scheduled to conduct relief in place/transfer of 
     authority (RIP/TOA) with TF Wild Boar. The RIP was delayed 
     based on conditions, to retain both forces for the 
     approaching NEO (exhibit 126). After 17 August, both forces 
     were at HKIA and made TACON to 1/82 IBCT during the NEO 
     (exhibits 128,247). TF Polar Bear operated as the HKIA quick 
     reaction force (QRF) and had liaison officers (LNO) in the 
     JTF-CR Joint Operations Center (JOC) (exhibit 247). TF Wild 
     Boar also served as a QRF, but executed targeted recovery 
     missions with the MNCC and ICC when operations permitted 
     (exhibits 10, 126, 247).
       (iii) USFOR-A FWD was responsible for coordination with 
     adjacent military, paramilitary, and former adversary forces 
     (exhibits 13, 20, 21, 22, 23). On 16 August, RADM Vasely 
     coordinated with other governmental agencies (OGA) for NSU 
     assistance with airfield security. NSU took over large swaths 
     of the perimeter on the South, West, and North of HKIA 
     (exhibits 13, 15, 181,20, 21, 22, 23). Shortly after, RADM 
     Vasely began coordinating with (TEXT REDACTED) the regional 
     Taliban Commander and Taliban-designated LNO, for Taliban 
     assistance with clearing the airfield and providing security 
     along the southern perimeter of HKIA (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 
     20, 21, 22, 23). Finally, RADM Vasely and his staff 
     coordinated with the Turkish Military to relieve them of 
     security and airfield operations responsibilities (exhibits 
     13, 15, 18, 21).
       (iv) USFOR-A FWD, and subordinate units, continued to 
     coordinate with the Taliban throughout the NEO, however, only 
     USFOR-A FWD and MG Donahue had authority to release threat 
     reporting to the Taliban (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 
     23). Prior to the Abbey Gate attack, on 25-26 August, USFOR-A 
     FWD was continuously updating the Taliban with information 
     necessary to improve their security posture and provide 
     effective screening for exposed forces at the gates (exhibits 
     13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). USFOR-A FWD and MG Donahue 
     frequently provided updates in person to the Taliban at the 
     South Terminal and by phone (exhibits 13, 21, 23, 125).
       (3) Task Force--Medical (TF MED).
       (a) TF MED was initially located at Bagram Air Base and 
     served as the most capable US Role Ill medical facility in 
     Afghanistan (exhibits 14, 131). On approximately 15 June, the 
     facility at Bagram closed and TF MED moved to North HKIA to 
     continue to provide medical support to remaining U.S. Forces, 
     but with a reduced capability {exhibits 14, 128, 131). TF MED 
     co-located with Norwegian medical personnel at the HKIA Role 
     II military treatment facility (exhibit 14, 128, 131). (TEXT 
     REDACTED) USAF, commanded TF MED during the period of the 
     move to HKIA and throughout the NEO (exhibits 14, 131). The 
     facility at HKIA was a Role II Enhanced (Role 11-E), with 
     lab, pharmacy, two operating rooms (ORs), and computed 
     tomography (en scan capability (exhibits 14, 128, 131).
       (b) During the NEO, the capabilities of this facility 
     swelled, eventually supported by nine surgical teams arriving 
     20-23 August (exhibits 131). These teams came from various 
     locations and nations: one Norwegian Special Operations 
     Surgical Team (SOST), two U.S. SOSTs, two U.S. Forward 
     Resuscitative Surgical Detachments (FRSD), surgical teams 
     organic to TF MED, one U.K. Military surgical team, and those 
     organic to the 82nd, which operated from the Role II at Camp 
     Alvarado (exhibits 14, 128, 131, 149). In addition to 
     surgical teams, TF MED also had an Aeromedical Evacuation 
     Liaison Team (AELT), responsible for medical airlift from 
     HKIA rearward. Io synchronize efforts, (TEXT REDACTED) 
     conducted daily huddles with the various contingents to 
     discuss threat reporting, posturing medical assets and 
     supplies, and patient flow (exhibits 131, 149). TF MED 
     created and exercised a mass casualty (MASCAL) plan for 
     medical response in June 2021, which included Norwegian 
     capabiltties and participation (exhibits 14, 131). During the 
     NEO, (TEXT REDACTED) made the decision to consolidate higher-
     level medical care at the Role II-E an not push any assets to 
     the gates (exhibit 131). The units at the gates had medics/
     corpsmen and the Role I capability had already pushed forward 
     (exhibits 66, 100, 104).
       (c) On 25-26 August, Role II-E personnel were aware of 
     increased credible reporting for a vehicle-borne improvised 
     explosive device (VBIED) or suicide vest IED (SVIED) at a 
     gate (exhibits 14, 131). The USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) 
     contacted approximately 26 August and warned him a MASCAL 
     event was imminent exhibit 131). (TEXT REDACTED) placed 
     medics and surgical teams on stand-by until 1700, and then 
     released them on immediate recall (exhibit 14, 131). At the 
     time of the blast (TEXT REDACTED) was in the Joint Operations 
     Center (JOC) and a Role I facility reported significant 
     numbers of casualties, which triggered the MASCAL response 
     (exhibit 131). (TEXT REDACTED) Trauma Team Leader, was in the 
     emergency room (ER) and did not hear the blast, but was 
     notified within minutes to prepare for a MASCAL (exhibit 
     128). TF MED received its first patient within 12 minutes and 
     treated patients for the next 10-12 hours (exhibits 14, 128 
     131, 149). The most seriously wounded patients arrived first, 
     a result of proper triage at the Role I facilities and 
     casualty collection points (CCPs) (exhibits 14, 128, 131 
     14Q). The Role II-E expanded its operating room to 
     accommodate four patients at a time and used hallway space to 
     provide additional required care (exhibits 128, 131, 149). 
     Patients with less severe injuries, not requiring immediate 
     care, were staged outsde or in ambulances with medics to 
     stabilize injuries (exhibits 14, 128, 131, 149). Of the 13 
     killed in action (KIA), every medical professional 
     interviewed concluded that no amount of additional measures, 
     equipment, or treatment could have saved their lives 
     (exhibits 14, 128, 131, 149). By approximately 0700 on 27 
     August, the Role II-E was empty of patients, with three 
     flights taking personnel to Qatar or Germany, to include 19 
     U.S. causalities (exhibit 14, 131, 236). The Role II-E had a 
     small morgue, capable of handling only eight deceased 
     (exhibits 68, 131). Because the MASCAL overwhelmed the 
     hospital morgue capacity, the KIA were moved to a pre-
     coordinated refrigerated shipping container for preparation 
     and movement back to continental U.S. (CONUS) (exhibit 68, 
     131).
       (4) JTF-CR.
       (a) JTF-CR is a command and control organization derived 
     from a joint manning document, manned by TF 51/5th Marine 
     Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) personnel, stationed in Bahrain, 
     and augmented with personnel from the CENTCOM area of 
     responsibility (AOR) (exhibits 15, 17, 18). TF 51/5th MEB 
     began initial planning in April for the potential NEO, 
     convened two operational planning teams, coordinated with 
     USFOR-A, CENTCOM, and MARCENT, and attended operations and 
     intelligence updates with USFOR-A FWD (exhibits 15, 17, 18). 
     JTF-CR activated in May and was TACON to USFOR-A FWD for NEO 
     planning (exhibits 15, 17, 18). In May and June, JTF-CR 
     conducted a pre-deployment site survey (POSS) to Afghanistan 
     to assess possible evacuation sites and coordinate with 
     stakeholders, specifically USEK (exhibits 15, 17, 18). 
     Initial planning accounted for two aerial ports of 
     embarkation (APOEs), HKIA and Bagram Air Base. In early June, 
     Bagram transitioned to ANDSF control and was no longer 
     considered for planning (exhibits 15, 17, 18). JTF-CR 
     deployed three LNOs forward in May, along with a small three 
     person quartering party to HKIA in late May to set 
     conditions for a possible NEO (exhibit 15, 18).
       (b) JTF-CR deployed to HKIA on 19 July, starting with the 
     Early Entry Assistance Team (EEAT), followed by the JTF-CR 
     staff as a robust quartering party (exhibit 15}. The staff 
     continued to coordinate with USEK while in Afghanistan, in an 
     attempt to plan the NEO, but to little effect (exhibit 18). 
     With the fall of Afghanistan districts to the Taliban 
     throughout July and August, the JTF-CR continuously took 
     steps to prepare HKIA for NEO, such as building supply stocks 
     on HKIA to handle evacuees' basic needs (exhibit 18). During 
     early August, DoS began processing Special Immigrant Visas 
     (SIVs) and sending out evacuees by commercial air. They 
     evacuated approximately 750 before the NEO was called on 13 
     August (exhibits 18, 8, 24).
       (c) During execution of the NEO, JTF-CR had initial 
     responsibility for securing HKIA and processing evacuees 
     designated eligible by DoS (exhibits 15, 17, 18). In the 
     early morning hours of 14 August, 24th MEU arrived with 
     nearly 200 personnel that included some of the headquarters 
     staff, snipers, ECC personnel, and a single rifle company 
     (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 104). At this time, elements of TF 
     Polar Bear and TF Wild Boar, who were subordinate elements of 
     3/10 IBCT providing security for USEK and HKIA, arrived to 
     HKIA (exhibits 15, 126, 247). 24th MEU later closed 
     additional capability during 14 August, with a similar mix of 
     personnel as the first lift (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 104). The 
     Turkish Military was providing security on North HKIA, with 
     approximately 400 troops, and the ANDSF were securing the 
     southern perimeter of HKIA, specifically the routes into the 
     commercial terminals (exhibit 15). Approximately a battalion 
     of U.K. Forces was also facilitating their own evacuation 
     operations out of the airport (exhibits 15, 18, 126). U.S. 
     Air Force C-17s were slow to arrive throughout 14-15 August 
     (exhibit 15). By the end of 14 August, there were 
     approximately 1600 U.S. and coalition forces at HKIA 
     (exhibits 13, 15, 18).
       (i) On 15 August, Afghanistan's President Ghani departed 
     Kabul in a helicopter, abandoning the capital and the 
     government. Soon after, ANDSF leaders also fled (exhibits 13, 
     15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). This precipitated the dissolution of 
     the ANDSF, leaving the southern perimeter of the airport 
     unsecured. Simultaneously, USEK was evacuating personnel to 
     HKIA (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). Ghani's departure 
     and the Embassy evacuation created a panic in the Kabul 
     population, and civilians began to rush the airfield in an 
     attempt to board departing or stationary aircraft (exhibits 
     13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23). On three separate occasions, on 
     15 August and into the hours of darkness of 16 August, large 
     crowds pushed across the HKIA flight line and near the North 
     HKIA footprint, forcing JTF-CR to empty their operations 
     center of personnel to push back the crowds (exhibits 15, 
     18). The presence of large crowds of civilians on the runways 
     halted air operations continuously throughout 16 August.
       (ii) Three solutions to the airfield security problem 
     manifested during the next 24-48 hours. 1/82 IBCT forces 
     arrived on C-17s during the hours of darkness on 15-16 
     August, and JTF-CR immediately tasked them with airfield 
     security (exhibit 15). On 16 August, an OGA offered to bring 
     the NSU's approximately 1200-1300 personnel to provide 
     security at HKIA (on the condition of evacuating NSU 
     families) (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 23).

[[Page S3267]]

     Later on 16 August, the Taliban offered to help remove 
     civilians from the airfield. RADM Vasely accepted the 
     Taliban's offer, and Taliban forces began clearing and 
     securing the airfield (exhibits 15, 18, 21, 23). The addition 
     of these three forces was sufficient to clear the runway and 
     resume flight operations (exhibits 15, 18).
       (iii) Once the perimeter was reestablished on 16 and 17 
     August, the Taliban took the South, the NSU took the North 
     and West, and 1/82nd took the West and overall security 
     responsibilities (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 103). JTF-CR continued 
     to manage the flow of combat forces into HKIA and into the 
     line to hold the tenuous status quo (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 
     103). Force flow over the next two days delivered the 
     remainder of the 1/82 IBCT, all of the 24th MEU Command 
     Element, the remainder of 1/8 Marines, the MEU Combat 
     Logistics Battalion (CLB), 2/1 Marines with enablers from the 
     CENTCOM SPMAGTF, and the TAC of the 82nd Airborne Division 
     (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 100, 102, 104, 121, 125). JTF-CR had 
     TACON of all forces providing security of HKIA until 17 
     August, when Gen McKenzie, CENTCOM Commander, tasked the 82nd 
     Airborne Division with security of HKIA (exhibits 8, 10, 11, 
     13, 15, 18, 21, 238). The JTF-CR retained sole responsibility 
     of NEO tasks and duties (exhibits 10, 11, 15, 18, 138, 238).
       (d) During the execution of NEO, the JTF-CR managed three 
     critical tasks at the JTF level or through its subordinate 
     units: Gate Operations, ECC, and the Multi-National 
     Coordination Cell (exhibits 15, 17, 18).
       (i) After being relieved of airfield security duties, 1/8 
     Marines (24th MEU) occupied North and East Gates, and 2/1 
     Marines (SPMAGTF) occupied Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 103). 
     From 19-26 August, these gates were used to process and 
     screen tens of thousands of civilian evacuees (exhibits 15, 
     18). Commanders at each gate exercised their authority to 
     open or close their respective gates, as they deemed 
     appropriate, according to the situation on the ground 
     (exhibits 15, 53, 103). The JTF-CR Commander retained the 
     authority to reopen a gate if the gate commander had closed 
     it due to the threat environment or possible attack (exhibits 
     15, 18, 103). However, there was tremendous pressure from the 
     strategic level (Combatant Command (CCMD), Joint Staff (JS), 
     White House) to continue to process and evacuate civilians to 
     the maximum extent possible, so gate closures were done 
     rarely, locally, and temporarily (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 56, 
     77, 103, 121). For example, Abbey Gate did not physically 
     close until the night of 26 August (exhibit 53). JTF-CR's 
     management of gate operations also entailed reacting to the 
     overwhelming number of special requests to secure specific 
     evacuees from gates (exhibits 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22). 
     Members of the USFOR-A FWD, JTF-CR, MEU, 1/8, and 2/1 staffs 
     were constantly engaged in retrieving specially requested 
     individuals from the gates, with the lower echelons doing so 
     on behalf of JTF-CR (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 76, 
     108, 122).
       (ii) The JTF-CR Commander was responsible for deciding when 
     to close Abbey Gate to facilitate the Joint Tactical 
     Exfiltration (JTE) (exhibits 13, 15, 17, 18, 22). Initially, 
     the JTF-CR sought to close the gate on the evening of 25 
     August (exhibits 18, 53, 77, 89, 126). However, U.K. Forces 
     were still operating at the Barron Hotel and could not meet 
     this timeline (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 77, 89, 126.). If the 
     JTF-CR Commander decided to close Abbey Gate while U.K. 
     Forces were still processing evacuees, it would have isolated 
     them at the Barron Hotel. This would have affected the JTE, 
     as the JTF-CR Commander estimated it would take 24-48 hours 
     to clear the outer corridor and facilitate U.K. Forces' 
     passage of lines into HKIA (exhibits 15, 18). Additionally, 
     if the JTF-CR closed Abbey Gate early, the crowds likely 
     would have breached the airfield, which posed a significant 
     risk to mission and risk to force (exhibits 15, 18).
       (iii) The 24th MEU established the ECC at the passenger 
     (PAX) Terminal in North HKIA (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 101, 
     102). Evacuees waiting for flights consistently saturated 
     this area, creating a security concern (exhibits 100, 101). 
     As a result, JTF-CR tasked subordinate units to provide 
     security forces at the PAX Terminal to ensure evacuees did 
     not attempt to board the wrong flights or move into the 
     compounds on North HKIA (exhibits 15, 18, 101).
       (iv) As the lead for NEO, JTF-CR hosted the MNCC (exhibits 
     18, 21, 145). At the MNCC, JTF-CR coordinated the 
     requirements of the multi-national partners to evacuate 
     personnel (exhibits 18, 21). This usually included 
     manifesting flights and coordinating appropriate arrival 
     destinations based on the status of evacuees (exhibits 18, 
     21).

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