[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 114 (Tuesday, July 12, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3228-S3231]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



             Unanimous Consent Requests--Executive Calendar

  Mr. SCHATZ. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the nominations 
of Dr. Lester Martinez-Lopez to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Health Affairs, Dr. Agnes Schaefer to be Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Mr. Franklin Parker to hold 
the same position within the Navy.
  The office Dr. Martinez-Lopez is nominated for is responsible for 
ensuring that we are medically ready to fight and win wars. This is a 
critical role for our national security at all times, but, of course, 
it is even more important during a pandemic.
  Leaving this office without leadership jeopardizes our ability to 
respond to this health crisis and prepare for the next one. Having 
spent more than two decades as an Army surgeon and commander of medical 
centers at major U.S. military bases both stateside and overseas, and 
more than a decade as a leader of private medical research 
organizations, Dr. Martinez-Lopez clearly has the experience to fill 
this position.
  The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs across the 
branches ensure our military and civilian workforce have the education, 
the training, and the skills needed to meet current and future threats. 
Mr. Parker, who is nominated to head this office for the Navy, has 
demonstrated his ability to fill the role and will be able to hit the 
ground running, having held the position before.
  Dr. Schaefer, nominated to head this office for the Army, will bring 
firsthand knowledge from her 15 years at the RAND Corporation, where 
she specialized in military personnel policy, reserve component issues, 
national security strategy, and emerging threats.
  All three of these positions play important roles in our national 
security. All three nominees to fill them were voted out of committee--
a committee on which the Senator from Missouri serves--without 
objection--without objection--4 months ago. But all three remain 
vacant.

[[Page S3229]]

  The Senator from Missouri, as someone who serves on the Personnel 
Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I know would know better 
than most the issues our military branches and the troops face. These 
include recruitment and retention challenges, ensuring safe workplaces, 
including implementing IRC reforms to prevent and respond to sexual 
assault and sexual harassment within the ranks, and addressing the high 
suicide rate among troops and veterans--all issues which impact 
military readiness. But there is a hold on all DOD nominees.
  I am unaware of any substantive objections to these nominees based on 
their qualifications or their ability to serve, reasons which we have a 
constitutional duty to review based on our advice and consent role.
  My understanding is that the Senator from Missouri is implementing a 
blanket hold based on general policy disagreements with the Biden 
administration. In addition to our advice and consent role, the Senate 
has oversight responsibilities, and that is a place where the Senator 
from Missouri, as a member of the Personnel Committee of the Armed 
Services Committee, has the responsibility of oversight of the three 
offices that we are discussing today. He has a way to ensure that once 
these three nominees are confirmed, he and his colleagues can evaluate 
their performance. With acting, nonconfirmed officials in these roles, 
that oversight authority is undermined.
  As a Senator, we are afforded extraordinary powers to advance 
policies or even just to make a point, but these powers should be used 
in accordance with our constitutional responsibilities. The President 
of the United States has the responsibility to nominate qualified 
individuals to fill these roles, and he has. These individuals are 
qualified, and now we have the responsibility to confirm them so that 
they can get to work for our servicemembers and for the American 
people.
  I will now yield to my friend and colleague Senator Kaine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I rise and thank my colleague from Hawaii 
for stating plainly the qualifications of these candidates.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have had a chance to 
review their qualifications. And as the father of a U.S. marine, I 
agree wholeheartedly with the Senator's contention that these three 
positions would be very important to fill at a time when the United 
States has so many security challenges.
  Anticipating a productive dialogue with my colleague from Missouri, I 
would like to ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider the 
following nominations en bloc: Calendar Nos. 779, 780, 781; that the 
Senate vote on the nominations en bloc without intervening action or 
debate; that the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon 
the table; that any statements related to the nominations be printed in 
the Record; and that the President be immediately notified of the 
Senate's action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection?
  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. HAWLEY. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.
  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to say a word, if I could, about the nature 
of my objection.
  It has been now almost a year since the attack at Abbey Gate in Kabul 
in Afghanistan, almost a year since we lost 13 American servicemembers 
in that tragic attack, almost a year since hundreds of American 
civilians were left behind enemy lines, abandoned by this 
administration to fend for themselves against our enemies. And that 
attack claimed the lives, among the 13, of CPL Jared Schmitz, from 
Wentzville, MO.
  I was thinking of Corporal Schmitz again just the other day when I 
was driving past the bridge in Wentzville that will soon be named for 
him. I am glad that Corporal Schmitz is getting some of the honor that 
he deserves, but let's be honest. As his father said to me just hours 
after we learned of his death: What would be far better--far better, 
indeed--would be for Corporal Schmitz, who is a very young man, to be 
with us. He was just at the beginning of his service, just at the 
beginning of his life. And while he was proud, I am sure, to give his 
life for his country--it is what he volunteered to do--we owe it to 
him, I owe it to him, to try and find out why--why--this attack at 
Abbey Gate happened. How was it that a civilian evacuation was not 
ordered in time? Why was it that this administration ignored repeated 
warnings from military commanders on the ground about the dangers that 
were mounting in Kabul in Afghanistan? Why was the withdrawal a 
debacle?
  Now, I want to give central command some credit. They have 
commissioned an investigation on this point and issued a report, and I 
have some of it here with me. This is just the unclassified portion. It 
is 6,000 pages long. I will tell you, having been through all of it 
with my team, it is very exhaustive. It took them months to do. They 
interviewed commanders on the ground. They interviewed military members 
who were there at the time. They interviewed State Department officials 
and DOD officials.
  Their conclusions that are set out here in this report are truly, 
truly stunning. What they found is that military commanders repeatedly 
warned the White House--repeatedly--that the situation in Afghanistan 
was deteriorating rapidly, that the danger to American troops were 
high, that the danger to American civilians was high and, indeed, 
potentially lethal. And what did the administration do? It ignored 
these warnings.
  The CENTCOM investigation shows that Tony Blinken's State Department 
and Jake Sullivan's National Security Council dragged their feet for 
weeks and, indeed, months on end. It shows the State Department 
wouldn't even talk about an evacuation--wouldn't even speak of it--
until it was too late. And the worst of it is, after this botched 
withdrawal, after this tragic loss of life, the administration took 
efforts to cover up what had happened. And we are still in the midst of 
this coverup.
  Just last November, Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas testified--
testified--that--and I am quoting him now:

       Biometric and biographic information was collected from 
     every individual evacuated from Afghanistan.

  Every individual, that is his statement.
  He testified that the administration--I am quoting him now:

       (T)ook a whole-of-government approach, ensuring that 
     Afghans arriving in the United States have been thoroughly 
     screened and vetted.

  That simply is not true, and we know it isn't true because the DOD 
inspector general just released a report debunking it, finding that 
U.S. Agencies did not use available data when vetting Afghan evacuees, 
finding that some evacuees with derogatory information could not be 
located, including individuals whose latent fingerprints have been 
found on improvised explosive devices and are known or suspected 
terrorists.
  Here is my point: Almost a year after this tragedy, almost a year 
after this debacle, there has still been no accountability.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President.
  Mr. HAWLEY. No accountability. There has been no one fired. There has 
been no one relieved of command. This administration has stonewalled. 
They have dragged their feet. They have refused to cooperate. Oh, we 
have had hearings, and they have had briefings almost entirely behind 
closed doors.
  Here is my request. It is what I promised Corporal Schmitz's father I 
would do on the morning that I spoke to him, that I would seek 
accountability for what happened in Afghanistan, and that is exactly 
what I intend to do. It is what I have been doing, many a time have I 
been on the floor for the last 11 months seeking accountability. And I 
have been stonewalled at every single turn.
  What I have asked for months on end is that the Armed Services 
Committee hold a public hearing on this investigation--a public 
hearing--not behind closed doors, not without the press, not cut off 
from the American people--a public hearing, and I have been denied 
every time.

[[Page S3230]]

  So what I am going to do today is I am going to enter this report 
into the Record so that the American people can see what U.S. Central 
Command found. And until we have that accountability in public, I will 
continue to ask that the Senate observe regular order and actually vote 
on these nominees.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KAINE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, if my colleague from Missouri would yield 
for a series of questions, I want to make sure that I understand the 
objection. I certainly understand the objection as indicated with 
respect to seeking accountability for Afghanistan. I understand that 
point.
  Is it correct that in the committee, however, you supported each of 
the three nominations who are proffered on the floor today?
  Mr. HAWLEY. A parliamentary question, Mr. President: Do I have the 
floor when I respond?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has yielded for a question. So he 
has the floor.
  Mr. HAWLEY. But I am not asking the question. He is asking me the 
question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. But you were the one who yielded to the 
Senator from Virginia for a question. So you still maintain the floor.
  Mr. HAWLEY. No, I have yielded the floor. My remarks were concluded. 
So the Senator has the floor. I am happy to respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator yield for a response?
  Mr. KAINE. I will yield for a response, yes.
  Mr. HAWLEY. Say it one more time, Senator. I can answer.
  Mr. KAINE. My question was: I believe, in the Armed Services 
Committee, these three individuals, you supported their nominations for 
reporting to the floor. And I just want to make sure that I am accurate 
about that.
  Mr. HAWLEY. That is incorrect, Senator. I reported as a no.
  Mr. KAINE. On all three?
  Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir.
  Mr. KAINE. Is it the Senator's position today that you do not object 
to them individually but there are other Members of your caucus who 
individually object to them?
  Mr. HAWLEY. I do object to them, Senator. Are you asking me if I 
object to having a vote on them? Or are you asking me if I object to 
them?
  Mr. KAINE. I will rephrase the question.
  Do you object to having a vote on them? So, for example, I can modify 
the motion to suggest to seek unanimous consent that we schedule a vote 
on these three nominees instead of trying to move them en bloc.
  Mr. HAWLEY. Yes.
  Mr. KAINE. I would be very happy to amend my motion to that, if you 
would find that acceptable.
  Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. A vote, I would like, Senator, but there are other 
Republican Members who have objections to all three nominees, and I am 
not authorized to consent for them.
  Mr. KAINE. Then let me ask one final question. If we are able to 
clear the objections of others, would you agree--at a time that is 
convenient for the floor leaders of each party--to a recorded vote on 
the three nominees, if we were able to clear the objections with your 
other colleagues?
  Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to have a recorded vote. Are you asking me 
if I would vitiate cloture, Senator?
  Mr. KAINE. Yes, move to a final passage vote, on which you would be 
able to express your views on each of these nominees.
  Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to have a cloture vote and a recorded vote. 
I would like to observe regular order on each of these, unless we can 
make some progress on having a public hearing on this report. That is 
my position at this time. Again, I am not authorized to negotiate for 
anybody else.
  Mr. KAINE. I yield the floor.
  Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in 
the Record the first part of an investigation directed by the U.S. 
Central Command concerning the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan in 
August 2021.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

                                    United States Central Command,


                               Office of the Deputy Commander,

                                                15 September 2021.

          Memorandum for Commander, United States Army Central

     From: Vice Admiral James J. Malloy, Deputy Commander, United 
         States Central Command.
     Subject: Memo Directing U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) to 
         Conduct an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into 
         the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Attack at 
         Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) on 
         26 August 2021.

       I am directing the Commander, USARCENT to appoint an AR 15-
     6 investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding 
     the attack upon U.S. forces located at the Abbey Gate at 
     HKIA, Kabul, Afghanistan on 26 August 2021. This AR 15-6 
     investigation will be a holistic review of the facts and 
     circumstances surrounding the attack. USARCENT is directed to 
     conduct an in-depth examination of all relevant aspects which 
     gave rise to the attack. The AR 15-6 should closely examine 
     tactical-level actions of U.S. personnel, gate operations, 
     force protection and posture, readiness, leadership, and all 
     other actions before, during and after the attack.


                               BACKGROUND

       Recently the Commander, USCENTCOM directed his staff, 
     Component Commands, and relevant supporting commands to 
     conduct an after-action review (AAR) of the Afghanistan non-
     combatant evacuation operation (NEO). This AR 15-6 is a 
     separate requirement from that AAR.


                               DISCUSSION

       This AR 15-6 will be conducted in accordance with Service 
     regulations. USARCENT will provide the completed AR 15-6 to 
     Headquarters, USCENTCOM no later than 1 October 2021. If 
     additional time is required, this request must be approved by 
     the Commander.
       Finally, to thoroughly examine the facts and circumstances 
     of this attack, Component Commands, subordinate commands and 
     other supporting commands are directed to assist USARCENT 
     investigators during the course of this AR 15-6 as 
     applicable.
                                  ____

         Department of the Army, 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment 
           Command,
                                     ACTS-SCK-DO, 22 October 2021.

  Memorandum for LTG Ronald P. Clark, Commander, Third Army/U.S. Army 
                    Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC

     Subject: Findings and Recommendations--Attack Against U.S. 
         Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International 
         Airport on 26 August 2021.

       1. BLUF. See EXSUM at enclosure 7.
       2. Background: On 26 August 2021, U.S. Marines were 
     conducting a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) at the 
     Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) as part of a larger 
     joint force operation to conclude U.S. combat operations in 
     Afghanistan. Eleven Marines, one Navy Corpsman, and one Army 
     PSYOP Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) were killed in an attack 
     at the entry control point (ECP) known as Abbey Gate. As a 
     result of the deaths of U.S. Service Members in combat, LTG 
     Ronald P. Clark, Commander, Third Army/U.S. Army Central, at 
     the direction of Gen McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central 
     Command (CENTCOM), appointed me to investigate the 
     surrounding facts and circumstances.
       a. Scope. In accordance with (IAW) AR 15-6, I was appointed 
     to investigate the facts and circumstances and address the 
     following matters:
       (1) Actions before, during, and after the attack;
       (2) Force Protection, specifically including pertinent 
     issues associated with:
       (a) Force Posture, and
       (b) Gate Operations.
       (3) Readiness;
       (4) Leadership;
       (5) Medical Considerations;
       (6) Chronology/Timeline of Events.
       b. Time Extensions. My initial appointment order, dated 17 
     September 2021, required me to complete my investigation no 
     later than 1 October 2021 (enclosure 1).
       After careful analysis, I requested an extension to 22 
     October 2021 to ensure I could conduct sufficient interviews 
     of widely dispersed forces and collect important products and 
     documents to provide a complete investigation. You granted me 
     the requested extension on 22 September 2021 (enclosure 2).
       c. Methodology. The investigation follows the procedures in 
     AR 15-6 and the appointment memorandum, with one exception. 
     After consulting with my legal advisor, I determined the use 
     of memorandums for record (MFRs) to capture interviews was a 
     more appropriate method, given the subject matter and 
     personnel involved. I spoke with my legal advisor and also 
     resolved conflicts in the evidence, and discussed the use of 
     any self-serving statement that I relied upon.
       (1) The Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command 
     (MARCENT), MajGen Paul Rock, assigned two Marine Corps 
     Officers, (TEXT REDACTED) to perform duties as both subject 
     matter experts and assistant investigating officers 
     (enclosures 3 and 4).
       (2) Additionally, I requested appointment of my Command 
     Judge Advocate, (TEXT REDACTED) investigating officers 
     (enclosures 4 and 5).

[[Page S3231]]

  

       3. Findings of facts.
       a. Task Organization. Before addressing the directed 
     matters, it is of extreme importance to describe and clarify 
     the task organization and command relationships (COMREL) 
     between units executing operations at HKIA from 1-31 August 
     2021. The below descriptions are also enclosed in block and 
     line charts (enclosure 8).
       (1) 1-16 August 202l.
       (a) RADM Pete Vasely, Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 
     (Forward) (USFOR-A FWD), was the overall commander throughout 
     the execution of operations in Afghanistan during the month 
     of August. USFOR-A FWD was chartered as a Diplomatic 
     Assurance Platform (DAP) and Joint Task Force (JTF) for 
     operations in Afghanistan (exhibits 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 21). 
     USFOR-A FWD was also Special Operations Joint Task Force-
     Afghanistan (SOJTF-A). Elements of the 3/10 Infantry Brigade 
     Combat Team (IBCT) augmented USFOR-A FWD staff and security 
     forces at the Embassy (exhibits 126, 247). The Commander of 
     3/10 IBCT, (TEXT REDACTED) also served as Chief of Staff for 
     USFOR-A FWD, and commander of two ground forces, Task Force 
     (TF) Polar Bear and TF Wild Boar, which supported the Embassy 
     and HKIA (exhibits 21, 22, 126, 247).
       (b) JTF-Crisis Response (CR), commanded by BGen Farrell 
     Sullivan, arrived at HKIA on 20 July 2021, to prepare for a 
     potential NEO. Beginning in May 2021, USFOR-A FWD had 
     tactical control (TACON) of JTF-CR for planning, and then for 
     NEO execution in August (exhibits 10, 11, 15, 18).
       (c) The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), (TEXT 
     REDACTED) sent its Command Element (CE) and Battalion Landing 
     Team (BLT), 1/8 Marines to HKIA on 14 August 2021 to set 
     conditions for NEO (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 104). JTF-CR had 
     TACON of the 24th MEU, which had TACON of 1/8 Marines 
     (exhibits 100, 102, 104).
       (d) Elements of 1/82 IBCT arrived at HKIA throughout 15-16 
     August 2021. JTF-CR initially had TACON of the 1/82 elements, 
     received them at the flight line, and put them into defensive 
     positions (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 121, 125).
       (e) 2/1 Marines, the ground combat element (GCE) for the 
     CENTCOM Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 
     (SPMAGTF), began arriving at HKIA in the early morning of 16 
     August 2021 (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 76, 77). The 24th MEU had 
     TACON of 2/1 Marines (exhibits 10, 11, 53, 54, 76, 77, 100, 
     102).
       (2) 17-28 August 2021. The Tactical Command Post (TAC) for 
     the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by MG Christopher 
     Donahue, arrived to HKIA in the early morning hours of 19 
     August 2021 (exhibits 13, 21, 125). With the TAC's arrival, 
     Gen McKenzie altered the task organization, granted USFOR-A 
     FWD TACON of the 82nd Airborne Division, and gave the 82nd 
     TACON of JTF-CR (exhibits 10, 11, 238). JTF-CR retained TACON 
     of Marine forces until departure, while 82nd Airborne 
     Division retained TACON of 1/82, and additional Army combat 
     formations. However, USFOR-A FWD retained TACON of JTF-CR for 
     NEO. and JTF-CR coordinated with 82nd Airborne Division 
     (exhibits 125, 40). Marine units also executed an alternate 
     COMREL, as 2/1 Marines reported directly to JTF-CR, despite 
     the fact the 24th MEU had TACON of 2/1 (exhibits 18, 53, 
     100). 1/82 IBCT assumed TACON of TF Polar Bear and TF Wild 
     Boar (exhibits 10, 126, 247).
       (3) 28-30 August 2021.
       (a) USFOR-A FWD departed HKIA in the early morning hours of 
     28 August 2021. MG Donahue, 82nd Airborne Division Commander, 
     assumed command of all operations at HKIA until his departure 
     at 0002 on 31 August 2021 (exhibits 131 21, 125, 246).
       (b) JTF-CR and all Marine forces departed by the morning of 
     30 August 2021 (exhibits 15, 18). No Marine forces 
     subordinate to JT-FCR were task organized under the 82nd 
     Airborne Division during the last two days of the NEO.
       (4) Adjacent Forces.
       (a) Taliban. On 16 August 2021, RADM Vasely began to 
     coordinate with Taliban forces for additional crowd control 
     and security of HKIA (exhibits 13, 20, 21, 23). USFOR-A FWD's 
     primary point of contact for coordination was local Taliban 
     Commander, (TEXT REDACTED) (exhibits 13, 20, 21, 23). U.S. 
     commanders and leaders at all echelons coordinated with 
     Taliban forces to clarify security tasks and responsibilities 
     (exhibits 53, 76).
       (b) Turkish Military Forces. Turkish Forces were present on 
     HKIA prior to the NEO and responsible for security of 
     northern HKIA and working through Afghan National Defense and 
     Security Forces (ANDSF) to secure the remaining perimeter 
     (exhibits 15, 18). JTF-CR, and later USFOR-A FWD, coordinated 
     with the Turkish Military Forces for security tasks and 
     evacuation efforts (exhibits 15, 18).
       (c) United Kingdom Forces. The U.K. had a large force 
     presence, led by (TEXT REDACTED) on HKIA and at the adjoining 
     Barron Hotel (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 126). This force 
     consisted of three companies from 2nd Battalion, Parachute 
     Regiment (2 PARA) and two companies from 3 PARA, for a 
     combined force of approximately 550 troops, (TEXT REDACTED) 
     (exhibit 126). Commanders and leaders at all levels worked 
     with the U.K. Forces at Abbey Gate, coordinating their 
     security and evacuation efforts (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 53, 
     56, 65, 76, 77).
       (d) Afghan National Strike Unit (NSU). This organization 
     was affiliated with U.S. interagency activities and 
     integrated into the security of HKIA on 16-17 August 2021 
     (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21). USFOR-A FWD worked through U.S. 
     Embassy Kabul (USEK) personnel to coordinate with NSU 
     (exhibits 18, 21).
       b. Actions before, during, and after the attack.
       (1) Key Findings.
       (a) By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the Main Effort for Gate 
     Operations at HKIA.
       (b) At approximately 1736 local time, 26 August 2021, a 
     single explosion occurred at Abbey Gate.
       (c) There was no complex attack; it was a single suicide 
     bomber not accompanied by enemy small arms fire.
       (d) How the bomber bypassed Taliban checkpoints to get to 
     the canal is unknown. There were multiple avenues of approach 
     to the canal continuously used by Afghans to bypass Taliban 
     checkpoints. The bomber likely used one of these avenues. No 
     Marines at Abbey Gate recall any civilian using U.S. 
     identification to get closer to their position at the time of 
     the attack.
       (e) The attack at Abbey Gate killed between 160-170 
     civilians. There is no evidence the Marines' response to the 
     attack caused further harm to civilians or fratricide. A 
     potential civilian casualty was reported during interviews 
     with 2/1 Marines. A Platoon Commander reported the casualty 
     occurred during initial gate operations on 20 August and the' 
     injury, or possible death, was caused by a flash-bang 
     grenade.
       (2) USFOR-A FWD
       (a) USFOR-A FWD was task organized to fill the command and 
     staff billets of SOJTF-A specifically NATO Special Operations 
     Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) (exhibits 20, 21). 
     CENTCOM, after consulting with outgoing USFOR-A Commander, 
     GEN Miller, established USFOR-A FWD as a DAP prior to its 
     deployment to Afghanistan (exhibits 20, 21). The DAP's 
     mission was to provide indications and warnings (I&W) for 
     USEK, coordinate military activities in Afghanistan (security 
     cooperation, targeting), and be prepared to command and 
     control NEO (exhibits 20, 21). USFOR-A FWD developed a 
     trigger matrix for preparation and execution of NEO, and 
     shared it with USEK staff (exhibits 20, 21, 22). USFOR-A FWD 
     used the trigger matrix as a tool to measure the Taliban's 
     advancement and convince USEK staff to prepare for NEO 
     (exhibits 20, 21, 22). However, USEK staff showed little 
     interest in planning for NEO (exhibits 15, 18, 20, 21, 22). 
     Despite the Taliban's rapid advance towards Kabul, on 12 
     August USEK only planned to evacuate 250 personnel by 31 
     August (exhibit 21 ). On 14 August. the Ambassador committed 
     to evacuating the Embassy, but his personnel were unprepared 
     and had taken few steps to reduce their footprint or destroy 
     sensitive equipment/information (exhibits 20, 21, 22, 146). 
     USEK security forces and the USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) 
     evacuated the final personnel from the Embassy to HKIA at 
     0100 on 16 August. Most USEK personnel departed Afghanistan 
     shortly thereafter (exhibits 15, 18, 20, 21, 22).
       (b) At HKIA, USFOR-A FWD was responsible for up and out 
     coordination. They communicated daily with various elements 
     of the interagency, to include Department of State (DoS) and 
     the White House. They also coordinated with partner nations 
     seeking support with evacuation, and coordinated with the 
     Turkish Military, the Taliban, and the NSU to establish and 
     maintain security of the airfield (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 
     21, 22).

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Markey). The Senator from Louisiana.