[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 102 (Wednesday, June 15, 2022)]
[House]
[Pages H5552-H5553]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1030
                           THE LCS IS A LEMON

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Speier) for 5 minutes.
  Ms. SPEIER. Madam Speaker, everyone knows what a lemon car is, but we 
have a fleet of lemon ships. They are called littoral combat ship, 
except it is a misnomer because it is not survivable in combat.
  Today, we are calling them the leaking, cracked ships, and let me 
tell you why. If the LCS was a car sold in America today, they would be 
deemed lemons, and the automakers would be sued into oblivion. But in 
the Federal Government it is big business as usual--$50 billion over 
the lifetime of the program. That is a lot of rotten lemons.
  My concerns and warnings about the LCS go back a decade, along with 
the late Senator John McCain. It is costing taxpayers billions of 
dollars, yet has failed to produce a reliable ship. So I was stunned 
and outraged to see that the proposed 2023 defense appropriations bill 
only decommissions four LCS, when it should be nine, as President Biden 
and the Navy have proposed. The annual cost of five LCS ships could pay 
for eight childcare centers in the military, four barracks, or a $1,000 
bonus for every enlisted E-3 and below.
  The LCS program's legendary failures have made it the subject of two 
Government Accountability Office reports. Those reports found each LCS 
costing an astounding $59 million a year to operate. Or actually, not 
to operate because they are, more often than not, in dock because they 
aren't working. That is three-quarters of the cost of operating a 
destroyer, which has three times the crew and a much greater 
capability, such as antisubmarine warfare.
  LCS is notoriously unreliable, plagued by breakdowns that have seen 
some ships spend more time in the repair yard than in deployment. On 
this chart, you will see the USS Little Rock, commissioned in 2017, 
lost power at sea in 2022. In March 2018, it was stranded in ice for 3 
months on its maiden voyage.
  Or how about the USS Milwaukee? Commissioned in November 2015. In 
December 2015, it broke down due to software malfunctions and was towed 
40 miles.
  Or how about the USS Freedom? Commissioned in 2008; in 2011, had a 6-
inch crack in the hull; in 2013, immobilized during trial run; in 
February 2016, coupling cracked; in August of 2016, engine replacement 
needed.
  What do we have going here? The GAO found that the LCS experienced 
engine failure in 10 of the 11 deployments reviewed. The aluminum hull 
of the Independence-class punctures easily. I mean, this is not funny. 
This is real money. And the combining gear for all Freedom-class ships 
must be replaced.
  One major reason for the excessive cost of LCS? Contractors. Unlike 
other ships where sailors do the maintenance, LCS relies almost 
exclusively on contractors who own and control

[[Page H5553]]

the technical data needed to maintain and repair.
  So what is this ship's mission and what does it contribute to 
national security? Nothing.
  The Navy says it plans to use the LCS for partner engagement, as a 
replacement for obsolete minesweepers for long-range fire capability, 
and for counterdrug activities. But the LCS are not well-suited for 
minesweeping due to their lack of endurance, and their already years-
late mine countermeasure package isn't even operational.
  Our top priority in national defense strategy is China and Russia. We 
can't waste scarce funds on costly LCS when there are more capable 
platforms like destroyers, attack submarines, and the new 
Constellation-class frigate. Most importantly, the cost of sustaining 
LCS isn't just felt in lost dollars, but lost lives.
  The Navy has a severe undermanning problem. Our surface fleet is 15 
percent undermanned compared to required levels for safe operation. The 
average sailor is overworked and gets 6 hours or less of sleep per 
night. A recent GAO report on pierside maintenance found undermanning 
was so bad on some ships that half of the electrician slots were empty. 
On others, the crew members had to work 80 to 100 hours per week to 
prepare to deploy.
  On these ships, the operational tempo is so high, several sailors 
have left due to behavioral health needs. At least one has died from 
suicide. This is unacceptable, especially in the wake of the deadly 
McCain and Fitzgerald collisions that killed 17 sailors 5 years ago. 
The key contributors? Undermanning and fatigue.
  We can and must prevent this. Let's decommission all nine ships.

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