[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 75 (Thursday, May 5, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2350-S2351]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         STAND with Taiwan Act

  Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, I wanted to come down to talk about a 
topic that a number of Senators have been talking about and that a 
number of Senators have been focused on. That is the topic of Taiwan 
and potentially the defense of Taiwan and the support for Taiwan.
  As this body knows, in 1979, the Senate passed a very important bill 
called the Taiwan Relations Act--a very bipartisan bill. From that time 
on, the Senate has played a very important oversight role in U.S. 
relations with Taiwan, and it has always been very bipartisan.
  Recently, a bipartisan codel, led by the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Menendez, with many other Senators--
Senator Graham, Senator Portman, Senator Sasse--traveled to Taiwan. I 
just got an out-brief from some of those Senators--a very good meeting. 
I was part of a bipartisan codel about a year ago, with Senator Coons 
and Senator Duckworth, also to Taiwan.
  So there is a long tradition in the U.S. Senate, in a bipartisan way, 
with all of us working together, of addressing this question: To what 
degree should we be supporting and defending Taiwan against a very 
aggressive Chinese Communist Party, led by the dictator Xi Jinping? Why 
does it matter? Why should we all be working together, as we have done 
for decades here in the U.S. Senate, Democrats and Republicans, to 
deter a military invasion of Taiwan?
  What will be happening in the next few weeks I want to talk about 
because I am concerned about the direction of the Biden administration, 
and I think every Senator here should be concerned. So I am going to 
ask my colleagues to lift up their voices when they talk to the Biden 
administration on a topic I am going to mention here in a minute. But 
why does it matter? Well, this issue of the potential invasion of 
Taiwan could take place in a few years.
  The INDOPACOM commander, a little over a year ago, in front of the 
Armed Services Committee, opined that the threat of an invasion of 
Taiwan by an aggressive Chinese Communist Party would manifest itself 
during this decade--``in fact, in the next 6 years.'' That was Admiral 
Davidson, former INDOPACOM commander, and that is not a lot of time.
  Here is why I think it matters: Right now, Taiwan is on the frontline 
of freedom in Asia. It is not some peripheral sideshow; it is, in many 
ways, central to freedom in that part of the world like West Berlin was 
during the Cold War. A violent military takeover of Taiwan by the 
Chinese Communist Party would be a sea change in how the entire world 
is ordered. It would change the history of the 21st century in the way 
that the Guns of August of 1914 changed the 20th century.
  Now, some see the defense of Taiwan and the support that is required 
from the United States because of the Taiwan Relations Act--again, led 
by this body--some see the defense and support of this island democracy 
as a luxury that we can't afford in an age shaped by great power 
competition.
  I actually believe--and I believe many Senators, Democrats and 
Republicans, believe the opposite--that a Taiwan under China's control 
would decisively advance Beijing's campaign to export its authoritarian 
model around the world; to separate the United States from our 
democratic allies; and it would certainly be part of Xi Jinping's goal 
of excluding the United States from the INDOPACOM theater.
  Taiwan--a thriving, prosperous Chinese democracy that holds free 
election and bounds its power by the rule of law--is central to the 
free world and its future.
  By the way, if you are an American citizen, regardless of political 
party, you should take pride in the fact that this country--or this 
island democracy--is free because it wouldn't have happened without the 
sacrifice and resources of the United States and our military, and that 
is a fact.
  A few months ago, I gave a speech on this topic, and I talked about 
how, when you think of the defense of Taiwan and deterrence, which is 
what we all want--deterrence; nobody wants a war in the Taiwan Strait--
there are really three layers of deterrence for the island of Taiwan.
  The first is Taiwan's ability to militarily defend itself, the so-
called hedgehog approach or porcupine approach. Right here, they are 
defending themselves in the way the Ukrainians are defending 
themselves. Senator Roger Wicker had a very good op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal just today on that very topic. We need to make sure 
Taiwan has that capability--it is in the Taiwan Relations Act that we 
have that responsibility--so that it can defend itself, and they are 
undertaking the right approach with regard to the military weapons they 
are buying from the United States and other places.
  The second level of deterrence that you see here on this chart would 
be America's capability to defend Taiwan militarily should the 
President of the United States decide to do so if there is an invasion 
by the Chinese Communist Party. Over several decades, through many 
different crises in the Taiwan Strait, this layer of deterrence, 
wherein the United States has shown up with military force, has proven 
to be decisive in keeping the Taiwanese people free, and our deep 
network of allies in the region augments this second level of 
deterrence.
  But there is also a third level of deterrence. The third level of 
deterrence is often not discussed, but in many ways, particularly now, 
it could be more powerful than the first and second levels, and that is 
the level that relates to bringing in the instruments of American power 
beyond our military, such as our global economic and financial 
strengths, to deter China from an invasion. You see this third level: 
economic and financial sanctions.
  This is exactly what my bipartisan bill, the STAND with Taiwan Act, 
would do. I am working with several Senators on this bill right now. We

[[Page S2351]]

have introduced it already, but we are going to recalibrate it, 
particularly with regard to the lessons learned from Ukraine.
  One of those lessons that we learned from the brutal Ukrainian 
invasion by the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin in Ukraine is that 
comprehensive economic and financial sanctions have the best chance of 
deterring a conflict when they are clearly articulated and ready to go 
before the conflict begins. That wasn't the case in Ukraine, and we 
will never know, had sanctions already been teed up and ready to go, if 
they could have deterred that conflict.
  With the STAND with Taiwan Act, which stands for Sanctions Targeting 
Aggressors of Neighboring Democracies--STAND--the whole point of this 
would be to deter Xi Jinping from making the decision. That third layer 
of deterrence is saying: OK. If you militarily invade Taiwan, here are 
the massive sanctions that we and our allies are going to hit you with, 
and they will be devastating.
  This bill makes it clear that we should be engaging with Taiwan 
economically, across the board, in many sectors. And this is where I 
have deep concern--and I believe many of my colleagues here in the U.S. 
Senate have deep concerns--about the direction that might be happening 
with regard to the Biden administration.
  Now, look, I am somebody who, you know, will be critical of the Biden 
administration when I think they are not doing a good job on certain 
things. And I do that a lot, particularly on a topic I am going to talk 
about here in a minute, energy. But in other areas, particularly as it 
relates to the Biden administration's relationship with regard to our 
allies and Taiwan, I have been supportive of a number of their 
initiatives vocally because I think they have strengthened American 
interests in the INDOPACOM theater. What are those?
  Well, for example, the Biden administration took this initiative from 
the Trump administration--it actually started in the Bush 
administration--called the Quad. That is the biggest democracies in the 
INDOPACOM theater: us, Japan, Australia, and India. They have taken 
that grouping, which, during the Trump administration, was 
reinvigorated, particularly by Secretary Pompeo, at the minister level, 
and the Biden administration has taken that to the leader level. The 
President of the United States meets with the leaders of Japan, 
Australia, and India on a regular basis. That is good. That is smart 
policy.
  They have also launched another very innovative policy, the 
Australia-UK-U.S. agreement to work together on military and defense 
issues: submarines, nuclear subs, AI, quantum computing. It is called 
the Arcus initiative. I think it is a really innovative initiative, and 
I have been very--one of the most vocal supporters of it in the U.S. 
Senate.
  The Biden administration has also been pressing the G-7 to do more as 
it relates to Taiwan--the first time ever in the G-7. That is a good 
initiative.
  In a lot of these areas, I have been supportive. So what am I 
concerned about?
  This is a concern I have, but it should be a concern that every 
Senator has. The administration is getting ready to announce what they 
are calling the Indo-Pacific economic framework. This is going to focus 
on more economic engagement with our allies in other countries in the 
INDOPACOM theater. OK. I support that in general. We will see what the 
details are. But right now, that initiative, which we need in terms of 
an initiative with regard to economics and other elements of 
connectivity with our allies in the region, appears to be on the verge 
of missing two critical factors.
  No. 1, and the real purpose of what I wanted to talk about, right 
now, we are hearing from administration officials that the Indo-Pacific 
economic framework is going to exclude Taiwan. Whoa. Whoa. That would 
not be a good thing, and I don't think many U.S. Senators--Democrats or 
Republicans--would agree that the Biden administration's first big 
economic initiative is going to exclude Taiwan, a very important 
economic player, very important technical player in terms of chip 
fabrication. Why would they do that? Well, it is not clear.
  I have been pressing a number of Biden administration officials 
saying, you can't make that move. A, the Senate is not going to like 
it. And we have had a lot to say about U.S. relations with Taiwan for 
decades. And, B, it just doesn't make sense.
  Some of the things I have heard is, well, there is this argument that 
trade is really not national security, so it doesn't relate to Taiwan. 
Well, that is not correct. Trade and economic issues are clearly 
national security issues as it relates to our country, as it relates to 
our allies.
  The other thing I have heard is that, well, some of the other 
countries in the Indo-Pacific framework don't really want Taiwan in it. 
Again, we are the United States. We are the leader in that part of the 
world. If another country is saying, hey, I don't want Taiwan in it, 
you know, I think we need to politely tell them that, too bad. They are 
going to be.
  So I am primarily giving these remarks right now to let all of my 
Senate colleagues, many of whom--Democrats and Republicans--I know care 
about this issue.
  I have been trying to raise the alarm with the administration, 
saying, bad idea if your big, first economic initiative for the 
INDOPACOM theater is not going to include Taiwan. I hope other 
colleagues of mine will do the same.
  Let me give you one final area that this administration should be 
focused on as it relates to our partners in the region, and that is 
energy--that is energy. We have so many opportunities to do more with 
our allies--of course, in Europe but also in Asia--as it relates to 
energy.
  I put forward legislation called the Quad energy initiative that 
would be an initiative dealing with the export and importation of LNG. 
Think about the Quad: the United States and Australia, two of the 
biggest exporters of LNG; Japan, probably the world's biggest importer; 
and India, who wants to be to help their economy, to help their 
environment. This is something else I have been pressing this 
administration on.
  It will help our trade deficits, it will help our energy security, 
and--you know I have talked about this a lot--it will help global 
emissions. The United States right now, since 2005, has been the leader 
in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, right there. The climb-
down was 15 percent since 2005. India, China, everywhere else, 
significant increases; more American clean burning LNG to our allies in 
the region, the Quad. But, heck, even China would help us, our national 
security, our workers at home, and our environment and the global 
environment.
  I just want to end with this: I hope all of my Senate colleagues in 
the next couple of days can reach out to the Biden administration and 
say: Look, on a number of initiatives--the Quad, Arcus--you have been 
going in the right direction, and you have strong bipartisan support. 
But the INDOPACOM economic framework led by the United States, if it is 
leaving out Taiwan, that is going to be a huge problem, and I don't 
think many U.S. Senators think that that would be a good idea.
  Given our long history of leading in a bipartisan way on issues 
related to Taiwan, I am asking my colleagues to also reach out to the 
administration and say, there has to be a better way. We cannot 
economically isolate and forget about Taiwan when we need to be 
supporting them now more than ever.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.