[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 69 (Wednesday, April 27, 2022)]
[House]
[Pages H4538-H4541]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             TRANSATLANTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ACT

  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 3344) to prioritize the efforts of and enhance coordination 
among United States agencies to encourage countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe to improve the security of their telecommunications 
networks, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3344

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Transatlantic 
     Telecommunications Security Act''.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) fifth and future generation's telecommunication 
     networks in allied and partner countries based on common, 
     secure, transparent, democratic standards have the potential 
     to increase cultural, political, and economic exchanges 
     leading to mutual job creation, closer citizen relations, and 
     stronger democratic institutions;
       (2) Russia's unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal invasion 
     of Ukraine and the People's Republic of China's tacit support 
     for Russian Federation's actions demonstrate the importance 
     of secure telecommunication infrastructure in Central and 
     Eastern European nations;
       (3) the United States has national security and economic 
     interests in assisting Central and Eastern European countries 
     to improve the security of their telecommunication networks 
     by reducing dependence on covered telecommunication equipment 
     or services that are often offered with predatory economic 
     inducements and replacing them with secure telecommunication 
     equipment or services;
       (4) China's Belt and Road Initiative and the 17+1 
     Initiative seek to undermine Central and Eastern Europe's 
     infrastructure resilience and sovereignty through predatory 
     inducements from state-linked providers of telecommunication 
     equipment or services such as Huawei Technologies Company and 
     ZTE Corporation;
       (5) China's 2017 National Intelligence Law obligates 
     Chinese businesses to fully cooperate with state intelligence 
     work, and thereby compromises the integrity of any network 
     that utilizes equipment from Chinese companies because 
     providers could be forced to hand over sensitive data or shut 
     down networks at the command of China;
       (6) Russia's campaign to elect a Russian national, who is a 
     former Huawei Technologies Company executive, to serve as the 
     Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication 
     Union (ITU) is indicative of China and Russia's efforts to 
     use international organizations to promote their interests 
     and their malign influence;
       (7) at global fora such as the ITU, the United States 
     Government should actively support candidates that espouse 
     democratic values, internet freedoms, and secure 
     telecommunication networks;
       (8) the United States International Development Finance 
     Corporation's development priorities, as described in section 
     1412 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
     Development Act of 2018, properly includes a focus on less 
     developed countries;
       (9) the United States should assemble a coalition of 
     democratic and like-minded allies and partners to counter the 
     rise of global malign actors such as China and Russia and 
     build resilience in Central and Eastern Europe against malign 
     influences; and
       (10) in order to ensure robust military coordination and 
     interoperability with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO) and transatlantic allies and partners, the United 
     States should ensure that allies and

[[Page H4539]]

     partners' telecommunication networks are secure and free from 
     potential threats in accordance with the 2019 NATO London 
     Declaration.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States--
       (1) to strengthen the transatlantic alliance based on 
     shared values in the face of rising malign influence from the 
     People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, 
     countries that seek to undermine democratic institutions and 
     values;
       (2) to encourage public and private sector investment in 
     European telecommunication infrastructure projects to ensure 
     secure telecommunication and to catalyze economic advancement 
     through the highest standards of transparency, accessibility, 
     and competition;
       (3) to provide economically feasible alternatives to 
     financing from providers of covered telecommunication 
     equipment or services;
       (4) to engage in diplomacy with European allies and 
     partners to strengthen the United States and European private 
     sector efforts to develop common telecommunication technology 
     and industry standards, and in turn promote them globally;
       (5) to support the Three Seas Initiative organized by 12 
     Central and Eastern European countries of the European Union 
     to increase infrastructure resiliency and reduce reliance on 
     malign actors, including in the telecommunication space;
       (6) to enhance telecommunication security and freedom 
     around the globe by engaging in elections at the ITU and 
     promoting the candidacies of individuals that will promote 
     democratic values, the rule of law, technological freedoms, 
     and telecommunication security;
       (7) to support the people of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and 
     the Western Balkan countries in their desire for integration 
     into Euro-Atlantic institutions and economies through 
     enhanced cross-border telecommunication infrastructure 
     connectivity; and
       (8) to ensure that frontline NATO allies have 
     telecommunication services that cannot be controlled by China 
     or Russia, especially considering Russia's illegal and 
     unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine.

     SEC. 3. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION SECURITY 
                   CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR.

       (a) Appointment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     appoint, from among existing personnel of the Department of 
     State, an International Telecommunication Union Security 
     Campaign Director (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Director'').
       (b) Duties.--The Director shall--
       (1) lead efforts to promote candidates for elections at the 
     International Telecommunication Union (ITU) who will support 
     and defend democratic values, internet freedom, and 
     telecommunication security;
       (2) coordinate with other officials of the Department of 
     State, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Communications 
     Commission, and other Federal departments and agencies to 
     ensure efforts described in paragraph (1) are carried out in 
     an organized, nimble, efficient, and effective manner;
       (3) work with stakeholders in the private sector to 
     harmonize efforts and to galvanize focus on elections at the 
     ITU;
       (4) use diplomatic tools of the Department of State to 
     bolster support for candidates for elections at the ITU who 
     will support and defend democratic values, internet freedom, 
     and telecommunication security;
       (5) brief Congress regularly on the implementation of the 
     duties described in paragraphs (1) through (4) and, if 
     appropriate, on requests for additional legislative authority 
     necessary to enhance telecommunication security and freedom 
     around the globe as described in section 2(b)(6); and
       (6) report to the Assistant Secretary of State for 
     International Organization Affairs regularly on development, 
     progress, or setbacks with respect to support to the people 
     of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkan 
     countries as described in section 2(b)(7).
       (c) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on October 31, 
     2022.

     SEC. 4. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE FOR 
                   TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN 
                   CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.

       (a) In General.--In carrying out the policy described in 
     section 2(b), the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
     the Secretary of Commerce, the Chief Executive Officer of the 
     United States International Development Finance Corporation, 
     the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the head of 
     the Federal Communications Commission, and the heads of other 
     relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall, as 
     appropriate, prioritize and expedite the efforts of the 
     Department of State and those departments and agencies in 
     supporting the efforts of the European Commission and the 
     governments of Central and Eastern European countries to 
     improve the security of their telecommunication networks, 
     including through providing diplomatic and political support 
     to the European Commission and Central and Eastern European 
     countries, as necessary--
       (1) to ensure European telecommunication networks are built 
     securely, consistent with democratic values and principles 
     such as privacy, including through early-stage project 
     support and late-stage project support for the construction 
     or improvement of telecommunication and related 
     infrastructure;
       (2) to remove covered telecommunication equipment or 
     services and replace such equipment or services with secure 
     telecommunication equipment or services;
       (3) to support the development of telecommunication 
     networks that are inclusive, transparent, economically 
     viable, financially, environmentally, and socially 
     sustainable, compliant with international standards, laws, 
     and regulations, and supplied by providers of secure 
     telecommunication equipment or services; and
       (4) to facilitate international coordination on cross-
     border telecommunication infrastructure construction and 
     security standards to ensure cross-border telecommunications 
     are secure.
       (b) Project Selection.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, the Chief 
     Executive Officer of the United States International 
     Development Finance Corporation, and the Director of the 
     Trade and Development Agency shall jointly identify 
     telecommunication infrastructure projects that would advance 
     the United States national security and be appropriate for 
     United States assistance under this section.
       (2) Project eligibility.--A project is eligible for United 
     States assistance under this section if--
       (A) the project--
       (i) improves telecommunication networks through either hard 
     infrastructure, such as telecommunication lines, towers, 
     antennas, or other equipment, or soft infrastructure, such as 
     innovative software development or cloud services;
       (ii) is inclusive, transparent, economically viable, 
     financially, environmentally, and socially sustainable, 
     compliant with international standards, laws, and 
     regulations, and supplied with secure telecommunication 
     equipment or services solely by providers of secure 
     telecommunication equipment or services; and
       (iii) does not use covered telecommunication equipment or 
     services or removes covered telecommunication equipment or 
     services and replaces such equipment or services with secure 
     telecommunication equipment or services; and
       (B) the project is located in a covered country.
       (3) Preference.--In selecting among projects that are 
     eligible under paragraph (2), the heads of the Federal 
     departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) shall 
     give preference to projects that--
       (A) are located in Ukraine;
       (B) can attract funding from the private sector, an 
     international financial institution, the government of the 
     country in which the project will be carried out, or the 
     European Commission;
       (C) have been designated as available for funding through 
     the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund;
       (D) are to be carried out in the Three Seas Initiative 
     member nations;
       (E) are to be carried out in NATO member states that meet 
     or are making progress toward meeting their commitments to 
     upholding the rule of law and preserving democratic 
     institutions in accordance with the preamble and Article 2 of 
     the North Atlantic Treaty;
       (F) are to be carried out in NATO member states that meet 
     or are making demonstrable progress toward meeting their 
     defense spending commitments in accordance with the 2014 NATO 
     Wales Summit Declaration; or
       (G) have the potential to advance United States economic 
     interests.
       (c) Types of Assistance.--
       (1) Diplomatic and political support.--The Secretary of 
     State shall provide diplomatic and political support to the 
     covered countries, as necessary, including by using the 
     diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the 
     Department of State to build the capacity of covered 
     countries to resolve any impediments to the development of 
     projects selected under subsection (b).
       (2) International financial institutions support.--The 
     Secretary of State shall seek to encourage international 
     financial institutions, including the European Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, 
     and the International Monetary Fund, the Foreign, 
     Commonwealth, and Development Office of the Government of the 
     United Kingdom, the Agency for International Cooperation of 
     the Government of Germany, and the Development Agency of the 
     Government of France to invest in telecommunication 
     infrastructure resilience in Central and Eastern Europe.
       (3) Early-stage project support.--The Director of the Trade 
     and Development Agency shall provide early-stage project 
     support with respect to projects selected under subsection 
     (b), as necessary.
       (4) Late-stage project support.--The heads of the Federal 
     departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) that 
     provide late-stage project support shall do so, with respect 
     to projects selected under subsection (b), as necessary.
       (5) United states international development finance 
     corporation support.--The United States International 
     Development Finance Corporation is authorized to provide 
     support for projects under this section in covered countries 
     that are countries with upper-middle-income economies or 
     high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the 
     International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
     International Development Association (collectively referred 
     to as the ``World Bank'')), notwithstanding the restriction 
     contained in section

[[Page H4540]]

     1412(c)(2) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading 
     to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)(2)).

     SEC. 5. REPORT.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
     years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the progress made in 
     providing assistance for projects under section 4 that 
     includes--
       (1) a description of the telecommunications infrastructure 
     projects the United States has identified for such 
     assistance; and
       (2) for each such project--
       (A) a description of the role of the United States in the 
     project, including in early-stage project support and late-
     stage project support;
       (B) the amount and form of debt financing, equity 
     financing, and insurance provided by the United States 
     Government, the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, and 
     international financial institutions, including the European 
     Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European 
     Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, the 
     Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office of the 
     Government of the United Kingdom, the Agency for 
     International Cooperation of the Government of Germany, and 
     the Development Agency of the Government of France for the 
     project;
       (C) the contractual terms of the project that preclude the 
     use of covered telecommunication equipment or services and 
     steps taken to ensure providers of telecommunication 
     equipment or services meet such contractual terms; and
       (D) an update on the progress made on the project as of the 
     date of the report.
       (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.

     SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Covered country.--The term ``covered country'' 
     includes--
       (A) any member state of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization that--
       (i) shares a border with the Russian Federation; and
       (ii) according to World Bank official data for 2020, has a 
     Gross Domestic Product per capita, adjusted for purchasing 
     power parity, of less than $45,000; and
       (B) any European country that--
       (i) has not participated or aided in Russia's invasion of 
     Ukraine; and
       (ii) according to World Bank official data for 2020, has a 
     Gross Domestic Product per capita, adjusted for purchasing 
     power parity, of less than $34,000.
       (2) Covered telecommunication equipment or services.--The 
     term ``covered telecommunication equipment or services'' 
     means any of the following:
       (A) Telecommunication equipment or services produced or 
     provided by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation 
     (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).
       (B) Telecommunication equipment or services produced or 
     provided by an entity that the Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, 
     or otherwise connected to, the People's Republic of China or 
     the Russian Federation.
       (3) Early-stage project support.--The term ``early-stage 
     project support'' includes--
       (A) feasibility studies;
       (B) resource evaluations;
       (C) project appraisal and costing;
       (D) pilot projects;
       (E) commercial support, such as trade missions, reverse 
     trade missions, technical workshops, international buyer 
     programs, and international partner searchers to link 
     suppliers to projects;
       (F) technical assistance and other guidance to improve the 
     local regulatory environment and market frameworks to 
     encourage transparent competition and enhance 
     telecommunication security; and
       (G) long-term telecommunication sector planning.
       (4) Late-stage project support.--The term ``late-stage 
     project support'' includes debt financing, equity financing, 
     insurance, and transaction advisory services.
       (5) Secure telecommunication equipment or services.--The 
     term ``secure telecommunication equipment or services'' means 
     telecommunication equipment or services that are not, and do 
     not contain, covered telecommunication equipment or services.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Connolly) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Meuser) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.


                             General Leave

  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material on H.R. 3344, as amended.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3344, as amended, the 
Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act.
  Let me start by thanking Representative Marcy Kaptur of Ohio, the 
chairwoman of the Ukraine Caucus here in Congress. She has been an 
incredible leader and a very important voice for Ukraine, not just 
these past 2 months, but for decades as a Member of Congress. This bill 
is part and parcel of her many efforts to aid the people of Ukraine and 
Eastern Europe.
  I emphasize a key point throughout my remarks today: 
Telecommunication security is a central pillar of national security.
  If a hostile power has the ability to shut down a country's access to 
the internet, then both telecommunications and national security have, 
in fact, been breached.
  If a strategic competitor can disable telecoms gear or cut an 
underseas cable to turn off a country's mobile network, then both 
telecommunications and national security have, in fact, been breached.
  And if foreign rivals can snoop on a country's calls and steal 
classified information because they can access the network, then both 
telecommunications and national security have, in fact, been breached.
  The lesson is clear: The United States and its allies cannot rely on 
telecoms gear produced and supplied by countries and companies close to 
the People's Republic of China government or the Putin regime in 
Moscow. This is especially true in Eastern Europe, as President Putin 
has decided to act on violent imperial hubris rather than respect the 
law of nations.
  If the problem is PRC-affiliated technology and Russian aggression, 
then the Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act is a key part in 
the solution to bolster our national security and that of our friends 
and allies.
  First and foremost, the bill allows the Development Finance 
Corporation to fund telecom security projects to ensure that all 
network gear in Eastern Europe is safe. As Ukraine faces the immediate 
threat to its national security, projects in the region must and will 
receive priority assistance.
  Second, this bill authorizes the State Department to create a new 
position of campaign coordinator at the Department to focus on upcoming 
elections in the U.N. body called the International Telecommunications 
Union. That election comprises of an American with significant 
experience with the ITU and a Russian who previously worked for the 
Chinese company, Huawei. What could go wrong with that?
  This is an election the free world can ill afford to lose, and we 
must do everything in our power to ensure corrupt actors are kept from 
its power. This includes a whole-of-government response, such as the 
State Department working with Commerce and the FCC, as well as the 
Foreign Affairs Committee teaming up with our good friends on the 
Energy and Commerce Committee to make sure the ITU promotes free and 
secure telecom systems around the globe.

                              {time}  1400

  The TTSA is a critical bill that would deliver tangible security 
benefits for Ukraine and frontline NATO allies. We can, should, and 
must get this bill to the President's desk quickly.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to make that reality one 
step closer by voting for this legislation today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MEUSER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this bipartisan bill, the 
Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act. This legislation 
authorizes the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide 
financing for secure 5G and future generations telecommunications 
infrastructure development projects in select Central and Eastern 
European countries with upper-middle-income economies or high-income 
economies.

[[Page H4541]]

  This authorization aims to push back against CCP efforts to dominate 
the 5G and future generations telecommunications networks of our 
strategic allies and partners in the region, many of whom are NATO 
allies.
  Ensuring the security of the telecommunications network of our NATO 
allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe is unquestionably in 
the U.S. national security interest.
  Moreover, this bill targets the majority of countries in the Three 
Seas Initiative. Launched by 12 of our close friends in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Three Seas Initiative seeks to expand cross-border 
energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure, as well as boost 
economic development in the region. Though it is a regional initiative, 
it has global implications that serve not only European but U.S. 
security and economic interests.
  We in Congress have expressed great concern that CCP is exporting 
corruption, debt traps, and poor labor and environmental standards to 
Europe and across the world through its 17+1 and Belt and Road 
initiatives. The Three Seas Initiative seeks to address these concerns 
by providing positive alternatives to PRC investments in the region, 
including in its 5G and future telecom networks.
  The last administration successfully convinced most of Central and 
Eastern Europe to opt not to use high-risk Chinese suppliers in their 
telecommunications networks. Supporting the Three Seas Initiative's 
efforts to expand secure digital infrastructure in Central and Eastern 
Europe will carry forward this major foreign policy success and ensures 
the transatlantic community remains united in its clear-eyed assessment 
of the threat the CCP poses to telecommunications security.
  In addition, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine must serve as a 
wake-up call to the dangers of allowing our adversaries to expand their 
influence in critical sectors of our economies. In particular, Europe's 
energy dependence on Russia has made it difficult to rally the 
continent around tougher sanctions and is funding the Kremlin's war 
machine to the tune of about $1 billion every day. This is not in 
Europe's or the United States' national security interests.
  We cannot wait for a potential conflict over Taiwan to assist our 
closest allies and partners in Europe and beyond in cutting out the 
CCP's malign influence now that it has been used to gain leverage over 
our democratic allies. This bill would help ensure we learn from our 
collective past mistakes.
  Lastly, this bill is important because it directs the Secretary of 
State to appoint a campaign director among existing personnel for the 
upcoming election at the International Telecommunications Union, the 
ITU, which sets global standards for technologies such as 5G.
  Russia's campaign to elect a Russian national who is a former Huawei 
executive to serve as the secretary general of the ITU is indicative of 
Russia's and China's efforts to use international organizations to 
promote their interests and malign influence.
  The United States should ensure that we are coordinated in driving 
support for the U.S. candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, for the secretary 
general of the ITU, but the State Department should also engage on the 
important down-ballot races at the ITU.
  There are four other posts of significance within the ITU's 
leadership structure, including the director of the ITU Development 
Sector, the ITU-D. The ITU-D plays a particularly vital role in 
supporting multilateral cooperation for fair and open internet 
governance through trustworthy deployment of digital technologies in 
the developing world.
  The U.S. must be doing everything we can to ensure Russian and 
Chinese malign influence does not grow. This bill would help.
  The Three Seas Initiative seeks to address threats posed by the CCP 
by providing positive alternatives to PRC investments in the region, 
including in its 5G and future telecoms networks.
  We must support our allies in Central and Eastern Europe as they 
seek, through the Three Seas Initiative, to reduce their dependence on 
Moscow's and Beijing's economic overtures. Only together can we face 
the threats posed by the authoritarian regimes in China and Russia.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, again, I thank my friend for his 
leadership and bipartisanship on this critical piece of legislation. I 
think it is timely. I think it is urgent. I urge my colleagues to 
support the legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Connolly) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 3344, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. ROY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution 
8, the yeas and nays are ordered.
  Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion 
are postponed.

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