[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 54 (Monday, March 28, 2022)]
[House]
[Pages H3880-H3883]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROHIBITING PUNISHMENT OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT ACT OF 2021
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass
the bill (H.R. 1621) to amend section 3661 of title 18, United States
Code, to prohibit the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing,
as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1621
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Prohibiting Punishment of
Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021''.
SEC. 2. ACQUITTED CONDUCT AT SENTENCING.
(a) Use of Information for Sentencing.--
(1) Amendment.--Section 3661 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting ``, except that a court of the
United States shall not consider, except for purposes of
mitigating a sentence, acquitted conduct under this section''
before the period at the end.
(2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall apply only to a judgment entered on or after the date
of enactment of this Act.
(b) Definitions.--Section 3673 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``As'' and inserting the following:
``(a) As''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) As used in this chapter, the term `acquitted conduct'
means--
``(1) an act--
``(A) for which a person was criminally charged and with
regard to which--
``(i) that person was adjudicated not guilty after trial in
a Federal, State, or Tribal court; or
``(ii) any favorable disposition to the person in any prior
charge was made, regardless of whether the disposition was
pretrial, at trial, or post trial; or
``(B) in the case of a juvenile, that was charged and for
which the juvenile was found not responsible after a juvenile
adjudication hearing; or
``(2) any act underlying a criminal charge or juvenile
information dismissed--
``(A) in a Federal court upon a motion for acquittal under
rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
``(B) in a State or Tribal court upon a motion for
acquittal or an analogous motion under the applicable State
or Tribal rule of criminal procedure.''.
SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of
complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall
be determined by reference to the latest statement titled
``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act,
submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the
Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that such
statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Bentz) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
General Leave
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous materials on H.R. 1621.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I am very proud to support H.R. 1621, the Prohibiting
Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act, which offers a solution to a long-
identified problem within our criminal justice system.
This bill provides necessary reform to current Federal sentencing
practice that allows judges to sentence defendants based on conduct for
which a jury has found them not guilty.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that anyone accused
of a crime shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public jury trial,
while the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
These provisions mean that the government is bound to move each and
every element of an offense for which a defendant is charged beyond a
reasonable doubt during a jury trial, or that defendant must admit each
element of an offense to support a plea of guilty. Absent that, those
offenses are not found guilty, if you will, to the individual.
Notwithstanding this constitutional obligation, Federal judges
routinely nullify not guilty verdicts rendered by juries and sentence
defendants to significantly higher penalties based on acquitted
conduct.
In its current form, 18 U.S.C. 3661 prohibits any limitation of the
conduct a judge may consider when sentencing a defendant, even when a
jury has determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove the
defendant committed the charged offense; it seems clearly a
constitutional violation.
Additionally, under the concept of ``relevant conduct,'' the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines allow judges to consider a range of conduct,
including dismissed charges, uncharged conduct, and acquitted conduct
when imposing sentences. Again, might I say, seemingly a very unfair
direction given without limitations, and certainly without adherence to
the constitutional amendments.
The fact-finding made by judges at sentencing is based on a lower
evidentiary standard than at trial--that is, by a preponderance of
evidence--which many scholars defined as a 50 percent chance that a
claim is true.
The reform proposed in this bill ensures that judges punish
defendants on facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt, criminal
standard, the higher evidentiary standard of proof required during a
jury trial, which some scholars attach a value of 90 to 95 percent
surety.
Justice Ginsberg, a moderate liberal who became more liberal in later
years, joined Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, a staunch
conservative, in his dissent in Jones v. United States, lamenting the
failure of the Court to determine if the Sixth Amendment is violated
when judges impose sentences based solely on judge-found facts.
While the Sentencing Guidelines suggested prison sentences from 27 to
71 months for the three defendants in the case, the trial judge
imposed--if you can believe it--overwhelming sentences of 180, 194, and
225 months, based on the conduct the prosecution failed to prove.
Justice Scalia's often-quoted dissent was issued more than 7 years
ago. Yet nothing has been done about this unjust, undemocratic practice
and, really, unconstitutional, which diminishes the sanctity of the
jury trial, the standard of reasonable doubt, which any layman can tell
you. When you ask them what the standard is for proving guilt or
innocence in a criminal trial, everybody knows the words, ``with
reasonable doubt.''
Can you imagine? That is not the case.
[[Page H3881]]
The public check on the government's power and the overall integrity
of the criminal justice system must be maintained.
H.R. 1621 would restore fairness to jury trials by amending Section
3661 to ban consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing unless the
conduct is considered for mitigation purposes.
Though I wish we were doing more to advance substantive criminal
justice reform, I am happy to support this bipartisan bill that
addresses an acute need while restoring the basic propositions of due
process and the right to a trial by jury.
I want to express enthusiastic support and appreciation to
Representative Steve Cohen, chair of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, for his commitment to
justice and for taking the lead on this significant, bipartisan bill,
along with Representative Kelly Armstrong.
A broad coalition of advocates support this measure, including--R
Street Institute, the ACLU, The Innocence Project, Brennan Center for
Justice, the American Bar Association, Families Against Mandatory
Minimums, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and the
Federal Public and Community Defenders.
It is for that reason I hope that the Senate will take up this bill
and pass the House version as soon as possible.
I ask my colleagues to support this bill and to continue working on
additional measures to make our justice system more equitable and more
transparent. I look forward to coming to the floor with those
initiatives.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BENTZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1621, the Prohibiting
Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution ensures that criminal
defendants have the right to a trial by jury. This right is so
important that our Founding Fathers preserved it in the Bill of Rights.
It is a hallmark of our great country and one of the many things that
separates us from other countries.
Our commitment to trial by jury means we accept the jury's decision
whether we agree with it or not.
This bill would prohibit Federal judges from increasing a defendant's
sentence based on conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted by
a jury.
In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission established Federal
sentencing guidelines. These guidelines allow judges to consider
conduct that was not formally charged or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt at a trial, so long as the judge finds the conduct relevant by a
preponderance of the evidence.
There are numerous examples of this happening. Judges have intervened
to overrule the determinations of juries and have handed down harsher
sentences after considering conduct for which the defendants have been
charged and acquitted.
{time} 1730
Allowing judges to consider acquitted conduct punishes people for a
crime for which they have not been convicted. It is wrong and violates
the spirit of our Bill of Rights.
Both Justice Kavanaugh and the late Justice Antonin Scalia recognized
the fundamental unfairness of using acquitted conduct at sentencing.
Both said it must stop.
In 2015, as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote: ``Allowing judges to rely on
acquitted or uncharged conduct to impose higher sentences than they
otherwise would impose seems a dubious infringement on the rights to
due process and to a jury trial.''
I agree with Justice Scalia and Justice Kavanaugh.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill,
and I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Cohen), the author of this legislation; the chairman of
the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
of the Committee on the Judiciary; and a strong advocate for justice.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. Speaker, first, I want to take a point of personal
privilege. This is the first day that I have walked into the House
without Don Young being in it.
Don Young was an outstanding Congressman and a good human being. He
was my friend. Every day I walked in those doors and he sat on the
aisle, I would say hello, and we would talk. This is the first day he
hasn't been there to say hello.
I will join with other Members to memorialize him in the services
tomorrow here in the Capitol and also at his church in Virginia on
Wednesday. Mr. Young was the dean of the House, just a good human
being, and he had a wonderful wife.
On this bill, I want to thank Mr. Armstrong for working with me on
it. He was a strong proponent of the bill, and it is truly bipartisan
and bicameral. It has already passed the Senate in some form, I
believe.
It has been mentioned that Justice Scalia was a great proponent of
this, as was Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kavanaugh.
Mr. Bentz and Ms. Jackson Lee have made all the arguments. I have a
few pages of speeches here, but there is no reason to read them. A long
time ago, I was told if you make the sale, sit down. The sale has been
made, I believe.
Mr. Speaker, I urge everybody to vote ``aye.''
I rise in strong support of H.R. 1621, the Prohibiting Punishment of
Acquitted Conduct Act. This bill is a bipartisan, bicameral effort to
prevent judges from punishing defendants for conduct they have not been
found to be guilty of. I'd like to begin by thanking my co-lead on this
bill, Congressman Kelly Armstrong, for all his hard work on this issue.
The U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee the
right to due process and the right to a jury trial for those accused of
a crime--these are two foundational principles meant to foster justice
and fairness in the American criminal legal system. These rights ensure
that we are presumed to be innocent unless and until the government
proves a defendant's guilt to a Jury.
Our system requires the government to prove an individual's guilt to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; however, under current federal law,
judges may impose sentencing enhancements for conduct that they find to
have been committed based on a less demanding standard--preponderance
of the evidence.
The result of this discrepancy in the law is that even if a defendant
has been found by a jury of their peers to not be guilty of a crime, a
judge may still use and consider that conduct for the purposes of
sentencing them. This means that people are spending time in jail for
conduct that the government failed to prove they had committed, and a
jury has acquitted them of.
This is entirely antithetical to the foundational principles of our
criminal justice system and Constitution--it not only undermines due
process, but it undercuts the important role juries play in our
criminal system by allowing judges to sentence individuals for conduct
regardless of the decision of the jury.
The Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act would correct
this inexplicable discrepancy by prohibiting the consideration of such
acquitted conduct in sentencing by federal judges, unless being
considered for the purpose of mitigating a sentence. This would ensure
that no one spends time in jail for conduct prosecutors were not able
to prove at trial.
It does so by amending Section 3661 of Title 18 to expressly state
that, except for purposes of mitigating a sentence, a court of the
United States shall not consider acquitted conduct when sentencing a
defendant.
Ending the consideration of acquitted conduct is and should be a
bipartisan effort--two of the fiercest champions of this policy
position include the late Justices Ginsburg and Scalia.
Allowing judges to continue to sentence defendants based on conduct
they have been acquitted of demeans and diminishes due process and is a
blatant attack on the Constitutional rights of Americans. We must
preserve and protect these rights by passing the Prohibiting Punishment
of Acquitted Conduct Act.
No one should be put behind bars for something the government was
unable to prove they did to a jury of their peers beyond a reasonable
doubt.
I urge all of my colleagues to join me in supporting this bicameral,
bipartisan bill to end this un-American practice.
Mr. BENTZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the
gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Armstrong).
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the
Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act.
[[Page H3882]]
I thank Mr. Cohen for introducing this important legislation.
Mr. Speaker, due process is more than an ideal. It is a fundamental
right enshrined in our law. The Constitution confirms that right and
explicitly ensures procedural fairness to those accused and convicted
of crimes. Yet, the criminal justice system often grants judges with
discretion to increase the length and severity of punishment based on
conduct for which an individual was proven not guilty.
We can all agree that holding criminals accountable is essential to
law and order. However, sentencing based on acquitted conduct is an
affront to all Americans' constitutional rights. The Prohibiting
Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act will bring an end to this unfair
practice.
This bipartisan, bicameral legislation bars judges from considering
an individual's acquitted conduct during sentencing, except for
purposes of mitigating a sentence.
This bill is a crucial step toward restoring some fairness in our
criminal justice system and commands a broad coalition of support,
including Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Dick Durbin, the ACLU,
Americans for Prosperity, and the American Conservative Union.
I thank both Chairman Nadler and Ranking Member Jordan for moving
this bill through the Judiciary Committee.
One last thing: Judges have a range of sentences in the sentencing
guidelines. Prosecutors, after conviction, make recommendations. There
is a pretrial sentencing report. Again, the sentencing can vary very
highly up and down in that vein. There is absolutely no reason, in the
interest of justice or fairness, where acquitted conduct needs to be
used in sentencing offenders.
Mr. COHEN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BENTZ. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to say how much I enjoyed working with
Mr. Armstrong on the Judiciary Committee.
When I came back for the new Congress and he wasn't on the committee,
that was a loss. But it has been good to work with him on this bill,
and he has worked on this in the past. I appreciate it.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to incorporate by reference everything that
Mr. Armstrong said into my previous lack of remarks. It can be done.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BENTZ. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I thank the gentleman from Oregon for supporting this legislation. He
cited a number of judges and courts who added their support to this
important legislation.
Mr. Cohen's eloquence was in the efforts he has made to help those
who have suffered injustice.
We thank Congressman Armstrong for his work as well. The fact that
they are speaking in tandem speaks loudly on this floor.
As I close, I include in the Record the dissenting opinion of
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with simple comments from their
opinion:
``On petitioners' appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that even if their
sentences would have been substantively unreasonable but for judge-
found facts, their Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.''
That was found by the D.C. Circuit.
``We should grant certiorari to put an end to the unbroken string of
cases disregarding the Sixth Amendment.''
So, you are more than affirmed that the Sixth Amendment in these
cases is patently disregarded.
I include in the Record the Supreme Court dissent on the Jones v.
United States case.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Joseph Jones, Desmond Thurston, and Antwuan, Ball v. United States
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 13-10026.--Decided October 14, 2014
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice
Ginsburg join, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
A jury convicted petitioners Joseph Jones, Desmond
Thurston, and Antwuan Ball of distributing very small amounts
of crack cocaine, and acquitted them of conspiring to
distribute drugs. The sentencing judge, however, found that
they had engaged in the charged conspiracy and, relying
largely on that finding, imposed sentences that petitioners
say were many times longer than those the Guidelines would
otherwise have recommended.
Petitioners present a strong case that, but for the judge's
finding of fact, their sentences would have been
``substantively unreasonable'' and therefore illegal. See
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 372 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). If so, their constitutional rights were violated.
The Sixth Amendment, together with the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, ``requires that each element of a crime'' be
either admitted by the defendant, or ``proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. __, __ (2013) (slip op., at 3). Any fact that increases
the penalty to which a defendant is exposed constitutes an
element of a crime, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
483, n. 10, 490 (2000), and ``must be found by a jury, not a
judge,'' Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007).*
We have held that a substantively unreasonable penalty is
illegal and must be set aside. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). It unavoidably follows that any fact
necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively
unreasonable--thereby exposing the defendant to the longer
sentence--is an element that must be either admitted by the
defendant or found by the jury. It may not be found by a
judge.
For years, however, we have refrained from saying so. In
Rita v. United States, we dismissed the possibility of Sixth
Amendment violations resulting from substantive
reasonableness review as hypothetical and not presented by
the facts of the case. We thus left for another day the
question whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when courts
impose sentences that, but for a judge-found fact, would be
reversed for substantive unreasonableness. 551 U.S., at 353;
see also id., at 366 (Stevens, J., joined in part by
Ginsburg, J., concurring) (``Such a hypothetical case should
be decided if and when it arises''). Nonetheless, the Courts
of Appeals have uniformly taken our continuing silence to
suggest that the Constitution does permit otherwise
unreasonable sentences supported by judicial factfinding, so
long as they are within the statutory range. See, e.g.,
United States v. Benkahla, 530 F. 3d 300, 312 (CA4 2008);
United States v. Hernandez, 633 F. 3d 370, 374 (CA5 2011);
United States v. Ashqar, 582 F. 3d 819, 824-825 (CA7 2009);
United States v. Treadwell, 593 F. 3d 990, 1017-1018 (CA9
2010); United States v. Redcorn, 528 F. 3d 727, 745-746 (CA10
2008).
This has gone on long enough. The present petition presents
the case the Court claimed to have been waiting for. And it
is a particularly appealing case, because not only did no
jury convict these defendants of the offense the sentencing
judge thought them guilty of, but a jury acquitted them of
that offense. Petitioners were convicted of distributing
drugs, but acquitted of conspiring to distribute drugs. The
sentencing judge found that petitioners had engaged in the
conspiracy of which the jury acquitted them. The Guidelines,
petitioners claim, recommend sentences of between 27 and 71
months for their distribution convictions. But in light of
the conspiracy finding, the court calculated much higher
Guidelines ranges, and sentenced Jones, Thurston, and Ball to
180, 194, and 225 months' imprisonment.
On petitioners' appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that even if
their sentences would have been substantively unreasonable
but for judge-found facts, their Sixth Amendment rights were
not violated. 744 F. 3d 1362, 1369 (2014). We should grant
certiorari to put an end to the unbroken string of cases
disregarding the Sixth Amendment--or to eliminate the Sixth
Amendment difficulty by acknowledging that all sentences
below the statutory maximum are substantively reasonable.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will say that the failure to address this issue
for so many years has contributed to the epidemics of overincarceration
and mass incarceration, weakened the finality that a jury trial is
meant to provide, and undermined overall public confidence in our
justice system.
I really think this legislation has exposed some incredulous behavior
because most people believe that you are sentenced on the reasonable
doubt convictions as opposed to additional sidebar conversations that
may come to the judge's attention in terms of other offenses.
Today, we consider a simple, narrowly tailored bill that builds on
our bipartisan effort to create a fair justice system. This bill will
make sure that defendants are punished only for the conduct that
prosecutors are able to prove at trial, consistent with the
constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to a trial by
jury of their peers, and consistent with the principles on which
country was founded.
[[Page H3883]]
Before I close, I join with my colleague from Tennessee's remarks and
indicate the deepest sympathy to the family of the dean, Congressman
Don Young. He is a voice--and I speak in the present. His presence was
larger than life. He spoke to everyone. His booming voice is something
that I am certainly going to find a great loss, as well as his love and
passion for not only his family and his great State but also for this
institution.
I don't know if we will ever find an institutionalist such as Don,
but we can certainly follow in his footsteps and his desire for order
when he cited the words ``regular order.''
We were blessed by having him here, and may he rest in peace.
Mr. Speaker, I ask that my colleagues join me in supporting this
bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 1621, the
``Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021, as amended.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5
legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
extraneous material on H.R. 1621.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Opening Statement
Mr. Speaker. I am proud to support of H.R. 1621, the ``Prohibiting
Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act,'' which offers a solution to a
long-identified problem within our criminal justice system.
This bill provides necessary reform to current federal sentencing
practice that allows judges to sentence defendants based on conduct for
which a jury found them not guilty.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that anyone accused
of a crime shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public jury trial,
while the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Together these provisions mean that the Government is bound to prove
each and every element of an offense for which a defendant is charged
beyond a reasonable doubt during a jury trial, or that a defendant must
admit each element of an offense to support a plea of guilty.
Notwithstanding this constitutional obligation, federal judges
routinely nullify not guilty verdicts rendered by juries and sentence
defendants to significantly higher penalties based on acquitted
conduct.
In its current form, 18 USC Sec. 3661 prohibits any limitation of the
conduct a judge may consider when sentencing a defendant, even when a
jury has determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove the
defendant committed the charged offense.
Additionally, under the concept of ``relevant conduct,'' the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines allow judges to consider a range of conduct,
including dismissed charges, uncharged conduct, and acquitted conduct
when imposing sentences.
The fact-finding made by judges at sentencing is based on a lower
evidentiary standard than at trial--that is by a preponderance of the
law--which many scholars define as a 50% chance that a claim is true.
The reform proposed in this bill ensures that judges punish
defendants based on facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt--the higher
evidentiary standard of proof required during jury trials, which some
scholars attach a value of 90 to 95% surety.
Justice Ginsburg moderate-liberal who became more liberal in later
years, joined Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, a staunch
conservative, in his dissent in Jones v. United States, lamenting the
failure of the Court to determine if the Sixth Amendment is violated
when judges impose sentences based solely on judge-found facts.
While the Sentencing Guidelines suggested prison sentences from 27 to
71 months for the three defendants in the case, the trial judge imposed
sentences of 180, 194, and 225 months, based on conduct the prosecution
failed to prove.
Justice Scalia's often-quoted dissent was issued more than seven
years ago.
Yet nothing has been done about this unjust, undemocratic practice,
which diminishes the sanctity of the jury trial, the public check on
the government's power, and the overall integrity of the criminal
justice system.
H.R. 1621 would restore fairness to jury trials by amending Section
3661 to ban consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing unless the
conduct is considered for mitigation purposes.
Though I wish we were doing more to advance substantive criminal
justice reform, I support this bipartisan bill that addresses an acute
need while restoring the basic propositions of due process and the
right to trial by jury.
I thank our colleague, Representative Steve Cohen, for his commitment
to justice and for taking the lead on this significant, bipartisan bill
alongside Representative Kelly Armstrong.
A broad coalition of advocates support this measure, including R
Street Institute, the ACLU, The Innocence Project, Brennan Center for
Justice, the American Bar Association, Families Against Mandatory
Minimums, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and
Federal Public & Community Defenders.
It is my hope that the Senate will take up and pass the House version
of this bill soon.
I ask my colleagues to support this bill and to continue working
together on additional measures to make our justice system more
equitable and more transparent.
Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the
Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act--commonsense bipartisan
and bicameral legislation to restore a key aspect of fairness to our
criminal justice system.
Under the U.S. criminal justice system, you are innocent until proven
guilty. A principle that is foundational to our system of law and
order.
Coupled with this principle, is that if you are charged with a crime,
you are entitled to a trial by a jury of your peers. If they find you
innocent, your case is finished.
This all makes sense--and aligns with our understanding of our
justice system. But, in too many cases, tour courts are punishing
people for crimes they've been found innocent of.
Currently, even if one jury finds you innocent and acquits you of a
crime, a different judge can still use that allegation as a basis of
providing a harsher punishment for a crime you are convicted of.
This means that the second judge can effectively unilaterally
overturn a prior acquittal when considering a future sentence--
dismissing the presumption of innocent until proven guilty.
This is absurd.
I was a litigator and defense attorney for many years, and I
understand exactly how unjust it is for someone found innocent to have
this ticking timebomb looming overhead.
This bill will end the practice of judges increasing sentences based
on conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted by a jury--
restoring a foundation pillar of fairness in our criminal justice
system.
I want to thank Congressman Cohen and Congressman Armstrong for their
leadership on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support this
commonsense bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1621, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. CLYDE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution
8, the yeas and nays are ordered.
Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion
are postponed.
____________________