[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 45 (Monday, March 14, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1148-S1149]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2022

   Mr. WARNER. Madam President, this explanation reflects the status of 
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence for the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2022.
   The explanation shall have the same effect with respect to the 
implementation of this act as if it were a joint explanatory statement 
of a conference committee.
   I ask unanimous consent that the Joint Explanatory Statement for the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 be printed into the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Joint Explanatory Statement--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
                               Year 2022

       The following is the Joint Explanatory Statement (the 
     ``Explanatory Statement'') to the Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (``the Act''), which has been 
     included as Division X of the Consolidated Appropriations 
     Act, 2022. The Explanatory Statement reflects the result of 
     negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (``SSCI'') and the 
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (``HPSCI'') 
     (together, the ``Committees''). The Explanatory Statement 
     shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation 
     of the Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a 
     conference committee.
       The Explanatory Statement comprises three parts: an 
     overview of the application of the annex to accompany this 
     statement; a statement on anomalous health incidents; and 
     unclassified congressional direction.


      Part I: Application of the Classified Annex and Schedule of 
                             Authorizations

       The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities 
     prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details 
     concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and 
     policy direction. Therefore, in addition to the Schedule of 
     Authorizations, a classified annex to the Act--referred to 
     here and within the annex itself as the ``Agreement''--has 
     been prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of 
     the Committees' actions.
       The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes that 
     accompanied H.R. 5412 and S. 2610; and reconciles differences 
     between the Committees, with respect to the National 
     Intelligence Program (NIP). The Agreement also makes 
     recommendations for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) 
     and the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP). The 
     Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community (IC) to 
     obligate and expend funds not altered or modified by the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations as requested in the 
     President's budget, subject to modification under applicable 
     reprogramming procedures.
       The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated 
     into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of 
     law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to clarify the 
     authorization levels found in the bill and the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       The Committees view direction and recommendations, whether 
     contained in the Explanatory Statement or in the Agreement, 
     as requiring compliance by the Executive Branch.


         Part II: Statement Regarding Anomalous Health Incident

       From the time the Committees received the first ``Havana 
     Syndrome'' reports, the Committees have focused intently on 
     the anomalous health incidents (``AHIs'') that have afflicted 
     United States Government personnel, including many in the 
     Intelligence Community (IC) and other United States 
     Government personnel. Provisions of the Act reflect that 
     continuing, bicameral and bipartisan effort.
       The Biden Administration also has pursued its own 
     initiatives. As directed by Congress, it earlier this year 
     appointed a senior official, within the National Security 
     Council, to oversee the government's response to AHIs. 
     Additionally, in recent months, a widely-discussed assessment 
     concluded that a majority of reported AHIs can be explained 
     by medical conditions or environmental or technical factors, 
     and that it is unlikely that a foreign actor--including 
     Russia--is engaged in a sustained, global campaign involving 
     hundreds of incidents without detection. But the assessment 
     left other cases unexplained, including a small subset that 
     the IC continues to scrutinize most closely.
       Around the same time, an IC panel of experts determined 
     that certain AHIs cannot be explained by environmental or 
     medical conditions, but could be due to external stimuli. 
     While acknowledging important information gaps, the panel 
     further determined that pulsed electromagnetic energy--and, 
     in some cases, ultrasound--plausibly might explain AHIs' core 
     characteristics; and that psychosocial factors alone could 
     not account for those characteristics, though they might 
     cause some other incidents or contribute to long-term 
     symptoms.
       These findings advance the United States' understanding of 
     AHIs. But these findings are also heavily qualified, 
     tentative, and based on a developing and incomplete body of 
     evidence and scientific and medical knowledge. Most 
     important, as the Committees wish to stress, these recent 
     developments do not justify shifting the Executive Branch's 
     AHI-related activities into a lower gear, or discrediting the 
     reports of AHI victims.
       The core work on AHIs--to include examination of a 
     potential role by one or more foreign actors--must continue 
     apace. As with prior inquiries into complex and murky 
     intelligence problems, unraveling the AHI mystery fully may 
     take time. It might be years before the United States reaches 
     definitive conclusions about exactly who, or what, is behind 
     AHIs.
       The Administration has acknowledged that a great deal 
     remains to be done. Indeed, much more evidence will have to 
     be gathered. Plausible theories regarding responsibility for 
     AHIs will have to be weighed against a record that will grow 
     and change over time, and potentially may have to be 
     revisited if circumstances warrant. And no plausible theory 
     should be ruled out or downplayed prematurely.
       Success will depend on many factors. Among other things, it 
     will be important to have a well-resourced cadre of ``cross-
     cleared'' individuals, at all relevant IC elements and other 
     Executive Branch organizations, who can readily review and 
     analyze all relevant intelligence and information, and 
     without hindrances. The Committees long have emphasized this, 
     with respect to AHi and many other priority intelligence 
     matters. However, the Executive Branch has yet to take all 
     necessary steps, to do away with excessive compartmentation 
     and unnecessary bureaucracy; and to ensure that, for AHi and 
     for other vital missions, the right people consistently and 
     easily can access necessary information. That will have to 
     change.
       Treatment also must remain a matter of highest priority. 
     All AHi victims must be encouraged to file prompt reports of 
     their experiences, and without fear of being disbelieved or 
     dismissed. They and their families must receive the highest 
     quality medical and

[[Page S1149]]

     other care and must receive that care immediately. Thus far, 
     some bureaucratic roadblocks to the provision of care have 
     been removed--but there is no excuse for any to remain. They 
     must be dismantled. And new ones must not be erected.
       Above all, there can be no slowing down, in the 
     investigation into AHIs and in the treatment of AHI victims 
     and their families. To do so would risk signaling--to those 
     individuals, to the broader IC workforce, and to the wider 
     world--that, though it prioritized the issue most highly for 
     a discrete time, the United States is ``moving on'' from 
     AHIs.
       That cannot be allowed to happen. And the Committees will 
     continue to conduct vigorous oversight, to prevent it from 
     happening.


             Part III: Unclassified Congressional Direction

       This Joint Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, 
     and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction 
     contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2022 (S. Rept. 117-37) and in the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H. Rept. 
     117-156).
       The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:
     Assessment of Intelligence Community Counternarcotics 
         Capabilities
       The Committees direct the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with such other Federal 
     Government entities as the Director determines appropriate, 
     to submit an assessment to the congressional intelligence 
     committees within 120 days of enactment of this Act, on the 
     status of the Intelligence Community's (1) counternarcotics 
     capabilities and resourcing with regard to intelligence 
     collection and analysis; (2) operational support to foreign 
     liaison partners; and (3) operational capacity to support the 
     counteractions mission of the Federal Government. The 
     assessment shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     include a classified annex.
     Assessment of Intelligence Community's Intelligence-Sharing 
         Relationships with Latin American Partners in 
         Counternarcotics.
       The Committees direct the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with such other Federal 
     Government entities as the Director determines appropriate, 
     to submit an assessment to the congressional intelligence 
     committees within 120 days of enactment of this Act, on the 
     intelligence-sharing relationships of the Intelligence 
     Community with foreign partners in Latin America on 
     counternarcotics matters. The assessment shall be submitted 
     in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
     Report on Intelligence Community Support to Visas Mantis 
         Program
       The Committees direct the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with such other Federal 
     Government entities as the Director determines appropriate, 
     to submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees within 120 days of enactment of this Act, on 
     intelligence matters relating to the Visas Mantis program, 
     including efforts by (1) the Intelligence Community to 
     provide and plan for effective intelligence support to such 
     program; and (2) hostile intelligence services to exploit 
     such program or any other program by which visas for 
     admission to the United States are issued. The report shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex, as necessary.
     Assessment and Report on Interagency Communication Relating 
         to Efforts to Address Anomalous Health Incidents
       The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence 
     to (1) conduct an assessment of how the various elements of 
     the Intelligence Community are coordinating or collaborating 
     with each other and with elements of the Federal Government 
     that are not part of the Intelligence Community in their 
     efforts to address anomalous health incidents, and (2) submit 
     a report to the congressional intelligence committees within 
     180 days of enactment of this Act on the findings of the 
     Director with respect to the assessment. The report submitted 
     pursuant to subsection shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may include a classified annex.
     Reporting on Occurrence of Anomalous Health Incidents
       The Committees direct that, whenever the head of an element 
     of the Intelligence Community becomes aware of a report of an 
     anomalous health incident occurring among the employees or 
     contractors of the element, no later than 90 days after each 
     incident, the head of the element shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a brief report on the 
     reported incident. The Committees further direct that this 
     reporting requirement shall cease upon joint notice from the 
     congressional intelligence committees to the Director of 
     National Intelligence.
     Report on Cooperation by Intelligence Agencies of Key 
         Democratic Countries Regarding Technological Competition 
         with China
       The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act, on the 
     status of current cooperation among the intelligence agencies 
     of key democratic countries and key partners and allies of 
     the United States in order to track and analyze the 
     following:
       1. Technology capabilities and gaps among allied and 
     partner countries of the United States;
       2. Current capabilities of China in critical technologies 
     and components;
       3. The efforts of China to buy startups, conduct joint 
     ventures, and invest in specific technologies globally;
       4. The technology development of China in key technology 
     sectors;
       5. The efforts of China relating to standard-setting 
     forums; and
       6. Supply chain vulnerabilities for key technology sectors;
       The Committees further direct that the report shall include 
     a plan to address any deficiencies identified in the report 
     with respect to the cooperation described in such subsection 
     and suggested areas for increased cooperation.
     STEM Technology Fellowship
       The Committees direct the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in coordination with the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and 
     any other relevant Intelligence Community elements, to 
     conduct and present to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, within 180 days after enactment of this Act, a 
     feasibility study examining the benefits of creating a 
     Science, Technology, Engineering, Math (STEM) fellowship for 
     the Intelligence Community, and whether such a fellowship 
     would help alleviate the Intelligence Community's workforce 
     shortages and retention challenges in STEM fields. The study 
     shall include:
       1. A comprehensive assessment of the IC's current and 
     future workforce needs in high demand STEM fields, such as 
     data science, cybersecurity, computer network exploitation, 
     software development, and artificial intelligence/machine 
     learning, including:
       a. An assessment of whether the Intelligence Community's 
     current positions and career categories are sufficient to 
     track and retain high demand STEM employees, and
       b. An assessment of workforce needs by grade, category, and 
     position descriptions.
       2. An overview of Intelligence Community programs aimed at 
     developing and recruiting new and mid-career hires in STEM 
     fields;
       3. Proposed timelines for converting fellows and interns to 
     permanent employees;
       4. Mechanisms by which the Intelligence Community could use 
     such a fellowship or internship to address shortfalls in 
     diversity among the workforce; and
       5. An assessment of the authorities and resources required 
     to establish an Intelligence Community-wide STEM technology 
     fellowship.

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