[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 20 (Tuesday, February 1, 2022)]
[Senate]
[Pages S456-S461]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAN

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, for nearly 30 years, first as a member 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and, to this day, as chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I have had the privilege of 
engaging in the most pressing foreign policy and national security 
issues facing our Nation.
  While we are rightly focused on the crisis unfolding around Ukraine, 
we must not lose sight of how dangerously close Iran is to becoming a 
nuclear-armed state, for we know that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose 
an unacceptable threat to U.S. national security interests, to our 
allies in Europe, and to overall stability in the Middle East.
  As someone who has followed Iran's nuclear ambition for the better 
part of three decades, I am here today to raise concerns about the 
current round of negotiations over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action and Iran's dangerously and rapidly escalating nuclear program 
that has put it on the brink of having enough material for a nuclear 
weapon. Three to four weeks--a month or less--is how long most analysts 
have concluded it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material 
for a nuclear bomb if they chose to do so. That is not a timeline we 
can accept.
  That is why I am calling on the Biden administration and our 
international partners to exert more pressure on Iran to counter its 
nuclear program, its missile program, and its dangerous behavior around 
the Middle East, including attacks on American personnel and assets.
  Now, before I continue, let me set the record straight. While some 
have tried to paint me as belligerent to diplomacy or worse, I have 
always believed that multilateral, diplomatic negotiations from a 
position of strength are the best ways to address Iran's nuclear 
program, and I have always advocated for a comprehensive diplomatic 
agreement that is long-lasting, fully verifiable, and with an 
enforceable snapback system of sanctions should Iran breach any terms.
  It was for very specific reasons that I opposed the JCPOA back in 
2015 as well as an underlying concern that I just could not shake, a 
sense that the deal itself at the time was the best case scenario, 
hinging on good-faith actors and overly optimistic outcomes without 
enough consideration for the worst case scenarios that might arise from 
the behavior of bad actors. Today, many of the concerns I expressed 
about the JCPOA back in August of 2015 are coming back to haunt us in 
the year 2022.
  First and foremost, my overarching concern with the JCPOA was that it 
did not require the complete dismantlement of Iran's nuclear 
infrastructure. Instead, it mothballed that infrastructure for 10 
years, making it all too easy for Iran to resume its illicit nuclear 
program at a moment of its choosing.
  The deal did not require Iran to destroy or fully decommission a 
single uranium enrichment centrifuge. In fact, over half of Iran's 
operating centrifuges at the time were able to continue spinning at its 
Natanz facility. The remainder--more than 5,000 operational centrifuges 
and nearly 10,000 not yet operational--were to be merely disconnected. 
Instead of being completely removed, they were transferred to another 
hall at Natanz, where they could be quickly reinstalled to enrich 
uranium, which is exactly what we have seen happen over the past year, 
nor did the deal shut down or destroy the Fordow nuclear facility, 
which Iran constructed underneath a mountain to house its covert 
uranium enrichment infrastructure. Under the JCPOA, it was merely 
refurbished.

  Now Iran is back in business at Fordow, spinning its most advanced 
centrifuges and enriching uranium to a higher level of purity than 
before it entered into the JCPOA.
  In the 2 years since President Trump left the JCPOA, Iran has resumed 
its research and development into a range of centrifuges, making rapid 
improvements to their effectiveness--huge strides that we will never be 
able to roll back.
  Today, Iran has more fissile material--2,500 kilograms--more advanced 
centrifuges, and a shorter breakout time--3 to 4 weeks--than it had in 
2015. This is exactly why I was so concerned

[[Page S457]]

over the JCPOA's framework of leaving the vast majority of Iran's 
nuclear program intact. This is how Iran was able to rapidly rebuild 
and advance its enrichment capabilities once the agreement fell apart. 
That was a serious mistake.
  Back in 2015, I also expressed my grave concern that Iran only agreed 
to provisionally--provisionally--apply the Additional Protocol of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Additional Protocol is what 
allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to go beyond merely 
verifying that all declared nuclear material and facilities are being 
used for peaceful purposes and provides it with a verification 
mechanism to ensure states do not have undeclared nuclear materials and 
facilities.
  The Additional Protocol was particularly important because Iran has 
never fully come clean about its previous clandestine nuclear 
activities. For well over two decades, mounting concerns over Iran's 
secret weaponization efforts united the world. The goal that we have 
long sought, along with the international community, is to find out 
exactly what Iran accomplished in its clandestine program, not 
necessarily to get Iran to declare culpability but to determine how far 
they advanced their weaponization program so that we would know what 
signatures to look for in the future.
  David Albright, a physicist and former nuclear weapons inspector and 
founder of the Institute for Science and International Security said:

       Addressing the IAEA's concerns . . . about the military 
     dimensions of Iran's nuclear program is fundamental to . . . 
     [any] long-term agreement. [An agreement] that sidesteps the 
     military . . . issues would risk being unverified.

  The reason that he said that an agreement that sidesteps the military 
issues would be unverifiable is that it makes a difference if you are 
90 percent, in terms of enriched material down the road in your 
weaponization efforts, or only 10 percent advanced; 90 percent or 10 
percent makes a big difference. The state of Iran's weaponization 
efforts significantly impacts the breakout time for the regime to 
complete an actual deliverable weapon so this verifiability is 
critical.
  In 2015, I explained that the JCPOA did not empower international 
weapons inspectors to conduct the kind of anytime, anywhere inspections 
needed to get to the bottom of Iran's previous weaponization program, 
and in February of last year, 2021, we saw the consequences of not 
insisting that Iran permanently ratify the Additional Protocol. Iran 
simply decided they were done with the Additional Protocol and refused 
to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to fully investigate 
locations where it found traces of uranium enrichment.
  It is now obvious that the IAEA, or what we call the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, is significantly limited in its ability to 
determine the extent of Iran's previous nuclear program and whether 
further militarization activities have continued all this time. Without 
the complete adoption of the Additional Protocol, the JCPOA did not 
empower the IAEA to achieve this task.
  So that was then and this is now, and though I had my concerns with 
the JCPOA, as I have expressed, I am also absolutely clear-eyed, as 
everyone else in this Chamber should be, that the way in which 
President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal--with no diplomatic 
plan for constraining Iran's nuclear ambitions, without the support of 
any of our allies, without any kind of serious alternative--emboldened 
Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions like never before.
  Now, we can't live in a counterfactual world where all parties remain 
in full compliance, but we do know that, even for the first couple of 
years of the JCPOA, Iran's leaders gave absolutely no--no--indication 
that they were willing to look beyond the scope of these limited terms 
and fought vigorously to keep their highly advanced nuclear 
infrastructure in place, and that was under a more ``moderate'' regime. 
They continued their destabilizing activities and support for terrorism 
in the greater Middle East with abandon.
  So today I ask: Why would we try to simply go back to the JCPOA--a 
deal that was not sufficient in the first place and still doesn't 
address some of the most serious national security concerns that we 
have?
  Let me lay out specific concerns about the parameters of the JCPOA, 
which, it appears, the Biden administration is seeking to reestablish.
  For decades now, Iran has pursued all three elements necessary to 
create and to deliver a nuclear weapon: producing nuclear material for 
a weapon, the fissile material--that is basically what we just talked 
about being 3 to 4 weeks away; the scientific research and development 
to build a nuclear warhead--that is why we don't know the full 
dimensions of what they were doing in terms of how advanced they got to 
the weaponization, the ability to have the nuclear warhead that makes 
the bomb go boom; and then the ballistic missile to deliver them--that, 
they already have.
  So if you think about it, they have the missiles capable--I will talk 
about that a little bit more in a few minutes--they have the missiles 
capable of delivering. They have the fissile material--are on the verge 
of having the fissile material necessary to create the ability for an 
explosion. These are checked off. The only question is the warhead. At 
what point are they there? And we don't fully know.
  Since the Trump administration exited the deal, Iran has installed 
more than 1,000 advanced centrifuges, enabling it to enrich uranium 
more quickly. While the deal the United States and our partners are 
pursuing in Vienna would ostensibly seek to reverse technological 
advancements, the acquisition of knowledge--that is never reversible.
  As Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association has said, 
``Iran's nuclear program hit new milestones over the past years.'' To 
quote it, it says: ``As it masters the new capabilities, it will change 
our understanding about how the country''--in this case, Iran--``may 
pursue nuclear weapons down the road.'' That is exactly why the 
starting position of the United States and our partners during our 
original negotiations was the complete dismantlement of Iran's 
enrichment facilities and capacity.
  According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has 
produced uranium enriched to more than 60 percent purity--more than 60 
percent purity--at the Natanz facility. Why is 60 percent purity so 
alarming? Well, as the Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Association--the U.N. international watchdog on these issues--
Rafael Grossi has stated, Iran's decision to enrich uranium to 60 
percent to produce uranium metal has no--no--justification for civilian 
purposes--no justification for civilian purposes.
  Iran says: Well, we only want nuclear energy for domestic energy 
consumption. But, as the IAEA's head says, it has no justification to 
enrich uranium to 60 percent for civilian purposes. In other words, 
Iran has already done most of the heavy lifting.
  Furthermore, the IAEA reports that Iran's nuclear stockpile has grown 
to nearly 2,500 kilograms. That is nearly 2\1/2\ tons of enriched 
uranium and eight times--eight times--the cap that was agreed to in the 
JCPOA. More and more advanced centrifuges, a much larger nuclear 
stockpile, and vastly higher levels of enrichment are a dangerous 
combination.
  As I noted before, Iran's breakout time is now a mere 3 to 4 weeks, 
but according to a report from David Albright and others at the 
Institute for Science and International Security, Iran could enrich 
uranium for a second weapon in less than 4 months. Once they hit this 
breakout period, which is 4 weeks away, then to get their second bomb, 
we are talking about 4 months.
  So while the United States has recognized Iran's right to civilian 
nuclear power, Iran's behavior continues to indicate that it is 
actively moving toward developing nuclear weapons capabilities. Adding 
to the alarm is the fact that we don't even have the full picture of 
exactly how far it has gone. Again, that is why full access was and is 
such a critical component of any deal.
  As the original deal was being negotiated, we started from a place of 
anywhere, anytime inspections that we wanted--anywhere, anytime--but 
that is not where the deal landed.
  While I recognize that other factors have contributed to Iran's 
efforts to block inspectors, simply put, I was not satisfied in 2015 
with the level of visibility the agreement afforded.

[[Page S458]]

  Today, indeed, the IAEA readily states it does not have the necessary 
level of access. In fact, in September of 2021, the IAEA Director, 
Rafael Grossi, warned that ``Iran's failure to fully cooperate and 
communicate with the IAEA `is seriously compromising' the IAEA's 
ability to have full insight into Iran's program.'' IAEA inspectors 
were denied access three times to the Karaj centrifuge component 
production facility in their efforts to install new surveillance 
cameras to monitor Iranian activities.
  In addition, Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA's ongoing 2-year-
old investigation into the presence of nuclear materials found at four 
locations outside of Iran's declared nuclear program sites. Iran has a 
lot of access to two of those locations but has denied and delayed 
access to the other two.
  The IAEA has further warned Iran multiple times that their ``lack of 
substantive engagement'' in resolving these issues ``seriously affects 
the agency's ability to provide assurance''--assurance--``of the 
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.''
  But Iran's obstruction has gone far beyond reneging on the inspection 
protocols agreed to in the JCPOA. As I mentioned previously, in 
February of last year, Iran suspended implementation of the Additional 
Protocol. Following that suspension, the IAEA managed an arrangement 
where Tehran agreed to certain surveillance activities. But even though 
there was an agreement, it refused to transmit any data from that 
surveillance until it got all the sanctions relief the regime felt 
entitled to under the JCPOA--never mind their own repeated failures to 
meet their obligations under the JCPOA.
  We are not dealing with a good-faith actor here. Iran's consistent 
obfuscation, continued stalling, and outlandish demands have left us 
flying blind, especially when it comes to verifying that Iran is not 
engaged in activities related to the weaponization process, activities 
related to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device, 
activities which were explicitly banned in section T of the JCPOA. I am 
talking about utilizing computer models to simulate nuclear explosions, 
developing the diagnostic equipment for nuclear testing, and 
researching conventional explosives for triggering a nuclear explosion.
  The JCPOA banned these activities because substantial evidence 
indicated that Iran had, in fact, pursued them in the past. Yet we 
cannot verify whether Iran is pursuing them again. We cannot know for 
sure because the Iranian Government has repeatedly stated the IAEA 
lacks the authority to inspect the very military sites where these 
activities took place--the activities where the IAEA has wanted to go 
to but has been denied.
  With Iran's breakout time now less than a month, we must be able to 
verify the scope of Iran's weaponization research, and this must 
include Iran's ballistic missile program. We already know that Iran has 
ballistic missiles that could carry a warhead to the Middle East and 
parts of Europe. Indeed, given how far Iran's enrichment capabilities 
and research and development have advanced, the only element left is 
preventing Iran from weaponizing its stockpile.
  All of this contributes to why we have a well-founded, deep mistrust 
of Iran's willingness to seriously curtail its nuclear program. And, of 
course, Iran keeps reminding the United States and our Arab Gulf 
partners that its missile program presents its own unique threats 
outside of the nuclear file.
  I remain highly skeptical it will suspend any of its other 
threatening and destabilizing activities, from ballistic missile 
development to support for terrorist proxies. Even as the United 
States, our P5+1 partners, and Iran convened in Vienna for indirect 
negotiations about returning to the JCPOA, Iran's leaders took it upon 
themselves to antagonize all parties and show, my view, their true 
intentions.
  In December, they launched a rocket with a satellite carrier into 
space to remind us all that even as they dragged out diplomatic 
negotiations, their ambitions remain acquiring the ability to 
eventually deliver a nuclear warhead. This launch was yet another 
provocation like those we have seen over the past several years, some 
of which directly--directly--violate the terms of U.N. Security Council 
resolution 2231. That resolution codified the JCPOA, our agreement with 
Iran, and plenty of others that are far outside of the limited scope of 
the deal.
  Beyond this failed launch into space, Iran's dangerous behavior has 
hit closer to home. In recent years, Iran has increased direct threats 
to U.S. personnel and assets and continued providing weapons to 
terrorist proxies throughout the Middle East.
  The U.S. intelligence community last year assessed that ``Iran and 
its militant allies continue to plot terrorist attacks against U.S. 
persons and interests. . . . Iran has the largest ballistic missile 
force in the region . . . [and] is increasingly active in using 
cyberspace to enable influence operations.''
  The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that Iran 
not only has the largest and most diverse ballistic missile program in 
the region, but it has also used those ballistic missiles to attack 
U.S. personnel stationed in Iraq--personnel who, let's be clear, have 
been there at the invitation of the Iraqi Government. While our last 
President made light of what he called headaches, the fact is, nearly a 
dozen servicemembers suffered from traumatic brain injuries during the 
attack on Al Asad Air Base in 2020.
  Already this year, there have been 3 rocket and drone attacks, with 
public reports of 14 rockets hitting an Iraqi air base hosting U.S. 
forces and wounding 2 American servicemembers.
  Allow me to share an article in the New Yorker by Robin Wright 
entitled ``The Looming Threat of a Nuclear Crisis with Iran.'' She 
writes of a conversation with CENTCOM commander Gen. Kenneth McKenzie 
in which he said the following:

       The lesson of Al Asad . . . is that Iran's missiles have 
     become a more immediate threat than its nuclear program. For 
     decades, Iran's rockets and missiles were wildly inaccurate. 
     At Al Asad, ``they hit pretty much where they wanted to 
     hit''. . . . Now they ``can strike effectively across the 
     breadth and depth of the Middle East. They could strike with 
     accuracy, and they could strike with volume.

  The article continues:

       The regime has concentrated on developing missiles with 
     longer reach, precision accuracy, and greater destructive 
     power. Iran is . . . one of the world's top missile 
     producers. Its arsenal is the largest and most diverse in the 
     Middle East, the Defense Intelligence Agency [has] reported.

  Now, as President Biden's Special Envoy on the question of 
negotiations on a potential return to the JCPOA, Robert Malley, has 
said, ``Iran has proven that using its ballistic-missile program as a 
means to coerce or intimidate its neighbors'' is a real challenge.
  Now, Iran can fire more missiles than its adversaries--more missiles 
than its adversaries, including the United States and Israel--can shoot 
down or destroy.
  Tehran has achieved what General McKenzie calls overmatch, a level of 
capability in which a country has weaponry that makes it extremely 
difficult to check or defeat.
  ``Iran's strategic capacity is now enormous,'' McKenzie said. 
``They've got overmatch in the theatre--the ability to overwhelm.''
  Iran now has the largest known underground complexes in the Middle 
East housing nuclear and missile programs. Most of the tunnels are in 
the west, facing Israel, or on the southern coast, across from Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf sheikhdoms.
  This fall, satellite imagery tracked new underground construction 
near Bakhtaran, the most extensive complex. The tunnels, carved out of 
rock, descend more than 1,600 feet underground. Some complexes 
reportedly stretch for miles. Iran calls them ``missile cities.''
  A recording of deceased General Suleimani echoes in the background: 
``You start this war, but we create the end of it.''
  An underground railroad ferries Emad missiles for rapid successive 
launches. Emads have a range of a thousand miles and can carry a 
conventional or a nuclear warhead.
  The Islamic Republic has thousands of ballistic missiles, according 
to U.S. intelligence assessments. They can reach--we see on this map 
that there are different missiles. But how far they can reach? Its 
farthest: 2,000 kilometers. They can reach as far as 1,300

[[Page S459]]

miles in any direction--deep into India and China to the east; high 
into Russia in the north; to Greece and other parts of Europe to the 
west; and as far south as Ethiopia, in the Horn of Africa, and dozens 
of countries in between. About a hundred missiles could reach Israel.
  The Biden administration has hoped to use progress on the nuclear 
deal to eventually broaden diplomacy and include Iran's neighbors in 
talks on reducing regional tensions.
  Ms. Wright then again quotes Special Envoy on Iran Rob Malley as 
saying:

       Even if we can revive the JCPOA, those problems are going 
     to continue to poison the region and risk destabilizing it. 
     If they continue, the response will be robust.

  Well, it may be too late. Tehran has shown no willingness to barter 
over its missiles as it has with its nuclear program.
  She also quotes Jeffrey Lewis, an expert on missile proliferation at 
the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, who 
said:

       Once you have spent the money to build the facilities and 
     train people and deliver missiles to the military units that 
     were built around these missiles, you have an enormous 
     constituency that wants to keep them. I don't think there's 
     any hope of limiting Iran's missile program.

  And President Raisi, of Iran, told reporters after his election: 
``Regional issues or the missile issue are non-negotiable.''
  Nonnegotiable. Now, the U.S. military is still vastly more powerful 
than anything built or imagined in Iran. Yet Iran has proven to be an 
increasingly shrewd rival. It has trained a generation of foreign 
engineers and scientists to assemble weaponry. It has dispatched 
stateless dhows loaded with missile parts for Houthi rebels, who have 
fired missiles at military and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. It has 
provided the older ``dumb'' rocket technology to Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad.
  The majority of the ``precision project'' kits crossing at Abu Kamal 
go to Lebanon, where Hezbollah upgrades its short-range rockets and 
missiles to hit more accurately and to penetrate more deeply inside 
Israel. Hezbollah is now estimated to have at least 14,000 missiles and 
more than 100,000 rockets, mostly courtesy of Iran.
  As McKenzie says, ``they have the ability to strike very precisely 
into Israel in a way they've not enjoyed in the past.''
  I shared this article on the floor today because I believe it 
captures the gravity of our present reality, and I encourage all of our 
colleagues to read it.
  Beyond what Ms. Wright has laid out above with excellent sources and 
details, let's also not forget that Iran continues to be a steady 
fighting partner for the murderous Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, all 
the while expanding its military footprint along our ally Israel's 
northern border.
  And, let's not forget, all of this belligerent behavior has escalated 
despite the ballistic restrictions under U.N. Security Council 
resolution 2231.
  Madam President, resolution 2231 of the United Nations was the 
framework that endorsed the JCPOA and imposed other restrictions. So 
just think of where Iran will go when these restrictions expire next 
year. They expire, under existing law, next year.
  Beyond this alarming aggression throughout the region, within its 
borders Iran continues to remind the world it has no respect for human 
rights. It is a country where dissidents and activists who want a 
better future are persecuted and killed. Indeed, just last January, 
Baktash Abtin, a prominent Iranian poet and human rights activist who 
was jailed for ``propaganda against the state,'' died in the notorious 
Evin prison from COVID-19.
  Iran's judicial system is a sham that denies basic human rights like 
freedom of expression and condones torture and extrajudicial killings. 
Last year--get this--the U.S. Justice Department indicted four Iranians 
for conspiring to kidnap and kill an Iranian-American journalist, Masih 
Alinejad, surveilling her daily activities in Brooklyn, NY, here on 
American soil.
  And we cannot forget the four American citizens who Iran continues to 
wrongfully detain--Babak and Siamak Namazi, Emad Shargi, and Morad 
Tabhaz--who are suffering in prison and whose family members are 
desperately seeking their return.
  It is against this backdrop of bad behavior that Iran is ostensibly 
negotiating a return to the JCPOA--or maybe just dragging out the time. 
It took years of crushing U.S. and international sanctions to bring 
Iran to the negotiating table in the first place. I know because I was 
the author of many of them. And we had to remain united in order to 
bring them to the table, and now we have to remain united as well.

  Now, I have been cautiously optimistic about the Biden 
administration's initial efforts. I waited for the last year to see 
results.
  Before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State and 
others--senior members of the administration--insisted that they would 
look for a ``longer and stronger'' agreement. I have a pretty good 
sense of what I think ``longer and stronger'' means. Longer is obvious: 
more time. Stronger: dealing with elements that had not been previously 
dealt with.
  However, a year later, I have yet to hear any parameters of longer or 
stronger terms or whether that is even a feasible prospect. And even 
when it seemed that a constructive agreement might be possible last 
summer, upon taking office, the Raisi government abandoned all previous 
understandings and, as I mentioned, made absolutely clear that Iran's 
ballistic missiles and regional proxy networks are ``not negotiable''--
his words: ``not negotiable.''
  Moreover, at this point, we seriously have to ask: What exactly are 
we trying to salvage? What are we trying to salvage?
  Iran has moved so far out of compliance with so many of the terms of 
the JCPOA and of the terms of the U.N. Security Council resolution 
2231. Meanwhile, the arms embargo that we had has already expired, and 
restrictions on Iran's missile program are about to expire next year.
  To quote again Rob Malley, the President's Iran negotiator, trying to 
revive the deal at this point would be ``tantamount to trying to revive 
a dead corpse.''
  I think he is right. It is time to start thinking out of the box and 
consider new strategies for rolling back Iran's nuclear program and 
addressing its dangerous and nefarious activities. These new efforts 
should include creative diplomatic initiatives, stricter sanctions 
enforcement, and a steely determination from Congress to back up 
President Biden's declaration that Iran will ``never get a nuclear 
weapon on my watch''--his words.
  One critical first step is vigorously enforcing the sanctions we have 
in place.
  A few weeks ago, the Washington Post reported on the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps' extensive oil smuggling operations 
throughout the Persian Gulf: ``Smuggled Iranian fuel and secret 
nighttime transfers: Seafarers recount how it's done.''
  Now, I was pleased to see the Department of the Treasury dispatch a 
senior official to the United Arab Emirates, which has been part of 
this, to help stop it. More significantly and despite what it says 
publicly, numerous reports also suggest that China continues to buy 
Iranian crude oil at a discount--a lucrative lifeline for the Iranian 
regime that both subverts international oil markets and gives China yet 
another inroad into the Middle East.
  Using a sophisticated web of shipping, delivery, and tanker flagging 
techniques, private energy analysts--here is where we see their 
abilities, in this space right in here, to make these transfers that 
ultimately go to China, through tanker flagging techniques--private 
energy analysts estimate that China bought an average of 350,000 to 
650,000 barrels per day--per day--last year.
  And according to United Against Nuclear Iran, this amounted--that 
reality of how many barrels they are buying per day amounted--to about 
$10 billion going to the Iranian regime, in violation of existing 
sanctions.
  We can't turn a blind eye to these violations. The Biden 
administration must rigorously enforce our sanctions, including 
targeting Chinese entities in a way that will impose a serious cost. We 
must use our sanctions to crush the illicit, underground economy of 
Iranian oil shipments throughout the world.
  The international community must also leverage a full range of tools. 
We have to urge our P5+1 partners to call for snapback sanctions on 
Iran under the parameters of the JCPOA, and we should be urging the EU 
to reimpose its pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran.

[[Page S460]]

  Now, of course, we have to be realistic here. Former President 
Trump's disastrous withdrawal from the JCPOA hampered our ability on 
the sanctions front. Indeed, when former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
went to the U.N. in the summer of 2020 and attempted to invoke the 
snapback mechanism, our European partners and the rest of the P5+1 
roundly rejected him and pointed out that the United States, from their 
view, did not even have the standing to do so having exited the deal.
  That was then. That said, I believe the Biden administration has 
diligently worked to build back trust and cooperation with our 
partners, and I believe the remaining partners must look at the facts 
and officially invoke the snapback mechanism to send a strong signal to 
the Iranians.
  We must also be thinking beyond the JCPOA. It is worth noting that 
even though President Trump's withdrawal, from my view, was a 
strategic, serious error, nothing technically constrained his ability 
to do so. Iran's leaders insist they want a guarantee that the United 
States will not withdraw from any future agreement.
  As these negotiations continue, the best guarantee of a sustainable 
diplomatic agreement with Iran and the international community is to 
build one that garners bipartisan political support. One such idea that 
I have been working on with Senator Graham is a regional nuclear fuel 
bank that would provide Iran with access to fuel on the condition that 
it forgoes all domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
  Now, that idea may sound lofty, but it is worth noting that the IAEA 
already runs a nuclear fuel bank that provides access to members in the 
case of a disruption to their existing fuel arrangements.
  Iranian leaders have long maintained their nuclear program is for 
domestic energy development, and yet it belies logic that Iran would 
need to highly enrich uranium or undertake any number of the steps they 
had been taking over the past few years for a purely peaceful nuclear 
energy program, to say nothing of the fact that Iran was the fifth 
largest crude oil producer in OPEC in 2020 and the third largest 
natural gas producer in the world in 2019. So it has an abundance of 
natural resources for energy purposes within its own country.
  It doesn't need nuclear fuel for domestic energy consumption. But if 
you accept that--well, we want to keep our oil and gas to sell, and we 
want nuclear power for the purposes of domestic energy consumption, 
fine, then why do you bury your program thousands of feet under a 
mountain? Why do you hide what you are doing? Why are you enriching to 
a grade that even the IAEA says has no civilian purpose whatsoever? Why 
won't you show us that, in fact, your previous actions that we believe 
may lead to weaponization exist? Why won't you show us, dispel it?
  The kind of arrangement we are talking about would truly satisfy the 
need for a peaceful nuclear program. Now, while we understand that 
there are both political and logistical challenges regarding this 
proposal in the past, we don't believe we should close any potential 
doors. We believe, actually, that our proposal opens new doors because 
while we are just now talking about Iran--and we have been having this 
conversation with our P5+1 allies and Iran in a bilateral arrangement 
because of our concerns about Iran's nuclear program--we could be 
talking about the entire region.
  We have successfully negotiated nuclear cooperation agreements with a 
number of countries in the region on a bilateral basis, including 
Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. In the future, such a fuel bank--a 
regional fuel bank--could even be expanded to guarantee that any 
Iranian Gulf state--or further beyond in the Middle East for that 
matter--can peacefully fuel its commercial nuclear reactors through the 
IAEA fuel bank. That means you don't enrich, but you get the fuel 
necessary if you want domestic energy consumption.
  Of course, regional investment into any diplomatic solution--from 
Gulf countries and Arab neighbors and Israel--is absolutely critical 
for success. Just as we know our sanctions are most effective when we 
work with our international partners, multilateral cooperation is 
critical to finding a successful outcome.
  But, particularly, what would be attractive to the Iranian regime? 
Well, what is attractive--or should be attractive--to the Iranian 
regime is this arrangement would decouple the view that the West is 
only seeking this arrangement from Iran.
  Iran would not have to give up its right to enrich, but would, 
without a loss of national pride, delegate that right to a multilateral 
nuclear fuel bank. And by including other Gulf countries in such a 
reasonable natural fuel bank with the same terms and conditions, Iran 
would not have to worry about other Gulf countries attaining nuclear 
weapons and posing a security threat to them.
  And finally, if we can succeed at a regional nuclear fuel bank, would 
we stop a nuclear arms race in what is already a tinderbox of the 
world? Because if Iran can acquire a nuclear weapon, you can be sure 
that the countries in the Gulf--Saudi Arabia, Emirates, and others--
they are going to say, under the theory of mutual self-destruction, We 
have to have nuclear weapons too. And now, we begin an arms race in a 
part of the world that can ill-afford it.
  As we look to a new approach, I also believe that we should revisit a 
number of proposals I laid out in 2015. First, we should seek the 
immediate ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol to ensure 
that we have a permanent international agreement with Iran for access 
to suspect sites.

  Second, we need a ban on centrifuge R&D--research and development--
for the duration of such an agreement because it is that advanced R&D 
that allowed Iran to be 4 weeks away from crossing the nuclear 
threshold so that Iran could not have the capacity to quickly break 
out, just as the U.N. Security Council Resolution and sanctions and 
snapback is off the table.
  Third, Iran should close the Fordow enrichment facility. After all, 
the sole purpose of Fordow was to harden Iran's nuclear program to a 
military attack. But if Iran has nothing to hide and it is all for 
peaceful purposes, why do you put it deep underneath a mountain?
  Fourth, the world needs full resolution of the possible military 
dimensions of Iran's program. We need an arrangement that isn't set up 
to whitewash this issue. The world needs to be able to go to sleep at 
night saying Iran has not achieved the ability to weaponize its 
desires. Iran and the IAEA must resolve the issue before permanent 
sanctions relief takes place. Should Iran fail to cooperate with a 
comprehensive review into the military dimensions of their program, 
then automatic sanctions must snap back.
  Fifth, rather than extend the duration of the agreement, we need a 
permanent agreement. One of the single most concerning elements of the 
original deal is its 10- to 15-year sunset of restrictions on Iran's 
programs, with off-ramps starting after year 8.
  Well, think about it: 2015-2022--7 years--this shows you how quickly 
that, in fact, Iran can be proceeding in a way that we would not want 
it to be able to proceed.
  And sixth, we need an agreement about what penalties will be 
collectively imposed by the P5+1 for Iranian violations, both small and 
midsized, as well as a clear statement as to the so-called grandfather 
clause which exists in paragraph 37 of the JCPOA, to ensure that the 
U.S. position about not shielding contracts entered into legally upon 
reimposition of sanctions is shared by our allies. Everybody should be 
in the same boat. We are seeing that. And without these elements 
clearly delineated, there is room for interpretation admission.
  I believe there is space for a deal with Iran. And I believe that one 
that garners bipartisan support would be the best guarantor of the 
political longevity the Iranians insist they want.
  Our goal must be the right deal, not just any deal. We must not agree 
to an arrangement that merely delays the inevitable.
  As we think about broader diplomatic options, we must be clear about 
what a good negotiation entails: Getting more, obviously, requires 
giving more. If Iran were willing to make greater concessions on 
halting uranium enrichment, destroying nuclear infrastructure, and 
seriously constraining its ballistic missile program, the United States 
and the international community should consider lifting a

[[Page S461]]

broader scope of sanctions, potentially including some primary 
sanctions.
  While Iran's leaders are scraping by in the resistance economy, the 
truth is that the whole country would be better off if the regime 
abandoned their enrichment and weaponization efforts and focused on 
providing everyday Iranians with real economic opportunity.
  At the same time, Iran must also fully understand that the United 
States will not hesitate to take any action necessary to protect our 
interests and those of our allies, and that includes the use of 
military force where appropriate and necessary. One of our greatest 
strengths is our enduring security partnerships with nearly every 
country in the Middle East region.
  Last month, a group of senior bipartisan diplomats, military 
officers, and former Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle 
issued a statement to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
about the importance of a credible military threat should Iran breach 
certain red lines. Let me quote from their statement. They said:

       Indeed, the Vienna negotiations are in danger of becoming a 
     cover for Iran to move toward achieving a threshold nuclear 
     weapons capability. . . . While the United States has 
     recognized Iran's right to civilian nuclear power, Iran's 
     behavior continues to indicate that it not only wants to 
     preserve a nuclear weapons option but is actively moving 
     toward developing that capability. Indeed, as the director-
     general of the International Atomic Energy Association, 
     Rafael Grossi, has stated, Iran's decision to enrich uranium 
     to 60 percent and to produce uranium metal has no justifiable 
     civilian purpose. . . . Without convincing Iran it will 
     suffer severe consequences if it stays on its current path, 
     there is little reason to hope for the success of diplomacy.

  This is all from their statement.

       Therefore, for the sake of our diplomatic effort to resolve 
     this crisis, we believe it is vital to restore Iran's fear 
     that its current nuclear path will trigger the use of force 
     against it by the United States. The challenge is how to 
     restore U.S. credibility in the eyes of Iran's leaders. 
     Words--including formulations that are more pointed and 
     direct than ``all options are on the table''--are also 
     necessary but not sufficient.
       In that context, we believe it is important for the Biden 
     administration to take steps that lead Iran to believe that 
     persisting in its current behavior and rejecting a reasonable 
     diplomatic resolution will put to risk its entire nuclear 
     infrastructure, one built painstakingly over the last three 
     decades.
       Such steps may include orchestrating high-profile military 
     exercises by the U.S. Central Command, potentially in concert 
     with allies and partners, that simulate what would be 
     involved in such a significant operation, including 
     rehearsing air-to-ground attacks on hardened targets and the 
     suppression of Iranian missile batteries.
       Also important would be to provide both local allies and 
     partners as well as U.S. installations and assets in the 
     region with enhanced defensive capabilities to counter 
     whatever retaliatory actions Iran might choose to make, 
     thereby signaling our readiness to act, if necessary.
       Perhaps most significantly, fulfilling past U.S. promises 
     to act forcefully against other Iranian outrages, such as the 
     drone attack by Iran-backed militias against the U.S. base at 
     al-Tanf in Syria and Iran's illegal capture of merchant ships 
     and killing unarmed seamen, might have the salutary impact of 
     underscoring the seriousness of U.S. commitments to act on 
     the nuclear issue.

  Again, I encourage everyone to read this statement from colleagues, 
congressional colleagues, military leaders, and diplomats on both sides 
of the aisle.
  Last year, following years of quiet cooperation and the narrowing of 
shared security concerns, the United States and our partners and allies 
welcomed Israel into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. 
We have a number of shared interests--from maritime security to 
confronting a growing threat of ballistic missiles and UAVs--and we 
must continue to strengthen our bilateral and regional partnerships to 
ensure that we have all the means necessary to protect our interests.
  Moreover, we must forcefully and proportionately respond to Iran's 
ongoing attacks on our diplomatic and military facilities in Iraq and 
Syria. We will not fail to respond against direct attacks on the United 
States that threaten our diplomat and servicemembers. Full stop.
  Let me close by saying that the Iranian nuclear threat is real, and 
it has grown disproportionately worse by day. It is becoming a clear 
and present danger. The time is now to reinvigorate our multilateral 
sanctions efforts and pursue new avenues, new ideas, new solutions for 
a diplomatic resolution.
  But today, I call on the Biden administration and international 
community to vigorously and rigorously enforce sanctions, which have 
proven to be among the most potent tools for impacting Iran's leaders 
and the IRGC. We cannot allow Iran to threaten us into a bad deal or an 
interim agreement that allows it to continue to build its nuclear 
capacity, nor should we cling to the scope of an agreement that it 
seems some are holding on for nostalgia's sake.
  As I said 7 years ago, hope is not a national security strategy. In 
the words that I spoke in 2015, I said:

       Whether or not the supporters of the agreement admit it, 
     this deal is based on ``hope''; hope that--when the nuclear 
     sunset clause expires--Iran will have succumbed to the 
     benefits of commerce and global integration . . .

  Well, I hate to say, they have not.

       . . . hope that the hardliners will have lost their power 
     and the revolution will end its hegemonic goals . . .

  They have not.

       . . . and hope that the regime will allow the Iranian 
     people to decide their own fate.

  The hardliners are more entrenched, and they have not allowed the 
Iranian people to decide that future.

       Hope is part of human nature, but unfortunately it is not a 
     national security strategy. The Iranian regime, led by the 
     Ayatollah, wants above all to preserve the regime and its 
     Revolution--

  Unlike the Green Revolution of 2009. This is still true.

     So it stretches incredulity to believe they signed on to a 
     deal that would in any way weaken the regime or threaten the 
     goals of the Revolution.

  They will not.

       I understand that this deal represents a trade-off, a hope 
     that things [might] be different in Iran in 10-15 years.
       Maybe Iran will desist from its nuclear ambitions.

  But it has not.

       Maybe they'll stop exporting and supporting terrorism.

  But it has not.

       Maybe they'll stop holding innocent Americans hostage.

  But they have not.

       Maybe they'll stop burning American flags.

  But it has not.

       Maybe their leadership will stop chanting ``Death to 
     America'' in the streets of Tehran.

  But it has not. Or the hope was maybe that they won't do those 
things. Well, they have continued to do all of those things.
  While there are so many crises brewing across the world, we cannot 
abandon our efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and the arms race 
it will surely set off in the Middle East. We cannot ignore Iran's 
nefarious support for terrorism or accept threats to American interests 
and lives. We must welcome legitimate and verifiably peaceful uses of 
nuclear power but remain true to our nonproliferation principles and 
our unyielding desire to build a more stable, safer, prosperous world 
for the American people and for all peace-loving people to thrive. In 
order to do so, Iran cannot and must not possess a nuclear weapon.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

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