[Congressional Record Volume 168, Number 11 (Tuesday, January 18, 2022)]
[House]
[Pages H199-H200]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   ENSURING A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Courtney) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. COURTNEY. Madam Speaker, just a few days before Christmas, on 
December 21, President Joe Biden issued a Presidential determination 
with little fanfare under the Defense Production Act of 1950.
  The Defense Production Act of 1950 is a Korean war-era law that 
allows the government to accelerate production of critical materials 
and technology. It is the same law that Presidents Trump and Biden used 
to stimulate production of COVID-related ventilators and PPE during the 
pandemic.
  In his memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Biden noted that: 
``Ensuring a robust, resilient, and competitive domestic defense 
industrial base that has the . . . workforce to meet the Virginia-class 
submarine undersea warfighting mission is essential to our national 
security.''
  To accomplish that mission, the President invoked DPA authorities to 
expand the domestic production capability for ``large-scale 
fabrication, shipbuilding industrial base expansion for resilience and 
robustness, and maritime workforce training pipelines.''
  As chair of the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, 
which oversees the Virginia-class program, I strongly support the 
President's decision because it is based on both strategic national 
defense considerations and industrial base demand.
  Indeed, just a few days after Christmas, the President signed into 
law the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, which contained 
provisions my subcommittee authored that are completely aligned with 
the President's DPA order.
  Specifically, the new 2022 NDAA added funding for new facility 
construction for submarine production, as well as a boost for workforce 
training and supply chain development. All of these provisions were 
plus-ups from the Navy's initial budget request last February and based 
on our own analysis of strained shipyard capacity.
  The more consequential issue contained in the DPA, I believe, is its 
finding that the Virginia program ``is essential to our national 
security.'' That finding is a blaring signal to the Congress and the 
entire country that we need to bolster our undersea deterrent 
capability to counter aggressive, coercive actions in the maritime 
domain--specifically, the behavior of both the Chinese and Russian 
navies that has been overwhelmingly repudiated by the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention, the former in the South China Sea in 2016 
and the latter in the Black Sea in 2019.
  In both cases, despite the International Court's scathing rejection 
of both countries' intrusions on protected waters, there is no sign 
that lawlessness has abated. China's encroachment on territorial waters 
in the Philippines and Vietnam continues, as does its illegal island 
building and militarization of artificial landmasses that the court 
condemned. In the Black Sea and the North Atlantic, Russian claims to 
sea control and its seizure of Ukrainian naval ships are blatantly in 
violation of the international rule of law.
  Madam Speaker, today, China has the world's largest navy, and Putin 
is aggressively increasing the size of his submarine fleet.
  For the U.S. Navy, what is particularly concerning is the development 
of sophisticated missile technology by both countries that increases 
the vulnerability of our surface fleet that has been working in 
conjunction with allies like France, Japan, and Australia to reassert 
post-World War II principles of freedom of navigation visibly and 
peacefully. The joint sea patrols in the international waters of the 
Indo-Pacific and Black Sea are a reassertion of principles that, since 
the end of World War II, have successfully reduced the risk of conflict 
while enhancing trade and prosperity.
  To counter ongoing threats to rule of law, the Biden administration 
has been diplomatically reconnecting, all throughout 2021, with U.S. 
allies in both regions, as well as reevaluating the highest and best 
use of limited defense spending. The DPA issued on December 21 is a 
logical extension of that process. Given the new challenge posed

[[Page H200]]

by missile technology to our surface ships, stepping up production of 
the Virginia-class program makes perfect sense since those submarines 
are not at risk from even the most sophisticated airborne missiles, and 
the Chinese and Russian navies know that.
  Madam Speaker, in addition, last September, the new AUKUS security 
alliance between the U.S., Australia, and the U.K., whose centerpiece 
is the sharing of nuclear propulsion technology for a new class of 
Australian submarines, is another powerful, tangible statement about 
the importance of strengthening our joint allied undersea capability.
  As David Ignatius, a longtime observer of U.S. foreign policy, 
recently wrote in The Washington Post: ``The AUKUS alliance with 
Australia and Britain to build nuclear submarines and share other 
military technology might be the most important strategic move'' by the 
U.S. ``in decades.''

  The Biden DPA order last month and the AUKUS agreement last September 
are a powerful, tangible signal by the U.S. to our allies and friends 
who support a collaborative action to uphold international rule of law, 
which is critical to maintaining a peaceful coexistence among the 
world's nations.

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