[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 214 (Monday, December 13, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9105-S9107]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Unanimous Consent Request--S. 1520
Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Madam President, I rise today to once again call for
every Senator to have the opportunity to cast their vote on the
Military Justice Improvement and Increasing Prevention Act, which was
unceremoniously and undemocratically removed from the NDAA behind
closed doors.
I started calling for an up-or-down vote on this bill on May 24
because I feared that this would happen and that the NDAA would not do
enough to address the epidemic of sexual violence and serious crimes in
the U.S. military. Now that we have seen the text, it is clear that
those fears were well-founded.
Committee leadership has overridden the will of a filibuster-proof
majority in the Senate and a majority of the House, who called for real
reform that would have moved serious crimes to independent military
prosecutors. Instead, committee leadership has codified the status quo,
leaving commanders as the convening authority--
[[Page S9106]]
even in sex crimes cases. That is the same system that everyone
supposedly agreed is failing our servicemembers. Unfortunately, this
does not fix the issue of convening authority, which was the singular
ask from the survivor community.
The NDAA does not make the necessary changes to the military justice
system. The change we must make--the change that survivors and veterans
have asked for--is to remove all serious nonmilitary crimes from the
chain of command. Commanders are not lawyers or judges, and they don't
have training or expertise necessary to make those complex legal
decisions.
Our servicemembers have told us that they do not trust commanders to
be unbiased or to deliver real justice in cases where they know the
survivor or the accused.
Although I have heard from my colleagues saying otherwise, the NDAA
does not remove sex crimes or any other serious crimes from the chain
of command. And I want to be clear about this because the American
people and our servicemembers deserve to know the truth. The NDAA keeps
the commander as the convening authority. Every single court-martial
will still begin with the words: ``This court-martial was convened by
order of the commander.''
It tells you everything you need to know.
The NDAA also continues to offer commanders the ability to choose the
members of the jury panel. I want to address this point specifically
because I have heard a few misleading statements about jury selection.
The NDAA allows a commander who is creating the court-martial to
handpick other members of his command to be the jury pool from which
the jury will be formed. Our bill, on the other hand, would put this
responsibility in the hands of an independent attorney without a stake
in the outcome.
Unlike what some who lack an understanding of the UCMJ have said,
under our bill, the independent prosecutor is not the same person as
the independent convening authority. Those are two separate military
attorneys.
Don Christensen, president of Protect Our Defenders, said about the
NDAA that ``because commanders retain convening authority and
associated powers such as selecting jury court members, commanders will
still wield significant influence over the court-martial proceeding.
Such influence erodes the independence of the special victims'
prosecutor and fails to address the concerns of the survivor community
that conflicted commanders still have too much influence over the
military justice process.''
The command influence does not stop with jury selection. The NDAA
also allows commanders to oversee the preliminary inquiry. It retains
commanders' ability to order depositions and to order warrants of
attachment. It continues to allow commanders to grant immunity and to
approve delays. It retains commanders' power to determine the
incapacity of the accused and to select witnesses. It allows commanders
to approve of findings and sentences and to order the reconsideration
of ambiguous sentences. It also allows the commanders to grant clemency
and to allow the accused to separate from the service instead of facing
a court-martial--fully eluding the justice system.
Anyone who looks at the system sees a system where the commander is
still in charge, where their influence cannot be overlooked. There is
no way for the prosecutors to be or to be seen to be independent under
that system. There will be no improvement in trust or, necessarily, in
the results.
Today, just one-third of survivors of sexual assault in the military
are willing to come out of the shadows to report their crime, showing a
clear lack of trust in the current system, but 44 percent of survivors
indicate that they would have been more likely to come forward if the
prosecutor were in charge of the decision over whether to move forward
with their case.
The Military Justice Improvement and Increasing Prevention Act is the
only provision that would empower impartial, independent prosecutors to
make the vital decisions necessary for a criminal justice system
shielded from systemic command influence, while allowing commanders to
focus on what they do best: warfighting, training troops.
I want to share the words of Retired Navy LT Paula Coughlin, a
survivor who brought the Tailhook Symposium scandal to light 30 years
ago. She said:
``The efforts to gut reform are unacceptable to the survivor
community and must be rejected. If this effort succeeds, it will be a
slap in the face to those who have put it all on the line this past
decade.''
Those survivors and the majority of my colleagues here in the Senate
who support real reform deserve to have their voices heard.
As if in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that at a time
to be determined by the majority leader in consultation with the
Republican leader, the Senate Armed Services Committee be discharged
from further consideration of S. 1520 and the Senate proceed to its
consideration; that there be 2 hours of debate equally divided in the
usual form; and that upon the use or yielding back of such time, the
Senate vote on the bill with no intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REED. Madam President, reserving my right to object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Madam President, on military justice reform, I am pleased
that the NDAA that we will consider this week will enact sweeping and
historic reform that changes how sexual assault and other offenses are
investigated and prosecuted in the Armed Forces. This bipartisan,
bicameral compromise was achieved after tough negotiations with the
House and also with the administration. The House voted last week 363
to 70 to pass this bill with these reforms--an overwhelming endorsement
of the work that we do. I look forward to a similar, strong vote in the
Senate this week, sending these reforms to the President of the United
States.
As you know, there have been many proposals for improving how the
military prosecutes sexual assault and other crimes, from Senators,
Representatives, from the administration, and from other organizations,
all of them with their unique merits. Bringing all this together was
difficult and complicated, but I believe we have done so effectively.
Our bill removes all meaningful prosecutorial authority from the
military chain of command for the series of sexual assault offenses
under the UCMJ, as well as for other offenses, including the wrongful
distribution of intimate visual images, domestic violence, stalking,
retaliation, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and child pornography.
Our bill creates special trial counsel, who are highly specialized,
independent prosecutors outside the chain of command of the victims and
the accused. They will have exclusive, binding, and final decision-
making authority over whether to prosecute these crimes.
Under our bill, no commander will be able to overrule the binding
decision of a special trial counsel to prosecute or not prosecute a
case. Similarly, our bill ensures that the special trial counsel have
the exclusive authority to withdraw or dismiss charges or
specifications, removing that power from commanders.
Finally, our bill will make a large number of necessary and
conforming amendments to the UCMJ to effectuate this reform, and I am
sure there will be need for more of this during the 2-year
implementation period.
The bottom line is that the reforms contained in this bill represent
a sea change in military justice. At the end of the day, this NDAA will
enact the most sweeping reform to the UCMJ in decades, and that is why
Protect Our Defenders--probably one of the most effective and vocal
organizations founded on the premise of defending the rights of victims
of sexual assault--said: ``The provisions included in this year's NDAA
are the most transformative military justice reforms in our Nation's
history.''
Madam President, having made that statement, I will object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The Senator from New York.
Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I would like to thank the chairman for his steadfast
work on trying to find common ground
[[Page S9107]]
here, but I disagree that ``all meaningful prosecutorial'' actions have
been taken away from the commander. These are the actions that still
rest with the commander, and these are meaningful: granting clemency,
highly meaningful; grant sentencing witnesses, highly meaningful;
granting immunity, highly meaningful; ordering depositions, highly
meaningful; preliminary inquiries, highly meaningful; separation
authority, highly meaningful. These are things that are essential to
the prosecution of any case, and so if the prosecutor doesn't have the
right to do these things, it means the prosecutor has to go ask the
commander: May I do these things? May I call this witness? May I have
approval for a witness at sentencing? May I have approval for this
preliminary inquiry?
That request alone sends the signal to survivors and to
servicemembers that the chain of command is still in charge; that that
independent prosecutor, while the language of the bill sounds really
good--they are independent and their decision is binding,
wonderful. The perception of servicemembers who understand the weight
of convening authority, they know what the words ``convening
authority'' mean; they know what the command ability and importance is.
They may not receive these changes and these reforms in the way the
chairman believes them to be seen. They may not see them as the ``most
transformative reforms'' that have ever happened because if they still
perceive the chain of command in charge, it may not dent their
willingness to report these crimes. They may not have now the ability
to report and to have a belief that they can have faith in this system.
And so my question to the chairman is, Why didn't we take the extra
step to do the one thing that we have been trying to do for 8 years,
which was to make these prosecutors, these independent, specialized
prosecutors--which is what we have been fighting for, for 8 years--
truly independent and give them all the authority the convening
authority had?
The only change they would have had to make is the designation of
``convening authority'' would go from the commander to these new,
independent, trained prosecutors. It is a simple change. It is a change
we have begged for from the survivor community, from the veterans
organizations, from Protect Our Defenders, the best and most effective
vocal organization, per the chairman. We have asked for that one
change--to be denied by this conference committee of four men in a
closed room making the decision themselves.
And for the chairman to get up and say that having such an
overwhelming vote by the House of Representatives just shows how right
they are, well, then why does 220 cosponsors in the House mean nothing?
Why does 66 sponsors in the Senate mean nothing? Why does the
endorsement of every veterans group in America mean nothing? Why does
the support of 29 attorneys general mean nothing? That is my question.
And it is such a small thing.
So, yes, having an independent, trained military prosecutor outside
the chain of command whose decision is binding sounds amazing. That is
what we have been fighting for. Why not make it really independent? Why
not take the convening authority and give it to the independent,
trained military prosecutor?
And, sadly, the answer is the DOD does not want to change the status
quo. They don't want to make these changes, and so what they are
willing to do is they are willing to put a great label on it. They are
willing to pretend that they are doing the thing that we have asked
them to do. They are willing to create the impression that they are
doing the thing we asked them to do. But they know what ``convening
authority'' means, and they retained it.
And when asked: Please, take the convening authority, give it to the
trained military prosecutor; please make a truly independent system,
like all these people are asking you to do, they said no. They said no
over and over and over again.
And, unfortunately, our chairman did not want to disregard the views
of the Department of Defense. And, unfortunately, that is my job, to
oversee, to provide oversight and accountability over the Department of
Defense, over the executive branch. That is what the Constitution
requires this Chamber, this body, this Senate to do. We are not
supposed to take our marching orders from the Department of Defense. We
are not supposed to do what the generals ask us to do.
We are supposed to look hard and fast at a problem that has plagued
our servicemembers who give their lives for this country. We are asked
to solve the problem, and we have put forward legislation that has the
blessing of 66 Senators and 220 House Members and every veterans
organizations that we know of and every single of the 29 attorneys
general who have written a letter. We have this breadth of support, but
it doesn't matter because it is not what the DOD wants to do.
So, yes, having independent, trained military prosecutors who make
decisions outside the chain of command that cannot be changed is
definitely a step in the right direction, but it is not the independent
review that we asked for because without convening authority, the
perception of servicemembers, of survivors, of the men and women this
justice system is designed to protect will be that all these rights and
privileges sit with the commander and that these are rights and
privileges that have value, that have ``meaningful prosecutorial
value.''
They are not meaningless, and if they were so meaningless, then you
would have given it to independent prosecutors.
That is why I will keep fighting on behalf of survivors. It is why we
do not just say we are excited, and we go home. It is why we have not
decided this is the moment to celebrate because, for us, it is not
because I worry that that percentage of sexual assaults, rapes, and
unwanted sexual contact--the 20,000 that are estimated every year--that
the percentage of those that will be willing to come forward will not
go up and the rate of cases will not go down and the rate of cases that
end in conviction will not go up.
So that is my concern. It is why I stand here gravely concerned and
very dismayed and very disappointed that we did not take this moment in
time to do the right thing on behalf of our servicemembers to have a
military justice system that is worthy of their sacrifice.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.