[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 199 (Tuesday, November 16, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8249-S8251]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4669. Mr. TOOMEY (for himself and Mr. Cardin) submitted an 
amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. 
Reed and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the 
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel 
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was 
ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end of title XII, add the following:

                       Subtitle H--Iran Sanctions

     SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Masih Alinejad 
     Harassment and Unlawful Targeting Act of 2021'' or the 
     ``Masih Alinejad HUNT Act''.

     SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that the Government of the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran surveils, harasses, terrorizes, tortures, abducts, 
     and murders individuals who peacefully defend human rights 
     and freedoms in Iran, and innocent entities and individuals 
     considered by the Government of Iran to be enemies of that 
     regime, including United States citizens on United States 
     soil, and takes foreign nationals hostage, including in the 
     following instances:
       (1) In 2021, Iranian intelligence agents were indicted for 
     plotting to kidnap United States citizen, women's rights 
     activist, and journalist Masih Alinejad, from her home in New 
     York City, in retaliation for exercising her rights under the 
     First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
     Iranian agents allegedly spent at least approximately half a 
     million dollars to capture the outspoken critic of the 
     authoritarianism of the Government of Iran, and studied 
     evacuating her by military-style speedboats to Venezuela 
     before rendition to Iran.
       (2) Prior to the New York kidnapping plot, Ms. Alinejad's 
     family in Iran was instructed by authorities to lure Ms. 
     Alinejad to Turkey. In an attempt to intimidate her into 
     silence, the Government of Iran arrested 3 of Ms. Alinejad's 
     family members in 2019, and sentenced her brother to 8 years 
     in prison for refusing to denounce her.
       (3) According to Federal prosecutors, the same Iranian 
     intelligence network that allegedly plotted to kidnap Ms. 
     Alinejad is also targeting critics of the Government of Iran 
     who live in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab 
     Emirates.
       (4) In 2021, an Iranian diplomat was convicted in Belgium 
     of attempting to carry out a 2018 bombing of a dissident 
     rally in France.
       (5) In 2021, a Danish high court found a Norwegian citizen 
     of Iranian descent guilty of illegal espionage and complicity 
     in a failed plot to kill an Iranian Arab dissident figure in 
     Denmark.
       (6) In 2021, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
     appealed to the United Nations to protect BBC Persian 
     employees in London who suffer regular harassment and threats 
     of kidnapping by Iranian government agents.
       (7) In 2021, 15 militants allegedly working on behalf of 
     the Government of Iran were arrested in Ethiopia for plotting 
     to attack citizens of Israel, the United States, and the 
     United Arab Emirates, according to United States officials.
       (8) In 2020, Iranian agents allegedly kidnapped United 
     States resident and Iranian-German journalist Jamshid 
     Sharmahd, while he was traveling to India through Dubai. 
     Iranian authorities announced they had seized Mr. Sharmahd in 
     ``a complex operation'', and paraded him blindfolded on state 
     television. Mr. Sharmahd is arbitrarily detained in Iran, 
     allegedly facing the death penalty. In 2009, Mr. Sharmahd was 
     the target of an alleged Iran-directed assassination plot in 
     Glendora, California.
       (9) In 2020, the Government of Turkey released 
     counterterrorism files exposing how Iranian authorities 
     allegedly collaborated with drug gangs to kidnap Habib Chabi, 
     an Iranian-Swedish activist for Iran's Arab minority. In 
     2020, the Government of Iran allegedly lured Mr. Chabi to 
     Istanbul through a female agent posing as a potential lover. 
     Mr. Chabi was then allegedly kidnapped from Istanbul, and 
     smuggled into Iran where he faces execution, following a sham 
     trial.
       (10) In 2020, a United States-Iranian citizen and an 
     Iranian resident of California pleaded guilty to charges of 
     acting as illegal agents of the Government of Iran by 
     surveilling Jewish student facilities, including the Hillel 
     Center and Rohr Chabad Center at the University of Chicago, 
     in addition to surveilling and collecting identifying 
     information about United States citizens and nationals who 
     are critical of the Iranian regime.
       (11) In 2019, 2 Iranian intelligence officers at the 
     Iranian consulate in Turkey allegedly orchestrated the 
     assassination of Iranian dissident journalist Masoud Molavi 
     Vardanjani, who was shot while walking with a friend in 
     Istanbul. Unbeknownst to Mr. Molavi, his ``friend'' was in 
     fact an undercover Iranian agent and the leader of the 
     killing squad, according to a Turkish police report.
       (12) In 2019, around 1,500 people were allegedly killed 
     amid a less than 2 week crackdown by security forces on anti-
     government protests across Iran, including at least an 
     alleged 23 children and 400 women.
       (13) In 2019, Iranian operatives allegedly lured Paris-
     based Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam to Iraq, where he was 
     abducted, and hanged in Iran for sedition.
       (14) In 2019, a Kurdistan regional court convicted an 
     Iranian female for trying to lure Voice of America reporter 
     Ali Javanmardi to a hotel room in Irbil, as part of a foiled 
     Iranian intelligence plot to kidnap and extradite Mr. 
     Javanmardi, a critic of the Government of Iran.
       (15) In 2019, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents 
     visited the rural Connecticut home of Iran-born United States 
     author and poet Roya Hakakian to warn her that she was the 
     target of an assassination plot orchestrated by the 
     Government of Iran.
       (16) In 2019, the Government of Denmark accused the 
     Government of Iran of directing the assassination of Iranian 
     Arab activist Ahmad Mola Nissi, in The Hague, and the 
     assassination of another opposition figure, Reza Kolahi 
     Samadi, who was murdered near Amsterdam in 2015.
       (17) In 2018, German security forces searched for 10 
     alleged spies who were working for Iran's al-Quds Force to 
     collect information on targets related to the local Jewish 
     community, including kindergartens.
       (18) In 2017, Germany convicted a Pakistani man for working 
     as an Iranian agent to spy on targets including a former 
     German lawmaker and a French-Israeli economics professor.
       (19) In 2012, an Iranian American pleaded guilty to 
     conspiring with members of the Iranian military to bomb a 
     popular Washington, D.C., restaurant with the aim of 
     assassinating the ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United 
     States.
       (20) In 1996, agents of the Government of Iran allegedly 
     assassinated 5 Iranian dissident exiles across Turkey, 
     Pakistan, and Baghdad, over a 5-month period that year.
       (21) In 1992, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the 
     United Kingdom expelled 2 Iranians employed at the Iranian 
     Embassy in London and a third Iranian on a

[[Page S8250]]

     student visa amid allegations they were plotting to kill 
     Indian-born British American novelist Salman Rushdie, 
     pursuant to the fatwa issued by then supreme leader of Iran, 
     Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
       (22) In 1992, 4 Iranian Kurdish dissidents were 
     assassinated at a restaurant in Berlin, Germany, allegedly by 
     Iranian agents.
       (23) In 1992, singer, actor, poet, and gay Iranian 
     dissident Fereydoun Farrokhzad was found dead with multiple 
     stab wounds in his apartment in Germany. His death is 
     allegedly the work of Iran-directed agents.
       (24) In 1980, Ali Akbar Tabatabaei, a leading critic of 
     Iran and then president of the Iran Freedom Foundation, was 
     murdered in front of his Bethesda, Maryland, home by an 
     assassin disguised as a postal courier. The Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation had identified the ``mailman'' as Dawud 
     Salahuddin, born David Theodore Belfield. Mr. Salahuddin was 
     working as a security guard at an Iranian interest office in 
     Washington, D.C., when he claims he accepted the assignment 
     and payment of $5,000 from the Government of Iran to kill Mr. 
     Tabatabaei.
       (25) Other exiled Iranian dissidents alleged to have been 
     victims of the Government of Iran's murderous 
     extraterritorial campaign include Shahriar Shafiq, Shapour 
     Bakhtiar, and Gholam Ali Oveissi.
       (26) Iranian Americans face an ongoing campaign of 
     intimidation both in the virtual and physical world by agents 
     and affiliates of the Government of Iran, which aims to 
     stifle freedom of expression and eliminate the threat Iranian 
     authorities believe democracy, justice, and gender equality 
     pose to their rule.

     SEC. 1293. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'', 
     ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those 
     terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
     (8 U.S.C. 1101).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Correspondent account; payable-through account.--The 
     terms ``correspondent account'' and ``payable-through 
     account'' have the meanings given those terms in section 
     5318A of title 31, United States Code.
       (4) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign 
     financial institution'' has the meaning of that term as 
     determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to 
     section 104(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513(i)).
       (5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means any 
     individual or entity that is not a United States person.
       (6) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

     SEC. 1294. REPORT AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN 
                   ABUSES TOWARD DISSIDENTS ON BEHALF OF THE 
                   GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

       (a) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director 
     of National Intelligence, and the Attorney General, shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     that--
       (A) includes a detailed description and assessment of--
       (i) the state of human rights and the rule of law inside 
     Iran, including the rights and well-being of women, religious 
     and ethnic minorities, and the LGBTQ community in Iran;
       (ii) actions taken by the Government of Iran during the 
     year preceding submission of the report to target and silence 
     dissidents both inside and outside of Iran who advocate for 
     human rights inside Iran;
       (iii) the methods used by the Government of Iran to target 
     and silence dissidents both inside and outside of Iran; and
       (iv) the means through which the Government of Iran 
     finances efforts to target and silence dissidents both inside 
     and outside of Iran;
       (B) identifies foreign persons working as part of the 
     Government of Iran or acting on behalf of that Government 
     (including members of paramilitary organizations such as 
     Ansar-e-Hezbollah and Basij-e Mostaz'afin), that the 
     Secretary of State determines, based on credible evidence, 
     are knowingly responsible for, complicit in or involved in 
     ordering, conspiring, planning or implementing the 
     surveillance, harassment, kidnapping, illegal extradition, 
     imprisonment, torture, killing, or assassination of citizens 
     of Iran (including citizens of Iran of dual nationality) and 
     citizens of the United States both inside and outside Iran 
     who seek--
       (i) to expose illegal or corrupt activity carried out by 
     officials of the Government of Iran;
       (ii) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote 
     internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as 
     the freedoms of religion, expression, association, and 
     assembly, and the rights to a fair trial and democratic 
     elections, in Iran; or
       (iii) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote the rights 
     and well-being of women, religious and ethnic minorities, and 
     the LGBTQ community in Iran; and
       (C) includes, for each foreign person identified 
     subparagraph (B), a clear explanation for why the foreign 
     person was so identified.
       (2) Updates of report.--The report required by paragraph 
     (1) shall be updated, and the updated version submitted to 
     the appropriate congressional committees, during the 10-year 
     period following the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (A) not less frequently than annually; and
       (B) with respect to matters relating to the identification 
     of foreign persons under paragraph (1)(B), on an ongoing 
     basis as new information becomes available.
       (3) Form of report.--
       (A) In general.--Each report required by paragraph (1) and 
     each update required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in 
     unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
       (B) Public availability.--The Secretary of State shall post 
     the unclassified portion of each report required by paragraph 
     (1) and each update required by paragraph (2) on a publicly 
     available internet website of the Department of State.
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--In the case of a foreign 
     person identified under paragraph (1)(B) of subsection (a) in 
     the most recent report or update submitted under that 
     subsection, the President shall--
       (1) if the foreign person meets the criteria for the 
     imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) of section 1263 
     of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
     (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 
     2656 note), impose sanctions under subsection (b) of that 
     section; and
       (2) if the foreign person does not meet such criteria, 
     impose the sanctions described in subsection (c).
       (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed under 
     this subsection with respect to a foreign person are the 
     following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
     powers granted to the President by the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the 
     extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in 
     all property and interests in property of the person if such 
     property and interests in property are in the United States, 
     come within the United States, or are or come within the 
     possession or control of a United States person.
       (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
       (A) In general.--
       (i) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in 
     subsection (a)(1)(B) is--

       (I) inadmissible to the United States;
       (II) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to 
     enter the United States; and
       (III) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into 
     the United States or to receive any other benefit under the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

       (ii) Current visas revoked.--

       (I) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of 
     an alien described in subsection (a)(1)(B) shall be revoked, 
     regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is 
     or was issued.
       (II) Immediate effect.--A revocation under subclause (I) 
     shall--

       (aa) take effect immediately; and
       (bb) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry 
     documentation that is in the alien's possession.
       (d) Termination of Sanctions.--The President may terminate 
     the application of sanctions under this section with respect 
     to a person if the President determines and reports to the 
     appropriate congressional committees, not later than 15 days 
     before the termination of the sanctions that--
       (1) credible information exists that the person did not 
     engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
       (2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the 
     activity for which sanctions were imposed; or
       (3) the person has--
       (A) credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior;
       (B) has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity 
     for which sanctions were imposed; and
       (C) has credibly committed to not engage in an activity 
     described in subsection (a) in the future.

     SEC. 1295. REPORT AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CONDUCTING 
                   SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS 
                   RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN ABUSES TOWARD 
                   DISSIDENTS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

       (a) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not earlier than 30 days and not later 
     than 60 days after the Secretary of State submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report required by 
     section 1294(a), the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies 
     any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts a 
     significant transaction with a foreign person identified in 
     the report submitted under section 1294(a).

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       (2) Form of report.--
       (A) In general.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (B) Public availability.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall post the unclassified portion of each report required 
     by paragraph (1) on a publicly available internet website of 
     the Department of the Treasury.
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
     may prohibit the opening, or prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution identified under subsection 
     (a)(1).

     SEC. 1296. EXCEPTIONS; WAIVERS; IMPLEMENTATION.

       (a) Exceptions.--
       (1) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and 
     national security activities.--Sanctions under sections 1294 
     and 1295 shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law 
     enforcement, or national security activities of the United 
     States.
       (2) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Sanctions under section 1294(c)(2) shall not 
     apply with respect to the admission of an alien to the United 
     States if the admission of the alien is necessary to permit 
     the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States, the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other 
     applicable international obligations.
       (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
       (A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this subtitle, the authorities and requirements to impose 
     sanctions authorized under this subtitle shall not include 
     the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the 
     importation of goods.
       (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' 
     means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, 
     supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test 
     equipment, and excluding technical data.
       (b) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
     application of sanctions under section 1294 with respect to a 
     person if the President--
       (1) determines that the waiver is in the national security 
     interests of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report on the waiver and the reasons for the waiver.
       (c) Implementation; Penalties.--
       (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 
     205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this subtitle.
       (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     section 1294(b)(1) or 1295(b) or any regulation, license, or 
     order issued to carry out either such section shall be 
     subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) 
     of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that 
     commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that 
     section.
                                 ______