[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 198 (Monday, November 15, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Page S8162]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 4641. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1253. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INDO-PACIFIC REGION.
It shall be the policy of the United States to--
(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States
foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United
States political and military objectives in the region;
(2) exercise freedom of operations in the international
waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains,
which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security
of the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific
region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated
missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires,
undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient
basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-
positioning strategies;
(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of
the United States to build capacity and capabilities,
increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications
architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges,
and increase joint exercises and security cooperation
efforts;
(5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United
States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region,
including longstanding United States policy regarding--
(A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, signed at
Washington January 19, 1960;
(B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington
October 1, 1953;
(C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at
Washington August 30, 1951, including that, as the South
China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on
Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South
China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under
Article IV of our mutual defense treaty;
(D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States
Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951; and
(E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at
Manila September 8, 1954, together with the Thanat-Rusk
Communique of 1962;
(6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the
Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and
defense cooperation with other regional partners;
(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United
States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as
appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in
order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in
international waters and airspace in accordance with
established principles and practices of international law;
(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' provided by
the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations
for United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the
fullest extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly
relations of the United States and Taiwan, including
cooperation to support the development of capable, ready, and
modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;
(9) enhance security partnerships with India, across
Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;
(10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the People's
Republic of China against United States and allies'
interests, especially along the First Island Chain and in the
Western Pacific, by showing People's Republic of China
leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny
them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by--
(A) consistently demonstrating the political will of the
United States to deepening existing treaty alliances and
growing new partnerships as a durable, asymmetric, and
unmatched strategic advantage to the People's Republic of
China's growing military capabilities and reach;
(B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases in the
Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of United States
resolve and commitment to the region, and as platforms to
ensure United States operational readiness and advance
interoperability with allies and partners;
(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture throughout the
region, particularly the Western Pacific, and pursuing
maximum access for United States mobile and relocatable
launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic
weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks to
United States and allied forces, including ground-launched
cruise missiles, under sea and naval capabilities, and
integrated air and missile defense in the First Island Chain
and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter and prevent
People's Republic of China coercion and aggression, and to
maximize the United States ability to operate;
(E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure that
escalation against key United States interests would be
costly, risky, and self defeating; and
(F) collaborating with allies and partners to accelerate
their roles in more equitably sharing the burdens of mutual
defense, including through the acquisition and fielding of
advanced capabilities and training that will better enable
them to repel People's Republic of China aggression or
coercion; and
(11) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose
prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational,
and military costs on the People's Republic of China for acts
of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself and its
allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against
them.
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