[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 194 (Thursday, November 4, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7988-S7989]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4492. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to 
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to 
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1253. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

       It shall be the policy of the United States to--
       (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States 
     foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United 
     States political and military objectives in the region;
       (2) exercise freedom of operations in the international 
     waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, 
     which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security 
     of the Indo-Pacific region;
       (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific 
     region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated 
     missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, 
     undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient 
     basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-
     positioning strategies;
       (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of 
     the United States to build capacity and capabilities, 
     increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications 
     architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, 
     and increase joint exercises and security cooperation 
     efforts;

[[Page S7989]]

       (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United 
     States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, 
     including longstanding United States policy regarding--
       (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
     Security between the United States and Japan, signed at 
     Washington January 19, 1960;
       (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
     United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington 
     October 1, 1953;
       (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
     United States and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at 
     Washington August 30, 1951, including that, as the South 
     China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on 
     Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South 
     China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under 
     Article IV of our mutual defense treaty;
       (D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States 
     Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951; and
       (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at 
     Manila September 8, 1954, together with the Thanat-Rusk 
     Communique of 1962;
       (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the 
     Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and 
     defense cooperation with other regional partners;
       (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United 
     States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as 
     appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in 
     order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in 
     international waters and airspace in accordance with 
     established principles and practices of international law;
       (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 
     U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' provided by 
     the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations 
     for United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the 
     fullest extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly 
     relations of the United States and Taiwan, including 
     cooperation to support the development of capable, ready, and 
     modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;
       (9) enhance security partnerships with India, across 
     Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;
       (10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the People's 
     Republic of China against United States and allies' 
     interests, especially along the First Island Chain and in the 
     Western Pacific, by showing People's Republic of China 
     leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny 
     them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by--
       (A) consistently demonstrating the political will of the 
     United States to deepening existing treaty alliances and 
     growing new partnerships as a durable, asymmetric, and 
     unmatched strategic advantage to the People's Republic of 
     China's growing military capabilities and reach;
       (B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases in the 
     Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of United States 
     resolve and commitment to the region, and as platforms to 
     ensure United States operational readiness and advance 
     interoperability with allies and partners;
       (C) adopting a more dispersed force posture throughout the 
     region, particularly the Western Pacific, and pursuing 
     maximum access for United States mobile and relocatable 
     launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic 
     weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
       (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks to 
     United States and allied forces, including ground-launched 
     cruise missiles, under sea and naval capabilities, and 
     integrated air and missile defense in the First Island Chain 
     and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter and prevent 
     People's Republic of China coercion and aggression, and to 
     maximize the United States ability to operate;
       (E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure that 
     escalation against key United States interests would be 
     costly, risky, and self defeating; and
       (F) collaborating with allies and partners to accelerate 
     their roles in more equitably sharing the burdens of mutual 
     defense, including through the acquisition and fielding of 
     advanced capabilities and training that will better enable 
     them to repel People's Republic of China aggression or 
     coercion; and
       (11) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose 
     prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, 
     and military costs on the People's Republic of China for acts 
     of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself and its 
     allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against 
     them.
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