[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 194 (Thursday, November 4, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7987-S7988]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4490. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to 
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to 
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1253. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING 
                   CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.

       (a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
     through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to 
     counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party 
     globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization 
     are authorized to remain available until expended and shall 
     be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be 
     appropriated to counter such influence.
       (b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the 
     malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally 
     shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent 
     with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
       (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
     existing senior official of the Department at the rank of 
     Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, 
     coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds 
     authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
       (2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
       (A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific 
     strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of 
     focus or functional categories of programming that funds are 
     to be concentrated within, consistent with the national 
     interests of the United States and the purposes of this 
     division;
       (B) the coordination and approval of all programming 
     conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
     subsection (a), based on a determination that such 
     programming directly counters the malign influence of the 
     Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or 
     policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to 
     the strategic objectives of the United States, as established 
     in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National 
     Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional 
     strategies as appropriate;
       (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a 
     sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese 
     Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to 
     the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and

[[Page S7988]]

       (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the 
     effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure 
     that it advances United States interests and degrades the 
     ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities 
     that align with subsection (d) of this section.
       (3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official 
     designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating 
     and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek 
     to--
       (A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and
       (B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all 
     approved programming functions in concert with other Federal 
     activities to counter the malign influence and activities of 
     the Chinese Communist Party.
       (4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United 
     States Agency for International Development shall designate a 
     senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or 
     above to assist and consult with the senior official 
     designated pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign 
     influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party 
     should be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese 
     Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that--
       (1) undermine a free and open international order;
       (2) advance an alternative, repressive international order 
     that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic 
     ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;
       (3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the 
     United States or other countries; or
       (4) undermine the economic security of the United States or 
     other countries, including by promoting corruption.
       (e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section, 
     countering malign influence through the use of funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include 
     efforts to--
       (1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce 
     corruption, including in governance structures targeted by 
     the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;
       (2) support civil society and independent media to raise 
     awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative 
     impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative 
     and associated initiatives;
       (3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, 
     or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese 
     Communist Party;
       (4) encourage economic development structures that help 
     protect against predatory lending schemes, including support 
     for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such 
     as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
       (5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the 
     security forces of the People's Republic of China;
       (6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese 
     Communist Party's propaganda, including through programs 
     carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and
       (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to 
     legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance 
     models.
                                 ______