[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 194 (Thursday, November 4, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7888-S7889]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4366. Mr. RUBIO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to 
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to 
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end of title XII, add the following:

                Subtitle H--Countering Chinese Influence

     SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering the Chinese 
     Government and Communist Party's Political Influence 
     Operations Act''.

     SEC. 1292. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
     of the Senate;
       (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
       (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
     the Senate;
       (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (I) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (J) the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (M) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (N) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Political influence operations.--The term ``political 
     influence operations'' means the coordinated and often 
     concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation, 
     economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or 
     academic censorship, which are often intended--
       (A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, values, 
     institutions, or individuals; and
       (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes 
     in the United States that support the interests of the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese 
     Communist Party.

     SEC. 1293. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and 
     culture and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     and the Chinese Communist Party in official statements, media 
     messaging, and policy;
       (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally 
     accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications 
     campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic 
     institutions or freedoms;
       (3) to protect United States citizens and legal residents 
     from malign or coercive political influence operations;
       (4) to enhance cooperation and coordination with the United 
     Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, 
     Singapore, and the members of the European Union, whose 
     governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from 
     the political influence operations of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, 
     and with other allies throughout the world;
       (5) to create strategies to ensure that countries in 
     Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere 
     are aware of the People's Republic of China's ``sharp power'' 
     tactics, including the Chinese Communist Party's party-to-
     party training program, which is designed to instill 
     admiration and emulation of Beijing's governance model and 
     weaken democracy in these regions, and provide needed 
     capacity to counter them effectively;
       (6) to implement more advanced transparency requirements 
     concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media 
     agencies, universities, think tanks, and government 
     officials;
       (7) to use various forums to raise awareness about--
       (A) the goals and methods of the political influence 
     operations of the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
       (B) common patterns and approaches used by Chinese 
     intelligence agencies or related actors;
       (8) to require greater transparency for Confucius 
     Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and 
     nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese 
     Communist Party, or by individuals or public or private 
     organizations with a demonstrable affiliation with the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese 
     Communist Party that are operating in the United States to 
     register through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 
     (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mechanism;
       (9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency 
     among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding 
     linked to the Government of the People's Republic of China;
       (10) to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently 
     screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and
       (11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the 
     goals of--
       (A) screening investments from the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China or sources backed by such 
     government to protect against the takeover of United States 
     companies by Chinese state-owned or state-driven entities; 
     and
       (B) protecting institutions or business sectors critically 
     important to United States national security and the 
     viability of democratic institutions.

     SEC. 1294. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ``SHARP POWER'' POLITICAL 
                   INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PROTECT UNITED 
                   STATES CITIZENS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security, in coordination with all relevant 
     Federal agencies, shall develop a long-term strategy--
       (1) to carry out the policy set forth in section 1293(c);
       (2) to effectively counter the ``sharp power'' political 
     influence operations of the Chinese Communist Party globally 
     and in the United States;
       (3) to ensure that United States citizens, particularly 
     Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese, Uyghur, 
     Mongolian, Korean, Taiwanese, and Tibetan diaspora who are 
     often the victims and primary targets of malign political 
     influence operations, are protected;
       (4) to ensure that--
       (A) the United States Government strategy to protect the 
     communities described in paragraph (3) is clearly 
     communicated by relevant Federal officials; and
       (B) secure outlets are created for reporting on 
     intimidation and surveillance;
       (5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are legally 
     studying, living, or working temporarily in the United States 
     know that intimidation or surveillance by the Government of 
     the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist 
     Party is an unacceptable invasion of their rights while they 
     reside in the United States;
       (6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on intimidation 
     and surveillance; and
       (7) to identify new tools or authorities necessary to 
     implement this strategy.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
     of State or an appropriate high-ranking official shall--
       (1) submit an unclassified report, which may include a 
     classified annex, containing the strategy required under 
     subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees; 
     or
       (2) describe the strategy required under subsection (a) 
     through unclassified testimony before the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 1295. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS OF 
                   THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE 
                   COMMUNIST PARTY.

       (a) In General.--Because it is important for United States 
     policymakers and the American people to be informed about the 
     influence operations described in section 1293, not later 
     than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, and 
     in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal 
     departments and agencies, shall submit an unclassified 
     report,

[[Page S7889]]

     which may include a classified annex, to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that describes the political 
     influence operations of the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party affecting 
     the United States and select allies and partners, including 
     the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, 
     and Japan, including efforts--
       (1) to exert influence over United States governmental or 
     nongovernmental institutions or individuals, or government 
     officials among United States allies and partners;
       (2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal 
     permanent residents or their families and associates living 
     in China or elsewhere;
       (3) to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms 
     of speech, expression, the press, association, assembly, 
     religion, or academic thought;
       (4) to otherwise suppress information in public fora, in 
     the United States and abroad; or
       (5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, 
     infrastructure, business entities, or other assets for use in 
     facilitating the activities described in paragraphs (1) 
     through (4).
       (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include recommendations for the President and Congress 
     relating to--
       (1) the need for additional resources or authorities to 
     counter political influence operations in the United States 
     directed by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     and the Chinese Communist Party, including operations carried 
     out in concert with allies;
       (2) whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to 
     political influence operations of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party 
     should be established within the Department of State or 
     within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 
     and
       (3) whether regular public reports on the political 
     influence operations of the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party are needed 
     to inform Congress and the American people of the scale and 
     scope of such operations.
                                 ______