[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 192 (Tuesday, November 2, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7638-S7639]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4171. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to 
amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. Reed and intended to be proposed to 
the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1548. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-BASED 
                   STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM AND W87-1 WARHEAD 
                   MODIFICATION PROGRAM.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
     projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States 
     nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017 
     dollars over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to 
     operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear 
     forces and about $400 billion to modernize them''. With 
     inflation, the cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not 
     include the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities 
     proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
       (2) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles is possible for multiple 
     decades and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, 
     through 2036, this would cost $37,000,000,000 less in 2017 
     dollars than developing and deploying the ground-based 
     strategic deterrent program.
       (3) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28, 
     2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American 
     Scientists found that only 26 percent of registered voters in 
     the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missile with the ground-based 
     strategic deterrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered 
     voters who opposed replacing the Minuteman III missile.
       (b) Limitation on Use of Funds.--None of the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
     fiscal year 2022 may be obligated or expended for the ground-
     based strategic deterrent program or the W87-1 warhead 
     modification program until the later of--
       (1) the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a certification that 
     the operational life of Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles cannot be safely extended through at least 
     2050; and
       (2) the date on which the Secretary transmits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the report required by 
     paragraph (3) of subsection (c), as required by paragraph (4) 
     of that subsection.
       (c) Independent Study on Extension of Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.--
       (1) Independent study.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall seek to enter into a contract with the National Academy 
     of Sciences to conduct a study on extending the life of 
     Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to 2050.
       (2) Matters included.--The study under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
       (i) extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles; and
       (ii) deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent 
     program.
       (B) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 
     technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missile program as part of a service life extension 
     program that could also be incorporated in the future ground-
     based strategic deterrent program, including, at a minimum, 
     opportunities to increase the resilience against adversary 
     missile defenses.
       (C) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating 
     sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies 
     to reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the 
     service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through 
     2050.
       (D) An analysis and validation of the methods used to 
     estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and 
     Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch 
     experience of motors retired after the operational service 
     life of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.
       (E) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative 
     methods of estimating the operational service life of 
     Minuteman III motors, such as those methods based on 
     fundamental physical and chemical processes and 
     nondestructive measurements of individual motor properties.
       (F) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 
     configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic 
     missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.
       (G) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service 
     life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing 
     the deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery 
     vehicle force from 400 to 300.
       (H) An assessment on the degree to which the Columbia class 
     ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will 
     enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile 
     submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine 
     warfare threats.
       (I) An analysis of the degree to which an extension of the 
     Minuteman III would impact the decision of Russian Federation 
     to target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 
     States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding with the 
     ground-based strategic deterrent.
       (J) A best case estimate of what percentage of the 
     strategic forces of the United States would survive a 
     counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down 
     by intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile 
     submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
       (K) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78 
     warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new ground-based 
     strategic deterrent missile as compared to proceeding with 
     the W-87 life extension.
       (L) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional 
     launchers or uploading submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
     with additional warheads to compensate for a reduced 
     deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 
     United States.
       (M) An analysis of whether designing and fielding a new 
     intercontinental ballistic missile through at least 2070 is 
     consistent with the obligation of the United States under 
     Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
     (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty'') to ``pursue

[[Page S7639]]

     negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
     cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
     nuclear disarmament''.
       (3) Submission to department of defense.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     National Academy of Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a 
     report containing the findings of the study conducted under 
     paragraph (1).
       (4) Submission to congress.--Not later than 210 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
     report required by paragraph (3), without change.
       (5) Form.--The report required by paragraph (3) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives.
                                 ______