[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 183 (Tuesday, October 19, 2021)]
[House]
[Pages H5654-H5656]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      SECURE EQUIPMENT ACT OF 2021

  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 3919) to ensure that the Federal Communications Commission 
does not approve radio frequency devices that pose a national security 
risk, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3919

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Secure Equipment Act of 
     2021''.

     SEC. 2. UPDATES TO EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION PROCESS OF FEDERAL 
                   COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION.

       (a) Rulemaking.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall adopt rules 
     in the proceeding initiated in the Notice of Proposed 
     Rulemaking in the matter of Protecting Against National 
     Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through 
     the Equipment Authorization Program (ET Docket No. 21-232; 
     FCC 21-73; adopted June 17, 2021), in accordance with 
     paragraph (2), to update the equipment authorization 
     procedures of the Commission.
       (2) Updates required.--In the rules adopted under paragraph 
     (1), the Commission shall clarify that the Commission will no 
     longer review or approve any application for equipment 
     authorization for equipment that is on the list of covered 
     communications equipment or services published by the 
     Commission under section 2(a) of the Secure and Trusted 
     Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(a)).
       (3) Applicability.--
       (A) In general.--In the rules adopted under paragraph (1), 
     the Commission may not provide for review or revocation of 
     any equipment authorization granted before the date on which 
     such rules are adopted on the basis of the equipment being on 
     the list described in paragraph (2).
       (B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section may be 
     construed to prohibit the Commission, other than in the rules 
     adopted under paragraph (1), from--
       (i) examining the necessity of review or revocation of any 
     equipment authorization on the basis of the equipment being 
     on the list described in paragraph (2); or

[[Page H5655]]

       (ii) adopting rules providing for any such review or 
     revocation.
       (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Commission'' 
     means the Federal Communications Commission.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Pallone) and the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Scalise) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.

                              {time}  1645


                             General Leave

  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on H.R. 3919.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New Jersey?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment 
Act of 2021.
  Two years ago, we came together on a bipartisan basis to enact the 
Secure and Trusted Communications Act, legislation that I proudly 
authored. That bill was an important first step toward securing 
commercial communications networks in the United States from untrusted 
foreign adversaries. Among other things, it prohibits certain funds 
provided by the Federal Communications Commission from being used to 
purchase or obtain network equipment and services from certain 
untrusted vendors.
  While that legislation established an important foundation and has 
made great strides in helping secure our communications networks, we 
have the opportunity today to take the next step by applying those same 
principles to the FCC's equipment authorization process. We know our 
adversaries will use any and all potential avenues to weaken our 
networks, and therefore, we must remain vigilant and prevent it before 
they can do so.
  H.R. 3919 simply requires the FCC to update its equipment 
authorization rules so that, going forward, the agency will no longer 
review or approve any application for equipment from vendors that have 
been determined to be a threat to our national security.
  Importantly, while this bill focuses only on the applications that 
the agency is in the process of reviewing or will receive in the 
future, it does not prevent the FCC from later studying whether it 
should review equipment previously authorized but which is now known to 
pose a threat.
  Over the past several years, the Energy and Commerce Committee has 
worked, on a bipartisan basis, on important security issues, and I 
commend Representatives Eshoo and Scalise for continuing in that 
tradition through their leadership and bipartisan work on this 
legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Secure Equipment 
Act of 2021, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCALISE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Pallone and Ranking Member 
Rodgers of the full committee, as well as Ranking Member Latta and 
Chairman Doyle of the Communications and Technology Subcommittee, for 
helping bring my bill, H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act, to the 
House floor.
  Madam Speaker, I also want to especially thank Congresswoman Eshoo 
for partnering with me on this bill. We have worked on a number of 
telecommunications laws, and this is yet another example of 
Congresswoman Eshoo and I coming together, and our staffs, to address a 
very important threat to American families.
  Madam Speaker, my bill is about one thing, and that is stopping the 
Chinese Communist Party and Chinese companies that act on their behalf 
from compromising our telecommunications networks and stopping them 
from jeopardizing American national security and the important data 
that all Americans hold sacred.
  H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act, puts a full stop to China 
infiltrating our networks by prohibiting the FCC from issuing equipment 
licenses to Chinese telecommunications equipment companies that are 
identified as national security threats.
  This legislation builds off the important work of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee when it came together in a bipartisan manner in 
2019, as Chairman Pallone mentioned, on his critical legislation that 
will address the threat of China by getting the Secure and Trusted 
Communications Networks Act signed into law.
  One of the requirements of that act instructed the FCC to publish a 
list of telecommunication equipment companies deemed to be national 
security threats. In fact, earlier this year, the FCC published that 
list of companies. As you can see, five companies ended up on that 
list. All of these companies are Chinese companies that are either 
partly or wholly owned by the Chinese Government and that have ties to 
the CCP.
  Madam Speaker, we know all too well that the CCP wastes no time and 
no opportunity to expose American vulnerabilities and to try to 
undermine our national security. There are way too many examples of 
that.
  Since all Chinese companies are subject to Chinese national security 
laws, at any point the CCP could choose to exploit these listed 
companies and require them to tap into their access in American 
networks to gain critical, sensitive data, both from individuals as 
well as sensitive government information.
  While the 2019 law made great strides in thwarting the threat of 
China in our networks, U.S. carriers can still privately purchase 
equipment from these listed companies on the open market.
  By prohibiting the FCC from issuing any equipment licenses to these 
companies that are listed as national security threats, our bill seeks 
to close the gap in existing law and slam the door on jeopardized 
Chinese equipment from threatening our American networks and from 
threatening the privacy and data of American families.
  Madam Speaker, the time has never been more urgent. It is important 
that this body do all it can to stop the undue and malign influences of 
the CCP from infiltrating our data and our telecommunications network.
  Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this bill, and 
I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCALISE. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Latta), the ranking member of the Communications and 
Technology Subcommittee.
  Mr. LATTA. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, my 
good friend, the whip of the Republican Party here in the House, for 
yielding.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3919, the Secure 
Equipment Act of 2021, which was introduced by Representatives Scalise 
and Eshoo.
  This bill takes an important step to strengthen the security of our 
communications network from bad actors like Huawei. The Communist 
Chinese Party and its allies have been working for years to find ways 
to access American networks and enter our markets. Our national 
security agencies agree that Huawei and other untrusted vendors pose an 
unacceptable risk to our national security. Today, we are sending 
another strong signal that America will hold China accountable.
  Last Congress, we passed the Secure and Trusted Communications Act 
into law, which took a great first step to secure our networks by 
prohibiting Federal funds to be used to purchase untrusted equipment 
and services, still allowing untrusted vendors to enter our market if 
purchased by private dollars.
  H.R. 3919 would strengthen our national security and close this 
loophole by prohibiting the FCC from licensing any communication 
equipment by an entity on the Commission's covered list, regardless of 
whether it was bought using public dollars.
  It is critical that we work to stay one step ahead of our 
adversaries, and this bill would advance our security as 5G is deployed 
across the country.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCALISE. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from

[[Page H5656]]

Indiana (Mr. Pence), my friend and also a member of the committee.
  Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for 
yielding.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in staunch support of the bipartisan 
Secure Equipment Act of 2021.
  Hoosiers back home in my home State of Indiana rely heavily on 
telecom companies to connect them with the critical services they need, 
particularly healthcare through telehealth. When foreign adversaries, 
like Communist China, try to prey upon these companies, they are in 
turn attempting to prey upon hardworking Americans like my 
constituents. That is why I am proud today to join my colleagues in 
supporting this vital legislation that would ensure the Federal 
Government prevents any further Chinese state-backed equipment from 
being used here in the United States.
  This bill is vital to our national security, and I urge my colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle to support it.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, does the whip have any additional 
speakers?
  Mr. SCALISE. Madam Speaker, the gentleman does not, and I am prepared 
to close.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCALISE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I would just again join, along with my colleague, Anna 
Eshoo from California, in urging all Members of the House to pass the 
Secure Equipment Act and protect the privacy of data from Americans as 
well as that sensitive information that flows across networks that is 
also held by the government.
  Let's delist and not certify companies that have already been deemed 
by the FCC to be national security threats. I urge all of my colleagues 
to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I would urge, again, bipartisan support. 
This is an important next step in our effort to try to secure our 
equipment and prevent foreign actors, such as the Chinese, from 
interfering with our national security, and I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3919, the 
Secure Equipment Act of 2021, as amended.
  For over a decade, I have raised concerns about how the 
vulnerabilities in our telecommunications infrastructure directly 
impact our national security. On November 2, 2010, I wrote to the 
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) expressing 
grave concerns about Huawei and ZTE, which have opaque relationships 
with the Chinese government.
  Sadly, in the intervening eleven years, telecommunications companies 
have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in equipment made by 
Huawei and ZTE because the equipment is the cheapest available.
  On March 12, 2020, Congress passed and the President signed into law 
the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (STCNA), 
which directed the FCC to: (i) establish a list of companies deemed to 
be a national security threat; (ii) prohibit the use of federal funds 
for purchasing equipment made by those companies; and (iii) authorize 
funding for U.S. carriers to rip and replace equipment made by those 
companies. The FCC's list includes Huawei, ZTE, and other companies 
linked to the Chinese government.
  STCNA was a significant step forward for our national security. 
However, U.S. companies can still privately purchase equipment from 
these companies. This allows potentially vulnerable equipment into our 
wireless systems which is a threat to our national security because 
compromised equipment can include hard-to-detect surveillance 
capabilities.
  On June 15, 2021, Representative Steve Scalise and I introduced H.R. 
3919 to prohibit the FCC from approving any telecommunications 
equipment made by companies deemed to be a national security threat. 
Senators Marco Rubio and Ed Markey have companion legislation in the 
Senate. The legislation is supported by the FCC's Democratic Acting 
Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel and Republican Commissioner Brendan 
Carr.
  The bill was considered and favorably advanced by voice vote, first 
by the House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and then by 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The companion bill was favorably 
advanced by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.
  As I stated when STCNA was being considered by our chamber, no one 
bill can fully protect our telecommunications networks. The threats we 
face are constantly evolving, and Congress must remain diligent in 
ensuring our communications are secure, private, and reliable.
  H.R. 3919 is a highly important and necessary complement to STCNA and 
I urge my colleagues to vote for it.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3919, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. GOOD of Virginia. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution 
8, the yeas and nays are ordered.
  Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion 
are postponed.

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