[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 128 (Wednesday, July 21, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5010-S5011]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              NSCAI REPORT

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may place 
into the Record a portion of the final report by the National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence,

[[Page S5011]]

NSCAI. This landmark report and its important recommendations are the 
result of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2019, which established the NSCAI as an independent 
commission ``to consider the methods and means necessary to advance the 
development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
associated technologies to comprehensively address the national 
security and defense needs of the United States.''
  In March 2021, the Commission submitted its final report to Congress 
and the President, in part, warning of the dangers of the Chinese 
Government obtaining the personal genetic information of U.S. citizens 
and the importance of ensuring U.S. leadership in biotechnology. As we 
complete our work on the United States Innovation and Competition Act 
that will enable us to maintain our technological edge over China, it 
is imperative that we acknowledge the findings of this Commission 
regarding the critical importance of securing our biodata from China 
and its agents. To that end, allow me to cite warnings and 
recommendations directly from this Commission. I hope our State 
Department leadership, including Secretary Blinken, take these into 
serious consideration and put them into action.
  On Page 53, the report finds: ``[China understands the tremendous 
upside associated with leading the bio revolution. Massive genomic data 
sets at places like BGI Group (formerly known as the Beijing Genomics 
Institute), coupled with China's now-global genetic data collection 
platform and ``all-of-nation'' approach to AI, will make them a 
formidable competitor in the bio realm. BGI may be serving, wittingly 
or unwittingly, as a global collection mechanism for Chinese government 
genetic databases, providing China with greater raw numbers and 
diversity of human genome samples, as well as access to sensitive 
personal information about key individuals around the world. The United 
States cannot afford to look back in 10 years and be ``surprised'' by 
the biotechnology equivalent of Huawei.]''
  Later, on Page 586, the report finds: ``[BGI has also benefited from 
substantial support from the Chinese government, as well as its 2013 
acquisition of a competing U.S. firm, Complete Genomics. There are 
indications that BGI's links with the Chinese government may run deeper 
than it publicly claims, as it built and operates China National 
GeneBank, the Chinese government's national genetic database, and has 
used PLA-owned supercomputers to process genetic information. Chinese 
diplomats have pushed BGI-built COVID-19 testing kits, including in the 
United States, and by August 2020 BGI had ``sold 35 million rapid 
COVID-19 testing kits to 180 countries, and built 58 labs in 18 
countries.'' The highest levels of the United States government should 
publicly state these concerns so as to raise awareness among the U.S. 
commercial and academic biotechnology communities, as well as U.S. 
allies, many of which currently have partnerships or business dealings 
with BGI.]''
  The Commission then recommends on Page 587 that the State Department 
design a specific initiative to warn America and its allies about BGI. 
``[Launch a strategic communications campaign to publicly highlight the 
links between the Chinese government and BGI. The Secretary of State 
should personally voice concern about BGI's ties to the Chinese 
government and instruct the Department to conduct a strategic 
communications campaign to highlight those links and warn of the 
dangers of the Chinese government obtaining personal genetic 
information via BGI. The Department should also warn BGI and the 
Chinese government that it will closely monitor BGI's activities, and 
that should BGI be utilized as a mass DNA-collection apparatus for the 
Chinese government, it could face additional U.S. regulatory action.]''
  It is important to note that two subsidiaries of BGI were placed on 
the entity list by the Commerce Department last year for their role in 
aiding the genocide being perpetrated by the Chinese Government against 
the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, an issue that I and many of my Senate 
colleagues have been vocal on.
  In closing, I think it is important that this report be part of our 
Record today.

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