[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 114 (Wednesday, June 30, 2021)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E719-E720]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTRODUCING THE INVESTING IN COMMONSENSE BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBM) ACT
OF 2021
______
HON. JOHN GARAMENDI
of california
in the house of representatives
Wednesday, June 30, 2021
Mr. GARAMENDI. Madam Speaker, the Investing in Commonsense Ballistic
Missiles (ICBM) Act of 2021 bill will pause the development of the
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile program, the planned replacement to the current Minuteman III
missile, and the associated W87-1 nuclear warhead. Additionally, it
requires the service life of the currently deployed Minuteman III
missiles to be extended until 2040--something that is both technically
feasible and more cost-efficient.
The world is witnessing a new nuclear arms race, and this one is
extremely dangerous as tensions rise between the Great Powers. As the
United States, Russia, and China rush to modernize their nuclear
arsenals, the trip wire is growing more taut. Observation and
communication satellites and systems are increasingly vulnerable to
attacks. All three countries are fielding stealth and hypersonic
nuclear delivery systems designed to evade detection. The risk of a
false alarm or a political miscalculation has always haunted the
nuclear landscape and they do even more today.
As long as nuclear weapons exist we must have a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent. The simultaneous modernization efforts
across all three legs of the nuclear triad are an unnecessary and
costly way to achieve our deterrent. The modernization includes the
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the B-21 bomber, the Columbia-
class submarine, the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) air-launched cruise
missile, the sea launched nuclear cruise missile, and new nuclear
warheads. The costs are extraordinary: a 2017 Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) report estimated that the 30-year cost of nuclear weapons
spending would be $1.2 trillion ($1.7 trillion adjusted for inflation).
As the Government Accountability Office recently noted, the current
plan to modernize every part of the arsenal at the same time is a
recipe for schedule delays and cost overruns.
The ICBM leg of the Triad deserves special attention. The total price
tag to procure the GBSD is projected to be at least $95 billion, and
$264 billion when accounting for total life-cycle costs. A GBSD pause
will help defray short-term costs for the Air Force and will also defer
a long-term expenditure. Additionally, the W87-1, the warhead that is
being designed for the GBSD, will cost at least $12 billion to build--
and is not part of the estimated GBSD procurement cost of $95 billion.
To build new warhead cores for the W87-1, the National Nuclear Security
Agency (NNSA) is expanding plutonium pit production, which will cost at
least another $9 billion through the late 2020s according to the
Congressional Budget Office.
[[Page E720]]
We do not need a new ICBM to provide a robust deterrence. The
existing MMIII can serve until 2040 with one more life extension, which
is technically feasible. Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark, then-Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, noted in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives that we have ``one more opportunity''
to conduct life extension on the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extending
the Minuteman III missile.
Other independent experts have confirmed the feasibility of a MMIII
life extension. In fact, the Air Force intends to do just that. It will
upgrade and extend the life of existing MMIII missiles while it is
replacing others with the GBSD. The swap out plan is an admission that
the life extension is not only possible but has already been factored
into the existing plan.
Maintaining and upgrading the current Minuteman III missile is
technically possible, and according to a 2017 CBO report, it would cost
$37 billion less than developing and deploying the GBSD through 2036.
Budget analysts who watch Pentagon budgets have warned that an
unaffordable ``bow wave'' would occur as the Pentagon plans to upgrade
every weapon system at the same time. Former Secretary of the Air Force
Heather Wilson noted in December 2020, ``the next fiscal year (FY22)
will see a steep increase in the cost of refurbishing our nuclear
deterrent, and with a flat budget, the Air Force can't do this without
crushing its ability to handle all of its other missions.'' The current
leadership of the military must answer the question, ``What critical
weapon, defense system, or benefit for the troops and their families
could be funded with the $37 billion saved by pausing the GBSD Missile
program?''
Any discussion of the GBSD and the MMIII must include the question
``Do we need ICBM's sitting in 400 silos in the upper midwest to have
an effective deterrent?'' There is a powerful argument that they are
not necessary. The bomber fleet, together with America's Trident II D5
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, can deliver several times more
nuclear bombs to any part of the globe than the 400 silo-based ICBM's.
Moreover, it is argued that the silo-based ICBM's are inherently
dangerous because their location is known and they must therefore be
launched within minutes of notification of a nuclear attack or be lost
to an incoming missile attack.
In every ICBM silo lies the existential risk of a false alarm or a
miscalculation. Both have happened in the past but fortunately the
errors were discovered in time to save human life on our planet.
Bombers can be recalled and subs cannot be found as they hide in the
oceans, thereby providing critical time for a thoughtful and fully
informed decision before pressing the button.
The ICBM Act bill will strengthen our national security and save
billions of tax-payer dollars by:
Prohibiting the use of funds for the GBSD program and W87-1 warhead
modification program for fiscal years 2022 through 2031;
Extending the service life of the Minuteman III missiles until at
least 2040, and requiring use of nondestructive testing methods and
technologies similar to those used by the Navy for Trident II D5 SLBMs;
and
Transferring back to the Air Force all unobligated funds for the GBSD
program, and transferring unobligated funds for the W87-1 warhead
modification program from the National Nuclear Security Administration
to the Treasury.
I shall end this with a personal memory of a visit to a United
Kingdom submarine that was about to deploy with 16 ICBM's and multiple
nuclear bombs. The captain took great pride in his ship and its role in
deterrence. As we were leaving the sub I asked him, ``Suppose you are
ordered to launch your missiles and their nuclear bombs. You follow the
order and launch your missiles. Then what do you do? Go home? To
what?'' He did not reply.
____________________